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HERMATHENA:

A SERIES OF PAPERS ON

LITERATURE, SCIENCE, AND PHILOSOPHY.

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VOL. XII.




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HERMATHENA.

ORIGINS OF BARBARIAN HISTORY.

WHEN the great ethnological revolution, which the Germans call *Völkerwanderung*, took place, and the Teutonic nations, set in motion by the impact of the Huns from Asia, poured like a cataract into the Roman Empire, they came, as we all know, with but slender materials for constructing the history of their own past. Or, if this be too broadly stated, if the Barbarians had, in their *Sagas* and their war-songs, ampler historical information than we generally recognise as their inheritance, at any rate it is safe to say that they brought very little with them which the learned men of the nations whom they conquered were both able and willing to assimilate. Hence has arisen the mist, tantalising and difficult to penetrate, which hangs over all the earlier pre-Roman life of the natives of modern Europe. Had the learned men of the Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries had the slightest conception of the part which the descendants of these unwelcome guests would play in the future history of Europe, doubtless some Herodotus or Diodorus would have arisen to preserve for us such traditions as yet lingered among them as to the past generations of their forefathers. But that golden opportunity was lost, save for a few scraps of Gothic and

Lombard history preserved for us by such men as Jordanes and Paulus, and once lost, it of course never returned. The traditions of an unlettered folk, conscious of their barbarism, soon fade away and are forgotten, when they are brought into contact and contrast with the elaborate literary histories of nations who have a long civilized past behind them, and this general proposition was proved emphatically true in the case of the barbarians who overran the Roman Empire. Probably the great-grandson of any Frank or Burgundian who was among the first settlers in Gaul, or of any Visigoth who crossed the Pyrenees in the army of Ataulfus, knew little or nothing, by genuine oral tradition, of the dim Teutonic fore-world of his fathers.

A few—a very few—fragments of the old national traditions were preserved, chiefly by intelligent Christian ecclesiastics who condescended to interest themselves, after a somewhat desultory fashion, in the previous history of the invaders; but even these fragments seldom reach us in an uncorrupted state. The natural tendency of these ecclesiastics was to bring barbarian history into some sort of relation with sacred and profane history as they had learned it at school; and, accordingly, the legendary history of the barbarians was pushed and pulled into an approximate conformity with the account in Genesis of the descendants of Noah, or with Homer and Virgil's story of the Trojan War. This tendency, though it sometimes causes a modern scientific inquirer a good deal of trouble, was not perhaps in itself altogether unscientific. As each new fact concerning the Mycenean age, or the prehistoric civilization of the Nile valley, emerges before the eyes of the historical investigator of to-day, he generally tries to fix, in some way, its relation to the facts already known respecting the national life of Hellas or of Egypt, and the instinct which leads him to take this course is surely in itself not

deserving of censure. But such an attempt, made by an imperfectly educated monk dealing with the early history of a Teutonic tribe, generally led to results of extraordinary absurdity.

I propose, in this paper, to compare the information which has reached us as to the early history of three nations, the Saxons (including the Angles and Jutes), the Goths, and the Lombards ; to see what light, if any, these histories throw upon one another ; and to indicate such points of similarity as exist between them. I will confine my attention to two subjects : the royal genealogies, and the fables connecting the barbarians with classical antiquity or with the Hebrew Scriptures.

I.

A.—The Genealogies of the Anglo-Saxons.

As is well known, the English Chronicle is extremely rich in records of the descent of the chiefs who founded royal dynasties in our island.

The form is almost always the same, and may be exemplified by that genealogy which has most interest for us as dealing with the ancestors of our own now reigning king, the genealogy of the kings of *Wessex*.

[A.D.] 597. Her angan Ceolwulf ricsian on Wes-Seaxum [Now Ceolwulf began to reign over the West Saxons]. Se waes Cuthaing [He was the son of Cutha], Cutha Cynricing, Cynric Cerdicing, Cerdic Elesing, Elesa Esling, Elsa Gewising, Giwis Wiging, Wig Freawining, Freawine Frithugaring, Frithugar Bronding, Brond Baeldaeging, Baeldaeg Wodening.

This rather uncouth list of names informs us that Ceolwulf, who became king of the West Saxons in the year 597, was great-grandson of Cerdic, the founder of the West Saxon monarchy, and that Cerdic was

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descended through eight intermediate ancestors from the god Woden (or Odin).

From the later entries in the Chronicle we learn that Egbert, who is generally looked on as the founder of the united English monarchy, and who became king in 802, was descended through seven intermediate ancestors from Cuthwin, first cousin of Ceolwulf. This gives us eight generations for 205 years, two more than we should have expected. No doubt we may, as a rule, reckon three generations to a century. As Cerdic is said to have landed in Britain in 495, a hundred and two years before the accession of his great-grandson Ceolwulf, the rule works rightly there. Carrying the same principle of computation backwards from Cerdic, we find that he is in the ninth generation or at a distance of three centuries from Woden. On the converse principle to *omne ignotum pro magnifico* we may probably

Woden.
|
Baeldaeg.
|
Brond.
|
Frithugar.
|
Freawine.
|
Wig.
|
Giwis.
|
Elsa.
|
Elesa.
|
Cerdic.
|
Cynric.
|
Cutha.
|
Ceolwulf.

assume that when memory of Cerdic's ancestors stopped, a divine ancestor was introduced, and, therefore, that the chanter of royal pedigrees knew of no names reaching back further than three centuries from Cerdic. Woden, the divine α , stands, therefore, at about 200 A.D.

I need not go into so much detail with the other genealogies of the Chronicle. The genealogy of Ida, king of *Bernicia*, makes him also ninth in descent from Woden; but as Ida began to reign in 547, the divine α should probably be placed about half a century lower down than in the case of Wessex. On the other hand, Aelle, king of *Deira*, who seems to have been only a slightly younger contemporary of Ida, is eleventh in descent from Woden. This looks as though the links in the chain of the ancestors of the Yorkshire king were rather better known than in the case of his Bernician rival.

In *Mercia*, Penda, who, at the age of fifty, succeeded to the throne in 625, is in the eleventh degree from Woden. Notwithstanding Penda's middle-aged accession, we cannot here put Woden much earlier than 240.

The genealogy of the kings of *East Anglia* is not given in the Chronicle; but Florence of Worcester (who, though only a twelfth-century authority, seems to have had access to some earlier Anglo-Saxon authorities) makes Redwald, who came to the throne in 593, tenth in descent from Woden, who would thus be brought down to 260.

The same authority makes Erchenwin, king of the *East Saxons* in 527, eighth in descent from Woden. This again carries us back to 240, or thereabouts. Of the pre-invasion genealogy of the kings of the *South Saxons*, we do not appear to have any records: and that of the Jutish kings of *Kent*, though still preserved, is of extraordinary brevity, Hengist (A.D. 444) being represented as only fourth in descent from Woden. This would bring the divine ancestor down to 320, a much later date than is given by any of the other royal pedigrees. There are some slight indications that Hengist was of less undoubtedly royal descent than any of the other kings; and this may perhaps account for the fact of fewer human ancestors being assigned to him than to any other of the English kingdom-founders.

On the whole, however, it seems to be right to attribute a certain amount of real historical value to all these pedigrees. Looking upon the name of Woden at the head of each list as a confession of ignorance as to all the yet earlier links, we find that historical consciousness went back from the fifth or sixth to the third century after Christ. If the Chronicler had been simply using his imagination to glorify the antiquity of his sovereign's dynasty, it would have been easy for him to imagine ten times as many ancestors as those here

recorded; but the remarkable agreement, in a general way, between the lengths of the various dynasties, most of them going back for about eight or nine links behind the first invader, looks like truth. Even so, if there was a complete absence of written materials, the effort of memory was a considerable one. Few persons probably in our own day, except the members of some of the great historic families, could readily, without reference to books or papers, furnish an inquirer with the names of eight ancestors of their own in direct lineal ascent. It will generally be found that about a century and a half is the extent of time covered by genuine oral tradition unhelped by books, and therefore the preservation of the names of the ancestors of Cerdic and Penda for a period of about three centuries was a feat of memory creditable to the men, probably in most cases minstrels of the court, by whom it was performed.

B.—I now turn to the pedigrees of the Goths.

In the year 533, we find Cassiodorus, Prætorian Prefect under the Ostrogothic king Athalaric, saying, in a carefully prepared official eulogium on himself (issued in the name of his young sovereign): "Not satisfied with extolling living kings, from whom he might hope for a reward, he drew forth the kings of the Goths from the dust of ages, showing that the Amal family had been royal for seventeen generations."¹ Unusual as it is for a modern Minister of State thus publicly to recite his own praises, these words do really describe very truly the debt which the royal family of the Ostrogoths, and indirectly the modern student of their history, owe to the somewhat verbose rhetorician who penned them. Himself a Roman of high culture, brought face to face

¹ *Variae*, ix. 25.

with a barbarian ruler of Italy, and entering heartily into his service, he set himself to work to draw forth "from the dust of ages" the names and characters of that ruler's ancestors and to record them for the benefit of future generations. Would that some Britanno-Roman ecclesiastic had been permitted to do a similar work for Hengist and for Cerdic.

The history of Cassiodorus is itself lost, but we have a valuable abridgment of it by the Gothic ecclesiastic Jordanes, who flourished in the middle of the sixth century. In his pages we read the names of the heroes of the Amal line, reaching back to the demi-god Gapt, whose name some would read Gaut, making him thus the eponymous hero of the Gothic nation¹. Reckoning inclusively both this mythical ancestor and his descendant Athalaric, we get the seventeen generations of which Cassiodorus speaks; and, as Athalaric was born about A.D. 516, sixteen generations, reckoned backward from his birth, should carry us up to about A.D. 36. Probably some of the links in the genealogy are mythical; still we do seem able to mount much higher towards antiquity on this line than on those which we have previously examined; a result which is in no way surprising, inasmuch as the Goths came into contact with the civilization of the Empire about two centuries before our Saxon

¹ The passage in Jordanes, describing the semi-divine character of the earliest ancestors of the kings, is worth quoting for the light it throws on other barbarian pedigrees. After describing (cap. xii.) a victory won (not really by the Goths, but by the Dacians) over one of Domitian's generals, he continues: "*Fusco duce extincto divitias de castris militum spoliant magnaue potiti per loca victoria iam proceres suos quorum quasi fortuna vincebant non puros homines sed semi-*

deos id est Ansis vocaverunt. . . . Horum ergo heroum, ut ipsi suis in fabulis referunt, primus fuit Gapt qui genuit Halmul," &c. Then follows the genealogy of Theodoric, grandfather of Athalaric. It was, therefore, in Jordanes' opinion, a victory over the great world-empire of Rome, which led the barbarians to perform a sort of process of canonisation and declare their successful king's ancestor a demi-god.

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ancestors. It may be mentioned, in passing, that we scarcely get from Jordanes any facts even professing to be historical, except as to those two centuries of earliest contact with Rome.

C.—Genealogies of the *Lombards*. Our one chief authority for the story of this people is Paulus Diaconus (otherwise called Paul Warnefrid), who wrote in the latter part of the eighth century, but who had access to the earlier (sixth to seventh century) historian Secundus, bishop of Trient, as well as to the *Origo Gentis Langobardorum*, prefixed to the laws of Rothari (*circa* 650).

The fact which at once strikes us in comparing Paulus with Jordanes is the entire absence of long genealogies. We have a good deal of somewhat discursive history, which possibly deals with some events of the second century, as it certainly does with those of the sixth century, but leaves us ignorant as to what happened to the Lombards in the interval between A.D. 200 and 500. But owing to the predominantly elective character of Lombard kingship, we get, for the pre-Italian period, no long line of royal descents, only a chain of five links (from Gudeoc to Waltari), which ends in the year 546, and which therefore cannot be considered as beginning earlier than about 400. Even our Anglian and West-Saxon kings could show a longer lineage than that. On the other hand, it should, perhaps, be placed to the credit of this undoubtedly barbarous people that they do not introduce any divine or semi-divine ancestor into their pedigrees. They start with a *saga*, showing the favour which Freya, wife of Odin, bore to the long-bearded heroes, but they do not suggest that there was any intermingling of divine and human relationships.

II.

I now come to the second part of my subject, the fables which, in the absence of knowledge of the early history of the Germanic nations, were “fondly imagined” in order to connect them with classical antiquity and the Scriptural account of the dispersion of the nations.

A.—I will begin, not with the Saxons, but with the Goths, whose historian Jordanes (or rather Cassiodorus, the author epitomised by Jordanes) is a palmary example of this kind of solemn romancing. In the previously quoted letter, in which Cassiodorus praises himself for having drawn forth the dead Amal kings from the dust of antiquity, he goes on to say, “*Originem Gothicam fecit esse Romanam*, colligens quasi in unam coronam germen floridum quod per librorum campos passim fuerat ante dispersum.” It is just this desperate effort to “make the Gothic history Roman,” and to adorn the conquering Teutons with flowers gathered in widely distant fields of history, which has all but deprived the Jordanes-Cassiodorus medley of all historic value.

The plan which Cassiodorus and Jordanes adopted was to claim for their Gothic clients everything which was anywhere said about Scythia or the Scythians; and further, to identify them, in the teeth of all historical evidence, with the Getæ, who in the fourth century before Christ dwelt in Thrace, and who, long after, stoutly defended their then country of Dacia against the Emperor Trajan. By the first of these fraudulent appropriations they lay hold, for the Goths, of Herodotus’ stories about the Scythian law-giver Zamolxis, and they also contrive to drag in the Amazons, Theseus and Hippolyte, Penthesilea, Tomyris the vanquisher of Cyrus, and so on. They thus

succeed in bringing their friends into close connexion with the Trojan war, that equivalent of the Norman conquest for all the barbarous nations, who clamoured round the Heralds' Colleges of those days for patents of nobility.

Our authors then stride across the Danube to Dacia, describe the victories won by the natives of that country over Domitian, and claim the credit of them for the Goths. Of all these classical and pseudo-classical stories and legends, it is safe to say that Cassiodorus heard not a word from the ministers at the court of Theodoric. He has, as he says, collected his flowers from various fields, and stuck them about in different parts of his picture, half hiding the shadowy forms of heroes which are dimly discernible thereon. It is only by sternly refusing to take any account of these sham-classical intrusions, and treating the chapters containing them as though they were not, that we can get any continuous and scientific history out of the "*Getica*" of Jordanes.

B.—The Lombard historian, Paulus, shows praiseworthy self-denial in refraining from all such attempts to glorify and to "*Romanise*" the early history of his nation. When he does make a little display of classical learning it is generally in connexion with some physical fact. Thus the tides of the Atlantic (whose destructive force he greatly exaggerates) remind him of Virgil's lines about Charybdis; and the story of a woman who brought forth seven children brings to his remembrance a passage in Pliny recording a similar marvel among the Egyptians. He introduces, it is true, the story of the Seven Sleepers without relation to anything in his own narrative; and he does mention some Amazonian female warriors, but at once proceeds to say that "this kind of assertion rests on insufficient basis of truth; for it is

manifest to all who are acquainted with ancient history that the race of the Amazons was destroyed long before these events of which I am speaking occurred."

On the whole we may safely assert (nor is it the least of the many merits of the history of Paulus) that we have in his pages the veritable early legends of the Lombard people, often childish and absurd, but unspoiled by any admixtures from classical or Biblical tradition.

C.—Exactly opposite to this is the character of the author upon whom we are unfortunately compelled chiefly to rely for our knowledge of *British* history in the sixth and seventh centuries, the diffuse, the inaccurate, and the muddle-headed Nennius.

Concerning this writer an elaborate monograph has appeared from the pen of Professor Zimmer, a truly marvellous performance, for the wealth of erudition, especially of Celtic erudition, which it displays, and for the combination of patient tact and brilliant—sometimes perhaps too brilliant—conjectures which is found in its pages. The author entitles his work "Nennius Vindicated," but before one comes to the end of his treatise one finds out the considerable limitations with which these words are used. The Professor vindicates Nennius' right to *be*: he proves that he is not the mere literary fraud which some of his critics have suggested: but he by no means claims for him any great instinct for historical accuracy, hardly even the possession of common sense. As he says (p. 204): "Nennius is in his way a conscientious man who carefully attends to all sorts of trifles, but at the same time commits acts of astounding stupidity" (p. 201). "His calculations seem to be made by a witch's multiplication-table; he gives us in many ways a depressing picture of the state of mind of a Cymrian scholar of the end of the eighth century. He


was not strong enough for the work which he had undertaken." When the "vindicator" of Nennius speaks in this manner, there does not seem much left to be said by his calumniators.

The main results at which Zimmer arrives, and which have been generally accepted by scholars, are that Nennius was a native of South Wales, living in the confines of Brecknock, Radnor, and Herefordshire: that in the year 796 he wrote his *Historia Brittonum* (or as he probably called it, *Volumen Britanniae*), into which he introduced some extracts from a work of much greater value than his own, a history of the dealings between the Angles and North-Britons, written by one of the latter in or about the year 670. New editions, revisions, and translations of the work appeared through many centuries (the most important, an Irish translation, as late as the eleventh century), and by all these the text has been often thrown into confusion, and the question of authorship rendered more intricate. But so low is the estate of the historian of England for the interval between Ammianus and Bede that he cannot afford to neglect even this miserable patchwork, cobbled together by an ignorant Welsh monk three centuries and a half after the events to which it refers, and preserved for us in a manifestly corrupt text. As an illustration of its importance it may be mentioned that Nennius is the only author, speaking with any pretence to authority, who makes any mention of the name of Arthur.

This Welsh ecclesiastic, writing at the end of the eighth century, after some general remarks about the six past ages of the world, gives a few (not very accurate) geographical facts, ending with the words, "The Britons formerly filled this island and ruled it from sea to sea," and then proceeds with these words:—

"Should anyone wish to know how long after the

Deluge this island was inhabited, I have devised the following double experiment to discover the answer¹. The three sons of Noah, after the Deluge, divided the world into three parts after the Deluge. They were Shem in Asia, Ham in Africa, Japhet in Europe, and in these continents they spread abroad their hordes. The first man of the race of Japhet who came into Europe was Alanus with his three sons." The rest of the paragraph will be best exhibited in a tabular form :—



"These races were subdivided through the whole of Europe."

The reader may observe that there are some faint dawnings of ethnological science in this table of national descent. Celts are, as a rule, kept apart from Teutons. It is true that the Franks are not included in either of the two great Teutonic branches: probably because they had boasted so long of their consanguinity with Rome that Nennius himself had come to believe in it.

But the extraordinary thing is that so soon after having informed us that Alanus was a son of Japhet he should (in the same paragraph) give us a pedigree of fifteen links connecting Alanus with Japhet.²

¹ "Hoc experimentum bifarie inveni." I accept what seems to me the obviously right rearrangement of the text proposed by Zimmer, passing

from this point of section 10 to 17, and returning afterwards to 10.

² Alanus autem *ut aiunt* fuit filius Fetebir, filii Ougomun, &c., up to "filii

The accomplished author has, however, as he says, made this experiment "bifariously." Having given us an ethnological table tracing the descent of the Britons from Japhet, he will now show us how to fit them in to the history of the classical nations. "In the annals of the Romans it is thus written. After the Trojan war Aeneas came to Italy, . . . married Lavinia, and after the death of Latinus obtained the kingdom of the Romans or Latins. His son Ascanius founded Alba, and married a wife who bore him a son named Silvius. Then Silvius married a wife, and news of her pregnancy was brought to Aeneas, who sent to his son Ascanius, desiring him to consult his soothsayer as to the future offspring whether it should be male or female. The soothsayer went, examined the woman, and brought back a prophecy which resulted in his being himself put to death by Ascanius, for it was to this effect. 'The child that is in that woman's womb is a male, and he shall be a son of Death, for he shall slay his father and mother and shall be hated of all men¹.' So it came to pass. The woman died at his birth, but the child was reared and received the name Bruto [or Brito, or Brutus]. After a long interval he fulfilled the soothsayer's prophecy by killing his father, not intentionally, but by accident, with the stroke of an arrow when he was playing with some companion. He was expelled from Italy and was Arminilis (?) and came to the islands of the Tyrrhene sea, but was thence expelled by the Greeks because of the death of Turnus, whom Aeneas slew, and came to the Gauls, and there founded the city of Tours [Turones] which is called Turnis (apparently an expiatory offering

Jovan, filii Japet, filii Noe, &c., up to Seth "filii Adam, filii Dei vivi. Hanc peritiam inveni in traditione veterum, qui incolae in primo fuerunt Brittan-niae." It is safe to assert that he got from the tradition of those ancients

nothing of the kind.

¹ Quia dixit Ascanio, quod masculum haberet in utero mulier et filius mortis erit, quia occideret patrem suum et matrem suam, et erit exosus omnibus hominibus.

to the Manes of Turnus). Then afterwards he came to this island, which from him derived its name Britannia, and he filled it with his own race and dwelt there. This is the beginning of the continuous inhabitation of Britain from that day to this."

In reading this strange story which we are solemnly assured comes from "the annals of the Romans," we are amused by the discovery that always, then as now, in the tenth century before Christ, as in the twentieth after it, the Briton was a "hated" person. The cause of the hatred seems somewhat insufficient, a blunder rather than a crime, but it was enough to render him odious to his kinsmen on the continent. Might one venture to suggest to them that if they will now permit the luckless Brito to be no longer "exosus" he will gladly surrender to them any possible advantages which might accrue to him as ultimate heir of Aeneas and Ascanius?

Our author continues his account of the Alban dynasty reigning in Latium, and volunteers the statement that Bruto was reigning in Britain at the same time that Eli was judging in Israel, and the Ark of the Covenant fell into the hands of the Gentiles. (This synchronism is taken over from the Chronicle of Eusebius, who makes the 21st year of Silvius, son of Aeneas, coincide with the 900th year from the call of Abraham (say B.C. 1021) and with the death of Eli).

The sections in which Nennius relates the origin of the Picts and Scots [= Irish] lie outside of my present purpose; but I may just mention that he does seem to have had before him the story of the Five Migrations of peoples into Ireland, but reproduces it in a mangled state, so that only the sons of Partholan and Nemed and the Milesians (whom he calls "tres filii cujusdam militis Hispaniae") are discoverable in his story. The Fir Bolgs are dimly represented by a certain Buile who invades the Isle of Man, and the Tuatha de Danann, according to Zimmer,

are replaced by the otherwise unintelligible Damhocror.

It is not necessary to follow this most provoking author into his account of the Roman occupation of Britain, in which he has made almost every blunder as to names and dates and connexion of events that it was possible to commit. Here, where we can in some degree test his statements by trustworthy historians, and the evidence of coins, we see how all but absolutely worthless is his testimony. Nor will I here go into the discussion of the part which he assigns to Vortigern in the subjugation of our island by the Saxons. I may say, however, that I think the *Textus Receptus* of English history is drawn too largely from the pages of this most puzzle-headed and inaccurate writer.

But as even the history of human error has a certain interest and value, it is important to notice that we have here, in this work of a Welsh ecclesiastic of the eighth century (drawing, perhaps as Zimmer suggests, from Irish sources), the suggestion of a descent of the British nation, through "Brutus the hated," from "the kings of Troy divine." What that suggestion grew to in the hands of that accomplished writer of fiction, Geoffrey of Monmouth, we all know, but we are awaiting from the too small band of Celtic scholars further information as to the successive stages of the process, which evidently was chiefly carried on in the Armorican peninsula. They will perhaps some day be able to inform us how the dry bones of Nennius were clothed with the highly coloured flesh of Geoffrey; they may be able to explain to us the origination of some of the myths which Shakespeare and Milton have made for ever famous; and above all, they may possibly take away some of the responsibility for these fictions from Geoffrey of Monmouth, and may show that he was sometimes only repeating the fallacies of men who had gone before him.

THOMAS HODGKIN.

NOTES ON MANUSCRIPTS OF CATULLUS AND HISPERICA FAMINA.

BY way of preparing an edition of the text of Catullus for the new series called *Scriptorum Classicorum Bibliotheca Oxoniensis*, I made two visits to Italy, in September 1901, June 1902. As might be supposed, the results were small and unimportant. I found nothing new of any real value.

My journey, however, was not without utility, for though neither the Catullus of Brescia, nor that of Cesena, nor those once in the Ashburnham collection, now in the Laurentian Library at Florence, can, in any sense, be thought of first-rate importance, or worthy of collation throughout, a remark which also extends to the MS. at Carpentras, near Avignon, to which my attention had been called very early by Mr. Philip Pusey, son of Dr. Pusey, but which I had no opportunity of seeing till five or six years ago, when a tour in that part of France brought me into the neighbourhood of Carpentras; though I say none of these MSS. could be thought to take a place among the better sources for Catullus' text, I had the satisfaction—a real one—of personally inspecting each of them, and thus testing, by my own examination, what probability there yet is of new materials which may throw fresh light on the now well-nigh desperate condition of the poems.

One great exception must be made—the Vatican MS. (Ottoboni, 1829), brought to light in 1896 by Prof. Gardiner Hale of Chicago. This was a real find, not indeed so important as was at first believed, but such as to reduce most of the known MSS. of Catullus, except the Germanensis (G) and the Oxford Canon. Lat. 30 (O), to secondary consideration in comparison.

Of this codex, which Prof. Hale has named R (*Romanus*), I made a complete collation in June 1897; and it was mainly to re-examine this MS. that I again visited Rome in June of the present year. My estimate of R, which does not agree with the judgment of K. P. Schultze, the editor of the second issue of Bährens' Catullus, and closely approximates the high valuation ascribed to R by its discoverer, has been publicly stated in a lecture delivered at Oxford last March. Suffice it to say here, that future criticism must largely be employed with a discussion of R's lections, and of the relation in which it stands, on the one hand, to G O; on the other, to the *Datanus*, *Bononiensis*, *Laurentianus Primus*, and such other MSS. as, though falling into the second rank, are yet far removed from the interpolated class.

My renewed examination of the *Bononiensis*, once in the monastery of S. Salvator at Bologna, where I collated it in 1863, afterwards, on the suppression of the monastery, removed to the University Library, where I again examined it in 1876, and for the third time in June of this year, confirms the view which I formed of it forty years ago. It has the rare merit of being dated: the scribe completed it in the second year of the pontificate of John XXIII. This brings it to the beginning of the second decade of the fifteenth century, and we cannot be sure that the newly-discovered *Romanus* is earlier. Everyone must regret that this excellent codex (it is called *B* in my edition) has been much corrected and tampered with;

yet its close correspondence with the first Laurentian and with Vatic. 1630 removes part of the injury it has thus sustained, and I do not think any critical edition of Catullus can be fully adequate which does not take both it and La¹ into account. The University of Bologna also possesses another MS. of Catullus (2744): it is on paper, and is a good typical codex of its class. It did not appear to me to be interpolated; but it rarely presented anything new. I noted, however, x. 19, *qui* for *quod* of most MSS.; viii. 15, *nec te* for *ne te*. This *nec te* is also found in the Hamburg codex and Phillipps 9591; it is very near *nocte*, a conjecture which for a long time reigned undisputedly in the editions of Catullus.

The variant ^a*notorum* in lxxix. 4, which I had noted (in 1878) from a Brescia MS. in the Querini Library (A vii. 7), and which has the support of the Oxford codex (*notorum*), was sufficiently interesting to raise expectations; at any rate, to justify fresh examination. On a pouring wet day towards the end of September, 1901, I went through the MS., but only to be disappointed. I may mention, however, the following as interesting:—lxvi. 59, *Hi dii neu ibi* (so my Brit. Mus. codex *h*); 83, *colitis quae iure cubili* (not *iura*); 84, *Sed quae si*, this also with *h*, suggesting as a possibility *Sed si quae inpuro se det adulterio* in place of the vulgate *Sed quae se inpuro dedit adulterio*. Another variant which it shares with *O* and *h* is *Inuenit*, lxviii. 42, corrected, however, in the margin, to *Iuuerit*; again, with *h*, it has *porcus* in the well-known passage, xxxix. 11, where most MSS. agree in *parcus*.

My jottings at Cesena were ampler. And first, a word as to the library. Cesena is a town distant two hours by rail from Bologna, and is passed by the traveller who is on his way to Rimini. The country round it is picturesque, but the want of a first-rate hotel causes it to be less frequented than it deserves. The only Englishman I have

ever heard speak of the Library from personal knowledge is Prof. Lewis Campbell, who examined the MS. of Plato which it possesses, and gave me a glowing account of its other MS. resources. These, indeed, are such and so varied as to have called for the publication of two distinct catalogues, that of Muccioli, in 1780, and that of Zazzeri, in 1887. The founder, Domenico Malatesta, left his MSS. arranged in a long chamber, almost exactly like the room in which the library of Corpus Christi at Oxford was originally housed; a long passage is flanked to right and left by extensive bays, terminating each in its separate window. These bays contain slanting desks reaching from one end of the bay to the other, with seats on either side, so that, if filled, each desk might hold some fifteen or sixteen readers. The MSS. are fastened by chains to the under-side of the desks, but the chains are removable. I spent three hours in a perusal of the Catullus; it is dated 1474. I am not aware that it has been noticed by any critic before me, and I shall therefore quote all the extracts which I made from it, not, indeed, as of any remarkable value (the date is against this), but still as new, and I believe I may say unknown.

x. 26. *comoda* changed to *comodo*.

xi. 3. *Litus ut* changed to *Litus ubi*.

Interesting, because *ut*, the right reading, is found in only very few MSS. (*G O Vic*), and as the fifteenth century advanced was so entirely ousted by *ubi* as to be actually *changed* into it in *Ces*.

xi. 11. *horribiles et*.

xiv. 14. *Misti*.

xiv. 19. *Suphenum*, *p* changed to *f*.

xv. 7. *implatea*, as my Brit. Mus. *h*².

xvi. 12. *Vos quod* changed to *Vos qui*.

xvii. 25. *delinquere*, not *derelinquere* as in *O* and *Par*. 7989.

xxi. 9. *Atque qui si*.

- xxv. 12. *minuta* for *inimica*. This correction is also found in *h*.
 xxvii. 5. *quo lubet*.
 xxviii. 9. *o memi*.
 xxix. 4. *cum // te*.
 xxix. 13. *diffututa*.
 lxiv. 287. *Minosium*^{im} and *cloris* (in the margin) as a v. l. for *doris*.

This *cloris* is noticeable. *Doris* is an impossible form here. In my edition of 1878 I suggested that the right reading might be *Chlori*. Chlorus was the mythical father of Haemon, father of Thessalus, and was thus specially connected with Thessaly. This conjecture receives some support from *cloris* of *Ces*.

- lxiv, 317. *leni* (filo); so again *h*.
 lxvi. 12. *legam*, seemingly an interpolation, and certainly wrong.
 lxvi. 54. *Arsinoes gloridos ales equis*, with *c* written over *g* of *gloridos*. As a whole, this v. l. is unique, and bears every mark of being drawn from an independent source.

I had only time to glance at the Cesena Manilius, and the large MS. containing Silius' *Punica*, and Val. Fl. i., ii., iii., and part of iv. But I cannot forbear to observe that any scholar who has the leisure, and can find a sufficiently comfortable lodging or pension in the town, might do well to spend a month in examining some of the large store of MSS. in this little-known library.

The Ashburnham MSS. of Catullus (Libri 260 and 973 in the privately printed Catalogue of the MSS. at Ashburnham Place¹), now both in the Laurentian Library at Florence, yielded nothing of any importance. The latter contains notes by Braccio Ricasoli. Those who wish to learn more about them I refer to a work published at Rome in 1896, *I codici Ashburnamici della Biblioteca Mediceo-Laurentiana*.

After completing my re-collation in the Vatican of Prof. Hale's newly-discovered *Romanus*, I turned from

¹ Of this highly interesting Catalogue, the Bodleian possesses a copy, the only one I have ever seen.

Catullus to the unique codex of the mysterious *Hisperica Famina*. To this highly enigmatical treatise (of which Mr. Jenkinson, Public Librarian of the University of Cambridge, promises us a new and fuller edition than those at present known), I have called attention in the Cambridge Journal of Philology for the present year, and have offered some groping suggestions as to its language and meaning.

The *Hisperica Famina* form the first part of cod. Lat. 81. Regin. Christinae. They are written on twelve leaves of parchment, in a beautifully distinct writing which Otto Rossbach and Stowasser agree to assign to the eleventh century. The MS. was first collated and the whole of the treatise published by Cardinal Mai, vol. v., pp. 479–500 of his *Auctores Classici*. Dr. Stowasser, of Vienna, published a corrected text of it in 1887. Whether we shall ever fathom the full meaning of it, or even of some of the curious words it contains, is very doubtful. Its connexion with some one of the Celtic peoples is indubitable, probably the Irish. These are points on which we must hope for fresh light from Celtic scholars. Meanwhile, it will be enough for me to supplement the corrections in Stowasser's text by my own recent examination of the MS.

The most remarkable peculiarity of the writing is the abbreviation of *et*. It is like a large n with a horizontal line passing from left to right through the second perpendicular stroke, *ŋ*. I have never encountered this before.

Page. Line.

- 5, 16. Stowasser. For *propriferum* the MS. gives *pp' ferum*.
l. 35, it has *propriferum* (sic).
- 17. *utico* of MS. is probably not *uti eo*, but *uti quo*.
- 27. *abscultas* of MS. may be right = 'conceal,' which suits *mysteria*.
- 31. MS. has *et pantia*, with a space before *pantia*. Perhaps *Et enim παντοία*.
- 32. Stowasser writes '*raptis* enim corruptum est.' MS. has *ruptis*.

Page. Line.

- 6, 1. *tollus*. *Per macides* MS.
6. *ac, aruca* MS.
11. The word over *ligitura* is not *luna*, but *storia* or *sturia* (? rope).
19. *in quantum teosus ab occiduo limite distat articus*. The corruption of *eous* into *eosus* perhaps throws some light on Catull. lxii. (35), *quos idem saepe reuertens, Hespere, mutato comprendis nomine Eous*, for so Schrader, followed by Pleitner, Ribbeck, and Bährens, would write for *eosdem* or *eospem* of MSS. If there was a tendency to pronounce or write *Eous* with an *s* inserted before *-us*, we can see how the word might become *eos-dem*.
33. The spelling *euloigium* for *eulogium* looks like a well-known peculiarity of *Irish* pronunciation; so the insertion of *h* in *rethraho*, p. 14, l. 32.
- 7, 7. *necoliuatus* (in one word) MS.
23. *es suum* MS.
25. *sigellos* changed to *sigillos*, I think, not *uice uersa*.
31. After *soli* MS. has an erasure, then *Tū*.
caeteri, not *ceteri*.
35. *sonoreasq̄ reboant uchas*. Perhaps *euchas*; Stow. prints *echas*.
- 8, 25. Before *lustrant* MS. has an erasure of a letter.
- 9, 1. *florigena* of MS. should not be altered to *florigera*.
8. MS. gives *adunca strictim trahite clauī sigillum*. It does not seem clear that we should write *sigillum*. In 7. 25 MS. gives *sigellos*, then *sigillos*.
11. MS. has an erasure before *aetrae*.
- 10, 2. *aderint*.
4. *tripudiauerit*.
11. After *occiduum* MS. has a blank space of more than half a line.
12. *exomicat*.
26. *mersium*.
28. *strictisque debelant grimina loris*. Is *debaelant* for *debaelent* = *debaiulent*, or for *deuehant*? On rhythmical grounds, probably the former.

24 NOTES ON CATULLUS AND HISPERICA FAMINA.

Page. Line.

30. In *carneas*, *c* has been substituted for some previous letter.
34. *Int'imis* is *interimis*, not *interrimis*.
- 11, 9. ^e*rutilauerit*.
10. After *De hoc amplo*, MS. has a blank space extending to three-quarters of one whole line. It is noticeable that the same three words begin §§ 15, *De hoc amplo anfitridis lucumine*.
19. *gelidas horrendo flauore spargunt brumas*. Stow. prints Mai's correction, *fluore*. This does not seem certain. *Flauor* is possibly a low Latin word formed from *flare*.
27. The first four letters of INCIPIT are not in the MS.; but there seems to be an erasure before P.
38. *spumaticam pollet in littora adsisam*. For *pollet* I suggest *tollit*.
- 12, 4. ^k*arenosum*.
6. *fremat*.
26. *uiricomis* and *uricomo*, l. 35, are supposed to represent *auricomis*, *auricomo*. This appears to me doubtful. In l. 26 I suggest that it is either an error for *uiridicomis*, or else a bad compound of the stem *uir-* (*uirere*, *uiror*) with the same meaning. The passage runs thus, *Pantia uiricomis calificat licumina fomentis*, where the sense of pale-green flames suits better than the tautologous *gold*, which we have already encountered in the previous sentence, *auri-aeque rubreo liquescunt massae in camino*. The other passage, l. 35, admits equally of a *pale-green* colour in the flames, *uiricomo concremaret* (should not this be *concreparet*?) *focus ructu*; for such a colour in the flames might well be produced by pieces of timber cut fresh from the tree.
- 14, 30. The strange *margeriam* may, perhaps, find its elucidation, not in *maceriam*, or *materiam*, but in the purely mediæval *margerius* = *aceruus* (Du Cange). Of this *margeria* would be a by-form, like so many others in the *Hisperica Famina*.
- 15, 3. *ostium quod arborea strictis †fotis cluditur regia*. Stowasser rightly considers *fotis* corrupt. I suggest *folis* = *foliis*, 'with the leaves stripped away.'

ROBINSON ELLIS.

THE CREED OF CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA.

PROF. HARNACK, in his *History of Dogma* (vol. II, p. 34, Eng. Trans.), states that, while Clement of Alexandria appealed to the standard tradition which he designates by a great variety of names, he never gives its content. Now, it is a remarkable fact that though Clement contented himself by referring, in general terms, to ‘the divine tradition’, ‘the ecclesiastical canon’, ‘the canon of the Church’, ‘the common faith’, ‘the summary of salvation,’ etc., we can find a parallel to almost every clause of the Nicene Creed in his writings: and on two occasions we have something of the nature of a *κήρυγμα*. In the first chapter of the fifth Book of the *Stromateis* he refers to six distinct articles of faith in the Son. “There are some,” he there wrote, “who say that our faith concerns the Son, but that our knowledge is of the Spirit, but they do not perceive that we must truly believe in the Son; that He is the Son; that He came; and how He came; and concerning His Passion. But one must know Who is the Son of God. For neither is knowledge without faith, nor is faith without knowledge. For neither is the Father without the Son. For as Father, He is Father of the Son.” The *Paedagogus* concludes with the hymn-like utterance—“Praising and giving thanks to one only Father and the Son, Son and Father, the Son Instructor and Teacher, together with the Holy Spirit; One (i.e. the Trinity) in every respect, in Whom (i.e. the Trinity)

all things exist, through Whom all things are one, through Whom eternity is, of Whom we all are members; Who is good in every respect and just in every respect, to Whom be glory, now and evermore. Amen." In this passage we have a strong testimony to Clements' belief in the Divinity of the Holy Spirit, the Homoeousion of the Son and the Unity in the Trinity. We also find, scattered throughout his writings, the following statements, which may be arranged in creed-like form :—

I.—There is One Father of all things, Who made all things by the Word of his Power, the Only Almighty.

εἷς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὅλων πατήρ (Paed. 123). ὅς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν λόγῳ
δυνάμει αὐτοῦ (Str. VI. 39), ὁ μόνος παντοκράτωρ (Str. VII. 831).

II.—There is One Word of all things, Jesus Christ our Lord, the Word of the Father, the Second Person of the Trinity, the Son of God, our Saviour and Lord, Beginning without beginning, the Only-Begotten, the Light of the Father, Who is One with the Father, by Whom all things were made according to the Father's Will; the fruit of the Virgin Mary, the Spirit Incarnate, Who came down from heaven; Who for us men took upon Him suffering flesh; Who was to suffer and Who suffered the cross and the death; Who preached the Gospel to those in Hades; Who rose again and was taken up into heaven; Who is now glorified as the Living God and is the Judge and is at the right hand of the Father.

εἷς δὲ καὶ ὁ τῶν ὅλων Λόγος (Paed. 123), Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Κυρίου
ἡμῶν (Str. II. 464), Λόγος τοῦ Πατρὸς (Str. VII. 833), ὁ Λόγος τοῦ
Θεοῦ (Paed. 124), τὸν Υἱὸν δὲ δεύτερον (Str. V. 710), Υἱὸν δὲ εἶναι
τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τὸν Σωτῆρα καὶ Κύριον ὃν ἡμεῖς φάμεν (Str.
VII. 832), ἀναρχος ἀρχή (Str. VII. 829), ὃ τε βραβευτὴς ὁ Μονογενὴς
Υἱὸς τοῦ Θεοῦ (Str. VII. 839), ὅλος φῶς πατρῶν (Str. VII. 831),

υἱὲ καὶ πατέρ, ἐν ἁμῶ (Paed. III. 311), δι' οὗ πάντα ἐγένετο κατὰ βούλησιν τοῦ Πατρός (Str. V. 710), ὁ τῆς Παρθένου καρπός (Str. VII. 890), Πνεῦμα σαρκούμενον (Paed. I. 124), ἡ εἰς σάρκα κάθοδος τοῦ Κυρίου, ὁ δι' ἡμᾶς τὴν παθητὴν ἀναλαβὼν σάρκα (Str. VII. 832), ἐπεὶ Λόγον ἐμήνυνεν τὸν πεισόμενον (Paed. 126), τῷ παθόντι (Cohor. 84), τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν σταυρὸν καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς κολάσεις . . καὶ τὴν ἔγερσιν καὶ τὴν εἰς οὐρανοὺς ἀνάληψιν (quotation from the *Preaching of Peter* in Str. VI. 128), ὁ Κύριος εὐηγγελίσατο καὶ τοῖς ἐν ᾧδου (Str. VI. 762), καὶ προσκυνουμένῳ Θεῷ ζῶντι (Coh. 84), ὁ ἐκ δεξιῶν τοῦ Πατρός (Paed. I. 99), ὁ δὲ αὐτὸς οὗτος Λόγος δίκην ἐπιθεὶς κριτῆς ἐστι (Paed. I. 139).

III.—There is the Holy Ghost, One and the same everywhere, the Third Person in the Trinity, Who is praised with the Father and the Son, Who spake through Psalmist, Prophet, and Apostle.

καὶ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον ἐν καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ πανταχοῦ (Paed. 123), τρίτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα, αἰνοῦντας εὐχαριστεῖν τῷ μόνῳ Πατρὶ καὶ Υἱῷ σὺν καὶ τῷ ἁγίῳ Πνεύματι (Paed. III. 312), μάρτυς διὰ Ἡσαίου τὸ Πνεῦμα (Paed. 107), τὸ Πνεῦμα διὰ τοῦ Δαβίδ λέγον (Str. V. 713), τὸ ἐν τῷ Ἀποστόλῳ ἅγιον Πνεῦμα λέγει (Paed. I. 127).

IV.—There is one true, historic, pure and Catholic Church. There is the purification by Baptism for the Remission of Sins, the Resurrection of the dead, and the Life Everlasting.

μία δε μόνη γίνεται μήτηρ παρθένος. ἐκκλησίαν ἐμοὶ φίλον αὐτὴν καλεῖν (Paed. 123), μίαν εἶναι τὴν ἀληθῆ ἐκκλησίαν, τὴν τῷ ὄντι ἀρχαίαν (Str. VII. 899), νύμφην καὶ Ἐκκλησίαν ἣν ἀγνὴν εἶναι δεῖ (Str. III. 547), μόνην εἶναι φάμεν τὴν ἀρχαίαν καὶ καθολικὴν Ἐκκλησίαν (Str. VII. 900), διυλιζόμενοι βαπτίσματι (Paed. 6), μηκέτι λουόμενος εἰς ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτιῶν (Str. II. 460), ἀθάνατος ἄνθρωπος (Cohor. 84 and cf. Str. V. 649, where he argues that the fact of the resurrection was known to Plato and the Stoics), ζωὴ αἰώνιος (Str. II. 458).

Just as we may find an older form of the Apostles' creed in the summaries of the faith given by Irenæus in his

Refutation of the Heresies, especially that recited in the tenth chapter of his first book, so we may see in the above quotations “the Apostolic seeds,” ἀποστολικά σπέρματα (Str. I. 322), from which the great Nicene Creed was evolved or the material which was moulded into shape by the Councils of Nicæa and Constantinople. [This subject is more fully discussed in my “Clement of Alexandria” (S.P.C.K.), pp. 259–271.]

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

NOTES ON PASSAGES IN THE *SATIRES* OF HORACE.

(1). *S. I. 3. 23* :

Quidam ait, 'ignoras te, an ut ignotum dare nobis
Verba putas?' 'Egomet mi ignosco' Maenius inquit.

THE resemblance in sound here in the words *ignoras*, &c., has been noted; but not, so far as I know, the play on sound and meaning, which so much adds to the fun and force of the passage: 'if I don't *ignorare*, and if I am not *ignotus*, at any rate I *ignosco* myself.'

But I think there are several such instances of punning, intentional ambiguity, verbal allusion, and so forth scattered throughout Horace's writings, that appear to have been overlooked or misunderstood. I shall mention an example or two: my readers will decide for themselves whether they agree with my view.

(2). *II. 3. 71* :

Effugiet tamen haec sceleratus vincula Proteus.
Cum rapies in ius malis ridentem alienis.

In writing the last three words, Horace had, I think, two little jokes in his mind, in addition to the obvious meaning of 'hypocritical,' &c. First, on the analogy of *aes alienum*, he meant 'laughing at your expense' (Dr. Leeper has pointed out to me in this connexion the American colloquialism of 'having a loan of you'); and secondly, on the analogy of Proteus's power of changing his form,

he makes a reference to the man's power of changing his facial expression. Outside the *Satires*, too, we find similar cases.

(3). *A. P.* 80 :

Hunc socci cepere pedem grandesque cothurni
 Alternis aptum sermonibus et populares
 Vincentem strepitus et natum rebus agendis.

I cannot but believe that in the first verse quoted we have a pun perpetrated in cold blood. We are told that the *socci* and *cothurni* took their *pedem*, and when a writer deliberately so arranges his expression as to say that a certain foot-gear adapted itself to a certain foot, then, I think, the commentator who would refuse to acknowledge the existence of a pun would be quite capable of taking the *relicta non bene parmula* seriously and of believing that Horace unblushingly chose to brand himself a coward.

Moreover, I am not sure that the radiance, so to speak, of the pun has not spread itself a little further. For we find the verse about the foot followed by one beginning with the words *Alternis aptum*, and another with the words *Vincentem strepitus*. This naturally reminds us of such expressions as *Alterno terram quatiunt pede* (*C. I.* 4. 7), and *Tibicina cuius Ad strepitum salias terrae gravis* (*Ep.* I. 14. 26): cf. too *S. I.* 5. 63, *Pastorem saltaret uti Cyclopa rogabat : Non illi larva aut tragicis opus esse cothurnis*.

Now, these passages refer, of course, to dancing, and I very much incline to believe that Horace was thinking of the *pedem* in connexion with the *alternis*, &c., and meant his words to hint at both sets of movements of *pedes* on the stage, the dancing as well as the words. (Compare, too, *A. P.* 252, *Pes citus*, followed in 253 by *quum senos redderet ictus*).

There are few authors, it seems to me, in whom one discerns so many little hints and under-meanings as in

Horace; often, indeed, one suspects them, yet fails to catch them, on account of the limitation of our acquaintance with the customs and colloquialisms of that day (cf. No. 7, below). Nor is any author, perhaps, so continually reminiscent of himself. To go no further than our present citation, we have not only the examples given above, and others connected with other words, but the *vincentem strepitus* recalls *Ep.* II. 1. 200 :

Nam quae pervincere voces
Evaluere sonum, referunt quem nostra theatra ;
Tanto cum strepitu ludi spectantur, &c.

and *S.* I. 6. 43 :

Sonabit
Cornua quod vincatque tubas, &c.

Moreover, the play of words on *pedem* reminds one of yet another instance somewhat similar that occurs in the *Ep.* from which we have just quoted (II. 1. 174) :

Quam non adstricto percurrat pulpita socco ;
Gestit enim nummum in loculos demittere, post hoc
Securus, cadat an recto stat fabula talo.

Here he means that, though the play is so slipshod—the metaphor is just like our own—in its action and construction, the author (whose identity is partially merged in that of his work) cares for nothing but his own profit, and is in no wise concerned if the badly fitting shoe cause the downfall of his drama : cp. *Ep.* I. 10. 42 :

Ut calceus olim,
Si pede maior erit, subvertet.

(4). *A. P.* 147 :

Nec gemino bellum Troianum orditur ab ovo.

I am not sure that, in addition to the obvious reference

there may not be a little jocular allusion to the use of the phrase *ab ovo*, as in *S. I. 3. 6*, *ab ovo usque ad mala*, to mean 'from the beginning.' There are also what may be examples in *C. I. 4. 18*, and *III. 6. 22* (where *artubus* is the reading in several MSS.). And *Ep. I. 14. 4, 5*, is of a somewhat similar kind, as well as many other passages.

(5). *I. 3. 66* :

Communi sensu.

Why should there be any difficulty about the meaning of this expression, if we do not allow ourselves to be confused by its similarity to our 'common sense'? If *sensus* means 'a perception,' &c., and if *meus sensus* means 'my perception of my own feelings,' as in *Cic. Fam. V. 2. 10*, *Meus me sensus quanta vis fraterni sit amoris admonet*, then should not *communis sensus* mean (1) 'the reciprocal, or mutual, perception of one another's feelings': or, as the case may be, (2) 'the perception, in general, of the common feelings of the company, mankind, &c.'; leading to (3) the result of such perception, 'tact'? This explanation of the expression appears not only to be the natural one, but also to suit the context of the passages where we find it. I perceive that Palmer, in his edition of the *Satires*, translates it 'ordinary tact,' and he (with Mayor) quotes a good illustration from Seneca, *Benef. I. 12. 3*, *Sit in beneficio sensus communis; tempus, locum observet, [personas,] quia momentis quaedam grata et ingrata sunt*.

I have noticed, too, an interesting passage in De Quincey's Essay on Pope (vol. 12, p. 14, Black's ed.), which illustrates the view I would take of the phrase, though I don't suppose De Quincey had it in his mind—"The social sense, that living, trembling sensibility to the expressions and the electrical changes of human thought and feeling."

(6). I. 4. 10:

Stans pede in uno.

A similar proverbial expression would appear, though I have not observed the parallel noted anywhere, to have been in use among the Jews; for I have seen a story somewhere of a man who came to a rabbi, and asked to have the whole law taught him ‘while he could stand on one leg.’

But there is a slight difference between the two sayings, at any rate, as employed in the instances before us; for in the Jewish one the reference is more immediately to brevity of time; in the Roman one, to absence of effort (cf. *Ep.* II. 2. 124). (I find that the story is given in App. 3 to Farrar’s *Life of Christ.*)

(7). I. 4. 123:

Avidos vicinum funus ut aegros
Exanimat, mortisque metu sibi parcere cogit.

Avidos here seems to be usually explained by ‘greedy, gluttonous.’ But another explanation has struck me as very possible: I know not how it may strike others. We might take it as meaning ‘miserly’ (as at *C.* IV. 7. 19; *S.* II. 3. 151),¹ and *aegros* as meaning ‘ill from starvation’;

¹ Horace usually employs this word absolutely, and where it is not metaphorical, it generally means either (i.) ‘greedy,’ or (ii.) ‘avaricious.’ It means ‘greedy’ at *C.* III. 23. 4, *a. porca*, and *S.* I 5. 75, *a. convivas*. At *C.* I. 28. 18, the reading is somewhat doubtful (as, indeed, is several times the case with regard to reading or construction where this word occurs), but *avidum mare* seems to be used metaphorically to mean ‘greedy,’ as in (*C.* III. 29. 61) *Addunt avaro divitias mari*. It means ‘avaricious’ too in the passages above referred to—*S.* II. 3. 151,

a. heres, and *C.* IV. 7. 19, *manus avidas* (or *avidi*) *heredis*; and also at *C.* II. 2. 9, *a. spiritum*. Then it is found in *C.* I. 18. 11, *Sithonii a.*, and *C.* III. 4. 58, *a. Vulcanus*, where the meaning is disputed, but may, perhaps, best be taken to denote a fiery and passionate temper.

Then, again, it occurs in one passage with a dependent case, *A. P.* 172, *a. futuri* (if this is the correct reading). These are the only instances of the adjective that I have found (*avide*, *S.* I. 6. 127). So that the meaning I suggest in the passage above is entirely

then *sibi parcere* would mean 'to make oneself comfortable'; 'not wear oneself away in struggling to amass wealth.' Compare *Ep.* I. 7. 11:

Ad mare descendet vates tuus et sibi parcat.

What most inclines me to regard the suggested interpretation favourably is this. Our author, as is observed above, often refers to, or closely imitates, passages occurring in previous parts of his own works. Indeed, in this very Satire he does not only definitely refer to former Satires of his, but he actually quotes (v. 92) a verse from one of them (viz. 2. 27). Now, in *S.* I. 71-73 he has an expression that distinctly reminds us of the words quoted above:

Congestis undique saccis
Indormis inhians et tanquam parcere sacris
Cogeris.

And here there is no doubt at all that he is speaking

suitable to Horace's usage. By the way, Juvenal does not seem to use the word.

I may add a curious point as to Horace's use of the adjective *cupidus*. He has it (I think) seven times—three times (*C.* III. 14. 26; *S.* II. 1. 44, and 2. 98) with a defining genitive; once (*S.* II. 1. 12) with a defining word implied, meaning, in these cases, 'desiring the object in question,' and in the remaining three cases it is used absolutely, meaning 'governed by desire.' Now, the curious point is this, that the meaning of the word as thus used, without a dependent defining word, does not seem to be sufficiently clear, and Horace accordingly accompanies it with another adjective, to explain its force more fully. These cases are all in the *Epistles*—I. 2. 24, *stultus cupidusque*; II. 2. 156, *cupi-*

dum timidumque; and *A. P.* 105, *Sublimis cupidusque*. The word occurs, I think, twice in Juvenal—once (7. 58) with a genitive, and once absolutely, and here (8. 14) he adopts a method very similar to that of Horace, *Si cupidus, si vanus*.

The reason, I presume, for this treatment of the word is that, in the passages quoted, Horace is employing it in a somewhat unusual sense, referring rather to the character, whereas its usual reference is to the eager desire of some particular object, corresponding more to our 'eager,' 'desirous,' &c.

Another little point is, that where *avidus* occurs, *cupidus* could, so far as the versification is concerned, be substituted (except *S.* I. 4. 126), while *avidus* could not be put for *cupidus* in the passages where the latter adjective occurs (except in *Juv.* 7. 58).

of a miser. He speaks of him as being forced to spare his money, and so spoil his life and health, and of the public contempt (*populus me sibilat*, v. 66) which he brings upon himself by such practices.

But when we turn to the other passage, and there too find a reference to public contempt (*rumore malo*, v. 125), and find, moreover, the very words *parcere cogere* repeated in it, may we not conclude, with some appearance of probability, that Horace, when writing the one description, was thinking of the other?

If, as so many suppose, the first Satire was really the last to be written, and was intended in some sort as a general introduction to the rest, may we not take it, that in the passage there we have an authoritative indication from Horace himself of the sense he set upon his own words?

If, on the other hand, the passage in the third Satire can have been written after the other, would not the probability be equally strong that the author had in his mind his former picture of the miser, and now speaks of him as frightened by the death of some other such avaricious one, and so compelled to spare, not his precious gold, but himself?

(8). I. 10. 64:

Fuerit Lucilius, inquam,
Comis et urbanus, fuerit limatior idem
Quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor,
Quamque poetarum seniorum turba, &c.

This is a difficult passage, as is evident from the various interpretations it has received. I am not at all satisfied that the explanation which I am now about to suggest is the correct one; but it seems to me to accord fairly well with the line of Horace's argument, and the meaning of his words.

His point is the progress of a refined taste under the influence of Greek culture—a point on which he so frequently insists,—and the consequent necessity imposed upon any writer who would secure the suffrages of men of nice and critical taste, to correct and polish his poems to the utmost degree. Now here, he says, Lucilius failed, and this, even though we admit him to have surpassed the standard exacted in his own day. For, unfortunately, to have surpassed that standard was enough for him. His polish was, no doubt, finer than that of the times before Grecian influence was felt at all (*Quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor*); finer than that of the period in which his own time lay, when that influence was beginning to exert, and was gradually extending, its power (cf. I. 4. 6); but had he lived in *our* time, when this power is, indeed, the reigning one in art, can we doubt that he would have striven to act in a manner more nearly in accordance with its dictates?

Palmer (and others) would make *auctor* refer to Lucilius himself—‘than an inventor of a branch of poetry unattempted by the Greeks (might be expected to be).’ But there is nothing in the text to imply the ‘expected to be.’ Nor, on this view of the meaning, does the force of the epithet *rudis* seem to me at all so striking, or so worthy of a master in the use of epithet, as it is if we understand it as meaning ‘unpolished, *because* the polish of Grecian culture was as yet unfelt.’

Looking at the whole passage, it appears that Lucilius is allowed to be superior to two authors, or sets of authors: first, that of v. 66; secondly, those of v. 67; the first quite untouched by Grecian influence; the second, the mass of the elder poets in general; while it would seem rather odd to make the two classes stand thus: first, himself, or rather, not what he was, but what we might have supposed he would have been, though he wasn’t; and secondly, the elder poets.

As for the fact, that *auctor* is in the singular number, that is quite easy to understand as a contemptuous reference to ‘a composer of verse’ not worth particularizing further, like the *turba* used in speaking of the other class.

As I said above, I do not feel at all confident that I have rightly given the poet’s meaning, but there is no harm in submitting my suggestion for the consideration of others.

(9). II. 3. 35 :

Sapientem pascere barbam.

Palmer quotes the Greek proverbial saying, ἐκ πώγωνος σοφός; and Aulus Gellius (IX. 2) tells a story of a man who demanded alms from Herodes Atticus, assuming that the profundity of his inward and spiritual philosophy should be readily recognizable from the length of his outward and visible beard. Atticus saw the sign, but did not deduce the grace.

This story recalls to my mind a parallel case in modern times, which I quote from memory. An English envoy, who had been sent to (I think) the Dey of Algiers, was a clean-shaven man. The Dey, who was accustomed, like Gellius’ philosopher, to associate gravity of character with copiousness of beard, exclaimed; ‘Do these English mean to insult me by sending as an envoy a young man without beard, and, I suppose, without brains?’ ‘Had we been aware,’ replied the envoy, ‘that your Majesty measured intelligence by length of beard, we should have sent as envoy to your Majesty a he-goat.’

(10). II. 3. 128 :

Populum si caedere saxis

Incipias, servosve *tuo* quos aere pararis, &c.

Here, though it is not a matter of much importance, I should prefer the reading given, *tuo*, rather than *tuos*, for

at least three reasons. First, it is the reading of the important Codex Gothanus; secondly, it suits Horace's manner of placing his adjectives; and thirdly, it sounds *very* much better, avoiding the *-as, -os, -os, -os, -is*.

(11). II. 3. 298 :

Respicere ignoto discet pendentia tergo.

This seems to be always understood as referring to the fable of the wallets. But I have often thought that it may refer to v. 53, *caudam trahat*, and that there may be an allusion in both places to some saying, or custom, that we are not acquainted with.

Perhaps, as an appendix, I may add a couple of notes on Ep. I. 1. In line 44,

(12). Quanto devites animi capitisque labore.

Several commentators explain *animi capitisque*: but is this natural Latin? Would it not be better—especially looking at the examples that immediately follow—to take it ‘toil that involves courage and risk of life.’ Horace does use *caput* for ‘mind,’ ‘brain’ (*A. P.* 300), but I do not think that suits at all so well here: and where is it used for ‘body’?

As I have started, let me go on to one remark more, also upon the same Epistle, lines 73–75 :

(13). Olim quod vulpes aegroto cauta leoni
Respondit referam : ‘quia me vestigia terrent,
Omnia te adversum spectantia nulla retrorsum.’

I have seen no satisfactory explanation of this. It seems to be mostly shirked, and said to be a mere proverbial expression of caution. But Horace's illustrations

are usually much more to the point than that would be ; and, besides, it seems to me that the words very naturally bear a meaning which makes them not vague, but clear, apposite, and effective. Does not Horace mean (he being the fox, and the Roman people the lion), ‘Because my individuality would be swallowed up, and for ever lost in the confused and undistinguishable mass of all that had been your courtiers, were your victims, and have become yourself?’

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THE MEANING OF ARISTOTLE, *NICOMACHEAN ETHICS*, 1095^a. 2.

THE coincidence of the lines in *Troilus and Cressida*—

“ Unlike young men, whom Aristotle thought
Unfit to hear *moral* philosophy,”

with Bacon's words in the *Advancement*, “Is not the opinion of Aristotle worthy to be regarded wherein he saith that young men are not fit auditors of *moral* philosophy,” both referring to Aristotle's *Nic. Eth.*, 1095^a. 2 (τῆς πολιτικῆς οὐκ ἔστιν οἰκεῖος ἀκροατῆς ὁ νέος), has been made use of by some writers as an argument for identifying the author of *Troilus and Cressida* with the author of the *Advancement*. Their argument has two *momenta*: *first*, that the quotation of Aristotle is erroneous; *secondly*, that the coincidence in error is peculiar to these two authors. An error of this sort, common and peculiar to the two works, can (they argue) be accounted for only by assuming identity of authorship. Professor Dowden, in the *National Review* (July 1902), and Mr. Sidney Lee, in his *Life of William Shakespeare* (p. 370 *n.*), have sufficiently shown that the alleged *peculiarity* is none at all. Perhaps it still needs to be shown that the *error* also is imaginary, and that Aristotle, in the above passage, really and primarily *meant* moral, rather than political, philosophy.

One of the most curious things observable in the speculations of Aristotle is the way in which they outrun the scientific terminology at his command. Thus he had at hand no current term proper to designate 'Logic,' his special creation, and he remained to the end without one. It continued for him to be obscured under the names ἡ διαλεκτική, or ἡ ἀναλυτική, neither of which is equivalent to our 'Logic,' or to the ἡ λογική which came into vogue afterwards, but occurs first in Cicero, *de Finibus*, i. 7. 22; *Tusc.* iv. 14. 33. Also he lacked a term for 'Ethics,' another branch of science to which he first gave definite form. He never speaks of Ethics as ἡ ἠθική, a term which occurs first in Strabo. 'Ethics' is for him still conjoined with 'Politics' under the common term ἡ πολιτική. Passages which prove this double meaning of ἡ πολιτική abound in the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Politics*, but are not confined to these works. In the *Rhetoric*, 1356^b. 28, we read: τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματείας ἣν δίκαιόν ἐστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικὴν, and 1359^b. 10, τῆς περὶ τὰ ἥθη πολιτικῆς. 'Ethics' is for Aristotle introductory to 'Politics,' using the latter term in its modern sense: cf. ἀρχὴ ἡ περὶ τὰ ἥθη πραγματεία τῆς πολιτικῆς, *Magn. Mor.*, 1181^b. 26, where τῆς πολιτικῆς is used in this modern sense. In fact, ἡ πολιτική is employed by Aristotle in three ways—(a) to embrace Ethics and Politics (the theory of individual conduct, and that of the conduct of men in masses), without distinction; (b) to designate Ethics proper; (c) to stand for Politics proper. In the sentence with which we are here most concerned, it refers primarily to Ethics, but, of course, not exclusively; since, if the proposition in which it occurs holds good of Ethics, it holds *a fortiori* of Politics, which, however, was not then under the writer's immediate consideration.

The scope of Aristotle's thought when making the assertion (τῆς πολιτικῆς, κ.τ.λ.) can be best seen if one begins a few lines back and reads up to it from 1094^b. 14,

τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται. He is dwelling throughout on the method of studying ἡ πολιτικὴ, and the difficulties attending the study of it, in so far as it has to do with τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια in conduct. But thus limited, it is simply Ethics, under the brief description which the latter bears everywhere in Aristotle, and, indeed, in Plato. The difficulties of the study (apart from those connected with its method) arise from the variety and uncertainty (πλάνη) of moral laws, which 'some persons hold to be merely *conventional* (νόμῳ), and to have no *natural* basis.' The study of such a subject is perilous for youth. The fit student of Ethics is ὁ πεπαιδευμένος, i.e. one whose knowledge and critical faculty have been developed fully, but on a sure foundation of moral discipline. According to Aristotle, the truths of Ethics are *living* truths, which to be known require to be *felt*, and to which 'words, words, words,' give no adequate expression. The true propaedeutic for this study is *discipline of character*, not any mere exercise of intelligence, such as attendance at lectures (ἀκροάματα) might bring. Δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἤχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δίκαιων καὶ ὅλων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. In *N. E.* 1134^b. 24, we have an instance of the difficulties which trouble the over ardent and undisciplined student of Ethics. We almost seem to hear him ask 'if moral laws are objective or *natural* (φύσει), not merely subjective or *conventional* (νόμῳ), how is it that they vary so much all over the world?' Likewise Plato, *Rep.* vii. c. 17, dwells upon the dangers of indulging μετράκισκοι in dialectic exercises. It results, he says, in παρανομία; the δόγματα which they have held, ἐκ παίδων, περὶ δίκαιων καὶ καλῶν, lose all influence over their minds and conduct. Plato and Aristotle agree in the precept τὸ τὰς φύσεις κοσμίους εἶναι καὶ στασίμους οἷς τις μεταδώσει τῶν λόγων. Plato, too (*l. c.*), requires ethical students to be πρὸς βύτηροι. This view of the incapacity of youths to derive

profit from ethical study is maintained by Aristotle from the beginning to the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*. In Book x, c. 9 ff., where the transition from the work on Ethics to that on Politics proper is effected by the writer, and the duties of lawgivers as regards the education of the young are spoken of, the comparative uselessness of διδασχῆ, and the necessity of moral discipline for young persons are dwelt on impressively and at length. We read that words and discourses (οἱ λόγοι) are of little or no effect with boys as a ‘protreptic’ to virtue, for boys πάθει ζῶντες τὰς οἰκείας ἡδονὰς διώκουσι. The point of view taken up is precisely that of the passage in Book I., where the sentence under discussion occurs. Here, as there, what Aristotle thinks of, is the unfitness of youth for the study of *moral* philosophy.

If one examines the context, and bears in mind that for Aristotle (who did not possess a distinctive term for ‘Ethics’) ἡ πολιτική covered both ethical and political philosophy, he will probably conclude that, on the whole, Erasmus, Comte de Plessis, Virgilio Malvezzi, and Grote (‘Aristotle,’ p. 495), who agree with Bacon in making Aristotle here refer to *moral* philosophy, had a deeper and truer sense of their author’s meaning than any hasty glance at his mere words can give. The argument founded on the so-called ‘error’ of quotation deserves record chiefly as a specimen of what superficial criticism can achieve when enlisted in support of a paradox.

JOHN I. BEARE.

NOTES ON TWO PASSAGES OF HORACE

(EPP. I. I. 53-69, AND SAT. I. I. 88-109).

" O cives, cives, quaerenda pecunia primum est ;
 Virtus post nummos : ' haec Ianus summus ab imo
 Prodocet, haec recinunt iuvenes dictata senesque 55
 Laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.
 Est animus tibi, sunt mores, est lingua fidesque,
 Sed quadringentis sex septem milia desunt :
 Plebs eris. At pueri ludentes ' rex eris ' aiunt
 ' Si recte facies : hic murus aeneus esto, 60
 Nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.'
 Roscia, dic sodes, melior lex an puerorum est
 Nenia quae regnum recte facientibus offert,
 Et maribus Curiis et decantata Camillis ?
 Isne tibi melius suadet qui, rem facias, rem,
 Si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo rem
 Ut propius spectes lacrimosa poemata Pupi,
 An qui Fortunae te responsare superbae
 Liberum et erectum praesens hortatur et aptat.

THE meaning of Horace seems, in many places,
 obscured or weakened by our familiarity with a
 traditional rendering which ignores the dramatic character
 of much of the Satires and Epistles. Horace is not only
 constantly talking to himself, but answering himself.
 There are two voices in argument ; and as Horace did not
 know of the convenient device of inverted commas, and
 did not introduce objections by *At enim*, we are led often
 to attribute to him sentiments that he is combating or

quoting. Of course, in several instances, it was impossible to go wrong. Take for example, *Sat.* II. iii., 262 *sqq.*, where we have a passage from the *Eunuchus* (46 *sqq.*) rendered in hexameters with wonderful closeness, *e.g.* :—

Terence : Exclusit ; revocat : redeam ? Non si me obsecret.

Horace : Exclusit ; revocat : redeam ? Non, si obsecret. Ecce.

But in other places, we have not the original that Horace had in his mind, and we follow the lead of whoever it was that first introduced inverted commas, and shrug our shoulders at what does not seem to hang well together 'when we come to think of it.' It is perilous to face such long-rooted prejudice ; but I think the sense of the passage from *Ep.* I. i. is much improved by removing as above the inverted comma from the middle of line 60 to the end of 61, thereby making '*hic murus . . . culpa*' part of the *nenia* of the boys. As the passage has been taken, universally so far as I know, Horace is made to interpolate a frigid moral, couched in curious language, between his statement of the different lessons taught by the old boys and the real boys and the question which of the two is the better. The following arguments will, I trust, commend themselves to some :—

(1) If Horace were telling us to do no wrong, he would have said '*nil conscire tibi*,' and he would not have thought of *murus aeneus* out of connexion with any palace other than the palace of the soul.

(2) '*Rex eris si recte facies*' would be a short song for the Curii and Camilli to sing over and over. It must have originated when kings were well thought of, and when a wall of bronze, like Danae's (*Carm.* III. xvi. 1), was a sure protection, that required but a small stretch of imagination to render it metaphorical. There is a certain sing-song rhythm about line 61 which first suggested to me that it was part of what the boys were accustomed to hum over.

(3) There is a balance between the lesson—copy headline we might call it—of the old boys on 'Change, and that of the real boys. The former is paraphrased as the Roscian law, in contrast to the *nenia* ever on the lips of the manly old worthies; and again as the man who advises you to make money, as opposed to him who bids you to defy the frowns of Fortune and fits you for the task. The word *aptat* seems to suit the didactic '*hic murus aeneus esto.*'

(4) If it be said that the scholiast has given the conclusion of the trochaic line, '*si non facies non eris,*' I would refer not only to the passage from the Sat. quoted above, but to such a line as *Ep.* I. xiv. 44:

Quam scit uterque, libens, censebo, exerceat artem,

for which we have Cicero's iambic version of the Aristophanic ἔρδοι τις in *Tusc.* I. xviii. 41, *quam quisque norit artem in hac se exerceat.* If Horace worked iambics into his hexameters, why not trochaics? I am not contending that Horace gave the words, but only the sense of the *nenia*, and this sense pretty closely in the original words. Indeed the slight remodelling of stock phrases is a feature of Horace's style not confined to his hexameters. Witness *claudere lustrum* (*Carm.* II. iv. 24), *Pater urbium* (III. xxiv. 27), to quote two instances that first occur.

There is a difficult and much discussed passage in *Sat.* I. i, 88 *sqq.*, which may perhaps be explained by the recognition of two voices, and by the introduction of inverted commas in the proper places. I will not add to the discussion but merely state the readings I adopt, and my explanation. In verses 80-83 '*At si condoluit se . . . pro-pinguis,*' the miser advances another plea for avarice, viz. that wealth secures the attention of one's relations if one

be ill : Horace replies (84-87), " Even your wife and son hate you ; every man, woman, and child that knows you hates you ; and it's no wonder, since you preferred money to everything, that no one gives you true affection." The miser retorts : (88-91 "*At si cognatos . . . frenis*"), " If you think to make real friends out of relations whom nature gave you without any trouble on your part, you are as great a fool as a man that tried to make a donkey into a race-horse—you might as well try to make a silk purse out of a sow's ear." The miser's undervaluing of anything that costs nothing is a true and characteristic touch. Horace does not labour the point, but somewhat abruptly turns aside with, " Well, at all events, put some limit to your scraping and saving. Don't be an Ummidius." " What," says the miser (101), " would you have me live a spendthrift ?" Horace answers in his own person (103-7), '*Pergis pugnantia secum . . . consistere rectum*'; and then, having settled the miser (108), resumes the address to Maecenas and the world at large, '*illuc unde abii redeo qui nemo, ut avarus, se probet . . .*,' " I return to the point from which I started (at the beginning of the Satire, *qui fit ut nemo*), how is it that everyone disapproves of his own state of life as is really the case with the envious miser ?" The above apportioning of the dialogue seems to remove all the serious difficulties.

P. SANDFORD.

NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM II. AND III.

Att. ii. 1. 2. Nostrum illud ὑπόμνημα.

THIS word occurs twice elsewhere in Cicero's correspondence. In Att. xv. 23 it is used of a memorandum or pamphlet containing the pleadings in the *causa Siliana* (in xv. 24 he speaks of this pamphlet as *causa*, or *libellus*). In xvi. 14 it seems used in the sense of a 'note,' 'short disquisition,' 'memorandum' (in that case on the views of Poseidonius on conflicting motives, sent by a Greek philosopher, Athenodorus). In a previous letter (xvi. 11. 4) Cicero said he had asked Athenodorus for τὰ κεφάλαια on the subject. There is no doubt, then, that ὑπόμνημα means 'outline,' 'sketch.' Perhaps this was the document which Atticus glanced over at Corcyra (§ 1), the first sketch of Cicero's Greek treatise on his own consulship, which he afterwards revised and re-issued. The fact that Cicero speaks of *nostrum illud ὑπόμνημα* would seem to point to a treatise already mentioned, and the word ὑπόμνημα would indicate a less highly elaborated work than the *liber*, or *commentarium*, in its final condition.

ii. 1. 5. Inconstantiam eius reprehendi qui Romae tribunatum pl. peteret, cum in Sicilia †hereditatem sepe hereditasset†.

So M¹; M² has *aedilitatem sepe dictitasset*; Z (teste Bosio) *heraedilitatem sepe hereditasset*. The last two words have been rightly emended by Corradus (after M²) to *se petere*

di<cti>tasset. The other word, as given by Bosius from Z, is probably the reading of the archetype,¹ and has been corrupted from *nuper aedilitatem*. In i. 19. 2 *nuper* appears to have been corrupted into *puer*, the right reading being *pugnam nuper malam pugnarunt*, not, as Koch read, *pugnam permalam pugnarunt*. It may not seem to have been open to censure, that Clodius should have spoken about standing for one office, and have actually stood for another; but probably the implication is, that Clodius talked big about the aedileship, a magistracy entailing heavy expense, and was now shirking that onerous office.

ii. 1. 7. *Nostri autem principes digito se caelum putent attingere.*

Compare Sappho 37 [9], ψαύην δ' οὐ δοκίμοιμ' ὀράνω δύσι πάχεσι (or ψαύην δ' οὐ δοκίμοι [δύσπαλες ὠράνω]); on which Bergk compares Pseudo-Callisthenes, ὥς πότε καὶ γὰρ ἰσόθεον ἔχων κράτος χερσὶν ἐμαῖς οὐρανὸν ἠθέλησα ψαῦσαι. Also compare Symmachus, Epp. i. 52 (46), *ne ego digito, ut aiunt, supera convexa tetigissem*. Something different is Propertius, i. 8. 43, *Nunc mihi summa licet contingere sidera plantis*, where the idea, as Dr. Postgate shows, is not so much rising to divine stature, as 'walking a god among the gods.'

ii. 2 fin. *Velim . . . cenes apud nos utique pridie Kalendas.*

3 fin. *Tu pridie Compitalia memento.*

These two dates are the same. The feast of the Compitalia was a moveable one (*feriae conceptivae*), held after the Saturnalia. We know that it was held on Dec. 31st in 67 B.C. : see Asconius in Cornelianam, p. 65, l. 4, Orelli,

¹ We have good reason to believe that, however untruthful Bosius was as regards his Decurtatus and Crusellinus, he was fairly truthful as regards Z; for

as Z was a real manuscript, he could have been convicted of falsehood; cf. Lehmann, *De epp. ad Att. recens*, p. 104.

compared with Dio Cass. xxxvi. 25, Reimar (= 42. 2 Melber); on Jan. 1st in 58 (Pis. 8); on Jan. 2nd in 50 (Att. vii. 7. 3); and it occurred on Jan. 1st in 59 B.C., as can be proved from the above combination: see Pauly-Wissowa, s. v. Compitalia, vol. iv., p. 791.

ii. 4. 2. Clodius ergo ad Tigranem! Velim †Syrpiae condicione; sed facile patior.

One certainly cannot find rest in Gronovius' reading, *Scepsii*, which is taken as an allusion to Metrodorus of Scepsis, who was sent by Mithradates to Tigranes to urge the latter to send aid against the Romans, but when asked by Tigranes his own opinion, said, 'as the ambassador of Mithradates, I advise you to send the aid; as a candid counsellor, I advise you not' (Plutarch, *Lucullus* 22). The circumstances are not at all parallel, and there are other objections urged by Mr. Pretor. Dr. Reid has proposed *turpiore condicione*, 'on a less creditable footing'; i.e. Cicero would have preferred to see Clodius go abroad as exile, which is highly ingenious, and perhaps right. My own attempt had been *Velim in Syriam e condicione*.¹ Syria was one of the richest provinces that a governor could be sent to. No doubt some such rich province had been spoken of as reserved for Clodius if he supported the triumvirs (cf. ii. 7. 3, *deinde alia legatio dicta erat, alia data est*): hence Cicero says here *e condicione*. Cicero seems to have wished that Clodius should throw himself unreservedly into the service of the triumvirs (cf. 9. 1), should take the appointment in Syria, follow in the steps of the ordinary rapacious Roman in an official post in the provinces, and thus lose the position of leader of the extreme democratic party at home.

¹ For the appearance of *p* cf. i. 12. 3, where the MSS. has *seprule* or *seprul-lae* for what seems to be *servolae*. Boot

has already conjectured *Syriam: amplae conditiones*.

Cicero thought that even the acceptance by Clodius of the embassy to Tigranes, in which, of course, he would mix in the society of kings and tetrarchs and play the part of a Roman noble, would impair his popularity (ii. 7. 2).

But perhaps another solution on the same lines would be more satisfactory, *Velim in Cyprum e condicione*. That commission, which was afterwards given to Cato, was, indeed, a lucrative one for the collection of money (cf. 7. 3, *opima ad exigendas pecunias legatio*); and was, perhaps, the one which Cicero considered was reserved for Drusus Pisaurensis, or Vatinius. This *opima . . . legatio* is usually assumed to be a mission to Egypt, but I do not know on what grounds. There was some talk of Cicero's going on an embassy to Egypt (ii. 5. 1), but that is very far from being adequate reason or conclusive proof of the assumption.

ii. 6 fin. Vide quid narrent, ecquae spes sit denarii an cistophoro Pompeiano iaceamus.

The word *iaceamus* is usually translated 'sit down under,' 'put up with,' 'be palmed off with,' or the like. Possibly the meaning is a little stronger, 'be ruined by': cf. Fam. i. 5a, 3, *est quiddam tertium . . . ut neque iacere regem pateremur*, in which passage *regem* should not, I think, be altered into *rem*.

ii. 9. 1. Orbis hic in rep. est conversus: citius omnino quam potuit ꝑid culpa Catonis sed rursus improbitate istorum.

It is quite possible, as Mr. Pretor suggests, that *id* arose from a reduplication of the *-it* of *potuit*, and should simply be ejected. But possibly it may have been a corruption of *primo* (i°). For *primo . . . rursus*, cf. Suetonius, *August.* 17.

ii. 9. 3. Nam nos quidem, si per istum tuum sodalem Pubhum licebit, σοφιστεῖν cogitamus, si ille †cogitat tantum†, dumtaxat nos defendere, et, quod est proprium artis huius, ἐπαγγέλλομαι ἄνδρ' ἀπαμύνεσθαι ὅτε τις πρότερος χαλεπήνῃ.

Patria propitia sit. Habet a nobis, etiamsi non plus quam debitum est, plus certe quam postulatum est.

The words *Patria propitia sit* hardly give the sense we require, viz. 'only let my country be propitious': we require the addition of some word like *modo*. Possibly we should transpose *tantum* to precede *patria*, and read *tantummodo* (*tantūm*). Written originally in the margin, it may have been inserted in a place left vacant for a Greek word, something like ἀντίον στήναι. Or we might read, as Dr. Reid suggests, *si ille <male> cogitat*: cf. De Senect. 18. I cannot believe that *cogitat tantum* would have been used by Cicero to express 'goes so far in his aspirations,' as Lehmann supposes.

ii. 12. 2. De signifero Athenione.

The name Athenio is here applied in scorn to Sextus Clodius. In the previous generation we find that it was applied to Fimbria by Sulla's soldiers: cf. Appian, *Mithr.* 59, καὶ ὁ στρατὸς ὁ τοῦ Σύλλα, σὺν ὀργῇ καὶ καταφρονήσει περιστάντες τὸ τοῦ Φιμβρίου χαράκωμα, κατελοιδοροῦν αὐτοῦ καὶ Ἀθηνίωνα ἐκάλουν δὲ δραπετῶν τῶν ἐν Σικελίᾳ ποτὲ ἀποστάντων ὀλιγήμερος ἐγεγένητο βασιλεύς.

Possibly for *de ruminatione*, which cannot be supported, in the sense required, from classical writers, we should read *de rerum mutatione*.

ii. 14. 2. Basilicam habeo non villam frequentia Formianorum †ad (*M*; at *C*) quam partem† basilicae tribum Aemilium.

To the innumerable guesses we may add one more. Read as in *C*, and interpret, with Mr. Shuckburgh, *basilica* as the visitors at a *basilica*. 'I have a Public Hall,

not a country house, owing to the numbers of the Formian visitors ; yet what portion of my Public Hall are genuine Roman citizens, and so enrolled in the Aemilian tribe ? lit. ‘ as what portion of my Public Hall have I the Aemilian tribe ? ’ All sorts and conditions of dwellers at Formiae called on Cicero, not merely genuine resident Roman citizens. This interpretation has the merit that it does not alter the text.

ii. 17. 1. Prorsus ut scribis, ita sentio, turbatur Sampsicramus.

The meaning of *turbatur* is ‘ has lost his head ’: cf., for example, Quintilian, v. 7. 11, *providendum ne timidus, ne inconstans, ne imprudens testis sit: turbantur enim et a patronis diversae partis inducuntur in laqueos, et plus depressi nocent quam firmi et interriti profuissent*.

In § 2, for *neque tam* perhaps we should read *nequaquam tam*.

ii. 18. 3. A Caesare valde liberaliter invitor in legationem illam sibi ut sim legatus, atque etiam libera legatio voti causa datur.

This use of *illam*, as equivalent to *eiusmodi*, though perhaps capable of defence, still does not seem very satisfactory here. We should expect some word to mark the *legatio* as being a military one, like *militarem* or *bellicam* (cf. Balb. 47), in opposition to *libera legatio*.

ii. 19. 3. Caesar cum venisset mortuo plausu, Curio filius est insecutus.

It is doubtful whether Mr. Pretor is right in supposing that we should put a comma at *venisset*, and make *mortuo plausu* an independent clause, understanding *erat*. In i. 16. 3 (which he quotes) *iudicium* is the nom. to *erat*, understood with *incredibili exitu*; but Caesar cannot be the nom. here: the clause should rather be taken as abl. abs. However, it does not seem certain that the subjunctive is

required here, as the sentence is plainly temporal, and possibly we should read *Caesar cum venit* (or *venerat*) *semimortuo plausu, Curio filius insecutus est*: cf. Sest. 126, *cum erat reclamatum semivivis mercenariorum vocibus*.

ii. 22. 3. In causis atque in illa opera nostra forensi summa industria versamur: quod egregie non modo iis qui utuntur opera, sed etiam in vulgus gratum esse sentimus.

Nostra is required with the second *opera*, but is not required with the first. I think it should be transposed.

ii. 24. 4. Nunc reus erat apud Crassum Divitem Vettius de vi.

This Crassus Dives was not the triumvir; nor was he, as is commonly held (Drumann iv. 117), a praetor of this year (59 B.C.). More probably he was the P. Crassus who was praetor in 57 B.C., and favoured Cicero's recall (Post red. in Sen. 23). It appears that the *index* who was appointed president of a *quaestio* was generally an ex-aedile, who had not yet held the praetorship; and this Crassus Dives may well have been aedile in 60 B.C.: cf. Willem's *Le Sénat*, ii. 293-4. Valerius Maximus (vi. 9. 12) mentions a Licinius Crassus who became bankrupt, and Pliny (*H. N.* xxxiii. 133) states that the bankrupt was the first Licinius who bore the surname Dives. The first Licinius Crassus Dives we hear of in history was a very distinguished man, who was Pontifex Maximus and praetor in 207 B.C. (Liv. xxvii. 21. 5, cf. xxxix. 46. 1). So if Pliny is right, the bankrupt must have been anterior to him.

Att. iii., Epp. 1 to 6.

The circumstances connected with Cicero's departure into exile until he left Italy are tolerably well ascertained in their main outlines; but there are some points of detail which remain doubtful. We know that the first step which

Clodius took against him was the introduction of a law couched in general terms, *ut qui civem Romanum indemnatum interemisset ei aqua et igni interdiceretur* (Velleius Paterculus ii. 45), and that the person against whom this law was directed was so obviously Cicero that he left Rome, probably in the early morning of the day on which it passed.¹ Mr. Long (*Decline of the Roman Republic*, iii. 457) seems to be of opinion that this law was never passed; and he explains away the allusion in Att. iii. 15. 5 fin. (*Sed pergo praeterita, verum tamen ob hanc causam ut, si quid agatur, legem illam in qua popularia multa sunt ne tangatis*), by saying that *lex* is used improperly for *rogatio*. But, even granting this improper usage, there does not seem any reason why the bill should *not* have been passed; there was adequate reason that it should be passed as a 'Confirmatio legis Semproniae'; there is a specific statement in Dio Cassius, xxxviii. 17. 6, that it was enthusiastically passed, with the approval even of Cicero's friends (*φυγόντος δ' αὐτοῦ ὁ νόμος τὸ κῆρος, οὐχ ὥπως οὐκ ἐναντιωθέντος τινος, ἀλλὰ καὶ σπουδασάντων ἄλλων τε καὶ αὐτῶν ἐκείνων αἷ ὑπὲρ τοῦ Κικέρωνος ἀνὰ πρῶτους πράττειν ἰδόμενοι, ἐπειδὴ περ ἅπαζ ἐκποδῶν ἐγγίγναι, ἴλαβε*); and that we do not hear of it elsewhere is due to the fact that, once it was passed, it was not contravened again during the period of the Roman Republic, so that there was no occasion for it to be mentioned in after-times.

It was passed about the middle of March; for we are told that Caesar did not go to meet the Helvetii until Cicero had left Rome (Plut. *Caes.* 14 fin.),¹ and we know that Caesar arrived at the Rhone, after a very rapid journey of eight days from Rome, before March 28th (Bell.

¹ Plutarch (*Cic.* 31 fin.) says he left *περὶ μέσας νύκτας*. Cicero himself, in rhetorical fashion, says the law was passed on the day he tore himself

from the embrace of his country (Sest. 53).

² Plutarch says 'Italy,' an obvious error.

Gall. i. 6, 7). As soon as it was passed Clodius promulgated an enactment specially directed against Cicero. It assumed that Cicero, by his voluntary exile, acknowledged his guilt, and thus fell under the penalties of the law just passed; so its terms were 'that M. Cicero *has been* interdicted from fire and water' (*Velitis iubeatis ut M. Tullio aqua et igni interdictum sit*). Possibly this may have been intended to exonerate from blame those who destroyed Cicero's property on the day the general law passed (cf. Sest. 54, de Domo 62). Though it ought to have named a day for Cicero to appear and stand his trial,¹ Clodius may with some reason have considered such a provision superfluous. A precedent could be found in the case of Fulvius, an ex-praetor, who, when he departed into exile before his day of trial came on, in 211 B.C., was decreed by the people to be in righteous exile.² The law further confiscated Cicero's property, and fixed a limit of space within which, if found, he would be regarded as an outlaw.

Whether this latter feature was in the original draft of the law which attacked Cicero by name, or whether its introduction was the 'amendment' referred to in Att. iii. 4, is a disputed point. Rauschen (*Ephemerides Tullianae*, p. 24), after Lange (*Röm. Alt.* iii. 304) and Zumpt (*Criminalrecht*, p. 427 ff.), supposes that the amendment consisted in altering the limit within which Cicero might not remain from 400 miles to 500 miles. Cicero says (Att. iii. 4), *in qua rogatione quod correctum esse audieramus erat eiusmodi ut mihi ultra quadringenta milia liceret esse*, which they suppose to be the unamended enactment; and that the amended limit was 500 miles, as is given by Plutarch (*Cic.* 32 init.), ἐντὸς μυλίων πεντακοσίων

¹ Cf. the case of Postumius Pyrgensis, in 212 B.C. (Liv. xxv. 4).

² Liv. xxvi. 3, *postquam dies comitiorum aderat Cn. Fulvius exulatum*

Tarquinius abiit. Id ei iustum exilium esse scivit populus: see Mr. Greenidge's 'Legal Procedure of Cicero's time,' pp. 330, 361.

Ἰταλίας, and Dio Cassius (xxxviii. 17), who states the distance as 3750 stadia, and appears elsewhere to consider that $7\frac{1}{2}$ stadia were equal to a Roman mile (cf. lii. 21). But if this view is held, it appears very unlikely that Cicero would inform Atticus of the unamended form of the bill, and not the amended form, immediately after having heard of the latter; so that we must then, with Boot (*Obs. Crit.* pp. 45, 46), alter *quadringenta* into *quingenta*. The limit was reckoned from Italy, and not from Rome, as Dio erroneously says (*l. c.*). This is perfectly certain from Att. iii. 7. 1, *veremur ne interpretentur illud quoque oppidum* (sc. *Athenas*) *ab Italia non satis abesse*: cf. Plut. *Cic.* 32 init.¹ There could be no doubt that Athens was more than 500 miles from Rome; and the place at which Cicero seems to have intended to take up his permanent abode was Cyzicus, which is just about 500 miles from Italy. That he remained temporarily at Thessalonica, which was within the limit, was owing to the friendly protection of Plancius, and also because Cicero had no enemies there, like Autronius and other Catilinarians, whom he would have found in Greece proper.

But Mr. Clement L. Smith, in the *Harvard Studies*, vol. vii., p. 71, holds a different, and, in my opinion, the correct view as to the 'amendment.' He thinks that "the amendment, the insertion of which appears to have been secured by the influence of Cicero's friends and the interposition of the triumvirs, so far mitigated the severity of the original proposition as to prescribe a limit of distance, beyond which the exile might live unmolested." This appears to be the view of Dr. Holden also (Introd. to the *Pro Sestio*, p. xxi, to the *Pro Plancio*, p. x); and it suits admirably with the mention of the amendment in Att. iii. 2. Cicero had heard that efforts

¹ Possibly in Att. iii. 4 we should read *quingenta milia* <ab Italia> *luceret esse*.

were being made to mitigate the rigour of the law, but he thought it advisable to repair to Vibo, a retired place, where he had a good friend Sicca, until the definite nature of the mitigation was known. Hence he says, *praesertim nondum rogatione correctâ*. At Vibo he learned the exact nature of the limit, and found that it excluded him from Sicily or Malta, so that he was compelled to betake himself to the East, as he had originally intended (Att. iii. 1).

When Cicero left Rome he went somewhere south, but we do not know where. The most natural supposition would be Arpinum, his home. There he waited for the next step that should be taken. As soon as he read the bill, which was specially directed against himself by name, he appears to have formed the idea of going away to the East, and wrote Att. iii. 1, asking Atticus to accompany him, and give him his protection in his journey through Epirus. This was probably towards the end of March. Meantime he heard that his friends were making exertions on his behalf; he was possibly exposed to considerable annoyance, owing to the fact that he was comparatively near Rome, where his enemies were numerous; he thought that it would be better to go to a retired, fairly distant place until the amendment of the law was announced, which he, doubtless, surmised would not be of a *very* favourable nature; but he hoped to be able to take up his abode in Sicily, or, at any rate, in Malta.¹ So he determined to go to his friend Sicca, who lived at Vibo. When he made up his mind to do so, he wrote Att. iii. 3, some time about the beginning of April, and started for Vibo, asking Atticus to follow him thither.² On April 8th (a. d. vi Id. Apr.) Cicero was at a place called Nares Lucanae (Sallust, *Hist.* iii. 67), which was on the Via Popilia, beyond the Silarus, half way between it and Aceronia (C. I. L. x.,

¹ On a subsequent occasion he meditated going into retirement at Malta: Att. x. 7. 1.

p. 49). From this place he wrote Att. iii. 2, as the subscription shows. The subscription of Att. iii. 5 is *Data vii Idus Apriles Thuri*. Now, of course, it is impossible that Cicero could have been at Thuri one day, and Nares Lucanae the next, even supposing that he was going north. So that something must be wrong in the subscriptions to 2 and 5. Nissen conjectured *Eburi* for *Thuri*. This is most ingenious. Eburum is close to Nares Lucanae; and by reading *Eburi* we get rid of the un-Ciceronian form *Thurium*, and can keep the numeral *vii* as given by M. But on this hypothesis it seems strange that Cicero, in ep. 5, should say that 'If you are at Rome you will not be able to overtake me,' and in ep. 2 should urge him so unconditionally to the journey; and still more strange that he should write, between epp. 3 and 2, ep. 5, in which he did not mention his destination and give reasons why he directed his way thither. So it would seem that we must alter *vii* to *iiii* with Corradus, and either acquiesce in the reading *Thuri*,¹ or alter to *Thuriis*. In the journey between Nares Lucanae and Thuri Cicero spent a night, probably that of the 8th, in a villa of the Campus Atinas (cf. C. I. L. x. p. 40; Pliny, *H. N.* ii. 225), where he had the celebrated dream in which Marius appeared to him, and having led him into his 'monumentum,' said that therein lay his safety (*De Div.* i. 59, cf. *Planc.* 78). On the 10th, after having travelled rapidly (cf. *De Div.* i. c. *cum iter instaret*), he arrived at Thuri, from which he wrote ep. 5; and he was in Vibo (about 85 miles distant) probably by the 12th. There he learned the amendment to the law of Clodius, and saw that he must of necessity repair to the East. He was unwilling to expose Sicca to the danger of harbouring an outlaw, and, indeed, it appears that Sicca was unwilling to undergo the risk of receiving him into his own house, but offered to assign

¹ This form is found in Mela, ii. 4. 68.

him a farm in the country.¹ C. Vergilius, too, though a friend of Cicero, would not take on himself the responsibility of admitting him to his province, or its adjunct Malta.² Cicero had good reason then to say that it was due to his misfortune rather than to inconstancy of purpose that he left Vibo suddenly, immediately after learning the actual tenor of Clodius's law (ep. 4). This was on the 13th. He was probably at Thurii two days later, and at Tarentum on the evening of the 16th. He wrote ep. 6 from the neighbourhood of Tarentum, on the morning of the 17th, and arrived at Brundisium on the evening of the same day. In these hurried journeys Cicero must have travelled between forty and fifty miles each day; not a very great effort, for the regular rate for couriers was fifty miles a day, but more than was usual for ordinary travellers, especially when such stages were kept up for ten days. We may conjecture that his extreme haste was due to a desire to leave Italy before the bill became law; but that the courteous treatment he received from the municipalities on his journey from Vibo to Brundisium, and the great kindness of M. Laenius Flaccus, who entertained him hospitably at Brundisium,³ induced him to remain until the end of the month, when he learned definitely that the law had been passed. If it were promulgated early in April, say about the Nones, Cicero, at Vibo, might have heard of its provisions by the Ides: allow at least seventeen days (*trinundinum*) between promulgation and passing, and the date of passing will be about the 23rd,

¹ Plutarch, *Cic.* 32, ἐν δὲ Ἰππωνίῳ, πῶλεϊ τῆς Λευκανίας ἦν Οὐιβῶνα νῦν καλαῦσιν, Οὐίβιος Σικελὸς ἀνὴρ . . . οἰκίῃ μὲν οὐκ ἐδεξάτο, [τὸ] χωρίον δὲ καταγράφειν ἐπηγγελλετο. This looks very like as if Plutarch had misinterpreted *Sicca l'ib(onensis)*, which he may have found in some authority as 'a Sicilian Vibius.'

² Cicero *Planc.* 95, 96; Plutarch, *l. c.*

³ *Planc.* 97, *Sest.* 131, *Fam.* xiv. 4. 2. Plutarch (*Cic.* 32) notices that little heed was paid to the enactment of Clodius, as the people respected Cicero, καὶ πᾶσαν ἐνδεικνύμενοι φιλοφροσύνην παρέπεμπον αὐτόν.

and formal information that it was enacted could not reach Brundisium before the 29th.¹ On that day Cicero left for Greece, after writing Att. iii. 7 to Atticus, and Fam. xiv. 4 to his family.

This order of the letters at the beginning of the third book, viz. 1, 3, 2, 5, 4, 6 has been proved to be the right one by Mr. Clement L. Smith, of Harvard, in the discussion referred to, and has been adopted by Sternkopf and Müller.

Att. iii. 4. Allata est enim nobis rogatio de perniciē mea ; in qua quod correctum esse audieramus erat eius modi ut mihi ultra quadringenta milia liceret esse, illo pervenire non liceret.

What is the meaning of *illo*? It means, says Boot (Obs. Crit. 46), "in Siciliam quae rogatione Clodii erat excepta ut tradit Dio l. c. καὶ ἡ ἐν Σικελίᾳ διατριβὴ ἀπερρήθη." Mr. Clement Smith thinks it strange that Cicero should not have mentioned in ep. 4 that Vergilius refused to allow him to enter his province, and conjectures (p. 83) that a clause has dropped out before *illo*, something of this nature, <simul litterae a Vergilio nostro quibus significabat se nolle me in Sicilia esse>. *Illo cum pervenire non liceret*, &c. But M² and s are the only MSS. which give *illo cum*. The others read *illoc*, *illuc*, or *illec*. The forms *illoc* or *illuc* are not Ciceronian, but we find *istoc* three times in Caelius, Fam. viii. 4. 1 ; 8. 10 ; 9. 4 ; so perhaps, if we refuse to adopt *illo*, the less elegant form may be tolerated in a letter of Cicero's, composed hurriedly, when he was in distress of mind. Then *illoc* or *illuc* will mean 'to Epirus':

¹ If Cicero says (Fam. xiv. 4. 2) that Laenius Flaccus was exposed to danger by entertaining him, that does not necessarily prove that formal information that the law had passed had arrived in Brundisium before the 29th. The tenor of the law was known long before, and it

was also known that it was sure to pass ; so that Laenius Flaccus could be subjected to odium and hostility, though not to actual legal pains and penalties, for harbouring a disgraced man, who was to all intents and purposes an outlaw.

cf. ep. 2, *sine te autem non esse nobis illas partes tenendas propter Autronium*. If that view is rejected, I would suggest for *illoc* something like *alio quo*.

iii. 7. 1. Quod si auderem Athenas peterem. Sane ita cadebat ut vellem. Nunc et nostri hostes ibi sunt.

This is usually interpreted 'circumstances were so falling out that I should have wished to do so' (i.e. go to Athens); or 'the matter was turning out as I should wish.' But it is doubtful if *cadere* can be used impersonally in this way. The only place I know in which it appears to be used impersonally is Att. xiii. 33. 4, where the reading is very doubtful, and a plausible correction is *Cecidit* (or *ceciditque*) *belle res*. *Casu*, &c. There should be some subject to it, such as *res*, or a neuter pronoun or adjective. Possibly, then, before *sane* we should supply *Res*, which might have fallen out after *peterē*; or for *cadebat* read *decebat*, 'it was so eminently fitting for me (a man of culture) to go to Athens, that I should have wished to do so'; or, 'the fitting course coincided exactly with my wishes' (lit. 'it was fitting in just the way I should have wished').

iii. 8. 2. Nam Phaetho libertus eum (*sc.* Quintum) non vidit. Vento reiectus ab Illo in Macedoniam Pellae mihi praesto fuit.

Illo is Madvig's alteration of the MSS. *illo*, and it is accepted by all editors. Dr. Reid has, however, pointed out to me that it does not suit the circumstances. There were two routes (§ 1) which Quintus might adopt—(1) that by sea, across from Ephesus to Athens, and thence by Patrae and the west coast of Greece, to Brundisium: (2) the land route, along the Egnatian road, through Thessalonica to Dyrrachium. The latter Marcus himself was about to traverse; so that if Quintus adopted that route the brothers would meet. But in case Quintus went by sea, a letter

could only reach him by a special messenger. Accordingly, Marcus sent his freedman Phaetho by the sea route¹; but Phaetho failed to meet Quintus owing to the stormy weather. But there was no reason whatever, as Dr. Reid shows, why Phaetho should be near Ilium. The name concealed under *ab illo* must be some place on the route between Athens and Ephesus. I think it is probably a corruption of *a Delo*. If the words were divided *ad elo*, on *elo* being altered to *illo*, *ad* would be changed to *ab*.

iii. 9. 2. Nunc si ita sunt quae speras sustinebimus nos et spe qua iubes nitemur: sin ut mihi videntur firma sunt, quod optimo tempore facere non licuit, minus idoneo fiet.

An old correction is *infirmas*, which appears to me to be right. Müller, after Lehmann (*Quaest. Tull.* p. 79), retains *firma*. Boot, after Pluygers and Cobet, brackets the word. The passages on which Lehmann bases his defence of *firma*, without the addition of some substantive antithetical to *quae speras*, such as *mala* (cf. Fam. xiv. 4. 1), are (1) Fam. xiv. 3. 3, *Nunc spes reliqua est in novis tr. pl. et in primis quidem diebus; nam si inveterarit, actum est*. But here *spes* is subject to *inveterarit*, 'if hope becomes chronic,' 'if the affair is not settled off at once, but it become a matter of constant hope, then all is up.' (2) Att. iii. 8. 2, *tu altera epistula scribis Idibus Maiis audiri fore ut acrius postularetur* (Quintus), *altera iam esse mitiora*. Here the antithesis is most marked between *acrius postularetur* and *mitiora*. There is hardly any syllable so frequently omitted in MSS. as *in*: see Müller's note on Att. i. 14. 5,

¹ [Dr. Reid holds that Cicero sent Phaethon to Thessalonica and down by sea to Athens hoping that Quintus would be caught either at the one place or the other, but clearly expecting that Athens would be the place. He accordingly conjectures *Atho* for *illo*. This

may very well be right. The question seems to turn on whether the two messages which Cicero received at Dyrrachium (iii. 8, 1) announced alternative routes, or two portions of the same route. I rather incline to the former.]

64 NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM II., III.

Hic tibi <in> rostra Cato advolat. In Att. i. 16. 2, M¹ has *firmo* where Lehmann and Müller rightly read *infirmo* with M².

iii. 14. 1. Si tibi stultus esse videor qui sperem, facio tuo iussu, et<si> scio te me iis epistulis potius et meas spes solitum esse remorari.

Cicero had just received a letter from Atticus, in which he held out hopes that Pompey would take some step on his behalf. That being so, Cicero could hardly say that 'you are *accustomed* to check my excessive readiness to hope in *those* letters.' For *iis* I think we should read either *tuis*, or (less likely) *istis*.

iii. 15. 7. Sin omnia sunt obstructa, id ipsum fac ut sciamus et nos aliquando aut obiurgare aut communiter consolari desine.

For *communiter* Lamb. reads *comiter*, and is followed by Boot and many editors. Other editors rightly adhere to *communiter*, but I cannot follow them in translating, 'to console me and my family in common.' Rather it means, 'to give common-place, ordinary consolation,' *communiter* being opposed to *proprie* as often: cf. Quintilian, ix. 1. 23, *figura quam non communiter sed proprie nominamus*, and the commentators on Horace, *A. P.* 128. Cicero felt that in consolation 'common was the common-place, and vacant chaff well-meant for grain,' and would have none of it.

iii. 18. 2. Nam Quintus frater, homo mirus, qui me tam valde amat, omnia mittit spei plena.

It is very uncommon to find *mirus* used of a person, especially in Cicero. My friend, Mr. Goligher, however, quotes Att. xv. 29, 2, *Quintus filius usque Puteolos—mirus civis, ut tu Favonium Asinium dicas* &c. Nor does it seem a likely word to be used here. Dr. Reid has suggested *miser*; and for the corruption of *miserum* into *mirum* he

might compare Plaut. *Rud.* 485. But even *miser* is hardly the word. Rather *unicus*, as 19. 2.

iii. 17. 1. Livineius L. Reguli libertus ad me a Regulo missus venit. Is omnino mentionem nullam factam esse nuntiavit, sed fuisse tamen sermonem de C. Clodi filio, isque mihi tqm fratre litteras attulit. Sed postridie Sesti pueri venerunt qui a te litteras attulerunt.

The old correction is *tum a fratre*; Klotz reads *a Quinto fratre*. But it is unlikely that if Cicero had heard from Quintus he would have spoken so doubtfully, or cursorily. Possibly we should read something like *quasdam de* or *aliquorum de*. It was not until letters arrived from Atticus that Cicero felt that there were serious grounds for uneasiness.

iii. 19. 2. Non deseram . . . nec spem aerumnosissimae mulieris Terentiae nec miserrimae [mulieris] Tulliolae obsecrationem.

Most editors bracket the second *mulieris*. Possibly it arose from *meae*.

iii. 19. 3. Te oro et obsecro T. Pomponi.

For *T.* we should probably read the usual *mi*.

iii. 20. 3. Quod me vetas quicquam suspicari accidisse ad animum tuum, quod secus a me erga te commissum aut praetermissum videretur, geram tibi morem et liberabor ista cura, tibi tamen eo plus debebo, quo tua in me humanitas fuerit excelsior quam in te mea.

In a fine discussion on the word *tamen* (*De epp. ad Att. recensendi*, pp. 194-5), Lehmann says: "haud paucis locis non eam vim habet ut aliquid introducatur quod plane contrarium sit eis quae antecedunt, sed ut altera aut nova res adferatur: itaque *tamen* non nunquam idem atque *praeterea* sonat." Among the passages which he adduces in support of that view he might well have mentioned this

one. But I think the statement that *tamen* is virtually equivalent to *praeterea* requires the qualification, that there is always *some* note of opposition to the previous clause. Thus here the meaning is—I shall be far from entertaining the unpleasant feeling of suspicion that you were displeased with me, indeed I shall entertain the pleasant feeling of heightened obligation to you for showing greater consideration to me than I showed to you. Translate *tamen*, ‘indeed, on the contrary.’

For good remarks on the *humanitas* of the last century of the Roman Republic, see § 3 of O. E. Schmidt’s Introduction to ‘Briefe Ciceros und seiner Zeitgenossen,’ Heft i. He finds, in Cicero’s life and writings, our most important source from which to learn the *humanitas* of the ancients.

iii. 23. 4. Investiges velim . . . quare octo tribuni pl. ad senatum de me referre non dubitarint—scilicet (sive or sine *codd.*) quod observandum illud caput non putabant—eidem in abrogando tam cauti fuerint, &c.

Müller, after Lehmann, supposes a clause beginning with *sive* to have been lost. The ordinary reading is Lallemand’s *scilicet*. It would be nearer to the letters of the MSS. to read *sane*: cf. Terence, *Eun.* 89, for *sane quia*.

iii. 25. Post tuum a me discessum litterae mihi Roma allatae sunt.

We do not hear of any visit of Atticus to Cicero at this time, so that *a me* would seem to be very doubtful. Rauschen (op. cit., p. 29) thinks that this silence is no proof that such a visit was not paid, and, as we do not hear of any letters of Atticus to Cicero after the Ides of November (23. 5), there is some slight presumption that they met personally, and that Atticus left him to go to Epirus. Still, even so, there would not be any great reason

why Cicero should upbraid Atticus for leaving him at Dyrrachium; for there he could not do more than console Cicero, while at Rome he could have given material help. Kahnt read *a meis*; but *tuus a meis discessus* would have been a most unlikely phrase for Cicero to use, unless he went on to speak of his family. If we read *a meis*, I should suggest to transpose it and *Roma*. Mr. Tyrrell's conjecture *ad me*, 'after your leaving town to join me,' has much to recommend it; but such a pregnant construction requires a parallel. I think Klotz is right in reading *ab urbe*: cf. Att. viii. 3. 3 *fin*. If *b* was written as *u*, the corruption might readily have occurred by the omission of the intervening letters.

L. C. PURSER.

THE LIBRARY OF TRINITY COLLEGE, DUBLIN: THE GROWTH OF A LEGEND.

IN this year that the co-eval Library of Oxford, the Bodleian, is celebrating the Tercentenary of its foundation, a suitable moment occurs for reviewing the origin of our own great Library, and the fables which have gathered about it.

All the modern statements on the matter, and they are many, seem derived from that in our first Calendar (1833), edited by the late learned Dr. Todd. Here it is (p. 187): "In the year 1603 [sic] the Spanish troops were defeated by the English at Kinsale, and Her Majesty's army, to commemorate their victory, subscribed the sum of £1800 from the arrears of their pay to establish in the University of Dublin a public Library. Dr. Chaloner and Mr. James Ussher were selected by the benefactors as the trustees of this donation, and commissioned to purchase such books," &c.; then follows the usual statement from Parr's *Life of Ussher*, about their meeting with Bodley, who was purchasing for his newly-founded Oxford Library. This statement is so precise that it seems bold to gainsay it; all that a historian of the College wants is to find the original authority from which Dr. Todd derived it. I need not retail my search through older accounts in order to find a reference to the original statement. But

I must state that, having turned in the first instance to the two very minute accounts of the siege of Kinsale, and the subsequent occurrences, written by competent eye-witnesses, the secretaries of Mountjoy and Carew, both panegyrists of their patrons, I felt much astonished that there was not a single reference in either to this magnanimous act, which could not but have redounded to the great credit of Mountjoy, and could hardly have been completed without his sanction and approval.

There is a third contemporary document in the Library (MS. 591), of which the silence is still more significant. It is the draft, with many corrections, of a Latin oration, either delivered or to be delivered to Mountjoy on the occasion of a state visit to the College. The contents show that this visit was after his return from Kinsale, and before his victorious concluding of the war, for this event is not mentioned—hence the date is 1602. The oration is an elaborate panegyric, going through all the topics which the orator could think of in praise of Mountjoy. Is it possible that a splendid gift of his soldiers to the College, wherein he then stood, could possibly have been ignored? But there is not one word about it in the whole speech!

An argument *ex silentio* is seldom conclusive; but, if it is not so in the present case, there must have been a conspiracy of silence. It therefore became interesting to pursue the inquiry. The early Registry, the early entries in the particular book, produced not a word of evidence; but in an old *Book of Benefactions*, intended to be carried on, but in which only a page or two has been written in, occurs the following (p. 3):—"Anno 1601. In the yeare one thousand six hundred and one there was a contribution made by severall persons of quality, and especially souldiers and officers then in Her Majesty's service (the names of whom lye on record in the College books), which being

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collected then by SIR JAMES CAROLL, Knt., receiver of H. M. money in the Exchequer, came to about seven hundred pounds, and was to be disbursed for books for a Library, and was done accordingly." Is this entry contemporary? Certainly not, for Carroll was not knighted till years later, and it occurs in the book *after* an entry of 1610. But the book is a very formal copy of earlier entries on vellum, and was evidently intended as the official record.

The reader who compares it with Dr. Todd's statement will see that it differs in almost every detail. If it be true, Dr. Todd's account, followed by all the subsequent historians, is hopelessly and thoroughly inaccurate. The date is wrong; the sum subscribed is wrong; there is no mention of Kinsale in the gift; there is no mention of the benefactors having appointed trustees. It was not given to the University, but the College; it was not to be a public Library in the ordinary sense. A new person occupies the important place—James Carroll, a civilian official in Dublin, not a member of the army. The only agreement between the two accounts is that soldiers gave a contribution, and that Chaloner and Ussher were commissioned to carry it out.

Which of these is therefore to be adopted as the truth? The increasing evidence against the current story makes it still more interesting to find Dr. Todd's authority. But the process of my search need not detain the reader. Here is the result: In the funeral sermon preached on James Ussher in Westminster Abbey by Dr. Bernard, and published under the title "The Life and Death of Dr. James Ussher," &c. (London, 1656), occurs the following passage (p. 42):—"Not long after this defeat at Kinsale, the officers and commanders of the army gave at once £1800 to buy books for a Library to the Colledge of Dublin (then souldiers were for the advancement of

learning). The ordering of the money for that use was committed to Dr. Challoner and this Lord Primate, who came of purpose hither into England to buy them." I have not found the legend in any earlier document. Ussher's voluminous correspondence is, like all other contemporary authorities, silent about it. Now this Dr. Bernard had known Ussher since the year 1624, when he was appointed his private chaplain, and must therefore have been intimate with the great man, from whom he might often have heard the story. What better evidence of so remote a fact could we have? But yet this is a statement not made till 1656, made at a moment when Ussher's own great library was about to be sold, which the Cromwellian army of Ireland shortly after did actually purchase, and for the same purpose. There were, therefore, in 1656 strong reasons for a pious fraud, and for stating in a picturesque way that the Irish Library was due to soldiers' gift, with the suggestion that another such opportunity for them was now at hand. And if the intimacy of Bernard with Ussher and his respectable character seem to preclude his having deliberately invented the story, the lapse of half a century since the facts had occurred gave ample time for inaccuracies and distortions to creep in. Hence the account in the Book of Benefactions is distinctly to be preferred on *a priori* grounds. If we do this, the date assigned to the gift at once excludes the conquerors at Kinsale from being the donors. For the surrender of the Spaniards did not take place till January 9th, 1601 (O. S.), which is our January, 1602, and which would only leave $2\frac{1}{2}$ months' time for the organisation and collection of so complicated a donation. Nor was the war over, and the army was then and long after busy with the campaign. The wide divergence of the sums stated also tell in favour of the more modest estimate in the earlier account.

It remains to give a constructive argument, showing how the blunders arose, and also showing what was the real foundation for the story. This I am happily able to do, and it completes the destruction of the current legend.

In the Irish State Papers' Calendar for 1592 there is (p. 81) a letter from Chaloner, Henry Lee, and Launcelot Monney to Burleigh, requesting that he would help them in the cashing of bills given by captains serving in Ireland as a donation to the new College. The letter is dated March 14th, 1592, that is to say, at the time of the first subscription for the purpose. The amount in bills was £623 os. 8d. In May, 1594 (*ibid.*, p. 248), it appears from another letter that this money was not yet realised. As these letters have never been printed in extenso, I here give the texts:—

(S. P. IRELAND, Vol. CLXVIII. 60.)

1592. 14 Mar.

CHALONER, LEE, and MONNEY, to LORD BURGHLY.

"The most Christian care and very favourable inclinations which your good lordship shewed, right honourable and our worthy Chancellor, for the founding of a college and nourceserye [nursery] of good letters in this rude desolate and ignorant country doth give not to us only but to all this nation great cause continually to praise the God of heaven for your lordship's health, prosperous estate, and honour, both to be continued and increased daily: for whom hath this country found comparable to your lordship among the Council so tendering the welfare and very fatherly regarding the good estate thereof as you have done? And to omit many particulars which are yet fresh in the memories of all grateful persons, and will never die, this honourable favour and most Christian care which your lordship shewed in the planting of a seat of good learning in this land doth seem to

many far to exceed all others, and we hope the time though short will sufficiently show profitably your charitable care hath been employed upon so commendable and Christian a purpose as this will prove: both for the establishing of true religion, the banishing of barbarism and the bringing in of more civility in this poor kingdom than hath been heretofore. And therefore right honourable, since you were known to carry a zealous affection for the advancing of God's true religion and a very fatherly care over these commonweales that peace and prosperity may flourish in them both in your days and after your decease: we humbly presume to press upon your honour again (for we know not better how to be thankful to your lordship than to indebt ourselves into your further favour to your own perpetual honour) that as you [have] been the means next under God for first founding of this most Christian work (such as our ancestors did never enjoy, except that near 1200 years ago), so you would be the means under his mercy again for the careful cherishing and faithful preservation of this place so planted: which your good lordship may most safely do by dealing with Her Majesty for her most gracious bounty to bestow thereon after what manner soever it shall please your honour whether of her own most charitable endowing of it by some gracious token of her princely liberality or by the grant of any of those particulars which this bearer hath instructions at your pleasure to show, by which, we are assured, Her Majesty shall give a singular encouragement to her loving subjects here, who have already contributed to this great and charitable work, that they will proceed to the full establishing and perfect finishing thereof for their own exceeding welfare; and we are not only told, our very good lord and most worthy Chancellor, (for under you we have presumed to shield our college), that your lordship would labour for our former request, by which your honour shall have perpetual remembrance while this land endureth, but also we humbly require your honourable favour for a few prest bills amount[ing] to £DCXXIII VIII^d [£623 os. 8d.] which the captains of this country for the great affections they bear unto this work, have willingly afforded for their favourable contribution, which bills for the necessary employment of the Treasure or other needful uses (as we do hear) could not be paid here: and

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therefore were we counselled to offer our suit unto your honour
for them whose favour we have found so gracious already to us.
And thus &c."

S. P. IRELAND, VOL. CLXXIII. 67.

26 May 1594.

LORD DEPUTY FITZWILLIAM AND COUNCIL to SECRETARY
BURLEIGH.

"MAY IT PLEASE YOUR LORDSHIP

"Considering the prosperous success which the Lord hath
granted to this happy work of a college by your especiall means
next under God first founded in this distressed country, whereby
there is great hope conceived that both humanity and true religion
shall prosper among this people: which work hath so well pro-
ceeded that both tongues and liberal sciences are already professed
therein: yet for the further maintenance and better continuing of
the same it doth greatly depend upon the Christian assistance
which your good lordship may extend thereto, considering likewise
that it hath pleased your honours formerly to grant your favour-
able direction for the paying of certain bills and concordatums
amounting to the sum of £623 os. 8½d. given unto the said house
by diverse captains and gentlemen as their charitable benevolence:
which sum of money could not yet be received out of the Treasure
by reason of the employment thereof in other needful services. In
respect whereof being now earnestly moved by the said corpora-
tion to write to your lordship in that behalf we pray that your
former order may be renewed. It will be a help, *both for the
perfect finishing of the said house and the better settling of more
professors in the same.*

Considering the postponements and delays, the dis-
honesty of officials, the stinginess of the queen, the great
financial pressure of the ensuing time, I believe that this,
the real soldiers' gift to the College, was not realised till

1601, and then realised by the astuteness and address of James Carroll, who had constant money dealings with the College, and was a great friend thereof till late in his life, when the College was obliged to take the violent proceedings illustrated by a document already published in this Review, to recover his long outstanding debts to the Society. But in those early days he was a benefactor, and in this year his official position enabled him to serve the College well. I believe Mr. S. P. Johnston, who has made a study of Carroll's doings, can show that he did not behave honestly even now, and that a good part of this money stuck to his fingers. I suppose it was called near £700, instead of £623, the original gift, either on account of interest accruing, or on account of the difference of the value of Irish from English currency. £623 English = £680 Irish nearly. I must not omit to add that the list of names of those military benefactors is long since lost. It was probably part of the catalogue set up in the original Chapel, to which an extant letter of Matthias Holmes, in 1595, refers (Muniment Room, box C, 11. c).

This clearing up of the date of the soldiers' gift also sheds light upon the date of the origin of the Library. Dr. Stubbs, copying some older account which I have not yet been able to verify (probably Dr. Barrett's), speaks of a Library, with its material appointments, as being part of the original College built in 1593. But the soldiers, as appears from the documents I have cited, had apparently not so specified their gift, so that these afford no proofs that a Library formed part of the original foundation. When then was it furnished with books?

In the old *Particular book*, containing notes of many things from the origin of the College, we find the following heading and list (p. 215).

LIBRI IN PUBLICÂ COLLEGII BIBLIOTHECÂ

24^o Febr. Anno 1600.

Euripides Graecolat . cū coñmentariis Brodaeī et aliorū
Platonis omnia opera graecolat. [ex dono M. Henrici Lee
Aristotelis opera omnia graecolat.
Ciceronis operū volumina duo in fol.
Strabo Graecolat. fol.
Dioscorides lat. fol.
Ptolomaei volumina duo. fol.
Basilus. fol.
Hieronimi index. fol.
Augustinus de Consensu Evangelistārū.
Stephanus de urbibus graecè.
Hermes.
Lyranus in libros historicos. fol.
Albertus Magnus de Physica.
Aretinus in Ethica.
Faber in Evangelia.
Gesner de piscibus.
Gesner de avibus.
Fernetii opera. fol.
Munsteri cosmographia.
Tabulae geographicae Mercatoris.
Sermones quidam papistici Anglicè.
Budaeus in Pandectas et Laudinus de vitâ contemplativâ.
Polyanthia Dominici Nani.
Thomae prima secundae.
Menila in Juvenalem et adversus Domitiū in Martialē.
Musculi loci coñunes. Lent by Mr. Welsh.
Tremetii Biblia novissima editio.
Marlorat in novū testamentū.
Aristotelis Organon.
Aben Ezra, David Kimchi, and Salomo Jarchi in Joïlem.
Ursini Exercitationes.

LIBRI MANUSCRIPTI.

A French history in fol.	} ex dono M. Christopheri Ussheri Regis ad Arma in regno Hib.
Bartholomaeus Anglicus,	
Chrysostomi homilice in Matthaeū	
[5 items follow which are erased.]	
Jacobi de voragine legenda aurea	} Ex dono Richardi Latwar Sacrae Theol. Doctoris.
Adami Sasbuth opera. fol.	
Erasmi annot. in novū Test. fol.	
Wolfgangus Musculus in Isaiā. fol.	
Laetii Zecchii summa universae Moralis Theol. and casuū conscientiae : tomis 2 ^b /4 ^o	
Thaddei Perusini explanatio in Isaiam tom 2 ^b /4 ^o	
Hieronimi Zanchii cōment in Hoseā /4 ^o .	

There was therefore a recognised College Library in 1600, and probably even earlier, though it was very small.

The second catalogue we have (MS. 1) has a formal title-page, ascribing it to 1604. As many books of later publication occur in the list, the date is so far inaccurate; but the look of the title-page shows clearly that the writer was copying from an earlier document, begun in 1604, and this was the work of Ambrose Ussher, the first librarian. Before 1600 we can only conjecture; but I think it very likely that Chaloner's fine collection of books, of which we have his own catalogue (with prices attached), dated 1598, was kept in the new building, and served as the College library till the original endowment was realised and applied. We have in one of his notebooks lists of the *books abroad*, i.e., those which he lent to the fellows, Ussher, Richardson, Walsh, Dun, &c. Each list is headed by the borrower's name and the books were erased in the list according as they were returned. But however this may be, if the foundation of our Library dates from its first endowment by soldiers, it must date from 1593.

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It might seem strange at first sight, that our excellent benefactor and protector Chaloner, who may justly be called our Founder, did not bequeath the books, which he so liberally lent to the Fellows, to the College. But he did not do so. His will, which is extant (cf. Wright's *Ussher Memorials*, p. 142), tells us that while he left either particular books, or a selection of ten volumes to several of his friends in the College, he bequeathed the bulk of his Library to his daughter Phoebe, and her he bequeathed so far as he could, on his deathbed, to James Ussher. Whether that great lover of books regarded the lady as an appendage to the books, or the books to the lady, we do not know. At all events he married her, and so Chaloner's library must have been merged in Ussher's. This last having ultimately passed into the College Library, Chaloner's books here found their ultimate home in the most suitable place. I have not had time to see whether in the Ussher collection the books mentioned in Chaloner's catalogue show his name or press-mark. But I think it highly probable that some of them do, and when I have made search, I will make the result known.

J. P. MAHAFFY.

THE VISITS OF ST. PAUL TO CORINTH.

[T is proposed here to set forth the considerations which seem to prove that before the writing of 2 Corinthians Paul had paid only one visit to Corinth, *i.e.* that related in Acts xviii. In the discussion of this matter it will be assumed that the Book of the Acts is a trustworthy, though not necessarily an exhaustive history, and that the two Epistles to the Corinthians have come down to us in their integrity.

The most recent upholder of the theory that there are in 2 Corinthians portions of two distinct epistles, Dr. J. H. Kennedy, in his acute and scholarly work, *The Second and Third Epistles of St. Paul to the Corinthians*, prefaces his argument by an inquiry into the number of visits paid by the apostle to Corinth, it being essential to the truth of his theory that there were three in all. But as many scholars who believe in the integrity of 2 Corinthians agree with Dr. Kennedy on this last point, it is plain that it is possible to discuss the biographical problem without entangling ourselves in a large critical question. I may, however, be excused if in the course of this note I make use of an article which appeared in the *Expositor*, February, 1898, in which I attempted to reply to Dr. Kennedy's presentation in that periodical of his theory of the composite nature of 2 Corinthians.

It is obvious that if a visit of Paul to Corinth is to be inserted somewhere between Acts xviii. 18, when he left Achaia, on the return half of the second journey, and xx. 2, when he visited it on the third journey, it must have taken place before the writing either of 1 Cor. or of 2 Cor.

Now there are in 2 Cor. some three passages which, at first sight, and if nothing else were taken into account, would seem to imply that Paul had already paid two visits to Corinth. We shall defer the consideration of these passages for the present; for if we find that the language of the epistles elsewhere, and the circumstances under which they were written, render it unlikely that either of them had been preceded by a visit, this general presumption will give additional credibility to another possible explanation of the passages in question.

I.—Mr. G. G. Findlay (*Hastings, D. B.*, vol. iii., p. 710), following Schmiedel, places the unrecorded visit "not long before 1 Cor., probably in the previous autumn." There is absolutely no proof of this in the epistle itself.

(a) On the contrary, all through the letter it is implied that Paul's knowledge of the state of the Corinthian Church was based on reports "from them which are of the household of Chloe" (i. 11, cf. v. 1; xi. 18); and on a letter from the Church itself (vii. 1). It may be added that we must allow some considerable time for all the abuses and irregularities condemned in this epistle to have reached the height there described. If Paul had paid ever so short a visit to Corinth, ἐν λύπῃ, or otherwise, while these abuses were growing up, it is scarcely conceivable that in condemning them he would not allude to what he had himself then seen or said. In this connexion it may be noted that he actually had written (v. 9) bidding them "to have no company with fornicators."

His writing, and not coming in person, gave force to the taunt implied in iv. 18 sqq. "Now some are puffed up, as though I were not coming to you," etc. This remark would have no meaning if, as a matter of fact, he had shown the sinners at Corinth that he was not afraid to meet them.

(b) "Furthermore throughout this Epistle everything is dated from this original visit" [of Acts xviii.] *e.g.* ii. 1, "When I came unto you"; iii. 2, "I could not speak unto you as unto spiritual . . . I fed you with milk"; xi. 2, "I praise you that ye remember me in all things, and hold fast the traditions even as I delivered them to you." (Dr. Kennedy, *l.c.*, p. 12).

These considerations seem conclusive against supposing that an unrecorded visit preceded the writing of 1 Cor.

II.—We now pass on to the more complicated question: Did the unrecorded visit precede 2 Cor.? Mr. C. H. Turner (*Hastings, D. B.*, vol. i., p. 423) thinks that both epistles "fall, the one just before, the other soon after, the departure from Ephesus for Macedonia, A.D. 55." This, of course, is the commonly accepted view.

On the supposition that both epistles were written within at most a few months of each other, it seems so difficult to assign any time for the visit that Dr. Kennedy, who, as we have seen above, gives an excellent reason for denying a visit before 1 Cor., feels himself obliged to maintain (*l.c.* p. 19) "that 1st Corinthians was not written in the spring of the year in which St. Paul left Ephesus, but considerably earlier, probably in the spring of the year before; that he stayed at Ephesus beyond Pentecost by reason of the greatness of the work; but that he paid a short visit to Corinth (the visit ἐν λόγῳ)." If, therefore, we can show that various incidents and personal allusions

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found in the two epistles harmonize easily with the hypothesis that the two epistles are not separated by a long interval of time, the likelihood of a visit having taken place between them is considerably reduced.

(a) But before passing on to these considerations, it is noteworthy that, setting apart the debateable passages which we shall consider later, the same language is used in 2 Cor. about the original visit of Acts xviii. which we find in 1 Cor.: "Everything is dated from this original visit." If this be a strong argument, as surely it is, against the occurrence of an unrecorded visit before 1 Cor., why should it not have equal force in the case of 2 Cor.?

i. 19. "Jesus Christ, who was preached among you by us, even by me and Silvanus and Timothy, was not yea and nay."

vii. 2. "We wronged no man, we corrupted no man, we took advantage of no man" (an allusion to his manual labour, Acts xviii. 3).

x. 14. "We came even as far as unto you in the gospel of Christ."

xi. 9. "When I was present with you and was in want, I was not a burden on any man; for the brethren, when they came from Macedonia (Acts xviii. 5) supplied the measure of my want; and in everything I kept myself from being burdensome unto you."

xii. 12. "Truly the signs of an apostle were wrought among you For what is there wherein ye were made inferior to the rest of the churches, except it be that I myself was not a burden to you?"

With the exception of the debateable passages, these are the only allusions in 2 Cor. to a visit of Paul to Corinth. All five refer only to the original visit. If he had paid another visit in the interval, it would, no doubt, have been marked by the same disinterestedness of

conduct. It is scarcely possible that he would not have emphasised the fact that he had behaved alike on *both* occasions.

(δ) Moreover, the impression derived from these passages is strengthened by others which seem to imply that some time had elapsed since his last visit—sufficient time to allow the effect of his personal presence to have in part died away. Thus: "I beseech you, that I may not when present shew courage," etc., x. 2; "Let such a one reckon this, that what we are in word by letters when we are absent, such are we also in deed when we are present," x. 11; "I fear, lest by any means, when I come, I should find you not such as I would, and should myself be found of you such as ye would not," xii. 20.

If Paul had paid a visit, ἐν λόγῳ, to Corinth since the irregularities, etc., began, and had taken a strong line of action, these expressions would be unnecessary, if he had shown himself weak they would be ridiculous. It is noteworthy that Paul adopts precisely the same tone in 1 Cor. iv. 19 when speaking of the visit which he had in contemplation when writing that epistle.

(ε) Again, the allusions to the Collection most naturally fit in with the supposition that Paul had not been in Corinth since the subject had been first mooted there. The idea of such a collection was Paul's own. He attached the utmost possible importance to it; yet he ascribes the inception and the completion of the movement at Corinth to Titus alone (viii. 6). When writing ix. 1-4 Paul really did not *know* how far the movement had succeeded. Of course it may be answered that on the visit ἐν λόγῳ Paul had neither time nor inclination to think about the Collection. This is a possible, but not a likely solution of his language.

There are for our present purposes two links between 1 Cor. and 2 Cor. from which it may be most naturally

argued that the interval between the writing of the two epistles was not more than a few months. These are the notices of the Collection, and of Paul's plan of travel.

(d) The subject of the Collection is introduced abruptly in 1 Cor. xvi. 1. "Now concerning the collection for the saints, as I gave order to the churches of Galatia, so also do ye," etc. From this we may fairly infer that the proposed collection was a well-known matter in Corinth (So G. G. Findlay, *Hastings, D. B.*, vol. iii., p. 711). Even in modern times, when Christian congregations are accustomed to appeals, a pastor would hardly venture to commend to his flock an entirely new object of charity in this sudden fashion. Human nature was the same then as now. In these words then, Paul, in view of his approaching visit, gives instructions for a systematic carrying out of the plan, by weekly Sunday collections, so that on his arrival the total amount could be handed over to him without delay by the church officers.

It is natural to ask: How long had the Collection been going on more or less fitfully? We learn from 2 Cor. viii. 6, 10, that it had been started by Titus "a year ago." Professor Sanday (*Encyclopædia Biblica*, vol. i., p. 900) dates 1 Cor. about Easter, A.D. 55, and 2 Cor. in November of the same year. Assuming the correctness of these dates, we infer that the Collection had been proceeding more or less vigorously for not more than six months when Paul gave his systematic instructions in 1 Cor. xvi. 1; and it is not unreasonable to suppose that Titus initiated the project when he brought the letter mentioned in 1 Cor. v. 9. We have here assigned to ἀπὸ πέρους the utmost length of time it can possibly connote, "a year ago," an interval of twelve months; moreover, Paul is writing to people who knew the facts. The case is quite different in 2 Cor. ix. 2: "For I know your readiness, of which I glory on your behalf

to them of Macedonia, that Achaia hath been prepared ἀπὸ πέρυσι." Here the phrase "may very well be rendered 'last year', a term that we might use in February when speaking of something that had taken place in the previous November or December, especially when the writer's intention is to make the most of the interval that had elapsed" (*Expositor*, Feb., 1898).

Prof. Sanday (*l.c.*) also takes this view, adding that "the Macedonian year, like the Jewish, began with October." The earliest date at which Paul could, in his own mind, suppose Achaia to have been 'prepared' would be on the receipt of the instructions as to weekly collections, conveyed in 1 Cor., *i.e.* shortly after Easter. Dr. Kennedy's protest (*l.c.*, p. 16) against the supposed unfairness of such a use of ἀπὸ πέρυσι seems futile in the face of Paul's own confession in the following verse that his statement to the Macedonians had been a diplomatic hyperbole. In any case the comparison of 1 Cor. xvi. 1 with 2 Cor. viii. 6, 10 is sufficient to prove that not more than six months intervened between the two epistles.

(e) We now come to the notices of Paul's plan of travel as found in these epistles and in the Acts. They certainly do not afford us such notes of time as do the references to the Collection, but taken together they lead irresistibly to the conclusion that the two letters were composed within a short time of each other, and in particular that no visit to Corinth occurred in the interval. Generally speaking, no great stress can be laid on the silence of the Acts as an argument against an alleged occurrence. Not only has the Acts no pretensions to be an exhaustive history, but the writer seems to record only those purposes of Paul that were realised in fact, and only the leading incidents of the apostle's life. Thus, as far as the Acts is concerned, an unrecorded visit to Corinth might be placed during Paul's two years'

stay at Ephesus (xix. 10). But the narrative contained in xix. 21, 22, xx. 1, 2, seems to be so continuous as to leave no room for any journey other than that recorded there.

"Now after these things were ended, Paul purposed in the spirit, when he passed through Macedonia and Achaia, to go to Jerusalem, saying, After I have been there, I must also see Rome. And having sent into Macedonia . . . Timothy and Erastus, he himself stayed in Asia for a while And after the uproar was ceased, Paul departed for to go into Macedonia. And when he had gone through those parts, and had given them much exhortation, he came into Greece."

It was no part of Luke's business, even if he knew it, to complicate the narrative by stating that Paul wished Timothy to go on to Corinth (1 Cor. iv. 17), but that he was uncertain whether he would or not (1 Cor. xvi. 10). As a matter of fact, Timothy does not seem to have gone beyond Macedonia without Paul (2 Cor. i. 1). The bare statement of facts, however, in the Acts, is supplemented by the language of 1 Cor., and that again is considerably illuminated by 2 Cor.

The phrase 'purposed in the spirit,' *ἔθετο ἐν τῷ πνεύματι*, seems unnecessarily emphatic; but when we turn to 1 Cor. xvi. 5-8, although the journey projected there is the same as that 'purposed' and realised in the Acts, there are hints that there had been a rival plan, at all events, in Paul's mind. The emphatic repetition, 'For I do pass through Macedonia,' and again, 'For I do not wish to see you now by the way' (*ἐν παρόδῳ*), surely imply an alternative, now definitely abandoned, of not passing through Macedonia, and of seeing the Corinthians *ἐν παρόδῳ*. Moreover, his language also implies that by the time they had received his letter, if not earlier, they would have known of these rival plans. Again, when we turn to 2 Cor., we find a clear statement of the alternative which had been definitely

rejected when 1 Cor. xvi. was written. "I was minded to come before unto you, that ye might have a second benefit; and by you to pass into Macedonia, and again from Macedonia to come unto you," etc. (2 Cor. i. 15, 16). This detailed account in 2 Cor. of the rejected alternative plan is most naturally understood if we suppose it to have been the first intimation of it given *by Paul himself* to the Corinthians. The messenger who brought them 1 Cor., would naturally have known of it and have told the Corinthians of the benefit they had forfeited, but if Paul himself had either by letter or word of mouth promised the Corinthians this 'second benefit', the information conveyed in 2 Cor. i. 15, 16 becomes unnecessary and unmeaning, unless we suppose Paul to have had his commentators in view, or to be like the messenger in a Greek drama whose preliminary narrative helped the audience to understand the plot.

However that may be, a clear comprehension of the rejected alternative plan is one of the elements in the true explanation of the chief passages which are supposed to prove a second unrecorded visit. When writing 2 Cor. Paul was in Macedonia. If the Corinthians had been satisfactory in their conduct, the alternative plan would not have been rejected ("To spare you I forbore to come unto Corinth," 2 Cor. i. 23), and he would, when in Macedonia, have already paid them two visits, and be 'the third time ready to come to them.' The first visit is of course the original one of Acts xviii. The second would have been ἐν παρόδῳ, from Ephesus on his way to Macedonia; but, although this second visit was not actually paid, he had been *ready* to pay it, to such a degree indeed ready, that he had only abandoned the idea of paying it after a severe mental struggle. How natural then that he should have desired to emphasize, rhetorically, the fact that his approaching visit was the

third, as far as his wishes were concerned, especially in a context in which he is insisting on the proofs he had already given them of his devotion. It is to be observed that Paul does not say that this would be the third time he *had come* to them, but, "This is the third time I am ready to come to you" (xii. 14); "This is the third time I am coming to you" (xiii. 1). Principal Robertson (*Hastings, D. B.*, vol. I., p. 494) enumerates the following as favouring this interpretation of xii. 14 and xiii. 1: Paley, Baur, de Wette, Renan, Hilgenfeld, Davidson, and Farrar.

Another key to the explanation of this language, especially of xiii. 1, is to be found in the quotation from Deut. xix. 15, which follows in xiii. 2: "At the mouth of two witnesses or three shall every word be established." One cannot conceive of Paul as seriously proposing to submit all or any of the personal and spiritual issues which were at stake to the evidence of two or three human witnesses in a legal process (as Alford, following Meyer, interprets). The 'two witnesses or three' surely refer, in the first place, to the testimony borne to his apostolic character and teaching by his visits, two in reality, three in intention, and in the second place, to the twice or thrice repeated declaration, in the following verse. "I have said beforehand, and I do say beforehand, ὥς παρὼν τὸ δεύτερον, καὶ ἀπὼν νῦν that, if I come again I will not spare." The rendering followed in the R.V. text: 'As when I was present the second time' does not seem to have much force. The substance of this threat is found in 1 Cor. iv. 21: "What will ye? Shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love," etc. If 1 Cor. had been followed by a visit, whether with or without a rod, the repetition of the threat here would be idle and unmeaning. This reasoning has weight, even if we suppose the reference to include the warnings

found in the present epistle, x. 6, 11. But the R.V. marg.: 'As if I were present the second time,' yields a good sense, especially if we supply *προλέγω* again with *ἀπὸν νῦν*. Testimony that he would not spare would thus be borne thrice, *i.e.* by 1 Cor. iv. 21, by this letter, the receipt of which would be equivalent to a second visit, and by Paul himself now absent in Macedonia.

One more passage remains, ii. 1: *ἔκρινα δὲ ἐμαυτῷ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν λύπῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν*. It is quite true, as Principal Robertson concedes (*l.c.*), that "the more natural interpretation of this verse connects *πάλιν* with *ἐν λύπῃ* rather than with *ἐλθεῖν*," but it is at least possible to render this, 'I determined that my next visit to you should be a pleasant one.' He adds, "As a matter of fact, the assumption of a visit *ἐν λύπῃ* does encounter hopeless obstacles whether we seek to place it before or after 1 Cor." Those who believe in its reality not only have to overcome all the negative objections here enumerated, but they are, most of them, compelled to multiply lost letters or disintegrate existing ones in the most bewildering fashion.

NEWPORT J. D. WHITE.

SOME NOTES ON PROPERTIUS.¹

W^h welcome with a special pleasure this volume, one of the latest additions to the Oxford Classics. Propertius has long suffered undeserved neglect from English editors, a neglect due probably to the nature of his subject-matter, which renders his work unfit to serve as a text-book for young Latinists, while his place among poets is not sufficiently high to compel the attention of the general student of literature.

In respect of the quality and bulk of his best work, he ranks with our Sucklings and Lovelaces. He is not a world poet, like Catullus, nor a supreme master of the 'latium of the file,' like Ovid. Yet, in his own field, he is unrivalled by any Latin writer. His Elegiacs move with a varied grace and natural flow unrivalled by any other of his countrymen. So easy, indeed, is his style, that it seems almost flaccid when compared with the inevitable point and counterpoint, the elaborate mechanism of Virgil. Yet it would be possible, I believe, to prove by examples that Propertius can on occasion throw into a couplet a wealth of strong or tender feeling of which his successor was quite incapable. The late Professor Palmer was wont to commend the remark of Merivale,

¹ See the *Propertius*, ed. by the late Professor
H. J. Parker, with an introduction
by the late Professor H. J. Parker.

Graecarum apud Glasguenses Professor,
Archie Christi Oxoni olim alumnus:
typographo Clarendoniano.

that Propertius could put more meaning into a pentameter than any other man, challenging comparison with

Viximus insignes inter utramque facem,
or
Vinceris aut vincis ; haec in amore rota est,
or
Nunc tibi pro tumulo Carpathium omne mare est.

There is in Propertius, too, a certain vein of delicate and graceful humour extremely rare and precious in amorous poetry. Of the other Roman writers, Horace and Catullus alone seem to possess it ; and it lends a peculiar charm to such delightful little pieces as the twelfth and twenty-ninth poems of his Second Book. But the special merit of Propertius seems to me to lie in the warmth and vivid colour which he can infuse into his pen-pictures. Read the description of the sleeping Cynthia (I. iii.) ; of the deserted Antiope (III. xv.) ; of the visit of Cynthia's ghost to her faithless lover (IV. vii.) ; and judge if Propertius deserves to be remembered by the average young scholar chiefly as the Bore of the Sacred Way ! Nay, had he written nothing more, that exquisite and touching appeal of the dead Cornelia (IV. xi.) would entitle him to a high place among Latin poets.

Our gratitude then is due to the Clarendon Press for a most welcome addition to our bookshelves, and to Mr. Phillimore for the diligence and skill with which he has performed his task. Few readers, perhaps, will be content to accept as final the exact text he has given us ; doubtless he would himself introduce many changes, were he offering us a full contentious Edition. But he has selected and presented his material so clearly and judiciously, that where one is disposed to quarrel with his text, a glance at the bottom of the page supplies ample means for criticising it.

Two additions I should like to suggest for the consideration of the Editor. The use of asterisks or brackets to indicate passages where the manuscript reading, though retained for want of a certain remedy, is undoubtedly wrong, would save the casual reader much mental agony. Secondly, I think that critical students would be grateful for a separate table of all suggestions and emendations adopted in text or notes which have not previously appeared in any Edition.

To turn to particulars, it will probably be the best plan to examine shortly in the first instance the alterations that Mr. Phillimore himself suggests in his text and notes. Perhaps the most successful of these are the corrections of—

Book IV. iv. 55 :

Sin hospes patria metuar regina sub aula

[Mss. : Sic pariamne tua].

And Book IV. xi. 53 :

Vel cui, iuratos cum Vesta reposceret ignis

[Mss. : cuius rasos].

Other suggestions which appear to me to be correct occur at—

Book II. xxi. 12 :

Eiecta est (tenuit namque Creusa) domo

[Mss. : tenuis. Beroaldus : tenuit
domum].

Book II. xiii. 46 (in the commentary) :

Quin, tam longaevae minuisset fata senectae

[Mss. : Quis].

And Book IV. xi. 8 (in the commentary) :

Obserat abrosos lurida porta rogos

[MSS. : herbosos].

At Book II. ii. 11, Mr. Phillimore gives, as his text, after Burmann :

Mercurio *Ossaeis* fertur Boebeidos undis

[Mss. : satis].

But, guided by the demands of the context, he suggests in the commentary *qualis*. Modifying this to *talis*, I believe the reading to be far superior to that in the text.

With the rest of his corrections I am unable to agree. They are offered so far as I have noted them, on the following passages :

Book I. xiii. 26 (commentary) : *Tam* for the MSS. *Nam*. This is quite unnecessary.

Book I. xx. 14 (commentary) : *adite* for the MSS. *adire*. How can the plural be defended ?

Book II. xii. 17 :

Si puer est, *animo* traice puella tuo !

[Mss. : alio].

Assuming that *animo* would be written *año*, this reading agrees very closely with the MSS. tradition, and preserves the verbal antithesis which other Editors have had to sacrifice. But the only meaning I can extort from the words 'transfer him to *your* heart' involves a very doubtful grammatical construction ; while the context would lead one to expect *cordi* or *sinu* rather than *animo*.

Book II. xiii. 25 :

Sat mea sit *magno*, si tres sint pompa libelli

[Mss. : magna].

The MSS. reading might stand. Propertius seems to have felt that the strong caesura of a hexameter constitutes a breach of metrical continuity comparable with that existing at the end of a line. Accordingly we find him three times admitting hiatus in this position (II. xv. 1,

II. xxxii. 45, III. vii. 49): and once lengthening a short syllable before a vowel (IV. i. 17); liberties which he has permitted himself in no other part of his lines save at the end of the first half of a pentameter (cf. II. viii. 8). Here the stress of caesura is emphasised by the pause in the sense. Virgil himself has not shrunk from a similar license: witness his

Sancta ad vos anima atque istius inscia culpa.

Book II. xxxii. 61:

Quod si tu Graias tuque *is* imitata Latinas
[Mss.: *es*].

This change of *es* into *is* reads artificial and is, I believe, unnecessary. At Book II. xii. 17, the ingenuity of Editors has not yet hit on any plausible reading which will retain the MSS. *est*; and almost all have accepted as the opening of the line

Si puer *es*, alio

Again, at Book II. xxxiv. 83, I believe that the MSS. reading *animis* should be emended to *animi es*. At all events, in *two* cases the evidence strongly makes for the view that Propertius has used *es* as a long syllable. In this usage he is, of course, fully justified on philological grounds; and when we remember that to Plautus *es* alone was admissible, and that Propertius wrote before the Augustan age had finally stereotyped into one unquestioned canon the free variations of spoken language, I do not think we are entitled to say that either Propertius or the scribe is in the wrong here.

Book II. xxxiv. 83, 84:

Nec minor his *animi est*; aut, si minor ore, canorus
Anseris indocto carmine cessit olor.
[Mss.: *animis*].

The correction does not remove the difficulties of the couplet, the harsh ellipse after *ore* and the strained

meaning of *cessit*. I should prefer to read *animi es*, and to remove the comma after *ore* and substitute it for the full stop at the end of the couplet. We thus obtain a connected train of thought:—‘Nor art thou less inspired in strains like these (elegiac verse); or if the tuneful swan *has* degraded his voice by borrowing the goose’s unskilful music, why, Varro too unbent to this trifling when he had finished his “Iason.”’

But there remains the unpleasant assonance ‘minor ore canorus,’ and I believe this passage should be weighed in the same scale with II. xxxiv. 53, III. i. 27, and IV. iii. 7. In each case the end of the line is wanting in the Neapolitan MS. In each case the inferior MSS. agree in a reading thoroughly unsatisfactory, either from construction or meaning. To retain their reading in the latter two passages is to charge Propertius with perpetrating the merest nonsense, and to my mind we must rest content to fill in the sense of the lost words from the context. These observations, if correct, would seem to infer that all our MSS. are based on a single, slightly mutilated archetype; the Neapolitan being a direct transcription, while all the rest reproduce a single early copy filled up conjecturally by an unskilful patcher.

Book III. vi. 9:

Sic, ut eam incomptis vidisti flere capillis,
Illius ex oculis multa cadebat aqua?

I cannot understand Mr. Phillimore’s punctuation. Reading with the MSS. *sicut*, we get a satisfactory sense: ‘as, for example (*sicut*), “you have seen her weeping” “the tears fell fast from her eyes.”’

Book III. vii. 46:

Pauper, at in terra; nil, ubi flere, potest

Again I fail to understand the punctuation, in such a context.

Book III. viii. 19 :

Non est certa fides, *quae* non iurgia vertat
[Mss: *quam*].

The MSS. reading gives a tolerable sense, if we punctuate after *certa*: 'The mistress is not to be trusted, whom her own loyalty does not drive to reproaches.'

Book III. xvi. 9 :

Peccaram semel, et totum sum *postus* in annum
[N. *portus* . . *caeteri* pulsus].

The punishment seems too severe for a single failure to keep tryst; and the succeeding line

In me mansuetas non habet illa manus
appears to hint broadly at *corporal* punishment. I believe Propertius was *tortus*.

Book III. xvii. 17 :

Dum modo purpureo *tumeant* mihi dolia musto.
[NDF *numen*. L *numerem*].

The reading of L is nearer the tradition of the Neapolitan, and gives good sense. *Numerus* seems to have been a *vox propria* in connexion with wine storage. Cf. *Maximus vini numerus*. (Cic., *Phil.* II. 66.)

As a rule, Mr. Phillimore is very loath to depart from the MSS. tradition, but I have noted a few instances where he has rejected or despaired of readings which appear to me defensible. Thus he introduces at III. ix. 8 the reading of Beroaldus :

Fama nec ex aequo ducitur ulla iugo
[Mss.: *Flamma*].

which could *not* mean, in Propertius at least, 'Fame must be won in a field ploughed by no yokefellow.' May

not *Flamma* after all be right, and convey some allusion to the Promethean spark? 'Olympus is not an easy hill to climb.' If this meaning cannot be fairly extracted from *aequus*, perhaps one might conjecture

Flamma nec e quoquo ducitur ulla iugo.

Again, at Book III. xvi. 22, the MSS. reading *talis* presents no difficulty.

At Book IV. ii. 34, the reading of N, *Fauor*, points so clearly to *fauitor*, that this should certainly be given the preference to the *Faunus* of two inferior MSS.

At Book IV. iii. 34, Rossberg's

Et Tyria in gladios vellera secta suo

[MSS. : suos],

though ingenious, is by no means certain. The traditional employment of Roman ladies is weaving, not sewing.

At Book IV. ix. 70, Mr. Owen's *exclusi* has not sufficient superiority to other conjectures to be inserted in the text.

Lastly, at Book I. vii. 16, and again at Book II. xxii. 48, the editor, while he accepts in his text easy corrections which give a good sense, has stigmatised each passage in his commentary as '*locus nondum sanatus*.'

To discuss the claims of the various excellent conjectures which have been refused admittance would require many pages; and I will merely subjoin a list of passages where I believe the reading which is retained to be indefensible and the remedy to be certain. These are: I. xv. 33, I. xxi. 5; II. i. 66, II. xvi. 23, II. xx. 7, II. xxix. 42; III. xii. 18, III. xx. 13.

Readers who have enjoyed the privilege of attending the late Professor Palmer's lectures, will regret the omission of a number of his suggestions. Some of these have never, I believe, been printed; and I will append five which seem to me worthy of mention in any edition.

At Book I. xvii. 3, he proposed to read, following the guidance of Herzberg :

Nec mihi *Cassiope latus visura carinas*

[Mss. : Cassiope solito visura carinam].

Cassiope is the small town of that name in Corcyra whither the passage was made from Brundisium, not the constellation. Propertius is not given to astronomical jargon : and we know he was in the habit of visiting the eastern coast of the Adriatic.

At Book III. ix. 13, he proposed :

Argumenta magis sunt Mentoris *abditæ* formæ

[Mss. : addita].

The manuscript reading is meaningless, while *abditæ*, 'recondite,' is meant to contrast with the commonplace designs adopted by Mys (mentioned in the next line). I think *forma* must be taken with Mr. Postgate as meaning a metal worker's mould.

Book III. xiii. 39, 40 :

Corniger atque dei vacuum pastoris in aulam

Dux aries saturas ipse reduxit ovis

The traditional text, though quite intelligible, is intolerably weak. The pointless yet emphatically placed epithets *corniger* and *vacuum*, the attribution to some unspecified deity, whether Pan or Apollo, of a farm and stock of his own—surely we are entitled to doubt that Propertius wrote such stuff. To read with Beroaldus, *Atque Idaei*, is no cure. Palmer proposed :

Corniger atque *deus vaccam* pastoris in aulam,

supposing that Pan is represented as playing the herdsman for the Arcadian shepherd. Perhaps it would be an improvement to read *cornigeri atque dei*, transferring

the office to the Satyrs, whose introduction balances that of the Nymphs in v. 38 ; while v. 41 :

Dique deaeque omnes, quibus est tutela per agros,
sums up the picture.

Book IV. iv. 47, Palmer pointed out that the MSS. reading,

Cras, ut rumor ait, tota pugnabitur urbe,
involves a complete contradiction of the actual course of events (cf. l. 79). He therefore boldly proposed to read *cessabitur*, as giving the required sense.

This is, of course, too trenchant a remedy, but it has guided one of his pupils, Mr. E. H. Alton, to suggest what I believe to be the true cure, *pigrabitur* ; a most expressive, if somewhat conversational, term, which Cicero had already hit on.

At Book IV. v. 19, 20, he proposed to read :

Exorabat opus verbis, ceu blatta terebrat
Saxosamque forat sedula talpa viam.

[Mss. : blanda perure, ferat, culpa].

This restoration is, at least, in every way to be preferred to the suggestion which Mr. Phillimore puts forward tentatively in his commentary. I think it might be rendered still more plausible by retaining *perurit*, a not inappropriate word to apply to a moth's fretting. *Urere* is the *vox propria* for a galling friction. So Propertius says : *urit* lorica lacertos, Horace : *Calceus uret*.

In conclusion, I take the opportunity to put forward, for what they are worth, certain corrections which have occurred to myself as desirable :

Book II. xxii. 44 :

Aut si es dura, nega : sin es non dura, venito !

Quid iuvat et nullo ponere verba loco ?

Read *ex*.

‘What boots it to put me off with words that will neither declare for me or against me.’ *Ex nullo loco* I regard as equivalent to *ex nulla parte*, and should be taken as qualifying *verba*. The idea is the same as that which has given rise to the common colloquialism ‘*dare verba*,’ ‘to give words where deeds are due.’ *Ponere*, ‘to put down in payment of a demand,’ is an appropriate word enough. To read *ponere verba loco*, or, *in . . . loco*, ‘to put your words in no position,’ seems to me insufferably bald.

Book II. xxiv. 3, 4.

Cui non his verbis aspergat tempora sudor?
Aut pudor ingenuus aut reticendus amor.

These lines should be taken as part of the interpellator’s speech. There is really nothing in the mild rebuke of the opening sentence to call for the ‘sweat of shame’; while a respectable friend might well feel shocked at the professions of the preceding poem. Propertius’ apology begins quite naturally with the ‘*Quod si*’ of line 5.

Book II. xxv. 17 :

At *nullo* dominae teritur *sublimine* amor, qui
Read *nulli . . . sub limine*.

‘Steel may rust, flint may wear away, but you will never wear out the love of a man with waiting at his mistress’ doorstep.’ *nullo* is due to influence of *limine*.

Book II. xxvii. 1–12 :

At vos incertam, mortales, funeris horam
Quaeritis, et qua sit mors aditura via :
Quaeritis et caelo Phoenicum inventa sereno,
Quae sit stella homini commoda quaeque mala.
Seu pedibus Parthos *sequimur* seu classe Britannos,
Et maris et terrae caeca pericla viae :

Rursus et obiectum *fletus* caput esse tumultu, 7
 Cum Mavors dubias miscet utrimque manus :
 Praeterea *domibus* flammam *domibusque* ruinas,
 Neu subeant labris pocula nigra *tuis* !
 Solus amans novit, quando periturus et a qua
 Morte, neque hic Boreae flabra neque arma timet.

[l. 7, MSS. : *fletus*].

It is impossible in reading this poem to avoid noticing the strange interchange of the persons employed. The sudden transition from the first plural in ll. 5, 7 to the 2nd singular in l. 10 is specially difficult. Apart from this, the intolerable iteration of *domibus* in l. 9 calls for cure. Study the elegy as a whole. Surely Propertius ranks himself with the lover *contra mundum* ? If so, the first person is out of place in ll. 5, 7 ; and note that the MSS. do not offer it in l. 7, while in l. 5 it introduces a stiffness into the construction. I propose to read *sequitur* (with the inferior MSS.) in l. 5, connecting it with the preceding couplet ; *fletur* in l. 7 ; and *metuisque* (with L. Müller) in l. 9. The transition from the 2nd plural to 2nd singular is thus bridged by the impersonal *fletur*, and the emendation of l. 9 not only improves it, but accounts for the succeeding *tuis*.

Book II. xxx. 31 :

The passage 31-36 should be marked as a parenthesis. At 37 we return to the picture commenced in 27. Mr. Postgate's permutations are then unnecessary.

Book III. i. 29, 30 :

Deiphobumque Helenumque et Polydamantas *in armis*
 Qualemcumque Parim vix sua nosset humus.

Read *inermis* ; separating the construction of line 30. Polydamas, the champion of discretion (*πεινυμένως*) as

opposed to valour (Hom. *Il.* xviii. 252, says of Polydamas and Hector—

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἄρ' μύθοισι, ὁ δ' ἔγχεϊ πολλὸν ἐνίκα),

may well be characterised as *inermis*, and as a mere unindividualised type be spoken of slightly in the plural number.

Book III. xii. 25 :

Castra decem annorum, et Ciconum mons Ismara. *Calpe*,
Exustaeque tuae mox, Polypheme, genae

Read *culpa*, connecting it with the succeeding line.

This gives a definite meaning to *mox*, while removing the meaningless allusion to Calpe: 'Thy crime, Polyphemus, and its speedy requital.' The corruption arose from the scribe's failing to take the word in connexion with what follows.

Book III. xv. 1-8 :

Sic ego non ullos iam norim in amore tumultus,
Nec veniat sine te nox vigilanda mihi :
Ut mihi praetexti pudor est velatus amictus,
Et data libertas noscere amoris iter,
Illa rudes animos per noctes conscia primas
Inbuit heu nullis capta Lycinna datis.
Tertius (haud multo minus est) cum ducitur annus,
Vix memini nobis verba coisse decem.

Although I cannot sympathise with wholesale rearrangements of the text, I believe that we should here transpose lines 1, 2 to a position after line 6; reading *elatus* for *velatus* in line 3.

It is surely a most strange way of opening your self-defence to your lady-love, to protest 'As I hope for peace, when I came to man's estate the first girl I ever loved was—someone else!' No, the natural order is, first, confession, 'True, when I was but a child I loved

another', and *then* protestation, 'But for the last three years, I swear, I have hardly spoken to her.' Can we assign any cause for the misplacement? I think so. The scribe failed to understand the attestatory *sic*; failed to understand the somewhat unusual *ut* = since; and thought to simplify his difficulties by bringing the two into the familiar connexion, *sic . . . ut*, without wasting much thought on the general sense. Exactly the same difficulty seems to have led him to attempt the same escape by still more violent measures at I. xxi. 5, where the meaningless *ut* is almost universally rejected as an interpolation.

Book III. xv. 41, 42:

Prata cruentantur Zethi, victorque canebat
Paeana Amphion rupe, Aracynthe, tua.

[Mss.: *Parta*].

What meaning are we to attach to *Prata Zethi*? He was not king of Thebes as yet. Could we read *Sparta*, ropes of *spartum*, such as are mentioned by Pliny, which might have been used to bind Dirce to the bull?

If *prata* is retained I believe we should read with the 'Itali'

Prata cruentantur; *Zethus* victorque canebat

the construction would be, perhaps, sufficiently obscure to lead a hasty copyist to introduce the genitive.

Book IV. iii. 11:

Haecne marita fides et †parce avia† noctes

May I add to the countless suggestions offered already

. *et partae savia noctis?*

Book IV. vi. 7, 8:

. carmenque recentibus aris
Tibia Mygdoniis libet eburna *cadis*.

Pindar might have used this metaphor, but I cannot believe that Propertius ever did. Neither do I think that a poet whose geographical allusions are of the most vague and commonplace order would drag in the obscure name *Cadis*. Could Propertius have used *cavis* of the *foramina* of the flute? Or should we fall back on *modis*?

Book IV. ix. 3 :

Venit *et advictos* (et adiunctos L), *pecorosa Palatia*, *montes*,
[ad invictos *vulg.*]

Why may we not read *et ad iunctos . . . montes*, i.e. the famous seven hills; taking *pecorosa Palatia* in apposition as added by way of nearer definition, as in the the common Greek construction καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος?

L. H. GWYNN.

NOTES ON THE ODES OF HORACE.

1. Odes iv. 14, 13:

Drusus Genaunos, inplacidum genus,
 Breunosque veloces et arces
 Alpibus inpositas tremendis
 Dejecit acer plus vice simplici;
 Major Neronum mox grave proelium
 Commisit

PORPHYRION'S explanation, generally accepted, of "plus vice simplici," namely, "Quia dupla quam dederant clade perculsi sunt" is most unsatisfactory. Horace has given no hint that the Genauni or Breuni had previously inflicted loss upon the Romans, as he would have done if he meant *plus vice simplici* "with more than a bare requital." It makes a poor compliment to Drusus to say that he, with the conquering legions, gave these mountaineers more punishment than they had inflicted, or according to Porphyron, that the Roman casualties were half the enemy's. The comparison, "honoris causa," is between the two brothers. The stop should be put after "dejecit"; then "plus vice simplici" will qualify "acer," and the line should be read

Drusus

 Dejecit; acer plus vice simplici
 Major Neronum mox

Drusus had his turn first and did finely; then "with

more than a bare requital of keenness" his elder brother took up the running. Horace means that Drusus did exceeding well, and Tiberius better still. The stop might be put after "acer," but, I think, emphasis would be lost.

It may be added that, in Horace's *Alcaics*, it is very rare to find a strong stop at the end of the first line of a stanza, unless that line is a sentence complete in itself. In thirty-seven odes this only happens twice. When the first line is "end-stopped" it is usually a gnomic saying, or rhetorical question—

Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori.
Damnosa quid non inminuit dies?

2. Odes ii. 9, 19-22 :

Cantemus Augusti tropaea
Caesaris et rigidum Niphaten,
Medumque flumen gentibus additum
Victis minores volvere vertices
Intraque praescriptum Gelonos
Exiguus equitare campis.

What does Horace mean by "Medum flumen gentibus additum victis"? It is generally held to signify merely that the Euphrates had been subdued by Augustus, so that it "ibat iam mollior undis." But how can a river be said to be added to nations? It would be nonsense to say, in praise of Lord Kitchener, that he had added the Blue Nile to conquered nations. With the ordinary interpretation the phrase is as vicious as (ii. 2. 23)

Quisquis ingentes oculo irretorto
Spectat acervos,

but not so hopeless.

The expression should be compared with Virgil's (*Æn.* vi. 90)

Nec Teucris addita Juno
Usquam aberit.

"Juno, set like a thorn in the side of the Trojans." This meaning of *addita* is derived from the frequent use of the expression *addere custodem*; and Lewis and Short give an example from Lucilius, *Si mihi non praetor siet additus atque agilet me*. The word in this sense means much the same as *impositus*; cf. again Plaut. Aul. 3. 6. 20, *Argus quem quondam Ioni Iuno custodem addidit*. So Horace means in the above stanza that the Euphrates, set like a gaoler upon conquered nations, rolls its waters less proudly to the sea. The emphatic word, as its position shows, is *victis*. The Euphrates had been, more or less, the boundary between the Romans and Parthians since the days of Lucullus and Pompey. But the Parthians were not *victi*. After Carrhae, when

Crassus ad Euphraten aquilas natumque suosque
Perdidit,

the Parthians overran Syria, and besieged Antioch. In the Civil War the line of the Euphrates was deprived of garrisons, and the Parthians made invasions over it in B.C. 40 and 38. It pleased the Roman poets to say that the conquest was reserved for Augustus; and, as Wickham points out, it is impossible in Virgil (Georg. 3. 30), and in this ode of Horace, to "disentangle anticipation from history or the hyperbolical dress of historical fact." Augustus, according to the poetical version of the bloodless victory of B.C. 20, regained the standards, conquered the Parthians, but graciously permitted them to live beyond the Euphrates. So Prop. iv. 6. 83:

Gaude, Crasse, nigras si quid sapis inter arenas:
Ire per Euphraten ad tua busta licet.

Ever since Lucullus had first crossed it, the passage of the Euphrates was a momentous thing to Rome.

Horace is not speaking of a "river added to conquered nations." He speaks just as a Cromwellian might have

done, after the conquest of Ireland, describing how the Shannon, set like a gaoler over the rebellious Celts, rolled its waters more humbly to the sea.

3. Odes iv. 2. 29.

Teque, dum procedit io Triumphæ,
Non semel dicemus io Triumphæ
Civitas omnis.

Would it help towards untying this knot to compare Hor. Od. ii. 20. 6-7, *Non ego, quem vocas dilecte, Maecenas!* The text above is the reading of the best manuscripts, and is not beyond interpretation without accepting the impossible personification of Triumph. *Te* must refer to Antonius, and is set in antithesis to *Caesare* of the preceding line. In Ode ii. 20. 6-7 *quem vocas dilecte* surely means whom you address as "dilecte." The form of expression is a little confused, and I think there is the same confusion in *te dicemus Io Triumphæ*. Horace means that the crowd will hail Antonius also, as well as Caesar, with cries of *io Triumphæ*. In *dum procedit io Triumphæ*, the *io Triumphæ* is nom. to *procedit*, 'You also, whilst the cry "Ho Triumph" is passing along, we shall address as "Ho Triumph."' This is, of course, quite a common use of *dico*, as in Virg. Aen. iii. 335 :

Chaoniamque omnem Troiano a Chaone *dixit*.

What Horace and his friends shouted was "io Triumphæ, Antoni," just as Maecenas addressed Horace as "Dilecte Horati."

4. Hor. Odes ii. viii. 21-24 :

Te suis matres metuunt iuencis,
Te senes parci miseraeque nuper
Virgines nuptae, tua ne retardet
Aura maritos.

Catullus lxi. 51-55 :

Te suis tremulus parens
 Invocat, tibi virgines
 Zonula soluunt sinus.
 Te timens cupida novos
 Captat aure maritus.

The likeness between these two stanzas must be due, either to unconscious recollection, or deliberate burlesque by Horace. In both, each clause is introduced by the second person pronoun, the *matres* and *senes* of Horace answer to the *parens*, the *virgines* occur in both, and the *aure maritus* that ends is echoed, if not parodied, by Horace's *aura maritos*.

Catullus' Epithalamium must have been in Horace's time one of the most familiar Latin poems. It is just the sort of thing that *Simius iste* would sing, and I think it unlikely that Horace could have written his stanza without observing that his words were so like to those of Catullus. It is probable that he always had Catullus in his mind. He had wished to show that he could write Latin poems in Greek metre better than Catullus. Since Catullus was influenced by the Alexandrian school, he had drawn only upon the older Greek lyrical poets; since Catullus had used familiar language, especially diminutives, he kept, in his Odes, to the purest poetic diction, and particularly avoided diminutives, except in two instances where they express contempt. (As L. Mueller pointed out, "curriculo" in i. 1. 3. is a diminutive, conveying contempt. In fact the verse is the Latin of "the flannelled fools at the wicket, and the muddied oafs at the goal.") Horace imitates Catullus in several places, and tries to "go one better." In the "Integer vitae" Ode (i. 22) he amplifies, with poor taste, Cat. 45. 6-7 :

Solus in Libya Indiaque tosta
 Caesio veniam obvius leoni.

Europa, also (iii. 27), not only prays *utinam inter errem nuda leones*, but *speciosa quaero pascere tigres*. In Odes i. 36. 20 *Lascivis hederis ambitiosior*, as applied to Damalis, looks like a deliberate debasing of Catullus' beautiful lines (61. 34-6):

Mentem amore revinciens
Ut tenax hедера huc et huc
Arborem implicat errans.

As the stanza quoted above, the last of the "Barine" ode, is particularly offensive, I think he is maliciously burlesquing the "Epithalamium." The recalling of Catullus' *captat aure maritus* by the words *retardet aure maritos* is a device very familiar to us. Calverley uses it less offensively, as, for example, in his

"Now unto mine inn must I,
Your poor moralist, betake me,
In my solitary fly."

Or—

"There I met with him, my chosen
Friend—the long but not stern swell."

His "Carmen Saeculare" is all in this vein of parody, and is free from the inverted commas which are so annoying in his English verses. Aristophanes, of course, supplies many examples.

ERNEST ENSOR.

BUTLER'S INDEBTEDNESS TO ARISTOTLE.

IN drawing attention to the neglect which is shown to Bishop Butler by German historians of Moral Philosophy, Dr. Abbott says: "It is certainly a curious and suggestive fact that writers, professedly and learnedly treating of English moral philosophers, should be wholly ignorant of the writer who holds by far the highest rank among them, whose work is the classical work, the text-book of the Universities, and with a wider circulation, probably, than the works of all the other moralists put together." This sentence seems to suggest that the only possible explanation of the fact mentioned lies in the ignorance of the foreigners: it is the object of the present paper to show that there are possibly other grounds for their neglect.

In the first place, it must be remembered that a large portion of Butler's work is merely controversial. "His arguments," says Dr. Bernard, "are directed, not against men of straw who have been set up only that they may be overthrown, but against ethical and theological doctrines which were widely prevalent in his day." It does, indeed, by no means follow from this that his works are devoid of permanent value, so far as they are merely polemical; for it would be difficult to name a single great philosopher who was not to the full as busy as Butler with destructive criticism of theories widely accepted in his own time.

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But destructive criticism alone will not entitle a man to enrol his name among the great philosophers of the world. It must be accompanied by the power of origination—a rule to which David Hume is the sole even apparent exception in the entire history of philosophy. But although Hume's speculation was purely destructive in outward seeming, it was so in outward seeming only. The best proof of this lies in Kant's famous remark that it was Hume's scepticism which awoke him from his dogmatic slumber. While granting, therefore, that Butler's claim to greatness is not defeated by the destructive nature of much of his work, we have still to consider whether in the course of this destructive criticism he displayed marked original power. Did Butler, in other words, present in a new light the eternal principles which underlie the ever-varying rules of morality? Did he set forth, as no one had ever done before him, any essential aspect of ethical truth? Was he a pioneer in the realm of moral philosophy, as distinguished from an adapter of the work of other thinkers? It would seem that the answer can be nothing but in the negative.

It will be well to begin by clearing the ground. We are not concerned with any of Butler's more strictly theological argumentations, of the kind that compose the second part of the *Analogy*. We must also ignore the first part of the same work, because it belongs in no sense to ethical philosophy. We may consider it as a more or less successful reply to a line of argument which has long since ceased to be even historically interesting, and in any case has no connexion with ethics. We may also regard it as a stately admonition of human weakness and liability to error, and from this point of view it has a permanent and a very high value. Again, it may confidently be asserted, despite the criticisms of Bagehot and others, that the history of literature is acquainted with few works of a more

grand and sombre majesty than the first part of Butler's *Analogy*. But neither its value as literature, nor its value as a work of religious instruction is here our concern. We are interested in it solely in so far as it belongs to the domain of ethical *philosophy*, and therefore, as it would seem, we are for the present not interested in it at all.

If these views are accepted, it is now evident that Butler's claim to greatness as an ethical thinker must rest on the *Fifteen Sermons* and the *Essay on Virtue*. That these works contain ethical doctrines of the utmost importance is incontestable; but that those doctrines originated with Butler is a matter for question, and is here denied. There are two methods, either of which might be adopted in the support of this thesis. It is open to us, in the first place, to sum up the doctrine put forward by Butler, and then to show that they had, one and all, been previously maintained. But although this might be a fair enough method on the speculative side of philosophy, it is not so on the practical. For there an absolute origination is quite impossible, while on the other hand it is perfectly possible that different thinkers might in distant ages trace out independently the same explanation of those moral phenomena which are to be observed at every known stage of the world's history in uniform and invariable repetition. We must adopt a different plan. We must take up the salient doctrines of whatever ethical work is under consideration, and compare them one by one with some previous work or works, of which it is at least probable that the later writer had a knowledge, in order to decide from the actual wording in both cases whether we are in the presence of mere coincidence or borrowing conscious or unconscious; and if the latter should then seem probable, it will be our duty to take into account, not merely salient doctrines, but the smallest points of resemblance. If we pursue this method with Butler's

Fifteen Sermons and Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, it will be impossible to avoid the conclusion that the former writer, although he never names the latter, owed to him almost every remark and every doctrine of ethical value. The quotations in what follows will be by the paragraphs as numbered in Dr. Bernard's edition of Butler's *Works*, and by the pages of the Berlin edition as employed in Professor Bywater's text of the *Ethics*.

Butler's first important remark occurs in § 6 of the Preface, where he declares that "morals, considered as a science, concerning which speculative difficulties are daily raised, and treated with regard to those difficulties, plainly require a very peculiar attention. For here ideas never are in themselves determinate, but become so by the train of reasoning and the place they stand in; since it is impossible that words can always stand for the same ideas, even in the same author, much less in different ones." Compare with this the opening words of Aristotle's third chapter (*N. E.* 1094 b, 11 ff.):—

λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς, εἰ κατὰ τὴν ὑποκειμένην ὕλην διασαφηθεῖη· τὸ γὰρ ἀκριβὲς οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐν ᾗτασι τοῖς λόγοις ἐπιζητητέον, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἐν τοῖς δημιουργουμένοις. τὰ δὲ καλὰ καὶ τὰ δίκαια, περὶ ὧν ἡ πολιτικὴ σκοπεῖται, πολλὴν ἔχει διαφορὰν καὶ πλάνην, ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μή.

We may also compare the passage mentioned in Dr. Bernard's note (*N. E.* 1103 b, 34 ff.):—

ἐκεῖνο δὲ προδιομολογείσθω, ὅτι πᾶς ὁ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν λόγος τύπῃ καὶ οὐκ ἀκριβῶς ὀφείλει λέγεσθαι, ὥσπερ καὶ κατ' ἀρχὰς εἶπομεν ὅτι κατὰ τὴν ὕλην οἱ λόγοι ἀπαιτητοί· τὰ δ' ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ τὰ συμφέροντα οὐδὲν ἑστηκὸς ἔχει, ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὰ ὑγιεινά. τοιούτου δ' ὄντος τοῦ καθόλου λόγου, ἔτι μᾶλλον ὁ περὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα λόγος οὐκ ἔχει τὰκριβές· οὔτε γὰρ ὑπὸ τέχνην οὔθ' ὑπὸ παραγγελίαν οὐδεμίαν πίπτει, δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς ἀεὶ τοὺς πράττοντας τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἱατρικῆς ἔχει καὶ τῆς κυβερνητικῆς.

Butler next describes two methods of ethical discussion. "There are two ways," he says in § 12, "in which the subject of morals may be treated. One begins from inquiring into the abstract relations of things; the other from a matter of fact, namely, what the particular nature of man is, its several parts, their economy or constitution; from whence it proceeds to determine what course of life it is, which is correspondent to this whole nature." Here Butler probably had in his mind *N. E.* 1095 a, 36 ff. :—

μη λανθανέτω δ' ἡμᾶς ὅτι διαφέρουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν λόγοι καὶ οἱ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς. εὖ γὰρ καὶ ὁ Πλάτων ἠπόρει τοῦτο καὶ ἐξήτει, πότερον ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς ἐστιν ἡ ὁδός. . . . ἀρκτέον μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡμῖν τὰ δ' ἀπλῶς. ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων.

We have now arrived at the famous conception of human nature as a system. After he has 'instanced' in a watch, Butler continues (§ 14):—"Thus it is with regard to the inward frame of man. Appetites, passions, affections, and the principle of reflection, considered merely as the several parts of our inward nature, do not at all give us an idea of the system or constitution of this nature; because the constitution is formed by somewhat not yet taken into consideration, namely, by the relations which these several parts have to each other, the chief of which is the authority of reflection or conscience. It is from considering the relations which the several appetites and passions in the inward frame have to each other, and, above all, the supremacy of reflection or conscience, that we get the idea of the system or constitution of human nature. And from the idea itself it will as fully appear, that this our nature, *i.e.* constitution, is adapted to virtue, as from the idea of a watch it appears that its nature, *i.e.* constitution or system, is adapted to measure time." We have here a notion of fundamental importance for Butler's moral philosophy,

and I would therefore bespeak the reader's careful attention to the following quotation from Aristotle (*N. E.* 1168b, 25 ff.), merely premising the unnecessary reminder that *the principle of rationality* is one of Butler's phrases for the conscience :—

εἴ τις δὲ σπουδάζῃ τὰ δίκαια πράττειν αὐτὸς μάλιστα πάντων ἢ τὰ σώφρονα ἢ ὅποιασὺν ἄλλα τῶν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς, καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὸ καλὸν ἑαυτῷ περιποιεῖτο, οὐδεὶς ἐρεῖ τοῦτον φίλαντον οὐδὲ ψέξει. δόξειε δ' ἂν ὁ τοιοῦτος μᾶλλον εἶναι φίλαντος. ἀπονέμει γοῦν ἑαυτῷ τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθὰ, καὶ χαρίζεται ἑαυτοῦ τῷ κυριωτάτῳ, καὶ πάντα τοῦτῳ πείθεται· ὥσπερ δὲ καὶ πόλις τὸ κυριώτατον μάλιστα εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ πᾶν ἄλλο σύστημα, οὕτω καὶ ἄνθρωπος· καὶ φίλαντος δὴ μάλιστα ὁ τοῦτο ἀγαπῶν καὶ τοῦτῳ χαριζόμενος. καὶ ἐγκρατὴς δὲ καὶ ἀκρατὴς λέγεται τῷ κρατεῖν τὸν νοῦν ἢ μὴ, ὡς τοῦτου ἐκάστου ὄντος. καὶ πεπραγέναι δοκοῦσιν αὐτοῖ καὶ ἐκουσίως τὰ μετὰ λόγου μάλιστα. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τοῦθ' ἕκαστός ἐστιν ἢ μάλιστα, οὐκ ἄδηλον, καὶ ὅτι ὁ ἐπιεικής μάλιστα τοῦτ' ἀγαπᾷ διὸ φίλαντος μάλιστα ἂν εἴη, καθ' ἕτερον εἶδος τοῦ ὀνειδιζομένου, καὶ διαφέρων τοσοῦτον ὅσον τὸ κατὰ λόγον ζῆν τοῦ κατὰ πάθος, καὶ ὀρέγεσθαι ἢ τοῦ καλοῦ ἢ τοῦ δοκοῦντος συμφέρειν.

As the Preface is merely a summary of the rest of the work, it follows that the first three sermons are a simple development of the passage just quoted. Nor is this the only occasion on which it is natural to cite it; for it seems also to be the original of § 39 :—"The goodness or badness of actions does not arise from hence, that the epithet, interested or disinterested, may be applied to them, . . . but from their being what they are, namely, what becomes such creatures as we are, what the state of the case requires, or the contrary. . . . Self-love in its due degree is as just and morally good as any affection whatever." Furthermore, the whole discussion on the two kinds of *φιλαυτία*, including the self-disappointing nature of τὸ ὀνειδιζόμενον γένος, is summarised by Butler in a note on *Serm. X.*, § 6.

We have seen that the Three Sermons on Human Nature are largely a development of an important and

striking discussion in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. But other weighty doctrines of that treatise are also to be found there. First of all, there is the error about εὐδαιμονία, which οἱ πολλοί, the world in general, are agreed in: περὶ δὲ τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, τί ἐστίν, ἀμφισβητοῦσι καὶ οὐχ ὁμοίως οἱ πολλοὶ τοῖς σοφοῖς ἀποδιδόασιν, says Aristotle (1095 a, 20 ff.). οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἐναργῶν τι καὶ φανερῶν, οἷον ἡδονὴν ἢ πλοῦτον ἢ τιμὴν, ἄλλοι δ' ἄλλο· which Butler reproduces thus (Serm. I., § 14):—"Take a survey of mankind: the world in general, the good and bad, almost without exception, equally are agreed that, were religion out of the case, the happiness of the present life would consist in a manner wholly in riches, honours, sensual gratifications." And, speaking of these things, he gives us, a few sentences further on, his application of Aristotle's doctrine of the mean:—"Is not the middle way obvious? Can anything be more manifest than that the happiness of life consists in these, possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree; that to pursue them beyond this degree is always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's self, and often with extreme misery and unhappiness."

In Book VI. of the *Ethics* there is an important distinction drawn between κυρία and φυσικὴ ἀρετή:—

σκεπτόν δὴ πάλιν καὶ περὶ ἀρετῆς· καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ παραπλησίως ἔχει ὥς ἡ φρόνησις πρὸς τὴν δεινότητα—οὐ ταῦτ' ὁ μὲν, ὁμοίον δέ—οὕτω καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ πρὸς τὴν κυρίαν. πᾶσι γὰρ δοκεῖ ἕκαστα τῶν ἡθῶν ὑπάρχειν φύσει πως· καὶ γὰρ δίκαιοι καὶ σωφρονικοὶ καὶ ἀνδρείοι καὶ τὰλλα ἔχομεν εὐθὺς ἐκ γενετῆς. ἀλλ' ὁμῶς ζητοῦμεν ἕτερόν τι τὸ κυρίως ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἄλλον τρόπον ὑπάρχειν. καὶ γὰρ παισὶ καὶ θηρίοις αἱ φυσικαὶ ὑπάρχουσιν ἕξεις, ἀλλ' ἄνευ νοῦ βλαβεραὶ φαίνονται οὔσαι. πλὴν τοσοῦτον ἵστικεν ὁρᾶσθαι, ὅτι ὥσπερ σώματι ἰσχυρῷ ἄνευ ὀψews κινουμένῳ συμβαίνει σφάλλεσθαι ἰσχυρῶς διὰ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν ὀψιν, οὕτω καὶ ἐνταῦθα· εἰ δὲ λάβῃ νοῦν, ἐν τῷ πράττειν διαφέρει· ἡ δ' ἕξις ὁμοία οὖσα τότε ᾖσαι κυρίως ἀρετή.

If we note the emphasis here laid on νοῦς, it will not

surprise us to find the gist of the passage reproduced in an illustration of Butler's definition of Conscience (I., § 8):—
 "Thus, a parent has the affection of love to his children, this leads him to take care of, to educate, to make due provision for them: the natural affection leads to this; but the reflection that it is his proper business, what belongs to him, that it is right and commendable so to do; this added to the affection becomes a much more settled principle, and carries him on through more labour and difficulties for the sake of his children than he would undergo from that affection alone, if he thought it, and the course of action it led to, either indifferent or criminal." Another unmistakable reproduction of the same distinction occurs in the note to § 6:—"It is sufficient that the seeds of it [benevolence] be implanted in our nature by God. There is, it is owned, much left for us to do upon our own heart and temper: to cultivate, to improve, to call it forth, to exercise it in a steady, uniform manner. This is our work; this is virtue and religion."

Of Butler's contributions to ethical science one of the most important is usually said to be his insistence on the supremacy of conscience—in other words, his elevation of Ethics from the realm of empiricism to that of rational knowledge, with an *a priori* basis. Thus, in Serm. II., § 15, speaking of the principle of rationality, he says:—"This faculty was placed within to be our proper governor, to direct and regulate all under principles, passions, and motives of action. This is its right and office; thus sacred is its authority. And how often soever men violate and rebelliously refuse to submit to it, for supposed interest which they cannot otherwise obtain, or for the sake of passion which they cannot otherwise gratify; this makes no alteration as to the natural right and office of conscience." Let us now compare not only the doctrine, but also the actual wording of this and the many similar

passages in Sermons I.-III. with one of the most striking passages in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the conclusion of Book III. :—

εἰ οὖν μὴ ἔσται εὐπειθὲς καὶ ὑπὸ τὸ ἄρχον, ἐπὶ πολὺ ἤξει· ἄπληστος γὰρ ἡ τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις καὶ πανταχόθεν τῷ ἀνοήτῳ, καὶ ἡ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἐνέργεια αὖξει τὸ συγγενές, κἂν μεγάλαι καὶ σφοδραὶ ᾧσι, καὶ τὸν λογισμὸν ἐκκρούουσιν. διὸ δεῖ μετρίας εἶναι αὐτὰς καὶ ὀλίγας, καὶ τῷ λόγῳ μῆθεν ἐναντιοῦσθαι—τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον εὐπειθὲς λέγομεν καὶ κεκολασμένον—ὥσπερ δὲ τὸν παῖδα δεῖ κατὰ τὸ πρόσταγμα τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ ζῆν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν κατὰ τὸν λόγον. διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὣν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

It is difficult to believe that Butler had not this passage in his mind.

The identification by Butler of duty and interest may be considered in another place; for the present it will suffice to quote the parallel to his summary of the whole theory in the concluding sentence of the Third Sermon, which runs as follows: —“ Thus, they who have been so wise in their generation as to regard only their own supposed interest, at the expense and to the injury of others, shall at last find that he who has given up all the advantages of the present world, rather than violate his conscience and the relations of life, has infinitely better provided for himself, and secured his own interest and happiness.” The sarcasm and the low pitch are Butler’s, due to the circumstances of his age; the rest is Aristotle’s. Cf. *N. E.* 1169 a, 11 ff. :—

ὥστε τὸν μὲν ἀγαθὸν δεῖ φίλαντον εἶναι (καὶ γὰρ αὐτὸς ὀνήσεται τὰ καλὰ πράττων καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὠφελήσει), τὸν δὲ μοχθηρὸν οὐ δεῖ· βλάψει γὰρ καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τοὺς πέλας, φαύλοις πάθουσιν ἐπόμενος. τῷ μοχθηρῷ μὲν οὖν διαφωνεῖ ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ἃ πράττει· ὁ δ’ ἐπεικὴς, ἃ δᾷ, ταῦτα καὶ πράττει· πᾶς γὰρ νοῦς αἰρεῖται τὸ βέλτιστον ἑαυτῷ, ὁ δ’ ἐπεικὴς πειθαρχεῖ τῷ νῷ. . . . προήσεται γὰρ καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμὰς καὶ ὅλως τὰ περιμάχῃα ἀγαθὰ, περιποιούμενος ἑαυτῷ τὸ καλόν· . . . τὸ δὲ μῖζον ἀγαθὸν ἑαυτῷ ἀπονέμει.

In Sermon I., § 7, Butler mentions certain "public affections or passions," the sphere of which is society, just as Aristotle (*N. E.* 2. 6. 1) also places certain virtues and vices ἐν ταῖς ὁμιλίαις καὶ τῷ συζῆν. It has been noticed that one of these—"indignation against successful vice"—corresponds to Aristotle's νέμεις: cf. 1108 b, 2, ὁ μὲν γὰρ νημεσητικὸς λυπεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίως εὖ πράττουσιν. We may also observe that another—"love of society as distinct from affection to the good of it"—corresponds to the nameless virtue of *N. E.* 2. 6. 4, which εἶκει μάλιστα φιλία... διαφέρει δὲ τῆς φιλίας, ὅτι ἄνευ πάθους ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ στέργειν οἷς ὁμιλεῖ. A fourth curious coincidence in the same connexion is the use of the term 'public affections or passions' and not *virtues*: for Aristotle happens to remark that there are καὶ ἐν τοῖς παθήμασι καὶ περὶ τὰ πάθη μεσότηες (1108 a, 30), and that νέμεις is one of them.

Even with all this we have not exhausted the parallels of the Sermons upon Human Nature. There is still the distinction between emulation and envy in the note on Sermon I., § 12, which is generally acknowledged to be a mere summing-up of Aristotle's discussion in the *Rhetoric*. The following echoes are also well worthy of consideration:

To be the object of esteem and love is as much desired as any external goods.—Sermon I., § 10.

τοιούτων δ' ἡ τιμή· μέγιστον γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν.—*N. E.*, 1123 b, 20. φίλους . . . ὃ δοκεῖ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μέγιστον εἶναι.—1169 b, 9.

There is such a natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that having trod the same tract of land, . . . becomes the occasion of contracting acquaintances.—Sermon I., § 10.

ἴδοι δ' ἔν τις καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλάναις ὅς οἰκεῖον ἅπας ἀνθρώπος ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ φίλον.—1155 a, 21. This is noted by Dr. Bernard.

And this is the same absurdity as to suppose a hand, or any part, to have no natural respect to any other, or to the whole body.—Sermon I., § 10.

τὸ γὰρ ὅλον πρότερον ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τοῦ μέρους. ἀναιρουμένου γὰρ τοῦ ὁλοῦ οὐκ ἔσται ποὺς οὐδὲ χεῖρ.—*Pol.* 1253 a, 20 f.

Can anything be more manifest than that the happiness of life consists in these (*sc.* external goods) possessed and enjoyed only to a certain degree, that to pursue them beyond this degree is always attended with more inconvenience than advantage to a man's self? —Serm. I., § 14.

οὐ μὴν οἰητέον γε πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων δεήσεσθαι τὸν εὐδαιμονήσοντα, εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται ἄνευ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν μακάριον εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τὸ αὐταρκές οὐδ' ἡ πράξις.—*N. E.*, 1179 a, 1 ff.

Finally, we may notice how Butler refers in this same sermon (§ 13) to instances of persons who lack the natural affections, either to others or to themselves. He points out that these cases are rare, and furthermore, that general ethical discussions are not concerned with such morbid and isolated phenomena. Aristotle has the same considerations with respect to Brutal Desire: *ὁ θηριώδης ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις σπάνιος*, he says (1145 a, 30), and then, in the succeeding discussion (1148 b, 34): *τὸ μὲν οὖν ἔχειν ἕκαστα τούτων ἔξω τῶν ὄρων ἐστὶ τῆς κακίας, καθάπερ καὶ ἡ θηριότης*.

At the beginning of the Second Sermon Butler lays down his ethical method in these words:—"Moral obligations may be shewn by different methods. If the real nature of any creature leads him and is adapted to such and such purposes only, or more than to any other; this is a reason to believe the Author of that nature intended it for those purposes. Thus, there is no doubt the eye was intended for us to see with." This is Aristotelian, even to the illustration. Aristotle asserts that the object of his discussion would be attained, *εἰ ληφθῇ τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου* (1097 b, 24), and then, in Book II. (1106 a, 15), after showing that *ἀρετὴ* is a *ἔξις*, he resumes thus:—

ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι πᾶσα ἀρετὴ, οὗ ἂν ᾗ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ εὖ ἀποδίδωσιν, ὅσον ἡ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετὴ τὸν τε ὀφθαλμὸν σπουδαῖον ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ἔργον αὐτοῦ· τῇ γὰρ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ ἀρετῇ εὖ ὁρώμεν . . . εἰ δὲ τοῦτ' ἐπὶ πάντων οὕτως ἔχει, καὶ ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴ εἴη ἂν ἡ ἔξις ἀφ' ἧς ἀγαθὸς ἄνθρωπος γίνεται καὶ ἀφ' ἧς εὖ τὸ ἑαυτοῦ ἔργον ἀποδώσει.

Another fundamental doctrine set forth in this same

sermon was also anticipated by Aristotle. In his note on 1099 a, 11 (τοῖς μὲν οὖν πολλοῖς τὰ ἡδέα μάχεται διὰ τὸ μὴ φύσει τοιαῦτ' εἶναι), Mr. J. A. Stewart remarks:—"It may be noted that the term φύσει has the same reference, in the phrase τὰ φύσει ἡδέα, as the term 'natural' has, in Butler's expression, 'the natural supremacy of conscience,' viz. to *Human Nature as a system*."

In the Third Sermon we meet the "plain, honest man," who is a law to himself. This is Aristotle's σπουδαῖος, and the two passages are well worth a careful comparison. Man, says Butler, in § 3, is "from his make, constitution, or nature, in the strictest and most proper sense, a law to himself. He hath the rule of right within; what is wanting is only that he honestly attend to it. . . . Let any plain honest man, before he engages in any course of action, ask himself, Is this I am going about right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil? I do not in the least doubt but that this question would be answered agreeably to truth and virtue by almost any fair man in almost any circumstance." And so Aristotle (1113 a, 29 ff.):—

ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάληθες αὐτῷ φαίνεται. καθ' ἑκάστην γὰρ ἔξιν ἰδίᾳ ἐστὶ καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλείστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τάληθες ἐν ἑκάστοις ὄραν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν.

Finally, this sermon affords at least one more striking parallel. In § 8 Butler compares the pleasures of virtue and vice, and adds: "When virtue is become habitual, when the temper of it is acquired, what was before confinement ceases to be so, by becoming choice and delight." The tone of the whole section is Aristotelian, and the words quoted will be at once recognised as an adaptation of the sign of a developed ἔξις given in 1104 b, 3 ff.:—

σημεῖον δὲ δεῖ ποιεῖσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινόμενὴν ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀπεχόμενος τῶν σωματικῶν ἡδονῶν καὶ αὐτῷ τούτῳ χαίρων σώφρων, ὁ δ' ἀχθόμενος ἀκόλαστος.

We have now investigated the famous sermons on Human Nature with some minuteness. To treat each of the others in the same way would be impossible, but only because the space at my disposal is necessarily limited, not because the parallelisms are either fewer or less striking. Indeed, I might very well close the paper at this point ; but it will be interesting to note about a dozen passages scattered through the other sermons, some trivial and some fundamental, but all telling the same tale. Thus, it is curious how Butler excepts deliberate falsehood for the sake of a definite end from the scope of the Sermon upon the Government of the Tongue, just as Aristotle does from the chapter on ἀλαζονεία. The former says (§ 4) :—" A man may use the faculty of speech as an instrument of false witness, who yet has so entire a command over that faculty as never to speak but from forethought and cool design. Here the crime is injustice and perjury ; and, strictly speaking, no more belongs to the present subject than perjury and injustice in any other way." The corresponding passage in Aristotle is in Book IV., 1127 a, 33 ff. :—

οὐ γὰρ περὶ τοῦ ἐν ταῖς ὁμολογίαις ἀληθεύοντος λέγομεν, οὐδ' ὅσα εἰς ἀδικίαν ἢ δικαιοσύνην συντείνει (ἄλλης γὰρ ἂν εἶη ταῦτ' ἀρετῆς), ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηδενὸς τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

In § 3 Butler says that talkative people, after exhausting common subjects of conversation, " will go on to defamation, scandal, divulging of secrets, their own secrets as well as those of others, anything rather than be silent." Similarly, Aristotle's

βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ οὔτε ἑαυτοῦ οὔτε τῶν ἄλλων ἀπεχόμενος εἰ γέλωτα ποιήσῃ, καὶ τοιαῦτα λέγων ὧν οὐδὲν ἂν εἴποι ὁ χαρίεις, ἔνια δ' οὐδ' ἂν ἀκούσαι (1128 a, 34).

124 BUTLER'S INDEBTEDNESS TO ARISTOTLE.

From Sermon V. three parallel passages may be selected, of which the last is noted by Dr. Bernard. They are as follows :—

It is indeed true, that any disposition prevailing beyond a certain degree becomes somewhat wrong.—Serm. V., § 7.

πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τοῦτο θεωρητέον, ἵνα τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὅπ' ἐνδείας καὶ ἰσχυρῶς φθείρεσθαι.—1104 a, 11 ff.

Reason alone, whatever anyone may wish, is not in reality a sufficient motive of virtue in such a creature as man ; but this reason joined with those affections which God has impressed upon his heart.—Serm. V., § 3.

διάνοια δ' αὐτὴ οὐθὲν κινεῖ, ἀλλ' ἡ ἐνεκὰ τοῦ καὶ πρακτικῆς.—1139 a, 35 f.

There is first the relief which the distressed feel from this affection in others towards them.—Serm. V., § 7.

κουφίζονται γὰρ οἱ λυπούμενοι, συναλογούντων τῶν φίλων.—1171 a, 29.

In the Sixth Sermon (§ 9) we find the words, “ it must be owned that every affection, as distinct from a principle of reason, may rise too high, and be beyond its just proportion.” This is once more the distinction between φυσικὴ and κυρία ἀρετή, and it will again be found in Serm. XII., § 27—“ When benevolence is said to be the sum of virtue, it is not spoken of as a blind propension, but as a principle in reasonable creatures, and so to be directed by their reason ; for reason and reflection comes into our notion of a moral agent.”

In the Seventh Sermon we have a solution offered for the famous ἀπορία of *N. E.* 1145 b, 21, πῶς ὑπολαμβάνων ὀρθῶς ἀκρατεύεται τις, or, as Butler expresses it (§ 9) : “ For if the reasonable choice be seen and acknowledged, and yet men make the unreasonable one, is not this the same contradiction ; that very inconsistency which appeared so unaccountable ? ” There is no explanation of this, says Butler (§ 10), to be given in the way of reason : “ If this be

with a clear, full, and distinct view of the truth of things, then it is . . . acting in the most palpable contradiction to their very nature. But if," he continues, "there be any such thing in mankind as putting half-deceits upon themselves—which there plainly is, either by avoiding reflection, or (if they do reflect) by religious equivocation, subterfuges, and palliating matters to themselves—by these means conscience may be laid asleep." Now let us listen to Aristotle (1146 b, 31 ff.) :—

ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ διχῶς λέγουμεν τὸ ἐπίσταςθαι (καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων μὲν οὐ χρώμενος δὲ τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ ὁ χρώμενος λέγεται ἐπίσταςθαι), διοίσει τὸ ἔχοντα μὲν μὴ θεωροῦντα δὲ καὶ τὸ θεωροῦντα ἃ μὴ δεῖ πράττειν. τοῦτο γὰρ δοκεῖ δεινόν, ἀλλ' οὐκ εἰ μὴ θεωρῶν.

In the Eighth Sermon (*Upon Resentment*) several parallels will be found quoted in Dr. Bernard's notes, and need not be repeated here. But I desire to draw special attention to another. The whole sermon is a mere development of a certain view of resentment, a view which Butler, moreover, claims as originating with himself. That, at least, seems to me the most reasonable construction which can be put upon his words in the *Preface*. But if so, we must bear in mind not only that the whole view is given in a line in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also that Butler has lit upon the very words of the Greek writer. The passage in the *Preface* (§ 32) runs thus: "It may possibly have appeared to some, at first sight, a strange assertion, that injury is the only natural object of settled resentment, or that men do not in fact resent deliberately anything but under this appearance of injury. But I must desire the reader not to take any assertion alone by itself," &c. The line in the *Ethics* is 1135 b, 28: ἐπὶ φαινομένῃ ἀδικίᾳ ἡ ὀργὴ ἐστίν: cf. also *Rhet.* 2, 2, 1 ἔστω δὲ ὀργὴ ὀρέξις μετὰ λύπης τιμωρίας φαινομένης διὰ φαινόμενην ὀλιγωρίαν.

The Ninth Sermon contains a favourite Aristotelian doctrine, expressed in Aristotle's words:—

To be convinced that any temper of mind, and course of behaviour, is our duty, and the contrary vicious, hath but a distant influence upon our temper and actions.—Serm. IX., § 21.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ τὰς ἀρετὰς (sc. εἶναι) μὲν εἰδέναι οὐδὲν ἢ μικρὸν ἰσχυρ.—*N. E.*, 1105 b, 2.

Self-Deceit is the subject of the Tenth Sermon, and the most important passage in it, that which determines the province of self-deceit, is taken from the concluding chapter of Aristotle's second Book:—

Whoever will consider the whole commerce of human life will see that a great part, perhaps the greatest part, of the intercourse amongst mankind, cannot be reduced to fixed determinate rules. Yet, in these cases there is a right and a wrong; a merciful, a liberal, a kind and compassionate behaviour, which is surely our duty; and an unmerciful contracted spirit, an hard and oppressive course of behaviour, which is most certainly immoral and vicious. But who can define precisely wherein that contracted spirit and hard usage of others consist, as murder and theft may be defined? . . . In these cases there is great latitude left for everyone to determine for, and consequently to deceive himself. It is chiefly in these cases that self-deceit comes in.—Serm. X., § 10.

ἐν παντί δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἴ-
δὲ καὶ τὴν ἡδυστήν'. . . ταῦτ' οὖν ποιούν-
τες, ὡς ἐν κεφαλαίῳ εἰπεῖν, μάλιστα
δυνησόμεθα τοῦ μέσου τυγχάνειν. χαλε-
πὸν δ' ἴσως ταῦτο, καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς
καθ' ἕκαστον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾳδίον διορίσαι
καὶ πῶς καὶ τίσι καὶ ἐπὶ ποίοις καὶ πόσῳ
χρόνῳ ὀργιστέον· καὶ γὰρ ἡμεῖς ὅτε μὲν
τοὺς ἐλλείποντας ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ πρᾶν-
ταίμεν, ὅτε δὲ τοὺς χαλεπαίνοντας ἀνέρο-
δεις ἀποκαλοῦντες. . . ὁ δὲ μέχρι τίνος
καὶ ἐπὶ πόσῳ ψεκτὸς οὐ ῥᾳδίον τῷ λόγῳ
ἀφορίσαι· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἕλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰ-
σθητῶν· τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα ἐν τοῖς καθ'
ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἢ κρίσει.—
1109 b, 7-23.

I must now, for the present at least, bring this investi-
gation to a close when I have printed one parallel more.
The passage is a very famous one; the direct reference to
Aristotle has never been questioned, and it would prove
by itself that Butler was acquainted with the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Furthermore, it will show that he could

on occasion fail lamentably to understand the teaching of the master mind in the realm of moral philosophy:—

Knowledge is not our proper happiness. Whoever will in the least attend to the thing will see that it is the gaining, not the having, of it which is the entertainment of the mind.—Serm. XV., § 16.

δοκεῖ γοῦν ἡ φιλοσοφία θαυμαστὰς ἡδονὰς ἔχειν καθαρειότητι καὶ τῷ βεβαίῳ, εὐλογον δὲ τοῖς εἰδόσι τῶν ζητούντων ἡδὶω τὴν διαγωγὴν εἶναι.—1177 a, 25–27.

I cannot do better than quote Mr. J. A. Stewart's note on the passage:—"The contrast marked by τοῖς εἰδόσι and τῶν ζητούντων here is not that between the mere ἔξις of σοφία as a treasure and the ἐνέργεια of μάθησις by which that treasure is accumulated—for Aristotle would certainly tell us that of these two the μάθησις is the more pleasant; but that between the ἐνέργεια κατὰ τὴν ἔξιν, and the ἐνέργεια by which the ἔξις is formed. The σοφός derives more pleasure from the *use* which his trained faculties make of his accumulated knowledge than the learner derives from the process by which faculties are trained, and knowledge is accumulated."

In conclusion, I wish to say once more that the passages here presented are merely a selection from, and by no means exhaust, the echoes of Aristotle's words and thoughts which are to be met with in Butler's pages. But if the arm of coincidence can reach even as far as these, then it is long indeed; and in making up our minds upon the point at issue, we must not forget that *probability is the guide of life*.

WILLIAM A. GOLIGHER.

NOTE ON ACTS XVI. 1-8.

THE exegesis of this passage is too often complicated by discussions as to its bearing on the vexed question, What were the Churches of Galatia to whom St. Paul addressed his epistle? It is proposed however in this note to treat it simply as a portion of the Acts, without reference to the Epistle to the Galatians. The explanation offered will, it is believed, harmonize equally with either the North Galatian or South Galatian theory.

The key to the right interpretation of the first five verses is to be found in the preceding chapter. The plan of the second missionary journey seems to be mapped out in Acts xv. 36, "Paul said unto Barnabas, Let us return now and visit the brethren in every city wherein we proclaimed the word of the Lord, and see how they fare."

The careful reader of the Acts will observe that Luke records only those purposes of the apostle which were realised in fact. His work is not a diary in which plans, hopes and fears would be recorded as they were conceived from day to day, but a retrospective history, written when the events with which it deals could be seen in something like their true proportion, written too by a man who had a full knowledge of the issues of Paul's life and policy. This consideration will be found most helpful when we are endeavouring to solve discrepancies between the Acts and the Epistles of St. Paul.

In the case before us Luke is careful to point out that the journey as sketched by Paul was actually carried out with as little modification as possible. The sharp contention that immediately ensued between Paul and Barnabas over the ministerial qualifications of John Mark, though it dissolved the pleasant companionship of former days, was not suffered to otherwise hinder the progress of the Gospel.

Paul's plan, if rigidly adhered to, implied the revisiting of Cyprus, Perga in Pamphylia, Antioch of Pisidia, Iconium, Lystra, and Derbe. The family connexion of Barnabas with Cyprus (iv. 36), as it had, in all probability, suggested that island as a suitable starting-point for mission work on the first journey (xiii. 4), so now it determined the respective shares that each apostle took in the tour of inspection, and so "Barnabas took Mark with him, and sailed away unto Cyprus." It was left then for Paul to begin at the other end, and accordingly he set out on the road that leads north from Antioch, crossed the Amanus range of mountains by the Syrian Gates into Cilicia, and passed through that province, "confirming the churches," the principal of which would be Tarsus (ix. 30); and passing on through the Cilician Gates, arrived at Derbe, which had been the most easterly point reached on the first journey (xiv. 21). Here, then, his portion of the tour proposed in xv. 36 commenced. At the next stage, Lystra, a candidate for the ministry, presented himself in the person of Timothy. Visits to Iconium and Antioch of Pisidia would now complete the original design as far as Paul was concerned; for although we are told that "they had spoken the word in Perga," on the return half of the first journey (xiv. 25), yet it is not stated that a Church had been founded there. In any case, it did not lie in the westward direction, in which Paul was now being urged, and, if necessary, it could have been

more easily reached by Barnabas from Cyprus than by Paul from Antioch.

The statement of the historian, that Timothy "was well reported of by the brethren that were at Lystra and Iconium," does not necessarily prove that Paul himself visited Iconium before engaging Timothy as companion in travel; but a visit to Iconium, and also to Antioch of Pisidia, is certainly implied in the following verses—"And as they went on their way through the cities, they delivered them the decrees for to keep, which had been ordained of the apostles and elders that were at Jerusalem. So the Churches were strengthened in the faith, and increased in numbers daily."

We know that at Iconium and Antioch, as well as at Derbe and Lystra, churches had been regularly organized on the first journey (xiv. 23). All four places alike would be interested in the decrees of the Jerusalem council, and, as far as we know, there were no other churches in this district up to this time. Derbe and Lystra are alone mentioned for special reasons: Derbe, because there the prescribed tour began; Lystra, because of the introduction of Timothy into the history. Moreover, the verses just cited are evidently a concluding formula, summing up, in Luke's manner, a certain section of the story. (Compare ii. 46, 47; v. 42; viii. 40; ix. 31; xiv. 27, 28; xv. 35; xviii. 23; xix. 20.) The record of the accomplishment of a definitely pre-arranged plan, such as that of xv. 36, would be fitly marked by such a concluding summary.

It would seem, then, that xvi. 6 begins the narrative of a completely fresh journey (so G. G. Findlay, *Hastings, D. B.*, vol. iii., p. 707), a journey into a new country, the determining influence of which may be described as a westward instinct in St. Paul, which was yet easily controlled by revelations from the Holy Spirit, communicated

to him either directly, or possibly through Silas, who was also a prophet (xv. 32).

With two of these revelations we are specially concerned, and the exact wording of them is important. "They were not to *speak the word in Asia,*" and "they were not to *go into Bithynia.*" Διῆλθον δὲ τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν, κωλυθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἁγίου Πνεύματος λαλῆσαι τὸν λόγον ἐν τῇ Ἀσίᾳ· ἐλθόντες δὲ κατὰ τὴν Μυσίαν ἐπεύραζον εἰς τὴν Βιθυνίαν πορευθῆναι· καὶ οὐκ εἶασεν αὐτοὺς τὸ Πνεῦμα Ἰησοῦ· παρελθόντες δὲ τὴν Μυσίαν κατέβησαν εἰς Τρωάδα.

Since Antioch of Pisidia would be the last place to be visited on the pre-arranged tour, we may naturally suppose that it was the starting-place for the new departure indicated in διῆλθον κ.τ.λ. (so Marcus Dods, *Hastings, D. B.*, vol. ii., p. 94), and taking the natural and obvious sense of the aorist participle κωλυθέντες, we may further conclude that the revelation that they were "not to speak the word in Asia" was received before the start on the new journey was actually made. A straightforward and singleminded man like Paul, to whom moreover a journey meant a sowing of the word as he went, would naturally interpret this prohibition as equivalent to an intimation that the road westward, through Asia, was barred, that he must make a long detour and reach the shores of the Propontis through Bithynia. A glance at the map will show that a walk of a few miles from Antioch west, north, or due east would bring a traveller into the territory of the province of Asia.

The route Paul and his party actually took is thus described, Διῆλθον δὲ τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν. It is immaterial to our present argument whether we explain this phrase as "the land originally inhabited by Phrygians, but subsequently occupied by Gauls" (Lightfoot), or as "the Phrygo-Galatic land" (Ramsay), or as "the borderlands of Phrygia and Galatia" (Gifford). It

certainly did not include Antioch, which, rightly or wrongly, Luke assigns to Pisidia (xiii. 14), though Paul may have included it in Galatia. In any case it would be a fair description of a route from Antioch more or less south-easterly as far as Laodiceia, and then northerly as far as Germa. The MSS. evidence against the insertion of the article before Γαλατικὴν is overwhelming, and perhaps grammatical considerations are in favour of rendering Φρυγίαν as an adjective, though Zahn, followed by Marcus Dods, thinks it is a noun, as in Acts ii. 10, xviii. 23.

This last is a most instructive passage, Διερχομένους καθέξῃς τὴν Γαλατικὴν χώραν καὶ Φρυγίαν, στηρίζων πάντας τοὺς μαθητάς. Here Φρυγίαν is certainly more naturally taken as a noun than as an adjective, and it is hard to believe that the district, or districts, connoted by τὴν Φρυγίαν καὶ Γαλατικὴν χώραν in xvi. 6 are different from τὴν Γαλατικὴν χώραν καὶ Φρυγίαν of xviii. 23. This would certainly lead one to suppose that Luke distinguishes ἡ Φρυγία from ἡ Γαλατικὴ χώρα, and the changed order of the names throws light on what he conceived to be their relative geographical positions. Acts xviii. 23 is part of the narrative of the third journey, the Asia Minor portion of which began in Cilicia, and ended at Ephesus, and lay, in part at least, "through the upper country" (xix. 1). On this journey then, from east to west, or north-east to south-west, Paul came first to ἡ Γαλατικὴ χώρα, and then to ἡ Φρυγία. This exactly harmonizes with the interpretation given above of xvi. 6, *i.e.* that it describes a route the earlier stages of which were from west to east, or south-west to north-east.

Moreover, the words στηρίζων πάντας τοὺς μαθητάς prove that Paul must have spent some time in preaching on his journey towards Bithynia, "the disciples" of xviii. 23 being the fruit of these labours, and also proves that his route thither could not have lain through any part of the province of Asia, in which he had been forbidden to *speak the word*.

To resume, the journey through "the Phrygian and Galatian country" eventually brought Paul to a point close to the south border of Bithynia, and which is also described as "over against Mysia," *κατὰ τὴν Μυσίαν*. He had evidently intended to turn westward as soon as he had entered Bithynia, and so reach the Propontis. But here the way was again barred by a fresh Divine command which forbade him not only to speak the word in Bithynia, but even to go into it.

The apostle was now literally driven into a corner. We suppose him to have reached a point not far from where the boundaries of Asia, Bithynia, and Galatia intersect. In this difficulty he would naturally scrutinize the exact wording of the two Divine orders he had received, and see if such comparison would afford any guidance; and now at last an interpretation, hitherto unsuspected, of the first message would dawn upon him. What would have seemed at Antioch an evasion of the first prohibition was now forced upon him as a legitimate inference by the more stringent terms of the second. Whereas he was now forbidden to *go into* Bithynia, he had been only debarred from *speaking the word* in Asia. It was clear then that he could journey through the territory of Asia without preaching. Accordingly he crossed the frontier, and keeping the Olympos range on the right hand, he traversed the district of Mysia without preaching (*παρελθόντες*), eventually arriving at Troas from the north (*κατίβησαν*).

The only point in this theory which seems fairly open to question is the somewhat strained application it seems to involve of the phrase *κατὰ τὴν Μυσίαν*. On the one hand, one would not naturally so describe a place actually close to the borders of Mysia, and yet one does not expect a place so described to be ninety miles or so away. The boundaries of that region "were vague and

undeterminable" (Ramsay), "Mysia being rather ethnographical than geographical"; but if we assume that the river Rhyndakos constituted its eastern limit, Paul must have been at least that distance from the river when he turned westwards, through Asia, away from Bithynia. As a matter of fact, Mysia then lay directly due west, and that corner of Galatia is the only portion of the province that could possibly be described as "over against Mysia." Travellers would be told by the natives that Mysia lay "over there," between them and the sea.

The lexicons give only a few examples of *κατά* in the sense of "over against"; and of those in which the relative situation of places is so described, it would be unreasonable to expect to find many, if any, in which the places would be at a considerable distance from each other. The following, however, seem parallel cases to this of Acts xvi. 7:—In Thuc., vi. 104, Gylippus, sailing from Tarentum to Sicily, is said to have been caught in a storm, *κατὰ τὸν Τερριναῖον κόλπον*. Now, the Terinaean Gulf is on the west coast of the extreme south of Italy, where it is about twenty miles broad, and Gylippus could not possibly have been nearer to it than at some point in the Gulf of Scyllacium, on the east coast, some thirty miles or more away. It is fair to say that Jowett cites this as one of Thucydides' alleged geographical inaccuracies, and Poppo conjectures *Ταραντῖνον*; but, on the other hand, Arnold gives a plausible explanation of the text.

Again, in Hdt., i. 76, Pteria in Cappadocia is described as *κατὰ Σινώπην πόλιν . . . μάλιστα κη κειμένη*. The distance between the two places is at least 150 miles, according to Smith and Grove's atlas.

The interpretation of Acts xvi. 1-8 given above differs from those found elsewhere in that it regards the first five verses as descriptive of the accomplishment of the purpose enunciated in xv. 36, and also on the stress laid on the

at wording of the two prohibitory revelations found in verses 6 and 7. All other comments make Paul cross the Taurus range of mountains from Antioch into Asia, immediately after having been forbidden to speak there. But, surely, if he had at once perceived that he was not thereby forbidden to journey through Asia, he would have pushed on at once westwards, by Ephesus, to Rome.

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NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM XV.

IF, in the following remarks, scholars' names are, as a rule, only mentioned when dissent from their views is expressed, I trust that I shall not be supposed to have undervalued their labours. On the whole, the criticism of Cicero's Letters during the last twenty years has been attended by brilliant success, in which the editors whom I most often quote, C. F. W. Müller (whose text is indicated here by M); and the Dublin editors (denoted by TP) have had no small share. I wish to draw attention to a few difficulties in Ad Att. xv., which have either not been noted or which seem to me capable of better elucidation than they have hitherto received.

Ep. 1. § 1. quid mihi iam medico? aut, si opus est, tanta inopia est?

Cicero has just lost his physician, Alexio, who was dearer to him as friend than as physician. He is annoyed by being asked what physician he will call in for the future. For the construction of *medico* the only parallel offered by editors is the greatly debated phrase in Verg. Aen. 4, 98: quo nunc certamine tanto? If this reading of the passage in Vergil be correct, the support afforded by it to the ablative *medico* in Cicero is weak enough. Two obvious corrections, long ago suggested, are *cum medico* and *medico opus est*. A simpler and, I think, more probable reading

would be *a medico*: i.e., "What have I now to hope from a physician?" Neither the ellipse of *erit* nor the use of a needs illustration.

Ep. 1. § 2. *casu, cum legerem tuas litteras, Hirtius erat apud me in Puteolano. ei legi et egi. primum quod attinet nihil mihi concedebat, deinde ad summam arbitrum me statuebat non modo huius rei sed totius consulatus sui.*

There is a want of symmetry between *legi* (*litteras*) and *egi* (*de eis*) which has led to more than one proposal for change. But Cicero often does a slight violence not merely to symmetry, but even to usage, in order to arrive at assonance. Thus he writes *ope atque opera* in Att. 14, 14, 6, although *ope* was archaic in his time. He quotes it once from older poetry; once again in a legal formula; apart from the passages mentioned it seems to occur in his writings only in Mil. 30 and in Att. 16, 13 *b* (c), 2. In both of these places it may be a remnant of an original *opera*. It is true that Caesar wrote *ope* in a letter addressed to Cicero (Att. 9, 9, 3). But it is certain that this puritanical prose-writer, who advised that an unusual expression should be avoided as though it were a rock, often lapsed from his principle. In Sallust, *omni ope* and *summa ope* are archaisms, which were imitated by his successors. As to the words *primum quod attinet*, M objects with some justice to the explanation given by TP: "As to what first belongs to the subject." This rendering seems to stand in no proper relation to the context. There is no first thing contrasted with a second or with other things; and *primum* is obviously adverbial. The meaning is "at first he would make no concession which had any bearing on the matter." The phrase *nihil attinet* does not exactly mean "it is of no consequence," but rather "it is irrelevant." This slight misunderstanding seems to be in part the source of the difficulties that

have been raised. The order of the words *quod attinet, nihil*, is explicable by considerations of emphasis; the omission of *ad te* or *ad tuam rem* is a light matter in a letter, and occurs in Att. 12, 18a, 2, also Ad Herenn. 1, 1 and Hor. Od. 1, 19, 12, where (somewhat paradoxically in the context) the words *quae nihil attinent* recall "*οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον*." The tense of *attinet* is just endurable here, though it would be intolerable in a more formal writing. But the MSS. of the letters have incessantly confused tense-endings; and it is quite as likely that Cicero wrote *attineret*.

Ibid. § 2. Dolabellam spero domi esse.

Cicero and Atticus were striving to win the protection of the Caesarean leaders for the people of Buthrotus, whose possessions were threatened. The sense required is, "I hope Dolabella favours our cause." This is very indirectly conveyed if *domi* merely means "at home." But the more idiomatic usage which attaches to *domi esse* may well apply here: "I hope Dolabella is our man"; "I hope we have D. already." Not unlike is Ad Qu. Fr. 2, 8 (10), 4 hortus domi est: "I have the Garden (*i.e.*, Epicurean literature) at my fingers' ends"; for this see "Hermathena" (1897), p. 112. And *habere* has a similar use, as in Fam. 14, 1, 2 omnis tribunos plebis habemus, "have on our side."

Ibid. § 4. istam uero quam tibi molestam scribis esse, auditam a te esse omnino demiror. Nam quod eam conlaudavi apud amicos audientibus tribus filiis eius et filia tua ΤΟΕΤΟΥΟΥ quid est hoc? "quid est autem cur ego personatus ambulem?"

The readings of Med. are given. After his divorce from Publilia, gossips busied themselves with Cicero's remarriage; he could not praise an eligible lady without the report being spread that he was about to marry her. Such is the general sense of the passage, but there is much

obscurity in the details, which makes itself felt in the notes of the editors (see especially TP). At first sight the words *tibi molestam scribis esse* seem to imply that the mysterious lady had been assailing Atticus, in order to get him to further her plans. In that case *auditam a te esse demiror* must mean, "I marvel that you ever gave audience to her." The sense is not natural in the circumstances. If, however, as may well be, *molestam* only indicates that Atticus was perturbed by the reports which had reached him concerning the lady, then *auditam* etc. will be, "I wonder that you ever heard a word about her." Of course the use of *audire aliquem* for *de aliquo* is common enough. But this interpretation makes it an absolute necessity to omit *tua*, which may have been developed from the letters which follow. If Attica were really present when Cicero praised the lady, she would naturally inform her father; but the presence of Attica, still very young, is improbable. To proceed, *nam* is doubtless elliptic.

The Greek letters ΤΟΕΤΟΥΟΥ have been corrected in several different ways. TP print τὸδ' ἐκ τοῦτου as a question. The purport is right, but the contrast between τὸδε and τοῦτου rather unnatural. Cicero may have written τί ἐκ τοῦτου; "what follows from that?" That is, "no inference can be drawn." (So Kayser.) Or possibly τὸ ἐκ τοῦτου (Z): "the natural consequence followed"; *s.e.*, "because I spoke in praise of the lady it was concluded that I would marry her." The words, *quid est hoc?* are of course unendurable; TP follow Wesenberg in regarding them as the ejaculation of a puzzled scribe. They seem rather to be a gloss on a reading τί ἐστὶ τούτο; "what is there in that?" And *quid est hoc?* occurs in the letters, as in ep. 29 § 3 of this book. It is also possible that the gloss itself (as often happens) has been corrupted; it may have been originally *quid ex hoc*, referring to the diction τί ἐκ τοῦτου; which I am inclined to think original.

The application of the comic line to the situation is far from clear. Perhaps the sense is, "Why should I have to act a part, and to take care not to be natural in my conversation, in order to keep the ladies at bay? Is not the part I am forced to act, that of old man, prohibitive enough to them?" The passage in ep. 13 § 4 refers to the same subject and is written in the same humour: "Me ualde obseruat Visellia, sed haec quidem humana." The context in which these words occur is somewhat corrupt, but these words at least are sound and hang well together.

Ep. 1 b. § 2. Brutus noster misit ad me orationem suam habitam in contione Capitolina petiuitque a me ut eam ne ambitiose corrigerem, antequam ederet.

Bosius wished to write *nec ambitiose*. As M commends this, it does not seem superfluous to note that there is nothing in the employment of *ut . . . ne* here which is at variance with Cicero's usage elsewhere. Anyone may assure himself of this by reading Merguet's quotations. The change from *ne* to *nec* can hardly be said to mitigate the ungraciousness of the request made by Brutus. After pointing out how irreconcilable his conception of oratory and that of Brutus are, Cicero asks for the opinion of Atticus on the oration, and proceeds: "quamquam uereor ne cognomine tuo lapsus ὑπεραττικῶς sis in iudicando. sed, si recordabere Δημοσθένους fulmina, tum intelleges posse et ἀττικώτατα grauissime dici." Many editors (TP among them) have suspected *lapsus*. But the connexion of the causal ablative with *labi* is of common occurrence; and the sense given is exactly right. Cicero jocularly alleges alarm lest Atticus should deem that his very name compels him to follow Brutus, and adopt the view which restricted the term "Attic" to a thin and bare oratorical style. This was doubtless the dominant view among the younger speakers of the time. In the

“Brutus” and the “De optimo genere dicendi” there are long arguments to the contrary, and an appeal is made, as here, to Demosthenes. As to *et* before ἀττικώτατα, M is right in considering that this is not a case where Cicero would write *et* for *etiam*. He substitutes *uel* for *et*; but it is more likely that a second *et* has disappeared before *grauissime* (Lambinus).

Ep. 2. § 2. L. Antonium contionatum esse cognoui tuis litteris et aliis sordide; sed id quale fuerit nescio; nihil enim scripti.

I venture to think *scripti*, the reading of the first hand in Med., better than *scripsisti*, which comes from the *scripsti* of Med. 2. The word *scriptum* is often applied to a written copy of a speech, as *e.g.* in *de scripto dicere*; and there are many references to the custom of Cicero's time whereby speeches were taken down in shorthand, and copies circulated immediately. See for instance 7, 8, 5 and 14, 17a, 7 (= Fam. 9, 14, 7). Cicero means that he cannot judge of the style or taste of the speech (*quale*) until he has the written report in his hands. Even if the reading *nihil enim scripsisti* be accepted, the meaning must be not “you wrote nothing about it,” but “you did not write out any passage”; a sense far less satisfactory than that conveyed by *nihil enim scripti*. So *nihil . . . scripti* may be the right reading in Att. 11, 5, 3 (for *scriptis*); cf. too 4, 8, 1 *n. aedificati*.

Ibid. consilium meum a te probari quod ea non scribam quae tu a me postularis, facile patior, multoque magis id probabis si orationem eam, de qua hodie ad te scripsi, legeris.

The reference again is to the speech sent by Brutus to Cicero, which professed to represent what Brutus said when he spoke (after the murder of Caesar) from the Capitol to the populace assembled below. The words *quae tu a me postularis* have often been misinterpreted (as by TP); they cannot possibly refer to the contemporary history which,

about this time, Atticus had been urging Cicero to write. There is nothing to show that Atticus desired Cicero to dedicate this work to Brutus; and even if it were so, why should it be said that the oration of Brutus makes this impossible? His different conception of style did not prevent Cicero from dedicating to Brutus the "De Finibus," the "De optimo genere dicendi," and the work which bears the name of Brutus. Rather, to explain the words *quae tu a me postularis*, we must have recourse to Att. 14, 20, 3, from which it appears that Atticus pressed Cicero to compose a speech on the very same theme as that of the draft speech now sent by Brutus. Cicero was to make Brutus say, in fact, what he considered ought to have been said. Whether Atticus thought that this version might take the place of that constructed by Brutus, or meant the two versions to circulate side by side, is not clear. In either case, Brutus might well take offence, if the orator whose diction he pronounced "Asiatic" presumed to write a speech for him. We see from Att. 14, 20, 3 that soon after the assassination of Caesar, Brutus wanted to issue a proclamation, and Cicero sent him a draft, which he rejected. The references to the *contio Capitolina* illustrate incidentally the freedom, or rather license, with which speeches were in ancient times recast before publication. In spite of the downright refusal of Cicero, Atticus seems to have pressed his request again (Ep. 3, § 2, and 4, § 3). [Do not the words *ante quam ederet* in Ep. 1 a (b), § 2, compared with *cum ille ediderit* in Ep. 3, § 3, show that the difference in date between these two letters is greater than four days, the time indicated by the ordinary superscriptions?]

Ibid. quae de legionibus scribis ea uera sunt. sed non satis hoc mihi uideris tibi persuasisse, qui de Buthrotrīs nostris per senatum speres confici posse. quod puto—tantum enim uideo—non uidemur esse uicturi. sed, ut iam nos hoc fallat, de Buthroto te non fallat.

The passage is quoted with the readings and punctuation adopted by TP. But some difficulties at once suggest themselves. The words *quod puto* are interpreted to mean, "as regards what I think." Is this tenable Latin or capable of illustration? To convey this sense, Cicero would rather have written *ut puto* or *quem ad modum puto*. Then to what does *hoc* refer? It is rendered by TP, "your own news," so that they refer it to *quae de legionibus scribis*, and these words they regard as indicating hostile preparations on the part of Antonius (cf. ep. 4, §§ 1, 4). I submit, however, that *legionibus* alludes to the threatened rising of the *legiones Martia* and *quarta* against the Caesareans, of which there was much talk at the moment. If I am right, the news was good for the Republicans and not bad; and it follows that another reference must be found for *hoc*. The word, I think, points on to *quod*, and the stop after *posse* must be removed. Such a correspondence between *hoc* and *quod* is, of course, common. This makes the negative before *victuri* a necessity: we must read either *non* or *nos non* (preferably the latter) for the *nos* of the MSS., and either change is of the slightest. Moreover *puto* must be parenthetical, and *tantum enim uideo* is another parenthetical clause. The whole drift is this: "Your news about the insubordination of the two legions is correct. But if you found on that a hope that the senate will be able to settle finally the question of Buthrotus in your favour, you show me that the improbability, as I deem it to be (my insight serves so far as this) of our ultimate victory, has not sunk deeply enough into your mind. But if I am mistaken in my forecast, you will, of course, suffer no disappointment about Buthrotus. The senate will then be able to do what you wish." Cicero was despondent all through about the prospects of the Republicans. His letters differ widely in this respect from his "Philippics."

Ibid. § 4. Flamma quod bene loquitur, non moleste fero. Tyndaritanorum causa, de qua causa laborat, quae sit, ignoro. hos tamen.

The repetition of *causa* in the relative clause (for which *Casca*, *Pansa* etc., have been proposed) is, as TP urge after Lehmann, entirely defensible. There is, however, one dubious point not noticed by them; Cicero's obscure debtor, Flamma, is not likely to have been pressing Cicero in the interests of a Sicilian town. As to the words *hos tamen*, no two critics agree about the possible limits of ellipse; for me the supposition that Cicero left out *defendam* or *non moleste fero* (TP), or anything of the kind, has little probability compared with the assumption of corruption in the MSS. There were two legal phrases: (a) *ignoro causam*, "I refuse to take cognizance of a plea" (Phil. 8, 7); and (b) *nosco causam*, "I take cognizance" (Att. 11, 7, 5; Fam. 4, 4, 1; De Leg. 1, 11) with a variant *accipio c.* (Fam. 16, 19). It may be that *noscam tamen* was the original reading for *hos tamen*. The word *ignoro*, connected with *causa*, though not in a legal usage, suggested the opposite phrase; there is, in fact, a slight play upon words: "I don't know what the case is; but I will take a brief." The ending *-cam* would easily disappear before *tam-* of *tamen* and the confusion of *hos* and *nos* in MSS. is one of the commonest.

Ep. 3. § 1. de malo scripsi iam pridem ad Dolabellam.

Many suggestions have been made for replacing the corrupt *malo*, which evidently conceals a personal name. I find that Mr. Shuckburgh has anticipated me in publishing the conjecture *Manlio* (*Mallio*). I only notice here that Dolabella and Torquatus are brought into connexion in a very similar manner in Att. 13, 21, 2.

Ibid. § 2. Antonio quoniam est uolo peius esse.

Of two suppositions which pervade the editions: (1)

that *male* is to be supplied with *est* from *peius*, and (2) that *quoniam* is an example of a very common corruption of *quam*, the latter seems to me incomparably the more probable. The mere fact that *quam* very rarely occurs in prose *before* a comparative (as in *Planc.* 16 and *Phil.* 5, 48) was sufficient to throw the scribes off the right track. I may here refer to two other passages in which the occurrence of *quam*, in front of a comparative, appears in like fashion to have induced error, viz. *Deiot.* 8 *istam dexteram non tam in bellis nec in proeliis quam in promissis et fide firmiorem*; and *Liv.* 28, 39, 13 *uctigal ex eorum agro capimus quod nobis non tam fructu iucundius est quam ultione*. The only explanation offered of these passages by grammarians and editors is that they contain, wrapped up in them, portions of two comparisons. The passage in *Livy* is thus equivalent to “*quod non tam fructu iucundius fuit quam ultione, sed potius ultione iucundius quam fructu*.” So *Weissenborn* (second annotated edition, 1863); and *Halm* similarly elucidates the passage in *Cicero*. This distorted and unnatural interpretation surely must yield in point of likelihood to the view that the copyists, unfamiliar with *quam* preceding a comparative, and familiar with *tam . . . quam*, slipped in the *tam*. It is well known that few copyists, when they came to a difficulty, took count of the whole sentence in which it occurred: they were satisfied with curing the particular matter which troubled them. The fact that the reading in the *Deiot.* is as old as the time of *Priscian* has led the latest editor (*Mr. A. C. Clark*) to retain it; but it is certain that corruption had already affected the text of *Cicero* in that age. That comparisons are not at all times completely stated is no doubt a familiar fact. Thus in *Fam.* 15, 4, 4 *nec est quidquam Cilicia contra Syriam munitius*: “nor is any country better protected (against any other) than Cilicia against Syria.” But no

examples can be quoted so complicated as in the two passages just discussed.

Ibid. § 3. de Q. filio ut scribis AMC de patre coram agemus.

So writes Med. The commonest theory about AMC is that the letters have superseded a Greek word such as ἀλς. I have long suspected that they represent three Latin words. The abbreviation of words by writing initial letters only is commoner in the MSS. of the epistles of Cicero than in any other MSS. with whose readings I am acquainted. I can only quote here one or two specimens. In Att. 15, 7, 1, *Sex. n.* is written for *nostri*; in Fam. 8, 8 the abbreviations in the *senatus consulta* are probably not all due to the official style. These abbreviations have, of course, often given rise to corruption where copyists wrongly resolved them; the confusions between *p. r.* (*populus Romanus*), *pr.* (*praetor*), and *r. p.* (*res publica*) are constant and familiar. That copyists sometimes expected ordinary words to be indicated by an initial is shown by the reading *pupillus* in Fam. 10, 33, 4 and 13, 14, 1 which has sprung from P (*Publius*). Is it too bold to suggest that AMC is *a matre caueto*? It will be granted, I think, that this fits in excellently with the circumstances. There was perpetual trouble in the household of Quintus Cicero, where he, his wife Pomponia, and their son were constantly at variance. Cicero says: "You make matters right with the boys' mother (your sister); when you and I meet, we will discuss what measures must be taken with the boy's father." In ep. 1, § 4, there is an allusion to the same matter: "de Q. filio tibi assentior; patri quidem certe gratissimae bellae tuae litterae fuerunt." The word *quidem* hints at a contrast, which has generally been taken to be that between father and son; it may well have been between father and mother.

Ep. 4. § 1. sane insulse, ut solet, nisi forte, quem non ames, omnia videntur insulse fieri.

The MSS. reading is thought by TP to be possibly right, whereas M (with Wesenberg) regards the insertion of *ab eo* before *omnia* as a necessity. If we suppose *quem* to be corrupted from *quom*, all awkwardness will be removed.

Ibid. mihi duas a te epistulas reddidit unam XI, alteram X. ad recentiorem et leniorem laudo si uero etiam Carfulenus ‘*ἄνω πότεραμῶν.*’

So Med. The ellipse of *datam* is in itself not unnatural, though the passages quoted by editors in support of it (such as Att. 14, 19, 1) have little similarity. For *leniorem* there have been several corrections; I propose the very slightest possible. The jocular phrases *ponderosam epistulam* in 2, 11, 1 and *epistulam paulo grauiorem* in 1, 13, 1 (cf. 14, 14, 1) suggest *leuiorem* here. *Pondus* is applied to letters in Ad. Brut. 1, 14, 1, (as it seems) in the literal sense. Before *laudo* most editors have assumed a lacuna, an assumption which TP repel. But I would point to *etiam* in the words *si uero etiam Carfulenus*, which seems to indicate that another proper name had been mentioned just before. The allusion is to the revolt of the *legio Martia* and the *legio quarta*. Carfulenus was an officer of the *Martia*; perhaps *Egnatuleium* has fallen out before *laudo*; he was the officer who stirred up the *quarta* to mutiny (Phil. 3, §§ 7, 39).

Ibid. sed non cupio [sc. bellum fieri] quoniam cauetur Buthrotiis. Rides? at ego doleo non mea potius adsiduitate diligentia gratia perfici.

The reading *at ego doleo* (adopted by TP) is an emendation of Lambinus for *aps condoleo* of Med. The general sense which it yields is undoubtedly correct. “I am against war because peace is better for the Buthrotians. Do you laugh at me for regulating my view of public affairs by

their interests? But I really am grieved that these interests should be secured rather by the favour of the Caesarean leaders than by my own efforts." But *aps condoleo* is more likely to have arisen from *ab isto tñ (tamen) doleo*, *isto* is Antonius, and a comma should be placed at *doleo*.

Ibid. § 2. Saufeium pete celemus.

Possibly *pete* is an error for *puto*; for the parenthetic verb side by side with the subjunctive, cf. Phil. 2, 47: Att. 9, 6, 2.

Ibid. quod te a Bruto scribis, ut certior fieret, quo die in Tusculanum essem futurus, ut ad te ante scripsi, VI Kal.

As M remarks, the parallels which editors quote for the ellipse of *rogatum esse* here are far from close. The omission of an infinitive which, if expressed, would require nothing to complete its construction (such an instance as we find in 12, 5, 1) stands on a different footing from the ellipse of a verb on which a following clause depends. The passage in the letters which is most like this is Fam. 14, 20, 1, ut sint parata (sc. uide), but the ellipse there is not so harsh. The reading *futurus* of the MSS. is retained by TP. If the examples of the construction *esse in* with accusative be examined it will be found that they occur mostly in legal and official language, and generally in connexion with circumstances such that an idea of purpose is conceived. Thus *esse in iudicium* (Quinct. 22) "to be ready for a hearing in court"; *adesse in senatum* (Phil. 5, 19). The phrase *esse in subseciuom*, used by Varro de re rust. 1, 10, 2, can be so explained. [It may be noted in passing that one of the very few passages, later than Terence, where the construction occurs in verse, though not there, as in Terence, attested by metre, is in Ovid. Her. 16, 140.] But in many places where recent editors keep the construction as given by MSS. the balance of

probability lies, as it seems to me, on the other side. Any one who reads the context of Fam. 8, 8, 8 must feel how insecure the lection *in prouinciam fuerunt* there is. And as regards the instance which I am discussing there are, I cannot help thinking, three suppositions which have more chance of being true than the assumption that Cicero, in one out of many scores of passages, wrote *esse in* followed by a place-name. The suppositions are (1) that *Tusculano* originally stood in place of *Tusculanum*; (2) that by accidental omission of *n*, *uenturus* passed, after correction, into *futurus*; (3) that an accidental doubling of the *i* in *uturus* led through *uturus* to *futurus*.

Ep. 4. *summatim adhuc ad te : nihildum enim a Balbo. Tuas litteras exspecto nec actorum solum sed etiam futurorum.*

Just before this passage Cicero has been complaining that Brutus desired him to go to Nemus to meet L. Caesar. There seems to be no connexion of sense between the words *summatim adhuc ad te* and those which follow; moreover Cicero had not (as the letters hereabouts show) been prevented from writing fully to Atticus, by the absence of a letter from Balbus. I believe Cicero wrote *summa tamen adhuc apud te*: "but even now I depend entirely on you, for I have nothing yet from Balbus; so please send me a letter." Thus a continuity in the sense is established. Cicero at all times really felt about the letters of Atticus that he says out of politeness to Trebonius in Fam. 15, 20, "Ego tantum me scire putabo quantum ex tuis litteris habeo cognitum."

Ep. 5. § 1. *a Bruto tabellarius rediit; attulit et ab eo et Cassio.*

There is no need to insert *a* before *Cassio*. The Latin language does not permit such a phrase as *ab et eo et Cassio*; it requires the order *et ab*, but not the insertion of the second reposition. Cf. 1, 1, 2 *et ab amicis et existimatione*.

Ep. 5. § 1. plane non habeo quid scribam.

It is strange that M in his note should incline to the reading of the Editio Romana, *quod scribam*. The two forms differ just as the two English forms, "I don't know what to write," and "I have nothing to write." It is not easy to imagine circumstances to which both forms might not apply. Yet editors frequently change the one form into the other without reason assigned. There is certainly nothing to be gained here by a change. Similarly, Ἡρακλείδειον *aliquod* in Ep. 4, § 3, and *aliquid* Ἡρακλείδειον in Ep. 27, § 2, are both right, though often altered.

Ibid. § 2. ut tu de provincia Bruti et Cassi per senatus consultum. ita scribit et Balbus et Hirtius quidem se acturum.

Why M should obelize *Hirtius*, is hard to see. He thinks the name of Oppius has fallen out; why not that of Matius also? The Latin is slightly, but very permissibly unsymmetrical. For *acturum* I should prefer *negat iturum* to *afuturum* (Orelli and TP). Of course *actutum* (Bosius) is not Ciceronian.

Ibid. itus reditus uoltus incessus.

I can see little reason to suspect (with TP) these words of being a quotation from some poet. The fact that *itus* does not occur elsewhere in Cicero's writings, and indeed in very few places outside them (in Lucretius, a fragment of Titinius, in Suetonius, and two or three inscriptions), does not make in favour of the suspicion. Cicero has here constructed the phrase *itus reditus* on the model of *ire redire, eant redeant* (Att. 10, 1, 3) *isti redisti* (Phil. 2, 78), and similar common expressions. [I think Mr. A. C. Clark is right in omitting *et* in Phil. 12, 28 where the MSS. give *isse et redisse*.] In the same way Cicero manufactures *obutam itio* (11, 16, 1 and 13, 50, 4) from *obuiam ire*, though he uses *itio* in no other connexion. So his use of *consiliarius* led

to *consiliandum*, a ἀπαξ εἰρημνόν in Ep. 9, § 2. That *consiliandum*, not *conciliandum*, is the right reading there will become clear if Ep. 4, § 5, and Ep. 10, § 1, and Ep. 1, § 5 be studied in connexion. This subject of analogic phrase-formations (a small branch of a widespread phenomenon) deserves fuller treatment, and I hope to return to it on another occasion. The occurrence of *uoltus* and *incessus* together is natural; see Sest. 17 and cf. (for *itus* . . . *incessus*) Off. 1, 128 *status incessus, sessio occubitio*.

Ep. 6. § 1. cum ad me Brutus noster scripsisset et Cassius ut virtutem qui adhuc bonus fuisset sciebam neque eum confidebam fore mea auctoritate meliorem Antonio est enim fortasse iratior consue uero amicissimus tamen ad eum scripsi.

The passage is given without stops, and as written by Med. 1; Med. 2 inserts *facere* before *Antonio*. TP except this (though apparently thinking an ellipse of the word to be possible); they insert *fuisse* after *fuisset*, and make three parenthetic clauses, i.e. *fuisse* . . . *fore*; *mea* . . . *facere*; *Antonio* . . . *amicissimus*. In some respects the arrangement is attractive, but the interpretation of *cum* as equivalent to *talem* is hardly to be accepted. If this had been Cicero's meaning he would have conveyed it by leaving out *cum*. I incline to agree with TP that the insertion of *facere* to complete the construction of *ut* is not necessary, the *anacoluthon* being natural enough; but I would omit *fuisse* and make all the passage from *sciebam* to *amicissimus* one parenthesis. *Eum* thus has its natural sense, and the words *confidebam fore mea auctoritate meliorem* prevent any misunderstanding of the *anacoluthon*. To make a parenthesis between *fore* and *Antonio* cuts off *enim* from its proper reference.

Ibid. § 2. rure iam redierim quaeris. an ego, cum omnes caleant, uaviter aliquid faciam? etiam; ex urbe profectus sum.

I have inserted the semicolon after *etiam*. There is a

small *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* jest. "Would I be a malingerer when every patriot is agog? Ay, but I am; I have left the capital." TP interpret *etiam* (without stop after it to mean "I too"; but *etiam ego* would be needed. They understand *caleant* as ironical: "are so energetic in neglecting duty"; but they are compelled to suppose that the irony is dropped in a very awkward manner immediately after. I venture to think that the punctuation adopted above gives a more direct and more probable meaning. The *παρὰ προσδοκίαν* is a little like that in 16, 15, 1 *noli putare pigritia me facere, quod non mea manu scribam, sed mehercule pigritia*.

Ibid. *cedentes* (sc. Brutum et Cassium) enim ais haec scripsisse: quo? aut qua re?

The word *cedentes* is said by many editors (including TP) to mean "leaving Rome." But the letter of Hirtius was written near the end of May of the year 44 B.C., and Brutus and Cassius were almost certainly never inside Rome after they left it upon Caesar's death. For a long time Brutus (and apparently Cassius with him) had "sat by the Eurotas" at his villa near Lanuvium, and had enjoyed the "*Persice porticus*" there (14, 7, 1, where *sub Lanuvio* seems an error for *suo in Lanuvio*, and 15, 9, 1). Early in June he was at Antium (15, 11, 2), and stayed there some time; after that he visited Astura and Nesis (16, 1, 1) where he was on July 1 (16, 2, 3). He appears at Velia in the middle of August, with a fleet (16, 7, 5). In all these places Cassius was in his company. *Cedentes* therefore refers to the abandonment of Italy; so *non discessuros* in Ep. 6, § 4.

It is very difficult to fix the dates of the letters in this part of book xv. In Ep. 5, which is usually supposed to have been despatched from Tusculum on May 27 or 28, Cicero mentions the absence of Hirtius from Rome, and

indeed his presence on his Tusculan estate (§ 2), and this he knew because Hirtius had written. He also speaks of a letter from Cassius urging him to put pressure on Hirtius. In Ep. 6 (usually dated on the following day) Cicero speaks of a letter from Brutus and Cassius (not Cassius only as in Ep. 5) requesting him to use his influence with Hirtius, to whom he says he has written; and he encloses an answer from Hirtius, from which it appears that the latter had received from Cicero a letter addressed not to Tusculum, but to his house in town; in this was enclosed a copy of a letter from Brutus and Cassius. He asks Cicero to address his next letter to Tusculum. All this is extremely puzzling if Ep. 5 and Ep. 6 were written from Tusculum, and on successive days. Again, in Ep. 6, § 4, Cicero speaks of having answered the letter of Hirtius, whereas if both were at Tusculum we should expect some allusion to a meeting.

Again in Ep. 8 (supposed to have been written on May 31) we have mention of another letter received from Hirtius. Cicero can surely not have been at Tusculum at this time. Moreover in Ep. 9 (dated June 2 or 3) Cicero states, as though it were a novelty, that he has heard from Balbus of a meeting of the senate, to take place on the Nones. But this meeting for the Nones is mentioned by Hirtius in the letter which is enclosed in Ep. 6, several days earlier in date, according to the editors. The letter of Balbus was in answer to one from Cicero sent from Arpinum some time before May 24 (see Ep. 4*b*). In Ep. 4, § 2, we hear of Cicero's intention to proceed from Arpinum to Tusculum, where he expected to be on vi Kal. Iun. This plan was probably not carried out. In Ep. 4*b*, we find L. Caesar pressing Cicero to meet him at Nemus, and Cicero thinks he will have to promise a meeting, and then go to Rome. [In Ep. 5, § 3, nothing will persuade Cicero to go to Rome.] In Ep. 4, § 3, he entertains the idea of going to

Lanuuium to meet Brutus. But in Ep. 5, § 1, he intends to give Brutus no advice, so that the proposal for a meeting seems either not to have come yet into view, or to have been abandoned. The former supposition is the more probable. If we suppose Ep. 5 to be earlier in date than May 27 or 28, and to have been despatched from Arpinum, some of our difficulties disappear. But there is another obscurity to be mentioned in the relation between Ep. 5 and 6; in 5, § 1, we find that Cicero has sent to Atticus the letter of Cassius, whereas, on the following day, he has forgotten the fact (Ep. 6, § 1). It seems as if Ep. 5 and 6 were separated by some space of time, and as though *two* letters of Cassius are mentioned. Another question that suggests itself is whether the letter of Hirtius quoted in Ep. 6 is the same as that mentioned in Ep. 5, § 2. At any rate Ep. 4^a (b) seems to be prior to Ep. 6. A word must be said as to the relation of 4^b and 5. These letters appear to be closely connected: cf. *ego ad eum (sc. Brutum) litteras (4^b) with A Bruto tabellarius rediit* (5, § 1). I do not profess to be able to solve all the questions which I have raised; but it is clear, I think, that the editors' superscriptions for these letters cannot stand.

Ep. 7. mihi placebat cum sensus eius de re publica † cum tum scribendi.

For *cum tum* the most probable correction seems to me to be *tum consilium*; since *cūm* is a known contraction for *consilium*. Cf. 8, 14, 1 scribendi sententiam and Ad Qu. Fr. 1, 1, 22 where a *cum*, given by our MSS., seems to be an error for *consilium*.

Ibid. Seruius pacificator cum librariolo uidetur obisse legationem, et omnis captiunculas pertimescere. debuerat autem non ex iure manu consortum sed quae secuntur; tuque scribes.

TP (with other editors) explain *librariolo* as "young secretary." Rather the word is diminutive of *librarium*

"box of law-books." Servius is described as carrying his legal pedantry into his negotiations for peace. Cf. 10, 15, 2 *Serui consilio nihil expeditur; omnes captiones in omni sententia occurrunt*, where the reference in the words *omnes . . . occurrunt* is entirely to Servius, and is not a general reference as has sometimes been supposed. The tense of *debuerat* is to be compared with *aecum fuerat* and the like phrases. I cannot see why *tuque scribes* should be suspected (as by TP and others). The meaning seems to run on quite satisfactorily: "He ought to have looked to the sword law, which follows in the line of Ennius, and that is what you will have to write about." Cicero expects every day to hear of violence. The correction *tu quoque scribes*: "you as well as (who?) will write" is most unsatisfactory; and other changes proposed have no more probability.

Ep. 8. § 1. *expectat animus quidnam agam.*

Since several editors treat *expectat animus* as an unusual expression, I may point to Phil. 5, 13 *auet animus*, and Cael. 67 *praegestit animus*.

Ibid. § 2. C. Cassium scripsisse homines comparari qui in Tusculanum mitterentur. Id quidem †mihi uidebatur sed cauendum tamen pluresque† ut ille uidendae.

Here *Tusculanum* appears to stand not for Cicero's villa, but for *agrum Tusculanum*. The ambiguity of such words as this has sometimes caused confusion, as *e.g.* in 2, 12, 2, where, with *Antiatii, agro* not *uia* is to be supplied. The expression *homines comparari* implies rather elaborate preparations, which would not be made for a descent on Cicero's villa only; Cicero does not write as though the matter concerned himself alone; and had the danger been personal to him, Cassius would have written to him direct. The object of the military visit would probably be to force the numerous senators who lived in the district to

attend the approaching meeting of the senate: cf. Phil. 1, 11 and 2, 79. The words *villaeque plures uidendae* (such is the accepted correction of *ut ille*) thus become intelligible. Although Cicero disbelieves the rumour, he thinks the owners of other villas at Tusculum should be warned. For the corrupt *mihi*, *nihili* is a very easy and likely emendation: perhaps Cicero wrote *mihi nihili*. With the circumstances cf. 12, § 2, and 16, 3, 1. [In Fam. 4, 13, 2 a difficulty may be simply cured by reading *nihili est* for *nihil ei*, and beginning a fresh sentence.]

Ep. 9. § 1. nolo enim Lacedaemonem longinquo quom Lanuvium existimant.

For this corrupt passage, I long ago conjectured *longinuiorem quam Lanuvium existimari*: "I don't want you to think of any Lacedaemon farther off than Lanuvium." The allusion is to the villa of Brutus at Lanuvium, which he had adorned with names of places taken from Sparta. The same conjecture has occurred independently to O. E. Schmidt and C. F. W. Mueller.

Ep. 10. sed possim id neglegere proficiens.

This absolute use of *proficiens* upholds the reading *proficere* without *aliquid* in Fam. 15, 14, 1; and the absolute use of *proficere* is conceded to Plancus in Fam. 10, 15, 2. Cf. also Tusc. 4, 60. M quotes in his note some parallels from other authors, but none from Cicero. In the Letters the absolute use of verbs rarely or never so used elsewhere is a noteworthy feature; so e.g. *accipere* in 5, 21, 5 and 11, 22, 2; *curare* in 1, 18, 7; *desinere* in Fam. 6, 4, 4 (in 7, 1, 4 *artem* should be ejected as due to a copyist who did not understand the absolute use); *incurrere* in Fam. 9, 2, 2.

Ep. 11. § 1. hoc loco . . . Cassius . . . se in Siciliam non iturum. "egone ut beneficium accepissem contumeliam?"

As the discussion reported in this letter entirely regards

future action, and the words of Cassius are given in *oratio recta*, the tense of *accepissem* is extraordinary, and the passage in Fin. 4, 57 (qu. by TP after Hofmann), *saltem aliquid de pondere detraxisset*, is quite dissimilar. The only possible explanation seems to be as follows:—In *par erat* and the like phrases, used where we should naturally write *par est*, the sense is, literally, “it always was right,” and thence the inference is “it is emphatically right now.” The emphasis is sometimes strengthened by using the pluperfect, in *par fuerat* etc., which is not, of course, the equivalent of *par fuisset*, as grammars sometimes allege. Here Cassius means “Was it ever likely that I should take an insult as a boon?”

Ibid. § 4. *auco* genus legationis, ut cum uelis introire exire liceat, quod mihi nunc additum est.

Lehmann (Zeitschr. f. d. Gymnasialw. 1898) agrees with Andresen in thinking that the tense of *auco* (*adeo* Med., emended by Gronovius) is awkward in view of *quod mihi nunc additum est*, but declares *auebam* to be too great a change. He therefore gets over the difficulty by severely restricting the reference of *quod* to the words *introire exire liceat*; surely a forced interpretation, and the objection to the tense of *auco*, which regularly applies to *quod abest*, is not thereby removed. But another suspicion attaches to *auco*; its construction with the accusative *genus* is unique; elsewhere the only accusative is one of a neuter pronoun. The true reading I believe to be *obeo*, a technical phrase with *legationem* (cf. *e.g.* ep. 7). Further, *additum* seems insupportable. *Addere alicui genus legationis* is, in itself, an odd phrase. And, if the meaning is that a particular clause, *ut introire exire liceat*, had been tacked on to a form of *legatio* which did not originally comprise it, there is still difficulty. The context shows that Cicero had been considering the several advantages of three forms of *legatio*,

the *l. libera*, the *l. notitia*, the ordinary *l. prouincia*. It was the last-named form which gave the full liberty desired by Cicero; that liberty was not conveyed by clapping a clause on to one of the other two forms. Everything points to *datum* having been the original lection. The corruption is, of course, easy to illustrate. Here, doubtless, the existence of *addi* in the preceding sentence helped to induce the error.

Ibid. *contrahi* mihi negotium uidetur.

TP explain *contrahi* as short for *c. in angustum*, or something such, but quote no illustrations. The sense seems rather to be, "trouble is brewing for me": cf. Cat. 4, 9; and Att. 7, 7, 7 male contractis rebus. Somewhat similar is *suis contractis*, "by his own fault," an extraordinary phrase in a letter of Plancus ap. Fam. 10, 18, 3.

Ep. 12. § 2. τὰν δ' αἰτίαν τῶν Βρούτων τίς ἔχει.

Some editors point this as a question (with τίς interrogative), but Cicero would surely not imply that one or other of the Bruti must bear the blame, and that it was doubtful which of the two should be condemned. Elsewhere he is in no doubt; cf. ep. 20, § 2 haec omnis culpa Bruti, where Marcus only can be meant. To leave τίς enclitic in the question is worse still. Whether there is any pun on *bruti* (as TP suggest) I greatly doubt.

Ibid. Marcellus praeclare si praecipit †nostro nostri.

The reference is to Octavian, and to Marcellus his brother-in-law. The words have not the appearance of being deeply corrupt; and Kayser and others are probably right in supposing that *nostro nostra* stood in the original text. But the context here alone, to say nothing of other passages, forbids us to think that Cicero could at the

moment have spoken of Octavian as a pronounced partizan of the Republican party. If we assume *ut* to have fallen out after *praecipit*, this stumbling-block is removed. Cicero commends Marcellus for treating Octavian *as though* he were of the right way of thinking, and for trying to imbue him with sympathy for the senate.

Ep. 13. § 1. sed quando illum diem, cum tu edendam putes?

An excellent example of the purely defining *cum*-clause with subjunctive, the resemblance of which to the consecutive relative-clauses with subjunctive has been so clearly brought into view by Prof. Gardner Hale. So in 3, 3 *utinam illum diem uideam, cum tibi agam gratias*, we must regard *agam* as subjunctive, not indicative.

Ibid. § 3. iam probo Ἡρακλείδειον, praesertim cum tu tanto opere delectere.

This cannot be, as has sometimes been supposed, a work written by Atticus; it is rather the writing which, at the instigation of Atticus, Cicero thought of dedicating to Brutus (15, 4, 3). The mention of Ἡρακλείδειον here has probably led to the inclusion of the letter in the xvth book, where the word several times occurs. This is one indication, among many, that the original collector of Cicero's letters had sometimes the same difficulty in placing and dating them which we have to face.

Ibid. cautum Marcellum; me sic sed non tamen cautissimum.

TP do not refer in their note to Fam. 15, 21, 2 siue faceta, siue sic (where they read *secus* for *sic* with Corradi); but the two passages support each other. Here the sense is: "you can *just* apply the term to me," and in Fam. 1. 1., "whether the sayings are really decidedly witty or only just entitled to the name." Some of the examples of *sic*, quoted by M in note on p. 495, l. 31 of his text of Fam., are not essentially unlike.

Ibid. § 4. de Bruto te nihil scire dicis sed † Selicia uenisse M. Scaptium, eumque non qua pompa ad se tamen clam uenturum sciturumque me omnia; quae ego statim. interea narrat eadem etc.

Of the correction *Servilia* for *Selicia*, TP say, "It would be rash to read *Servilia* (the mother of Brutus) as some editors do." If the rashness consists in a too great departure from the *ductus litterarum*, one has only to think of the innumerable extensive changes to which proper names have been subjected in our MSS.; take *e.g.* Att. 4, 16, where, in Med., *Buthroto* stands for *Bruto*, and *adiscolis* for *Aristoteles*. The alteration of *Selicia* to *Servilia* is in reality slight if we consider the habits of the codices along with the extreme appropriateness here of the name *Servilia*. The emendation *Cilicia*, proposed by TP, would bring in its train other changes, since *narrat eadem* loses its reference. With regard to the words which follow, Gurlitt, in Berlin. Philolog. Wochenschrift, 1900, p. 477, ingeniously places a comma at *se*. Scaptius, the agent of Brutus, would not visit Cicero with the parade which he displayed on his visit to *Servilia*, but would come secretly so as not to compromise Cicero. There is, however, not much probability about this conjecture. If Scaptius had already visited *Servilia*, why should she not have written an account to Cicero of what he had to say, instead of proposing a secret visit? Moreover, *sciturumque me omnia* clearly indicates the intention of *Servilia* to write a letter. The words *non qua pompa* have been many times emended; among the numerous writers whose notes on the passage I have read, O. E. Schmidt is the only one who thinks no change is required. He treats the phrase *non qua pompa* as exclamatory; the introduction of the negative into such a phrase is, however, unique. *Pompa* has all the appearance of being sound, and it is like Cicero. Scaptius may well have been fond of vulgar parade, which it was not

now convenient for an agent of Brutus to display at Rome. I would propose *antiqua* for *qua*, a slight change. The ellipse in *quae ego statim* (sc. *tibi scribam*) has not always been rightly explained by editors.

Ibid. § 5. omnia summa fecisse.

The correctness of the reading is doubtful; *omnia summa adipisci ab aliquo* (Marcell. 21) is right enough; but in De Or. 2, 85, *omnia summe fecisse* found in the "mutili," has been properly preferred to *o. summa f.*, given by the Laudensis.

Ep. 14. § 4. his litteris scriptis me ad συντάξεις dedi.

Madvig declared, erroneously, in the preface to his edition of the De Finibus (in reference to Att. 12, 45, 1), that σύνταξις applies properly to a portion of a work, and his dictum continues to be repeated by scholars, as by Prof. Tyrrell, in vol. ii. of the Letters, p. lx, while other erroneous views are sometimes put forward, as by Landwehr in "Archiv für Lateinische Lexicographie," vi. 249. I have criticised Madvig's view in the preface to my edition of the "Academica," p. 31, collecting the available evidence. If I am right, συντάξεις could not here refer to the "De Officiis" alone, as TP and other editors affirm. Two separate works must be meant; probably the "De Gloria" and the Ἡρακλείδειον of which we have mention in 15, 27, 2 and 16, 2, 6. I take the opportunity of correcting a slight error in my preface to the "Academica." It is true that in Att. 15, 27, 2 and 16, 6, 4 the "De Gloria" is described as *liber*, not *libri*, and in 16, 3, 1 it is called σύνταγμα, which, by ordinary usage, ought to apply to a work in one, not several books. But De Off. 2, 31 and quotations by Hieronymus and others show that the work consisted of two books. Unless Cicero made a change in the form of the "De Gloria" at the last moment before publication (all the passages where it is

called *liber* or σύνταγμα being prior to publication), the fact that it is called both *liber* and *libri* would cancel the contention of Th. Schiche and others that in 14, 17, 6 the phrase *liber ἀνέκδοτος* cannot refer to the "Tusculan Disputations."

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Surely the doubts of M about the Latinity of *uix* are not well founded; it is merely, as often, a variation upon *nullum*. If *uix* be removed, as M seems to desire, the passage appears to become unintelligible.

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Boot seems right in requiring an accusative for *petii*; he reads *ab eodem mulos*. Perhaps *ab eo decem mulos*. But can *mulis uecturae et itineris*, "transport mules for the

journey" (TP), or *mulos uecturae* (M), be sound Latin? I conjecture *mulos uecturae causa* (i.e. *cā*, or, as sometimes written, *c̄*) *et itineris*. The following words *et in eis*, should be struck out as having arisen by dittography.

Ep. 19. § 1. quid autem se refert Brutus? doleo mehercules te tam esse distentum, quod decem hominibus referendum est acceptum. est illud quidem ἐργῶδες, sed ἀνεκτὸν mihi que gratissimum.

There are strong reasons, I think, against supposing that the first words allude (as many editors suppose) to a contemplated return of Brutus to Rome. That would have been a momentous event, not to be thrust in casually between two other matters. It is just possible that Brutus may have desired to come nearer to Rome, because of the preparations for his *ludi*. Atticus had undertaken to assist him in the preparations, and this is what *illud ἐργῶδες* indicates. I may note in passing that *sat egisse*, which M reads just above, although not Ciceronian, may be right, as the expression is quoted from Atticus, who may have used a phrase of comedy. Of course *agitur tamen satis* in 4, 15, 9 does not necessarily support *sat egisse* in this letter.

Ibid. de armis nihil uidi apertius: fugiamus igitur; sed ut ais coram. Theophanes quid uelit nescio.

Such is the ordinary punctuation, and the words *sed ut ais coram* are quite in Cicero's style. He frequently in the Letters puts aside a problem with the statement that its consideration must be left for a personal interview, and *coram* often ends an elliptic sentence, as in ep. 1a (b) 2 sed haec coram; 16, 12, 1 sed haec et alia maiora coram; 7, 8, 5 sed haec et multa alia coram; 13, 41, 2 sed coram. Lehmann, however (whose view TP accept), places a stop at *ais* and makes *coram* part of the following sentence. Thus *sed* becomes strange; one would expect *et*, and TP in their translation render it by "and." But the interpretation of the passage which follows presents much greater

difficulty. "I have had no opportunity of discovering Theophanes' meaning from a personal interview." Can *coram nescio*, "I don't know from a personal interview," be really Latin?

Ep. 20. § 1. sint quaelibet mihi aliquid.

In the "Classical Review," xi., p. 351, I have assumed *mihi* to be an error for *modo*. The contractions *m̄*^o and *m̄*ⁱ are easily confused. The contraction *m̄*^o has given rise to numerous errors elsewhere, e.g. it was taken in Fam. 6, 7, 3 for *ū*^o = *ero*, and in ad Herenn. 1, 14, *Simo* passed into *si modo*.

Ibid. § 2. quis enim haec, ut scribis, † anteno?

I have always thought the old and simple correction of Corradi, *ante nos*, which recent editors are disinclined to accept, quite satisfactory. Something like *passus est* is to be supplied after *haec*: "who was ever in such plight before?" Cicero had accepted a *legatio* from Dolabella, who was not treating him well; the position was undignified, and the acceptance of the *legatio* would be regarded as due to despair.

Ibid. genus illud interitus quo † casurus est.

There have been many corrections. I would propose *quo causa casura est*, *quo* being instrumental ablative. The crushing together of *causa* and *casura* is an example of one of the commonest types of error.

Ibid. § 3. Pompeium Carthela receptum scribis.

The usual correction is *Carteiam*; M however tries to defend *Carteia*. But the only relevant illustrations he quotes are Caes. B. C. 3, 103, 3 and Flor. 1, 7, 7. These supports (taking into account the bad condition of Caesar's text) are insufficient.

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Why *laxius* should have been so frequently suspected is not easy to see. The word occurs in 13, 14, 1 *laxius proferre diem*. Understand *curari*: "although I want him to be liberally supplied."

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Ep. 25. † *et tu etiam scire quo die Olympia cum, mysteria scilicet.*

The little letter from which this is taken teems with difficulties. Cicero begins by talking of his projected

journey overseas; then of the time for his return, for which (as TP rightly show) he suggests Jan. 1, saying that he has no preference for one time over another; only he wants to avoid giving offence. What offence he fears to give is not clear. Perhaps by waiting until Hirtius and Pansa were in office on Jan. 1 he might cause dissatisfaction to Antonius. Next come the words quoted above, as they stand in Med. The regular correction for *Olympia cum* is *olim piaculum*. Many editors (among them TP) excise *mysteria scilicet* as a gloss, but it is hardly conceivable that a copyist should have glossed *piaculum* by *mysteria*. And the letter goes on: *casus consilium nostri itineris iudicabit; dubitemus igitur; est enim hiberna nauigatio odiosa, eoque ex te quaesieram mysteriorum diem*. This passage strongly supports the genuineness of *mysteria scilicet* above. But what were these *mysteria*? On the showing of this letter it appears that Cicero might make these *mysteria*, if he only knew their date, an excuse for coming back at a particular time, so as to avoid *odiosa hiberna nauigatio*. But the passage must be studied in connexion with two others. First 5, 21, 14: *cum scies Romae intercalatum sit necne, uelim ad me scribas certum quo die mysteria futura sint*. Cicero wrote this when he was thinking of his return from Cilicia, and he applies *mysteria* to some Roman festival, the date of which depended on intercalation. But, assuming the *mysteria* in 15, 25 to be the same, we are at once confronted by a puzzle: for Caesar's reform of the Calendar had abolished irregular intercalation. Perhaps the fixing of the festival did not depend on intercalation *solely*. I pass on to the second passage, viz. 6, 1, 26: *facies me in quem diem Romana incidant mysteria certiore*. Again a Roman ceremony called *mysteria*; the epithet *Romana* is introduced to avoid ambiguity, as there has been mention of Athens just before. Scholars have commonly identified the *mysteria* with the festival of the Bona Dea. But this solution

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The words *utro erit* are, I think, a corruption of *intererit*: "will he take part?" *Interesse* is used a good many times in the Letters of taking a share in the civil wars: cf. 9, 9, 2 *et me tamen doleo non interesse huic bello*.

Ep. 23. *Silium expectabam cui hypomnema compositum. Si quid noui.*

The *hypomnema* contained an argument about a law suit in which Silius was engaged. I believe that the full stop at *compositum* should be exchanged for a comma: "I have given him a memorandum to meet any new turn in the case." It has been customary to understand *rescribas uelim* after *si quid noui*, and M conjectures *composui. tu mi* etc. It seems to have been assumed that *compositum* could not stand for *compositum est*, but there are a good many examples of the omission in brief clauses; see for instance Fam. 10, 26, 1, *sin iam confecta*, and 14, 20, 2 *quae de re mea gesta* (which is sound enough, though altered by Boö TP, and some other editors).

Ep. 25. † *et tu etiam scire quo die Olympia cum, myster scilicet.*

The little letter from which this is taken teems with difficulties. Cicero begins by talking of his project

journey overseas; then of the time for his return, for which (as TP rightly show) he suggests Jan. 1, saying that he has no preference for one time over another; only he wants to avoid giving offence. What offence he fears to give is not clear. Perhaps by waiting until Hirtius and Pansa were in office on Jan. 1 he might cause dissatisfaction to Antonius. Next come the words quoted above, as they stand in Med. The regular correction for *Olympia cum* is *olim piaculum*. Many editors (among them TP) excise *mysteria scilicet* as a gloss, but it is hardly conceivable that a copyist should have glossed *piaculum* by *mysteria*. And the letter goes on: *casus consilium nostri itineris iudicabit; dubitemus igitur; est enim hiberna nauigatio odiosa, eoque ex te quaesieram mysteriorum diem*. This passage strongly supports the genuineness of *mysteria scilicet* above. But what were these *mysteria*? On the showing of this letter it appears that Cicero might make these *mysteria*, if he only knew their date, an excuse for coming back at a particular time, so as to avoid *odiosa hiberna nauigatio*. But the passage must be studied in connexion with two others. First 5, 21, 14: *cum scies Romae intercalatum sit necne, uelim ad me scribas certum quo die mysteria futura sint*. Cicero wrote this when he was thinking of his return from Cilicia, and he applies *mysteria* to some Roman festival, the date of which depended on intercalation. But, assuming the *mysteria* in 15, 25 to be the same, we are at once confronted by a puzzle: for Caesar's reform of the Calendar had abolished irregular intercalation. Perhaps the fixing of the festival did not depend on intercalation *solely*. I pass on to the second passage, viz. 6, 1, 26: *facies me in quem diem Romana incidant mysteria certiore*. Again a Roman ceremony called *mysteria*; the epithet *Romana* is introduced to avoid ambiguity, as there has been mention of Athens just before. Scholars have commonly identified the *mysteria* with the festival of the Bona Dea. But this solution

is not really simple. Why should Cicero desire to be in Rome when that festival was proceeding? In order to receive congratulations from his friends? There were other days on which they would have been far more appropriate; for example the anniversary of *pugna Bouillana*. And the same consideration applies to the idea that Cicero observed some private festival on the day of the ceremony in honour of the Bona Dea.

A few words as to *Olympia cum* of Med. The journey which Cicero was contemplating would take him to Greece, and he was suspected of a desire to visit the Olympian games (16, 7, 5). It is conceivable that Cicero might go to Atticus for information as to the exact time of celebration; and a reading *Olympiacum* or (as that term is improbable in Cicero) *Olympia* (ejecting *cum*) would be in accord. If this were accepted, *mysteria* might refer to Eleusis not to Rome, and meaning would be given to *mysteria scilicet* by placing a semicolon in front; "of course you have already given me information about the mysteries." This has the advantage of harmonizing with the tense of *quaesieram*, otherwise strange. The assumption of a lost letter in which the question had been put is not difficult; it has to be made in several places elsewhere. In any case I think the word *olim* cannot be right. *Velim etiam scire* (often accepted) seems to be the best correction for *et tu etiam scire*. *Scires* below (in *ut tu scires*) may have been inserted to complete the construction of *ut*, in which case there is ellipse of *ais*, as elsewhere; but it is at least arguable that *ut tu scires* as sound, "I want you to know this, viz. that I have no settled plans." Cf. Fam. 2, 16, 7 hoc aspersi, ut scires; 13, 46 utrumque scripsi ut . . . scires. [Cicero uses in the Letters *mysteria* and *μυστικώτερα* of private affairs; but it is hardly possible to give a purely private reference to the passages discussed above.]

Ep. 27. § 1. ille autem quod Puteolos prosequitur, humane, quod queritur, iniuste.

The context, of course, shows that *prosequitur* (Med.) is wrong; the intention of Sestius was not to escort Cicero to Puteoli, but to overtake him there. Yet the ordinary reading *persequitur* (given in other MSS.) is improbable. Cicero generally uses *persequi* of following with hostile intent; indeed I do not know whether there is a clear instance to the contrary. In Phil. 2, 39 qui eum (sc. Pompeium) de Pharsalia fuga Paphum persecuti sunt, the word *persecuti* does not give the sense required by the context, which shows that the friends did not follow P. to Paphos but went with him. Those edd. therefore who write *prosecuti* are entirely justified. The true reading here is probably *sequitur*, an idiomatic use which a copyist would be likely to misunderstand; cf. e.g. 10, 18, 2 Formias sequimur, eodem nos furiae fortasse persequentur, "we are making for F."; 13, 16, 1 cum flumina et solitudines sequeremur.

Ibid. § 2. excudam aliquid Ἡρακλείδειον quod lateat in thesauris tuis.

It is often said (as by TP) that the word *lateat* taken with *thesauris* denotes a select set of books kept by Atticus to which access was allowed only as a special favour. But *lateat* merely indicates that Atticus is not to publish the work without further direction. The books xii.–xvi. contain a good many passages where an injunction of this kind is laid on Atticus. In 13, 21 a, 1 Cicero protests against publication without special permission; cf., too, 13, 25, 3. The inference drawn from *thesauris* is also incorrect; nor can there be any reference to the historical work composed by Atticus, as some say. In Fin. 2. 67 *Attici thesauri* only means "Atticus' store of learning." [But *Varronis thesauri* in a letter of Decimus Brutus, ap. Fam. 11, 10, 5,

refers to actual money. Is not *Varronis* there an error of the MSS. for *Verrinos*?] With *thesauri* applied to books compare *diuitiis* in Att. 1, 4, 3.

Ep. 29. § 1. ad M. Aelium nullus tu quidem domum, sed sicubi inciderit.

O. E. Schmidt declares *nullus* to be untranslatable, and changes it to *ne ieris*. It is true that *nullus* in such a case would usually stand for *non* and that *non ieris* for *ne ieris* is impossible in Cicero; he probably wrote in 4, 7, 2 not *non retexeris* which our MSS. give, but *non temere retexeris*, so that the phrase is parallel to Fam. 7, 19 non longe abieris, where we have a statement without any idea of prohibition. Yet there is nothing about *nullus* which would prevent it from taking the place of *ne* as *nihil* does (5, 11, 7); though I cannot recall a passage where this occurs.

Ibid. quod non solum mea sed etiam tua me expedis, gratum.

Med. omits *tua*, and it is obvious that some other word is omitted. The insertion by TP of *eadem* (sc. opera) is ingenious, and far superior to *causa*, proposed by Baiter and accepted by many editors. But I think the missing word is *re* as Koch suggested. Many passages will occur to a reader of the Letters in which Cicero thanks Atticus in this way for monetary aid. Cf. especially 11, 2, 1 and 12, 22, 3.

Ibid. § 2. Quintus filius usque Puteolos, mirus ciuis, ut Fauonius Asinium dicas, et quidem duas ob causas et ut mecum ut *σπείσασθαι* uolt cum Bruto Cassio.

So Med. Of course, *B. et Cassio* must be read; and ~~should be struck out before~~ *σπείσασθαι* (with TP). We the- have a change of construction of a type not uncommon in Cicero; cf., for example, Verr. 2, 5, 112 non solum ~~ut~~

laederet . . . uerum scripsit. Many, and for the most part desperate, have been the efforts to extract sense out of *Fauonius Asinium*. The old opinion that Cicero wrote *Fauonium Asinium* as the equivalent of *Pompeianum Caesarianum*, "facing both ways," will not stand examination. Asinius Pollio, himself a notorious sitter on the fence, will not balance Favonius, the fanatical partizan of the senate. I believe Cicero wrote *Fauoni simium*; he calls young Quintus "the ape of Favonius," just as Favonius himself had been dubbed "the ape of Cato." In Fam. 7, 2, 3 where Clodius and Bursa are compared, the word *simiolus* is applied to the latter. So Regulus called Fabius Rusticus "Stoicorum simia" (Plin. ep. 1, 5, 2). The phrase in our passage accords with the humour of the context. In the letter which follows (16, 1, 6) Cicero alludes to a promise made by young Quintus that he would behave himself as a very Cato. A similar reference to Cato as the moral standard incarnate is found in 1, 14, 6, where Cornutus figures as "Pseudo-Cato." And I still think (see "Classical Review," xi. p. 351) that the flippant Caelius wrote in Fam. 8, 17, 2 of the old ladies babbling about him as a regular Cato (*narrant anus me Catonem* for *arruntanum me Catonem*). The reading *Fauonius Asinium* here may have been partly caused by the fact that in 12, 38, 2 young Quintus is brought into connexion with Asinius.

J. S. REID.

THE TRADITION OF MUIRCHU'S TEXT.

§ 1. **T**HE relation of the Brussels to the Armagh copy of Muirchu's Life of St. Patrick does not seem to have been fully discussed. It was, of course, obvious that the copy in the Codex Bruxellensis (eleventh century) was taken from a fuller text than that which is preserved in the Codex Armachanus (A); but the recognition of this fact is far from exhausting the question as to the relation of that fuller text to our Armagh text. For we have to consider not merely larger lacunæ, but variations. Now, the variations are of such a kind that, if we were to assume the Armagh manuscript to represent faithfully the author's original text, we should have to say that the Brussels document is derived from the work of a scribe who was again and again forgetting that he was a scribe, and imagining that he was a compiler, and that his function was not merely to copy, but to paraphrase and improve his original. In fact, on this assumption, the Brussels MS. (B) in certain passages has as much, or as little, right as corresponding parts of the Life by Probus to be considered a reproduction of Muirchu's text. But we have no title to make such an assumption. We are not justified in supposing that all cases of important variation are cases of deliberate alteration. As the archetype of B was independent of A, it is clear that B represents so

far a different tradition, and furnishes a valuable control of the older MS. But in order to exercise this control, and attempt to reconstitute Muirchu's text, the question must be discussed as a whole.

§ 2. Besides textual variations in the stricter sense, we have to deal with certain remarkable differences in the order of the sections, and we may take these first. In the Armagh MS. the first eight folia (of which 1° is lost) are occupied with Muirchu's Life. But the work as here presented is incomplete, for it does not contain Muirchu's Preface and the Table of Contents to Book i. The following eleven folia contain the memoir of Tírechán and other notes about Patrick, and then fol. 20 supplies the missing Preface and Table. It seems clear that the scribe, when he began to write his MS., was not in possession of this initial part of the Life, and that, having subsequently discovered it, he inserted it supplementally. The question arises, whether he had recovered a missing leaf of the same MS. which supplied him with the rest of the text, or had obtained access to another complete copy.¹ There is one circumstance which suggests the second alternative. The order of sections in the Table of Contents differs at one point from the order of sections in the text—

<i>Table of Contents.</i>	<i>Order in Armagh Text.</i>
De Macc Cuill.	De Macc Cuill.
De fabula Dairi.	De gentibus lab. d. dominica.
De gentibus laborantibus die dominica.	De fabula Dairi.

If we could absolutely eliminate the possibility of scribal errors, we could infer, from this divergency, that

¹ I observe that this suggestion was made by the editor of *Documenta de S. Patricio* in *Analecta Bollandiana*, t. 1, p. 542. To this edition, by Rev. E. Hogan, I am indebted for the readings of B. For the text of A, I collated the MS., and I have been

able, through the kindness of Dr. Gwynn, to consult the proofsheets of his forthcoming edition. But, for the reader's convenience, I generally refer to the pages of the text in the Rolls series (ed. Stokes).

the text to which the Table belonged differed from the text of our MS. It is also to be observed, that B (1) agrees here¹ with the *text* of A, and (2) differs in the order of other sections from the Table of Contents. Unfortunately, these other sections are just those which have been omitted by the Armagh scribe.

<i>Table of Contents.</i>	<i>Order in B.</i>
De morte Moneisen.	De morte Monesan.
De eo quod s. P. uidit caelum apertum.	De Corotico.
De conflictu P, aduersum Coirthech.	De caelo aperto.

And while these three sections in the Table of Contents come at the very end of Book i., and follow the section *De fructifera terra in salsuginem uersa*, they appear in B immediately after the section *De doctrina et baptismo Patricii*, preceding the sections on Maccuill, Daire, the men who worked on Sunday, and the miracle of the salt marsh. If, for brevity's sake, we symbolize by L the triplet *a* Maccuill, *b* Daire, *c* Sunday labour; by N the triplet *l* mors Moneisen, *m* heavenly vision, *n* Coroticus; and by M the miracle of the salt marsh; then B differs from the Table of Contents in the order of L [M] N, of *a b c*, and of *l m n*—

<i>Table of Contents.</i>	<i>B.</i>
L M N	N L [M]
a b c	a c b
l m n	l n m

The Armagh text agrees with B, against the Table of Contents, in *a c b*; but, as it does not contain *l m n*, we are left in doubt how much this agreement means. Though it is obviously impossible to know whether the MS. from which the Armagh text was copied presented *l m n* or *l n m*, the

¹ In *Anal. Boll.*, op. cit., p. 568, obviously be "23, 24 (*ex parte*)."
note (a), "24, 23, (*ex parte*)," should

them regarding LMN or NLM is one which does not rely defly a conjectural solution.

3. Let us assume as a hypothesis, that the first binding of the manuscript Φ , from which Ferdomnach copied Muirchu's work, was a quaternion, and that this quaternion had lost the diploma which contained the Preface, the Table of Contents, and the triplet N, the Preface and Contents occupying fol. I., and N occupying fol. VIII., another leaf of the outer plicature. The circumstance that N contains somewhat more matter than the Preface and Contents is not an objection to this hypothesis; for the space required by the title of the work, and by the regular arrangement of the Contents, would account for the difference. Making the assumption, we may ask whether the intervening folia II.-VII. could have accommodated the text of the Life up to the point at which N begins, in either order, LMN or NLM. The answer will confirm or disprove the hypothesis, and may also show whether Φ agreed or not with the arrangement of B. If we had to do with printed matter, we might compute this with the greatest precision; but as the amount of matter in the pages of a MS. may vary considerably—*e.g.* in A, where the columns vary in the number of lines, and the lines of different columns in the average number of letters—we may be content with an approximate calculation.

Having estimated roughly the number of letters in a column from fol. 2 to the middle of fol. 5 v^o δ in the high MS., and likewise the number of letters in the missing portion, which was contained in the lost fol. 1 and reserved in the Bruxellensis, I found that the total number of letters in the text of the hypothetical ff. II.-VII. would have been about $(15,780 + 3,670) 19,450$. In other words, each fol. would have contained on an average about 3,600 letters. Now, N amounts to about 3,100 letters, and therefore might well have occupied fol. VIII. For the

difference, considering the rough nature of the calculation, and the fact that the columns of A vary between 900 and 1,200 letters, is really insignificant.

It follows that our hypothesis, that the first gathering of Φ was a quaternion, and that its first plicature contained the missing parts of A, will work perfectly, if we suppose that Φ had the order N L M; it will not work with the order L M N.

There is, however, another possibility which must be regarded. If we suppose that the first gathering of Φ was a quinion, we find, by a similar computation,¹ that ff. II-IX. would have approximately contained the text of the Life up to the end of f. 7 r^o of A, and thus N might have filled f. X., and the loss of the missing parts in A would be equally well explained. In this case the order would have been L M N (not N L M). The reason for preferring the former hypothesis is that the quaternion was a far more usual gathering than the quinion.

On either hypothesis the defects of the Armagh text are explained. And we may draw the corollary, that the Preface and Table of Contents, which the scribe Ferdomnach subsequently added in f. 20, were copied by him from a different MS., and not from the lost sheet. For the presumption is, that in the latter case he would not have omitted to append also the edifying sections contained in the other leaf, VIII. (or X.), of the recovered plicature, whereas in the case of a whole MS. a particular portion in the middle of the text would not have invited his attention.

§ 4. It is worth while showing—for through an accident, it admits of proof—that this other MS., which I will call Ψ , was not the original MS. of the author. In f. 20 r^o b, in the Table of Contents, we find the entry *De morte monicisem*

¹ The additional text up to the foot of f. 7 r^o b brings the number of letters up to about 27,000; which, as in this case there are 8 folia, gives 3,375 for one folium, practically the same as in the other case.

in a wrong place, l. 8 from foot, as well as the full entry, *De morte moneisen Saxonissae*, in the right place, l. 3 from foot. The cause of the error is manifest. A scribe, having written *De maccuill et conuersione eius ad uerbum Patricii*, raised his eyes from his own MS. to that which he was copying, and his eyes caught the words *ad uerbum Patricii* four or five lines below, where they are followed by *De morte moneisen*, which he accordingly proceeded to write; but before he had written *Saxonissae* he discovered his mistake, and reverted to the proper entry, *De fabula dairi*, but without erasing *De morte moneisen*. Now, the scribe who committed this inadvertence was not Ferdomnach; for Ferdomnach has attached his mark of query, *z*, to the entry, showing that he was puzzled by it. We infer that it was due to the scribe of Ψ , and therefore Ψ must have been copied from an older MS.

§ 5. To return to the question of the order of L M N, if we examine the sections *lm n*, which are omitted in A, we find that they are more in harmony with N L M than with L M N. The first sentence of *l* (*Patricii . . . de uirtutibus pauca pluribus enarrare conabor*) is appropriate as an introduction to the whole series of miracles, but inappropriate if that section was not the first of the series. It suits the order N L M, but not L M N. In fact, if we could prove that L M N was the original order, we should be obliged to infer that the sentence *Itaque uolente—conabor* (and *igitur* in the following sentence) was introduced by a redactor, to accord with his alteration of the order.

§ 6. To sum up. The scribe of A had access to two MSS. of Muirchu's Life. From one of these, Φ , in which the outer diploma of the first quaternion was missing, he copied the text of the Life (ff. 1-8); from the other, Ψ , he added subsequently the Preface and Table of Contents (f. 20). The order of the portions L M N probably differed in Φ and Ψ : Φ having N L M, and Ψ —which was copied

from an older MS. — having L M N. Here Φ agreed with B.

§ 7. There is a notable difference between B and A in regard to the division of the Life into Books. In A the first Book ends with the miracle of the salt marsh, and the second Book begins with the section *De Patricii diligenter orationis*. The Table of Contents (f. 20) bears out this division of the text. But in B, Book i. ends with the words *sequentibus signis*¹ (in the section *de doctrina et baptismo*), and Book ii. begins with the *mors Moneisen* section. It must be acknowledged that this distribution of the material is more natural and logical than the division in A; for Book i. thus consists of a continuous narrative, Book ii. of a miscellaneous collection of extra-chronological miracles.² This was the division adopted by Probus, who, in the two Books of his work, made a large use of Muirchu. But though logically better, there is no likelihood that this was the original order adopted by the author. Had it been so, there is no discoverable motive for the appearance of the other order in A (Φ and Ψ). But if the order of A was original, the readjustment is quite intelligible, as the improvement of an editor who perceived that the author's division was awkward. What the author's motive for his division may have been I have pointed out elsewhere. Book i. was written with the help of Bishop Aed; Book ii. by Muirchu unaided.³

§ 8. There is another important discrepancy in arrangement between A and B. In Book i., immediately after the section *de morte Milcon*, B has a section headed *de ebd. frequentia cum Patricio et reliq.* This section, beginning *Ad omnia iterum recurrat oratio*, and ending *fructum felicissimum obtinent*, is not found in this place in A, but

¹ The clause which ends with these words is taken from Mark xvi. 20. Book ii. is entirely lost in B.

² See the *Guardian*, November 27,

³ The part corresponding to A's 1901.

appears there, awkwardly enough, at the end of Book ii. (B v°), where it is introduced by *Iterum recurrat oratio*, about the words *ad omnia*. The subject of the section is a frequent converse of Patrick with the angel. We are led by the question, what is the genuine position of this paragraph? It must be allowed that it is equally out of place in B and in A, and this is acknowledged by *iterum recurrat oratio*.

It is not difficult to discover where this piece belongs. There is one appropriate place for it, namely, at the end of the section *De primo itinere* (f. 3 r° a; Rolls ed., p. 276). The last section of this sentence is: *de quo monte* *Anguelum Victoricum in conspectu eius ascendisse in* *sum.* Here it would evidently have been strictly relevant to proceed (omitting *iterum recurrat oratio*) *Anguelus omni septima die, &c.* Is it possible that the paragraph was intended to be inserted here? It is better to ask the question in the form: what position did the paragraph occupy in the author's MS.? The answer undoubtedly is: the same position which it occupies in A. For (1) if it came where it comes in B, there is no reason why it could have been removed in A to the end of Book ii.; whereas an editor-copyist, finding it obviously out of place at the end of the Life, might have transferred it to what he considered an appropriate place. And (2) it is difficult to conceive why the author should have added this paragraph to the section *de morte Milcon*, and not to the immediately preceding section, to which, as we have seen, it naturally belongs. On the other hand, we can understand that, when he had finished the Life, Muirchu discovering that he had omitted the material of this paragraph, might append it in his MS. with *iterum recurrat oratio*, and possibly with some signs to indicate where it ought to have come in the text. The editor-copyist, who is responsible for the order in B, while he recognised that the section was

misplaced, did not discover its true place, though he came very near it. We may guess how this happened. The author may have inscribed a mark, or note, on the page of his MS., which contained both the end of the section *De itinere*, and the whole of the section *de morte Milcon*, to show that the paragraph, which was to be found at the end of the work ought to have been inserted on this page; and an error may have arisen as to the point at which the insertion should be made.

My arguments that B (which inconsistently retains the [*ad omissa*] *iterum recurvat oratio*) does not present the original order, are corroborated by the fact that, at the end of the paragraph, it has *orandi locus est*, which seems to reveal the circumstance, that the passage has been transferred from the end of the document.

§ 9. In these matters of arrangement, then, I conclude that A represents faithfully the text of the author, while B is derived from a text in which the transcriber took liberties with the original. This being so, we may be ready to believe that he may have dealt more or less freely with the text too, and in a certain class of variants to accept A as presenting the genuine text, and reject the readings of B as the alterations of an editor-copyist. Such cases are the following:—

A f. 2^{ro} b

Cum omni uelocitate flatuque prospero mare nostrum contendit.

In illis autem diebus quibus haec gesta sunt in praedictis regionibus fuit rex quidam magnus ferox gentisque imperator barbarorum regnans in Temoria, quae erat caput Scotorum, Loiguire nomine, filius Neill, origo stirpis regiae huius pene insulae.

B (*Ann. Boll.*, p. 555)

prospero itinere mare nostrum peruenit.

In illis itaque diebus quibus uenit Patricius ad Hiberniam insulam regnabat Logere filius Nelul in loco Temoria qui tunc erat caput regni¹ Scotorum, vir magnus et gentis ferocior.

¹ *regni* is probably part of the original text, and has fallen out in A.

<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 2 v^o b</p> <p>De his ista sufficient</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 557)</p> <p>Satis de hoc diximus</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 3 r^o a</p> <p>Sed uolens cito ire ut uissitaret prae- dictum hominem Milcoin et portaret ei</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 558)</p> <p>Sed cito uoluit uisitare Miluch et portare ei</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ib.</i></p> <p>coepit per terras dirigere uiam in regiones Cruidnenorum</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ib.</i></p> <p>uenit in regionem Crunneorum</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ib.</i></p> <p>ad uisum primum illius regionis ilico sub oculis rogum regis incensum intuitus</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 559)</p> <p>qui inde uidit rogum regis incensum</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 3 r^o b</p> <p>quod pasca primum Deo in nostra Aegipto huius insolae uelut quondam in Genesseon celebratum est.</p>	<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ib.</i></p> <p>quia primum pasca quasi filiis Israhel in Egiptum sicut legimus in Genesim in nostra insula.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;"><i>ib.</i></p> <p>hanc magnam [resurrectionis] Do- mini sollempnitatem</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 560)</p> <p>hanc maximam resurrectionis Domini festiuitatem</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 3 v^o b</p> <p>in domu regia</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 561)</p> <p>in palatio regis</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 4 r^o a</p> <p>ut ollim Erodis et omnis ciuitas Temoria</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 562)</p> <p>et omnes optimates</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 4 v^o b</p> <p>adueniente ergo eo in caenacolum Temoriae</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 565)</p> <p>Eo ergo ueniente in palatio regis</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">A f. 5 v^o a-b</p> <p>omnis ciuitas</p>	<p style="text-align: center;">B (p. 568)</p> <p>omnes optimates</p>

§ 10. But while B is characterized by deliberate altera-
tions like these, all its variations from A do not belong to
this class. It can be shown that B is ultimately derived

from a MS. which was not only fuller than A, but contained a number of valuable variant lections:—

A f. 2 ^{ro} a	B (p. 553)
Reuertere uero eo hinc et primo mari transito coeptoque terrarum itenere in Britonum finibus uita factus (with z in marg.)	sed reuertente eo <i>ad illum qui misit eum</i> , primo mari transito in Pictorum finibus uita <i>functus est</i> .
A f. 2 ^{vo} a	B (p. 556)
resistentes turbas seducturum	<i>reges resistentes occisurum, turmas seducturum</i>
A f. 2 ^{vo} b	B (p. 557)
ad extremum fretum quod est Brene	in quodam fretu quod est Prenisse
A f. 3 ^{ro} a	B (p. 558)
credidit Patricio	credidit Patricio <i>pre omnibus</i>
A f. 3 ^{ro} b	B (p. 559)
inuenierunt consilium	ininierunt consilium [<i>leg. inierunt</i>]
<i>ib.</i>	B (p. 560)
liberari	<i>caput draconis confringeret a seru Dei excelsi celebrari</i>
A f. 3 ^{vo} b	B (p. 561)
Conuocatis — regi ¹	Conuocatisque — omnibus
A f. 4 ^{vo} a	B (p. 564)
per planitiem campi	per planitiem campi <i>maximi</i>
A f. 4 ^{vo} b	B (p. 565)
regibus et principibus et magis	regibus et principibus et magis <i>toti Hiberniae</i> .
<i>ib.</i>	<i>ib.</i>
in Temoria	et uerbum Dei predicaret in Themoi
<i>ib.</i>	<i>ib.</i>
coram omnibus nationibus	coram omnibus nationibus <i>Hiberne sium tunc illic collectorum</i>

¹ For this passage, see below, p. 192.

² Cp. p. 562, *Temoir*.

A f. 5 v ^o A	B (567)
incendemini	incendemini <i>in conspectu altissimi</i>
<i>ib.</i>	<i>ib.</i>
non tetigit eum ignis	non tetigit eum ignis <i>omnino</i>
<i>ib.</i>	B (568)
discendit ira Dei in uerticem suum	discendit ira Dei in populum im- pium et quia discendet ira Dei in uerticem tuum [See below, p. 193.]
A f. 5 v ^o B	<i>ib.</i>
gentes babtizansque eas	iens et docens omnes gentes bap- tizansque eas

These are some of the instances in which B may help us to determine the true reading. The grounds for believing that B has preserved the truth, or part of the truth, are not clear in some of these cases on mere inspection, but they will appear in the sequel.

§ 11. We may now turn to the Life of Patrick by Probus (Vita 5 in Colgan's *Trias Thaumaturga*), among whose chief sources was Muirchu, in order to determine the relation of the text which he used to A and B. The following facts seem to be decisive:—

1. The account of the angel's hebdomadal visits occurs in Probus in precisely the same place (i. 31) in which it occurs in B, namely, between the section on Dichu and the section on the approach of Easter. It is to be observed that Probus connects the hebdomadal visits closely with Patrick's sojourn in the land of Dichu, interpreting thus *in illo loco*, which really refers to Scirit.

2. In the statement of Patrick's intention to destroy idolatry at its centre, Probus, like B, has the metaphor of the dragon, which does not occur in A (see above, p. 182). See Prob. i. 32, ut iuxta Psalmistae uocem caput draconum confringeret Dominus.

3. In the description of the council held by Loigaire,

Probus (i. 35) has the speech of the king, which is found in B, but not in A (see below, p. 192).

4. The First Book of Probus terminates at exactly the same point where the First Book of Muirchu's Life (which he is here following closely) terminates in B.

5. Compare the following readings (Pr. = Probus):—

per plani campi A (Rolls ed. 279₈): per planiciem campi B Pr. (i. 35).

ipse A (280₁₂): ipsius B Pr. (i. 35).

Ercc A (281₁): Herc B, Hercus Pr. (i. 37).

naturam A (283₂₄): naturam suam B Pr. (i. 42).

in partem domus A (285₃): in p. d. aridae B, in p. d. aridam Pr. (i. 45).

credere me A (285₂₅): mihi credere B Pr. (i. 46).

praedicauit A (286₈): praed. ubique B, praed. ubique in Hibernia Pr. (i. 47).

Euoniam A (288₃₂): Euanneam B, Euaniam Pr. (ii. 11).¹

These comparisons² are amply sufficient to establish the fact that the Muirchu document (P), which Probus used, was closely related to B, not to A. On the other hand, it may be said that there are some indications that P was not absolutely identical with the text from which B is derived (B¹). Thus we find: Legit mail Pr. i. 42 (Lucet mail A, 283₁₄); Loiet caluus B;—in alternos animos agitatus Pr. i. 45³; in alternos annos A (284₂₇) and B;—mirati Pr. i. 43 and A (284₉): mirate B;—ablative abs. construction (uestimento exusto) Pr. i. 45 and A (cassula—exusta, 285₁₂); subj. and verb (cassula—exusta est) B;—diues et honorabilis Pr. ii. 4, A (290₃): *om.* B;—eat quis cito Pr. ii. 5, and A (290₂₈): erat quis B. But these and one or two others amount to very little; the last two cases may certainly be discounted, as they may represent *proprii errores* of B, and have nothing to do with the MS. from which it was copied. It is, in any case, safe to draw the conclusion that P and B¹ represent a common tradition, distinct from A (Φ).

¹ Two lines below, however, Pr. has example.
in Evonensium ciuitate.

² They are not exhaustive. Others For the distinction of P from B, see below, pp. 194-5.

³ This may be a *proprius error* of P.

§ 12. This conclusion has importance for the estimation of some readings in B. Thus the place named Ebmoria in A (272₃₂) appears as Curbia in B. Hitherto this has been regarded as an important variant, offering a different place-name. But when we realise the relation of B to P, and find that Pr. gives Euboria, we may suspect that Curbia is nothing more than a mistake of the B scribe, arising from a confusion of *c* with *e* (of which we have a converse example in Probus i. 27, if we can trust Colgan's text, where *cuelennorum* of B appears as *eudlenorum*).

The close relation of the Muirchu portions of Probus to B also justifies us in correcting with caution some passages in A where B deserts us. Thus in f. 7 r^o *b* (Rolls ed. 292₁₂) A has:—

uelut amantissimaque ouis;

but Pr. ii. 8 gives *uelut oue mitissima mansuetissimaque*. The original text, we may infer, had:—

uelut [mitissim]a man[sue]tissimaque ouis.

Again, A (293₂₅) has *siue manens (aut in itinere pergens)*, where Pr. ii. 29 gives *siue in uno loco manens*. It seems clear that *in uno loco* was part of the original text. And 299₁₃, where A gives *prorumperat*, Pr. ii. 40 supplies the correction *proruperunt*. Again, A (297₂₂), *Postquam autem in caelum profecti sunt angueli odorem suauissimum*, Pr. adds, ii. 36, *iuxta corpus in terra*, and something of the kind seems required.

In f. 8 r^o *b* (296₂₀), A has:—

sicut omnibus totius Hyberniae annis celebratur.

But Pr. ii. 34 gives *sicut in omnibus Hiberniae finibus celebratur*. This enables us to restore the true reading:

*Sicut omnibus [finibus] totius Hyberniae [omnibus] annis celebratur.*¹

¹ *Finibus* fell out through homœoteleuton; and then the second *omnibus* being superfluous was deliberately excised.

§ 13. The Second and Fourth Lives published in Colgan's *Trias Thaumaturga* are no less important, in fact they are more important, than Probus for the study of Muirchu's text. It is, perhaps, in their relation to Muirchu that their chief importance lies.

V₂ (as I may denote the Life which is second in Colgan's order) is incomplete. It stops short at Patrick's prophecy touching the seed of Loigaire—a point which corresponds nearly, though not quite, to the end of Book i. in B. In arrangement and diction it has a close resemblance to the corresponding part of V₄, so that it is clear, from the most superficial comparison, that they depended almost entirely on the same sources.¹

V₄, c. 1, coincides with V₂, c. 1, so far as Patrick's birthplace is concerned; but it contains an account of the origin of his family, and a statement as to his mother, which are not in V₂; while V₂ has a notice of his sister Lupita not to be found in V₄. But the point to be observed is, that while the text in V₄, c. 1, flows on consecutively, V₂, c. 1, reveals shamelessly that it has been put together, as it were, with scissors and paste:—

Natus est igitur in illo oppido Nemthor nomine: eratque illi soror Lupita nomine; cuius reliquiae sunt in Ardmacha. Patricius natus est in campo Taburniae. Campus autem tabernaculorum ob hoc dicitur, &c.

The document begins with *igitur*, a particle of transition; designates Nemthor as if it had been already mentioned;

¹ For the text of V₄ I have made use of a MS. preserved in the British Museum, Stowe 1054, which was not known to Colgan. This MS., while it presents no serious variants, enables us to control the text and correct a number of corrupt passages. Thus: f. 4 r^o (c. 8) we find *Postumianus in libris sanctissimi Martini* for the unmeaning *Ogartini*, which puzzled Colgan

(p. 49); f. 10 v^o *Mrechthan* for *Imrechhan* (c. 37); f. 12 v^o *paululum* (for *paulatim*, c. 43) *separati*, and *recumbente* (for *reambulante*, c. 44) *rege*; f. 21 v^o *ille Ciprianus nequissimus magus*, where Colgan gives *ille neq. tyrannus magus* (c. 82); *quod herbas depastus* (for *dei pastus*, c. 84) *est*; f. 23 r^o *aequaliter te scimus* (for *sumus*, c. 91); &c.

omits to tell us *who* was born there; and in the next sentence goes on to state that Patricius was born at (for all we know) a different place.¹ The original compiler can hardly be entirely responsible for this, and it is easy enough to see that the notice of Lupita was a subsequent insertion, which obliterated the original sentence. If we compare *V*₄, c. 1 *ad fin.*: Sanctus ergo Patricius in oppido Nemthor nomine . . . natus fuit. Quod oppidum in campo taburniae est, qui campus tabernaculorum dicitur, &c., we can infer that, before the introduction of Lupita, the text ran somewhat like this:—

Natus est igitur in illo oppido Nemthor nomine Patricius, [id] est in campo Taburniae. Campus autem, &c.

This is not quite so bad, but it is bad enough, and the original compiler must have taken it clumsily out of the text of a document similar to *V*₄, though, as we shall see, not from *V*₄ itself.²

¹ That Colgan should have passed all this in silence is characteristic.

² Colgan's *V*₃ contains the first 11 chapters of *V*₂ prefixed to a different Life. The slight differences are more trifling than are often found in two MSS. of the same work. In *V*₃, c. 1, *Patricius* is sensibly added in the first sentence. In c. 4, while *V*₄ gives the passage from the "Confession" more exactly, *V*₂ and *V*₃ agree in a looser quotation. At the end of c. 7, *V*₃, like *V*₄, has *ludentes* which *V*₂ omits; but the omission may be due to an inadvertence of Colgan. So in c. 9, *V*₃ and *V*₄ have *perambulante*, *V*₂ *ambulante*; *V*₃, *V*₄ *illam miserabilem causam*, *V*₂ *i. m. cladem*. In the same chapter *V*₃ gives *infestavit*, beside *V*₂ *inuasit*, *V*₄ *inuaserat*. These specimens (for others cp. especially c. 6) illustrate the relation of *V*₃, c. 1–10 to

*V*₂, c. 1–10, and would not be inconsistent with the view that the compiler of *V*₃ made use of Colgan's MS. of *V*₂. In c. 11 there is a marked divergence. The texts are practically identical up to the words *qui etiam* [*om. V*₃] *centum annumerato* [*conn. V*₃] *utroque sexu erant*. Then *V*₂ gives *fidelius ut mihi uidetur* (so *V*₄) and *in libris Episcopi* (but *V*₃ *in libris suarum Epistularum*); and their loose inaccurate quotations from the "Confession" diverge. One point might be alleged for the possibility that the initial chapters added to *V*₃ were copied from the actual MS. from which Colgan printed *V*₂. In c. 4 this MS. and *V*₃ agree in the error *in libro Episcopi* for *in libro Epistularum* (so *V*₄); while another MS. of *V*₂, to which Colgan refers, does not exhibit this blunder.

The miracles of the saint's childhood, *V*₂, c. 2-10, *V*₄, c. 2-10, have been taken verbally from the same document. Here also the peculiarity of *V*₄ is relative prolixity; the miracles at the baptism are described at greater length (c. 3), and parallels (Jerome, Daniel, &c.) are added *à propos* of the wolf miracle (c. 8). Moreover, *V*₄ has some miracles (c. 11-14) not given in *V*₂.

In the account of the captivity, *V*₂, c. 11-18, *V*₄, c. 15-21, the two narratives are closely parallel. But it is to be noted that, in *V*₄, c. 17, and *V*₂, c. 13, the passage from the Confession concerning Patrick's instance in prayer is cited in different words, and *V*₄ adds that Patrick did not write this *causa iactantiae*. *V*₂, c. 15, has a clause on the relics of Miliucc's children at Granard, which is not in *V*₄, and *V*₄, c. 21, omits the incident of the pursuit of Patrick by Miliucc's servants.

The next chapters, *V*₂, 19-20, *V*₄, 22-24, do not coincide, though the same events are recorded. *V*₄, c. 22, has the story of the man with the cacabus (found in the Tripartite Life); this does not appear in *V*₂. The following chapters of *V*₄, 25-28, have the same origin as *V*₂, 21-24.¹ But the failure of Palladius is not described in the same way, and *V*₄ (c. 28) adds a remark about the reliquiae of Sylvester and Solinus, which is not in *V*₂, c. 24. *V*₄ has also an alternative account of the death of Palladius. At this point *V*₄ inserts stories (c. 29, 30) of the staff of Jesus, and a miracle of Patrick on the north coast of Gaul, which do not appear in *V*₂.

From here to the end of *V*₂ these Lives are closely parallel; *V*₂, 25-41 = *V*₄, 31-49. The following are the chief differences:—

*V*₄, c. 37, gives in full the story of Bishop Loarn, only alluded to in *V*₂, c. 31.
*V*₄, c. 38. Here there is a difference in the order. The notice of Loigaire

¹ *V*₄, 26, is the same as *V*₂, 22, but verbally diffuse.

he prophecies which appears in the Muirchu order in V_2 , c. 27, has been posed to this place in V_4 .

V_4 , c. 43, omits the incident of the *cervi cum hinnulo*.

V_4 , c. 44, in the account of Patrick's coming to Tara, adds "that he might catch the word"; and omits the Dubthach incident.

V_4 , c. 49, adds that Loigaire was baptized.

V_2 contains some Irish sentences (c. 32, 34, and so too c. 20) which do not appear, or appear in a Latin equivalent, in V_4 .

This summary will give a general idea of the relation of V_2 to V_4 . It can easily be shown that V_4 is not derived from V_2 , nor V_2 from V_4 . The additional miracles of Patrick's boyhood recounted in V_4 show that this part is not taken from V_2 . Moreover, in the parts dependent on Muirchu, while V_2 contains several things that are not in V_4 , and, on the whole, keeps closer to Muirchu; on the other hand, there are some passages in which V_4 is nearer to the original.¹ V_2 and V_4 , therefore, had a common source, which we may designate as W .

§ 14. We have now to consider the relation of W to Muirchu. The portions directly taken from the Muirchu source are these:—

V_2 26–30 = V_4 31–36 = A 272₃₀–277₆.

V_2 34–41 = V_4 39–49 = ,, 278₂–286₂.

Further, V_2 , 22, = V_4 , 26, and V_2 , 23, depend mainly on Muirchu.²

In the first place, I may show that, for these portions

¹ Thus, V_4 , c. 31, is nearer the Muirchu text in the passage on Patrick's ordination than V_2 , c. 26. In V_4 , c. 38, we find *haec autem sunt uersiculi uerba propter linguae idioma non tam manifesti* (cp. A 274₁₇ and B) which V_2 , c. 27 omits. V_4 , c. 36, *instrumento substantiae*, as in A (276₂₂), but V_2 *substantia* (as B). V_4 , c. 36, has *et his dictis—crucis*, as in A (277₆), and c. 41 *ut olim Erodias* as A (279₂₆); both

clauses are absent in V_2 . It is equally obvious that V_2 is not derived from V_4 . The Irish bits in V_2 , the omission of incidents which are reproduced in V_4 from the Muirchu source, the fact that V_2 adheres to the Muirchu order of the prophecies of Loigaire's magicians, these leading points could be reinforced by a number of minor verbal indications.

² V_2 , 21 (V_4 , c. 25) depends, not on Muirchu, but on the "Confession."

W differed from A, and from B and P. The following comparisons will make this clear:—

V ₂ and V ₄	A ; B ; P
V ₂ 27, V ₄ 38 et veneficos et incantatores	A 273 ₂₅ et incantatores; so B.
V ₂ 27 Leogarius nomine cuius sedes erat et sceptrum regale in Temoria; V ₄ 38 L. n. c. s. et sc. r. in quodam monte qui Temoria uocatur fuerat	A 273 ₂₅ regnans in Temoria quæ erat caput Scotorum, L. nomine filius Neill. For B see above, p. 180.
V ₂ and V ₄ <i>ib.</i> Veniet uir cum corona decorata cumque (et cum V ₄) baculo curuati capitis cantabitque nefas ex sua mensa de orientali parte domus suae respondente tota familia fiat, fiat	A 274 ₁₉ adueniet asciciput cum suo ligno curui capite ex sua domu capite perforato incantabit nefas a sua mensa ex anteriore parte domus suae respondet ei sua familia tota fiat fiat. So B; and P (Pr. i. 26, with the variants <i>artis caput</i> ; <i>præcurui capitis</i> ; <i>ex eo omnis domus erit cap. perf.</i> ; <i>ex sua m.</i>)
V ₂ 28, V ₄ 31 in regione Lagenorum (V ₄ Laginiensium)	A 275 ₁₂ in regiones Coolennorum, B Cuelenorum; so P (Eudl. Pr. i. 27).
V ₂ 35, V ₄ 41 sederunt iuxta praeceptum maiorum	A 280 ₁₉ sederunt iuxta; so B; sederunt iuxta locum, Pr. i. 36
V ₂ 35 uaticinabimur, V ₄ 41 rationabimur [sic]	A 280 ₁₃ and P sermocinabimur; -itur B
V ₂ , V ₄ subulcus	A 275 ₂₇ B porcinarius
V ₂ iustae naturae V ₄ iusti	A 275 ₂₈ B natura boni
V ₂ , V ₄ prospicere (faciem Patr.)	A 276 ₂ B uidens
V ₂ qui Patricio praedicanti fidem Trinitatis credidit et baptizatus est, V ₄ Cui S. Patricius praedicans s. Trinitatis fidem cr. e. b. e	A 276 ₄ Et praedicauit P. fidem illi et ibi credidit Patricio; so B with error <i>patris</i> for <i>Patricius</i> , and <i>si fidem</i> for <i>fidem illi</i> .
<p>V₂ 30 and V₄ 34 have parts of <i>deferre</i> where A 276₇ and B have parts of <i>portare</i>; both have <i>per terram</i> for <i>per terras</i>, A 276₉; both insert here <i>sciens auaritiam eius</i>. V₂ 30 and V₄ 35 have <i>audiens seruum suum uenisse</i> (A 276₁₇ and B <i>iterum</i>, apparently for <i>iturum</i>); and <i>sectam quam nolebat . . . coleret</i> (A 276₁₈ and B, <i>morem quem nolebat faceret</i>). V₂ 24 and V₄ 39 insert <i>Hoc autem audito gentes ad quas missus est cum rege suo inierunt consilium quid de nouo quod contigit facerent</i>. V₂ 35 and V₄ 31 describe the two magicians as <i>in magica arte</i> (<i>magicae artis</i> V₄) <i>excellentibus</i> (not in A 280₅, B), and in the same passage describe Loigaire as <i>rex superbus stipatus sociis</i> (not in A B).</p>	
V ₂ 35, V ₄ 31 trucidabimus	A 280 ₁ , B and P occidemus
V ₂ <i>ib.</i> secundum morem illorum congruum atque omen aptum, V ₄ <i>ib.</i> s. ill. morem cognitum a. o. a.	A 280 ₇ secundum congruum illis sensum (<i>om.</i> B).

The following passage will further illustrate both the mutual relation of V_2 and V_4 , and their common relation to B^1 :—

V_2 c. 28.	V_4 , c. 31–32.	A 275 ¹³⁻²¹ .
<p>uisum est sibi ipsum tutus hominem cui ser- uit baptizandum,</p> <p> petitque condonans Scotiae partes filiuc habitabat con- donans ei geminum serui- pretium terrenum et et caeleste ut de diaboli liberaret eum ante captius erat. Ita- taeuigans secus orient- plagam Hiberniae in naus conuertit ad aliam aliam minimam de eius nomine appel-</p>	<p>et uisum est ei ut ad hominem cui in inuentute seruiuit primitus exiret ut ei uerbum uitae praedica- turus ad fidem Christi conuerteret. Hinc petiuit aquilonares partes Hiber- niae ubi Milicon habitabat, condonans ei geminum pre- tium terrenum utique atque caeleste ut de diaboli iugo illum liberare potuisset. Itaque nauigans secus ori- entalem Hiberniae plagam proram naus ad quandam insulam minimam conuertit quae de eius nomine appel- latur.</p>	<p>ubi uisum est ei nihil perfectius esse quam ut semet ipsum primitus re- demeret</p> <p> et inde appetens sinistrales fines ad illum hominem gentilem Mil- coin apud quem quondam in captiuitate fuerat por- tansque geminum serui- tatis pretium terrenum utique et caeleste ut de captiuitate liberaret illum cui ante captius seruierat, ad anteriorem insulam quae eius nomine usque hodie nominatur prurim naus conuertit.</p>

§ 15. These comparisons amply suffice to prove that W , common source for the Muirchu portions of V_2 and V_4 , is not a MS. of Muirchu's Life, but a document which was sometimes a free paraphrase, sometimes a close copy of the Life. Leaving aside the question, whether W was simply a paraphrase of Muirchu, with amplifications and omissions, or also contained, like V_2 and V_4 , other matter found in Muirchu, I go on to show that the MS. of Muirchu (let us denote it by Y), on which W was based, is closer to B P than to A .

. A 272²⁶, in Britonum finibus; B P W , in Pictorum finibus (V_2 , c. 23, in Pictorum finibus; V_4 , c. 28, in regione Pictorum).

. A 274⁷, resistentes turbas seducturum; B , reges resistentes occisurum turbas seducturum; W , r. r. o. turbas s. (V_4 , resist. reg. occ. turbas seducturum; B , reges occ. turbas seducens).²

2p. Probus i. 27, in some points
r.

² We may infer from W that *turmas* is a *proprius error* of the scribe of B .

3. A 275₂₃, ad extremum fretum quod est Brene (se immisit) ; B, ad extremum in quodam fretu quod est Prenisse ; W, ad extremum in quoddam fretum quod est Brenesse (V₂ ; so V₄, c. 33, but with *Brenasse*).

4. In reference to Dichu's conversion, B adds *pre omnibus*, which is not in A (276₅). It was represented in W by *primus Scotorum per Patricium confessus est* (V₂ 29, V₄ 33).

5. A 276₆, requiescit ; B W, mansit.

6. In the passages corresponding to A 277₂₄₋₂₈, V₂, c. 24, and V₄, c. 39 (omitting the wedge metaphor) have the dragon metaphor, which we found in B and P. It is noteworthy that V₄ adds the same reference as Probus (see above, p. 183), *iuxta uocem psalmistae*.

7. The position of the paragraph concerning the angel visits (see above, pp. 179, 183) was the same in W as in B P. See V₂, c. 33.

It is possible that some of these instances are cases of error due to the scribe of A (not the scribe of Φ) ; but they all go to show that W belongs to the B tradition, and not to the A tradition. In the following two cases also, the scribe of A may be the culprit.

8. A 282₁₅, ab oculis regis ; B, ab oculis regis dempti¹ ; W (V₂, c. 37), a. o. r. dempti sunt.

9.

A (279 ₁₀).	B (p. 561).	Probus (i. 35).	V ₂ (c. 34).	V ₄ (c. 40).
Conuocatisque senioribus et maioribus natu regi nesciisse, &c.	Conuocatisque omnibus maioribus ad regem et senioribus et magis dixit ei rex : Quis est qui hoc nefas ausus est facere in regno meo ; pereat ille morte. Et respondentibus omnibus nesciisse, &c.	Conuocatisque senioribus et maioribus, rectoribus quoque, necnon et magis ad regem, dixit ad eos rex : Quid est hoc ? Quis est qui haec tanta ausus est facere in regno meo ? pereat ille de populo suo. Respondentibus autem omnibus senioribus et maioribus natu regi se nescire, &c.	Rex quoque conuocatis senioribus et magis dixit eis : Quid est hoc ? aut qua causa factum est, potestis scire ? Quis ausus est hoc facere in regno meo ? Quicumque est reus est mortis. At senioribus fatentibus se nescire, &c.	Et conuocatis senioribus ac magis ad regem, dixit eis, Quid est hoc ? aut qua causa factum est, potestis nescire ? Quis est ausus facere in regno meo ? Quicumque est reus est mortis. Ac senioribus fatentibus se nescire, &c.

It is manifest here that some lines fell out through an oversight in A (or Φ), and our data enable us to restore

¹ " dempti *vel* derepti," *Anal. Boll.*, i., p. 564. V₂ confirms dempti.

the text with some approach to certainty. Let us first restore the reading of W, as follows :—

Et conuocatis senioribus et magis ad regem, dixit eis : Quid est hoc ? aut qua causa factum est, potestis scire ? Quis est ausus hoc facere in regno meo ? Quicumque est, reus est mortis. At senioribus fatentibus se nescire, &c.

The text of A may be thus corrected :—


Conuocatisque senioribus et maioribus natu [et magis, dixit eis rex : Quid est hoc ? Quis est qui hoc nefas ausus est facere in regno meo ? pereat ille morte. Et respondentibus omnibus senioribus et maioribus natu] regi nescisse [se] &c.

The corruption was due to homœoteleuton.

10. Again, for another error due to homœoteleuton in A 285₁₇ it is impossible to conjecture whether A or Φ is to blame. A here has *in uerticem suum*, instead of *in populum inpium, et perierunt multi ex eis*, &c. . . . *in uerticem suum* as in B (see above, p. 183), in P (Pr. i. 46), and in W (V₂ 41, V₄ 49).

11. After *et sic simul incendimini* in A 284₃₁, there was another clause in common source (X) of B, P, W, as is proved by their agreement. V₂ has *et iudicemini ab* (leg. *in*) *altissimi conspectu* ; V₄, *et iud. in con. alt.* ; Probus (i. 45), *et iudicabimur in cons. alt.* [cp. also Vit. Trip., p. 58] ; B has *in conspectu altissimi*, but *et iudicemini* was obviously omitted (whether by B or B¹), on account of the homœoteleuton with *incendemini*. We may suspect that the original reading was either *ut in conspectu altissimi iudicemini*, or *et in c. a. iudicabimini*, and that the omission of the clause in A was due to the same cause.

Before going further, the results of our discussion may be formulated by means of a genealogical table of codices¹—



¹ The dotted lines in this table denote the possibility of intermediate MSS.

§ 16. Whether Y was identical with X, is a question which we have no means of answering. There are certain facts which suggest that, at all events, Y and P must be distinguished from B¹. Thus P, i. 42, has *guttula illa*; V₂, c. 38, V₄, c. 45, have *illa guttula*, while B has *gutta* f. 5 r^o a (with A). Again, in the speech of Loigaire (of which the various versions are given above, p. 192), P and W are distinguished from B by having *Quid est hoc?* But in such comparisons caution is required, for we may have to do with *proprii errores* of B, which have nothing to do with B¹. For example, where A f. 3 r^o a has *congregato ad se omni instrumento substantiae suae*, Probus, i. 29, and V₄, c. 35, give exactly the same words. But B offers *congregata tota substantia sua*, as V₂, c. 30, *cong. ad se omni substantia sua*. The explanation may be either that B¹ agreed with P and W in the reading of A (and Ω), and that the change was due to the scribe of B; or that the scribe of B¹ took a liberty with the text of X. In either case the reading in V₂ was an independent, though similar, alteration. We have an instance of a *proprius error* of B in the same passage (three lines above), where it omits *in fine uitae*, preserved in W and P. Again, in f. 5 v^o a, we find in A *nunc aquam nunc ignem deum ueneratur*, in B (p. 567) *nunc aqua nunc igne dominum suum ueneratur*. If we had no means of controlling B, we might imagine that here we had a different tradition. But as W (V₂, c. 40 = V₄, c. 48) had the exact words of A, and Probus agrees (only omitting *deum*, i. 45), it is clear that X agreed with Φ, and that B's reading is a *proprius error*.¹ Another and more defensible ground that could be urged for distinguishing B¹ from Y

¹ Another instance is in A f. 5 v^o b: *et ibi crediderunt multi alii*, where B omits *multi alii*, but Pr. i. 46 *et alii multi crediderunt*, V₂ c. 41, V₄, c. 49 *et multi*, show that P and Y agreed with A. It is not quite so clear as to

the variants in the preceding clause: A *et conuertit* [sc. *rex*], B *et conuersi sunt*! [sc. *sui*]; but the fact that we find *conuersus est* in Pr. *ib.* makes it doubtful whether X and Φ differed here.

and P is the remarkable circumstance that B gives *Temoir* in three cases, where A has *Temoria*.¹ This lection was certainly in B¹, and, one would suppose, goes back to X, but it does not appear in the other derivatives of X, namely, Pr., V₂, V₄. The argument, however, is not conclusive, for *Temoir* may have appeared in P and Y, and have been Latinized by Probus and the compiler of W. The decisive reason for distinguishing B¹ from the other hypothetical MSS. is to be found in those cases of deliberate alteration which (see above, pp. 180-1) characterize B, but did not appear in P or W. As they cannot be due to the ignorant scribe of B, we must attribute them to B¹.

§ 17. We may now return to the important document V. The close parallelism between V₂ and V₄ throughout, and not merely in the Muirchu portions, makes it practically certain that, in the other portions, too, they were both following W. It is at least a gratuitous hypothesis to suppose a second common source. The divergences can be explained, on one hand, by the deliberate omission of different parts of W by the compilers of V₂ and V₄, respectively; on the other hand, by their occasionally inserting something from different sources. But it would be irrelevant to my present subject to go into this more fully. It seems probable that the compiler of V₄ used W for parts of the later part of his work, where V₂ fails us. This may be inferred from the few chapters derived from a Muirchu source. Thus V₄, c. 63, *profectus a Temoria praedicavit ubique*; so B (p. 568),² but A (286₈) omits *ubique*. V₄, c. 81, enables us to detect some *proprii errores* in B (e.g. the omission of *sub sago iacentem*, p. 569). V₄, c. 84, has *qui ostea Ardmrcha nominatus est*, corresponding to B's *hoc est Ardmache*, p. 572; and *quem Deo optulit* beside B's *Deo blatum a se*, p. 573, and A's *quem dedit Deo* (290₁₈); also

¹ In another case (p. 555) B has : *in loco Temori*.

² Cp. Mark xvi. 20.

repentina mors irruit with B and P, whereas A omits *repentina*. The probability is that V₁ derived these chapters also from W; but, of course, we cannot be sure to what extent its author may have used other sources in the second part of his work.

§ 18. It is unfortunate that W hardly offers any help for the criticism of the first part of Muirchu, which, in consequence of the loss of the first folio of A, depends entirely on B. Here W followed another source. Just at the end, however, the Muirchu source begins, and we can glean something. Thus, where B has (*Anal. Boll.* i. 551₂) *Et erat annorum xxxta secundum apostolum in uirum perfectum et cetera usque plenitudinis Christi*, and Probus (i. 11) gives *occurrentesque in uirum p. in mensuram aetatis plenitudinis Christi*, V₁, c. 25, has *occurrentes¹ s. A. in u. p., in mens. plen. aetatis Chr.* Hence we may infer that P and W had *currentes, in mensuram, and aetatis*, and correct B accordingly. Again, B (552₁₂) gives :

Quendam sanctissimum episcopum Alsiodori ciuitate principem Germanum summum donum inuenit,

which is clearly corrupt. P and W enable us to correct it partly—

V₂, c. 22, principem pene Galliarum omnium, V₄, c. 26, pr. G. p. o., Probus, l., 21, omnium pene Galliarum primatem eximum.

These texts do not explain *donum inuenit*, but they show that *Galliarum pene omnium* has fallen out in B after *principem*.

I may notice that the (otherwise corrupt) reading *Bannauem taburniae*, to which the corrupt lection in B (*Bannauem thabur indec*) points, is confirmed, so far as the *u* is concerned, not only by Probus, but by W, as against *tabErniae*, which we find in the text of the "Confession,"

¹ Colgan's text gives *currens*, but *occurrentes* is preserved in MS. Stowe 1054.

in Cod. Arm.; see V_2 , c. 1 (cf. V_3 , c. 1), V_4 , c. 1, *in campo taburniae*. The evidence of W here is particularly strong, because its compiler derived the name from *tabernacula*. There was therefore no motive to write *u* for an original *e*: on the contrary, there was every motive to write *e* for *u*. The preservation of *u* in B, W, and P (Probus, *Tiburniae*) is therefore an important fact, and may induce us to regard *taberniae* in A (f. 21 r^o a) as a less authentic reading, due to association with *taberna*, *tabernaculum*.

§ 19. It has been mentioned above that V_2 is distinguished from V_4 by the occurrence of some passages in Irish. When we look more carefully into this we can hardly avoid concluding that the author of V_4 was ignorant of Irish, while the compiler of V_2 was an Irishman. I note the following points:—

1. Three Irish bits in V_2 —(a) c. 20, incomplete in both Colgan's MSS., as I understand him: the incident is described by a quotation from the "Confession" in V_4 , c. 24; (b) c. 32, *isisin inditchech Mochoe noendroma*, in a paragraph which is omitted entirely in V_4 ; (c) c. 34, *isisin indaimsir sindam dorighnedhned feis Temradhi la Loegaire mac Neill agus la firu Ereann*. V_4 , c. 40, states this in Latin, abbreviating the statement of Muirchu.

2. V_2 , c. 24, names the churches of Palladius *Thech na Roman* [sic] and *Domnach ardec* [sic], but V_4 has *Domus Romanorum* and *Dominica Arda*.¹

3. V_2 , c. 15, has *quae hodie i Granaird Chenel Coirpri uenerentur*. V_4 , c. 19, has vaguely *quae omnia iuxta uerbum hominis Dei impleta sunt*.

4. V_4 , c. 37, *S. Patricius circumquoque praedicans peruenit ad quoddam oppidum nomine Deirus in quo erat homo*

¹ Archa in MS. Stowe 1054; but the last three letters are *in rasura* and in later ink; what was first written

was shorter, as there is too little room for the last a.

quidam potens Dorus uocabulo filius Trichmi; V₂, c. 31, *Perrexerit Patricius ad australem plagam praedicare Rus filio Trichem, qui fuit in oppido suo nomine Derluss in australem plagam*. We may infer that the text of W presented: *perrexerit P. ad australem plagam praedicare doRus mac Trichim*.¹ The compiler of V₂ knew that *do* was a preposition, but the compiler of V₄ took *Dorus* to be the man's name, though he knew the meaning of *mac*. (See "Tripartite Life," p. 38.)

5. V₂ has the nominative Miliuc rightly throughout. But V₄ has various forms, its author not knowing the difference between an Irish nominative and genitive. Thus Miluic (? -iuc), c. 16; Milchon, c. 20; Milico, c. 19; Melicon, c. 32, 35.² But these trisyllabic forms have an interest of their own. They, doubtless, preserve an older genitive than *Milchon*, a genitive with a transitional vowel, *Mil-con*, of which the older form still was *Miliconas*. An exact parallel is Glasiconas, which occurs on stones at Ballintaggart and Gurrane,³ from a nominative Glasiuc, which occurs in the Tripartite Life.⁴

In the text of V₂ the Irish has been to some extent corrupted. But we are justified in concluding that W contained some Irish passages. Muirchu not only writes proper names in their Irish forms, but introduces some Irish words, especially prepositions, which look odd in the middle of a Latin sentence.⁵ The *doRus* of W is just like Muirchu's *duDichoin* (f. 2 v^o b), or *hiSleibti* (f. 4 v^o b *ad fin.*),

¹ Cp. Muirchu (A 275₃₁): *indicauit domino suo duDichoin*.

² The Stowe MS. 1054 has Milico, Milicon throughout.

³ Macalister, *Studies in Irish Epigraphy*, i., p. 36, ii., p. 55.

⁴ Glasiuc, p. 162. See Professor Rhys, in the Report of 46th meeting of Cambrian Arch. Assoc., Aug., 1891, p. 138.

⁵ It seems to me that this can only be explained by supposing that the parts of Muirchu's Life in which these Irish forms occur were derived by him from material which was wholly or partly in Irish. The most remarkable case is in A f. 5 r^o b, *induxit niuem super totum campum pertingentem ferenn*, which presents a critical problem. B has *pertingentem usque ad*

which was copied by W (*hiSleibte* V₂, c. 38). But W went further, and inserted whole sentences. In the first case, (a) it is possible that the Irish stood alone, without any Latin equivalent; for the author of V₄ probably consulted a text of the 'Confession,' as well as W. In the second case, (b) the circumstance that V₄ omits the incident of Mochoe altogether suggests that the Irish clause was untranslated in W as in V₂. In the third case, (c) however, we must suppose that the Latin of Muirchu was partly reproduced in W, and the Irish statement added.

§ 20. This third case takes us into near range of an important question. This Irish sentence occurs in the middle of the portion of W which depends exclusively on the Muirchu source; yet there is no trace of it in either A or B. The idea at once occurs, that it was derived from one of the other sources (if there were more than one) from which W was compiled, and naturally from the same source which supplied the other Irish bits. Now, this source deserves particular attention. It was probably responsible for that part of W which corresponds to V₂, c. 11-33, with the exception of the pieces which are directly taken from Muirchu. The compiler of W had both this

zonas uirorum. But X (if not B¹) probably had the Irish word; for V₄, c. 36 *ad uirorum femora pertinguentem* suggests that *ferenn* was in W, *femora* having arisen from *ferenn*. We have, therefore, reason to suppose that the reading of B should be *pertinguentem ferenn, id est usque ad zonas uirorum*. The Tripartite gives *cotoracht fernu fer*, 'till it reached men's girdles' (p. 56). Did Muirchu write *pertinguentem ferenn*, as in A, 'reaching the girdle,' and leave the word without the Latin interpretation which is added in B? I am inclined

to answer this question affirmatively. Muirchu's book was addressed to Irish-speaking readers, and an interpretation was unnecessary. It is just as we, writing a Latin preface, might introduce an English word in italics without adding a Latin equivalent. On the other hand, it is very far from clear why this particular Irish word should be left untranslated, unless (as Dr. Gwynn suggests) the *ferenn* differed from the *criss* = *zona*, and Muirchu was at a loss for a Latin equivalent.

source and Muirchu before him, and worked them into each other. Now, it has not been noticed, so far as I am aware, that the non-Muirchu source in the portion of *V*₁, *V*₄ relating to St. Patrick's captivity has vestiges of considerable antiquity. The name *Patricius* was Goidelicized into *Cothraige* (as Todd pointed out in 1856, *Proceedings of R. I. A.*, vi. 294), and this name appears in a Latin form in *V*₂, *V*₄, *Quadrīga*.¹ Now, no one would have thought of Latinizing the name *Cothraige*, *Codrige*,² as *Quadrīga*, and the absurd etymology, which derived the appellation from serving four masters or households, made such a rendering all the more unlikely. *Quadrīga* evidently preserves a *q*-form of the name, older than *Cothraige*, namely *Quadrige*, *Quatrige*, in which the *a* of *Patricius* still appeared. This is confirmed by another *q*-form (which shows *o*) preserved in *V*₂, *Quotirche*.³ If this had been originally written *Cotir*-, or *Cothir*-, there was no chance of its becoming *quotir*-, since the etymology connecting it with the Irish numeral (*cethar-trebe di-a fognad*⁴) was a powerful protection for the *c*. We have here, undoubtedly, representatives of the original *q*-form in which Goidelic tongues adopted Patrick—the form in which it would appear in an Ogam inscription, just as the original form of *cruimthir* (from Brythonic *premter* = *presbyter*) was *grimtir*, or *grimitir*, as it is written on the stone of Arraglen.⁵ There is not a trace of the *c* form in *V*₂, *V*₄, that is, in *W*; and I cannot hesitate to conclude that this portion of *W* depends

¹ The author of *V*₂, c. 12 distinguishes the names *Quadrīga* and *Quotirche*, explaining the former as given *quia equorum quatuor domibus seruebat*, the latter *a seruiendo quatuor domibus*. This distinction does not appear in *V*₄.

² For this form, see gloss to l. 5 of hymn *Genair Patraicc*, *Lib. Hymn.*, i. 97.

³ Compare *Tírechán's Cothirthiacus*

(*Rolls ed.*, p. 302), which seems to have arisen by a dittography from *Cothircus* or *Cothiricus*, which would correspond to *Quotirche*. We thus get as the original form *Quatrice* (or *Quatirice* with a parasitic vowel as in *grimitir*), as we should expect.

⁴ *Fíacc's hymn*, l. 12.

⁵ *Macalister, op. laud.*, ii., p. 18.

on a very ancient source, in which the *q*-form appeared—a source prior to Tírechán and Muirchu.

But there are further traces of antiquity. It is noteworthy, that this name (not Patricius) was used in the part of W which related Patrick's dealings with Miliucc (V₁, c. 13–16; V₄, c. 19). Miliucc sees *Quadriga* in a vision, and bids *Quadriga* come to him. Now, this is a touch which is not at all likely to have been introduced by a late compiler. It betrays the fact that the story had taken form at a very early period, long before the ridiculous derivation of Cothraige from serving four houses was invented. That derivation appears in Tírechán (seventh century)¹ and Fíacc's hymn. The story which realised that Miliucc knew Patrick as Cothraige must have been very much older. It was, in fact, chiefly by this story that the knowledge of this form of the name, which had yielded to 'Patraic,' was preserved.² It is curious how the consciousness that *Cothraige* was simply *Patricius* vanished so completely, that the statement was invented that the saint was first called Patricius on the occasion of his ordination as bishop.

But this is not all. The account of Patrick's adventures during his captivity has another trait of verisimilitude, which confirms the conclusion that the legend grew up and was set down at an early date. As soon as Lupita recognises her brother *cui Succet uocabulum erat*, he is no longer called Quadriga, but Succet: *et dimissus est Succet liber abire* (V₂, c. 17).³

¹ Who derived it from a written document.

² This comes out (1) in the popular derivation, which connected the name with P.'s captivity; (2) in the statements that he bore the name when he was with Miliucc. *E.g.*, in the Preface to the Hymn of Secundinus, where the four names are enumerated, we find:

Cothraige nomen eius apud Miliuc (Liber Hymnorum, ed. Bernard and Atkinson, i., p. 6); and in a gloss on the Genair Patraicc hymn: *Codrige a ainm inn-a doere i n-Erind* (*ib.*, p. 97); V₂, c. 12, *illic* (that is, with Miliucc) *Quadrigae nomen accepit*.

³ In Tírechán, p. 330 (Rolls ed.), Patrick appears as Succet in his inter-

§ 21. It may be concluded that the document on which W depended here was derived from a source not later than the sixth century. That original document was probably largely in Irish, with bits from the Confession in Latin. In the Miliucc episode a fragment of Irish is preserved at the end of V, c. 15 (*i Granaird chenel Coirpri*), which resembles the fragments in Muirchu and Tírechán. We have therefore apparently to do with an ancient Irish biography, or memoir, of St. Patrick, of which some Irish sentences were preserved in W, and have come down to us, in a modified form, in V. One of these sentences was: "isisin indaimsir is ind am dorigned feis Temrach a Loegaire mac Neill ocus la firu Érenn."¹

Now, if we reflect that the text of Muirchu cannot well be explained except by supposing that those parts in which Irish words and names occur were derived by him from material which was written in Irish, and which he worked up into Latin, the probability forces itself strongly upon us, that in this sentence we have a fragment of the source from which Muirchu derived his account of the Tara festival. If this inference is right, we have, at one point, a peep behind Muirchu, and a glimpse of his relation to prior documents. We can also see more fully the meaning of his *haec pauca de S. Patricii peritia et uirtutibus* (A f. 20 v^o a). He and Aed did not exhaust their material. There was much more contained in their source than Muirchu set down.

§ 22. There is one other place in the Tara episode at which the compiler of W seems to have turned from Muirchu, which he was transcribing almost word for word, to consult the older document, which I suspect to have been Muirchu's source. In the first part of the prophecy

course with Miliucc. Cp. my remark p. 248.
in *Eng. Hist. Review*, April, 1902,

¹ See Stokes, *Trip.*, p. 40, n. 4.

of the Druids, W diverges from the text of Muirchu as preserved in A, B, P (see the readings cited above, p. 190). The explanation, in my opinion, is that the prophecy was given in Irish, in Muirchu's source,¹ and that the compiler of W made a new rendering for himself, not the same as Muirchu's. The second parts of the two renderings coincide, but in the first part Muirchu is fuller. *Vir cum corona decorata* (W) corresponds apparently to *asciciput* (A); *cum baculo curuati capitis* (W) to *cum suo ligno curuicipite* (sic leg., A). But there is nothing in W answering to *ex sua domu capite perforato*. Perhaps the original was obscure at this point to the compiler of W.

But it is important to observe that the Irish version given in the *Tripartite Life* (Rolls ed. p. 34), in the scholia on Fíacc's hymn, and elsewhere,² does not correspond either to the version of A or to the version of W. Neither translation takes any account of the words *dar muir merrcend*; both imply that *a chrand cromcend* came immediately after *tailcend*; and *incantabit nefas* has no equivalent in the Irish. And what of the mysterious *ex sua domu*, which cannot conceivably refer to *a bratt*? It must be concluded, so far as I can see, that the copy of the verses which Muirchu translated partially differed from the version which has been preserved; that in his copy the first two versicles corresponded to

Ticfa tailcend, a chrand cromcend,

and the second pair differed also.

Since I wrote the foregoing remarks, I find that Dr. Atkinson has made precisely the same criticism in his

¹ It seems to be assumed that the Irish was given in Muirchu's original text, and has been omitted in A. I hardly think so. The author's words *quod nostris uerbis potest manifestius expremi* (A 27423) do not necessarily imply it, and the fact that it was also

omitted in BW, and therefore presumably in X, may be urged on the other side.

² The first four versicles are :—

Ticfa tailcend, dar muir merrcend,
a bratt tollcend, a chrand cromcend.

notes to the Scholia on the hymn *Genair Patraicc*,¹ and I am glad to be able to quote his decided opinion in support of the conclusion to which I had come, that Muirchu was working on a different text. Dr. Atkinson naturally considered only the A version; the evidence of the W version strengthens the conclusion.

§ 23. So far, I have said nothing of the relation of W to the Tripartite Life. Muirchu is one of the sources of that Life; the whole Tara episode, for example, is reproduced there in Irish from Muirchu's version; but it is a question whether the writer of Pt. I. used the text of Muirchu directly or such a compilation as W. In any case, if he did not use a copy of W, he had access to the non-Muirchu sources of W.² He reproduces the miracles of Patrick's childhood in the same words and the same order; and in the account of the captivity and escape the same source is mainly followed. Again the account of the churches of Palladius (Trip., p. 30) corresponds to W; so, too, the notices of Dathi and Sinell (Trip., p. 32; V., c. 25), of Ross and Mochae (pp. 38-40). In the case of Mochae we have the same Irish sentence which we find in V., c. 32: *isi sin ind etech* (*sic legendum*: Stokes *ad loc.*) Mochae Nóendroma, 'this is the winged thing of Mochae of Noendruim.' The question is how far the authors of the Tripartite were translating from Latin (as in the case of what they derived from Muirchu) and how far they were modernizing sources written in older Irish. This, however, lies outside my scope, and I am only concerned here with the fact that the Muirchu source which we trace in the

¹ Liber Hymnorum, ii., pp. 181-2.

² It is important to remember that among the sources of the Tripartite were documents *older than the ninth century*, which are not reproduced in the Armagh MS., but are implied in

the brief memoranda in ff. 18, 19 of that codex. It is to be noted that, in regard to the order of these entries, they correspond in groups to groups in the Tripartite.

Tripartite, if it did not belong to the B tradition, at least was not derived from A. This is shown by the clause about the destruction of the "impious people" (p. 58) which is absent in A (see above, p. 193).

§ 24. I may conclude this paper—of which the main object has been to define two traditions of Muirchu's text which I designate by Φ and X—with the consideration of three cases of variation between those two lost MSS.

I may take first the notice of the death of Palladius, where (see above p. 191) Φ had *in Britonum finibus*¹ and X *in Pictorum finibus*. The Tripartite Life supplies a probable solution. There we find (p. 30) at the end of a notice of Palladius, which comes, not from Muirchu, but from a non-Muirchu source of W, the words: 'disease took him *hi ttrīb Cruithnech*, so that he died of it.' We may, therefore, I think, conjecture with much probability that Muirchu wrote *Britonum*, but that the scribe or a reader of X, acquainted with the other source, substituted, or added interlineally, or in the margin, *Pictorum*.

In the same paragraph we find a corrupt reading in A (272₁₅): *certe enim erat quod Paladius . . . ordinatus . . . fuerat*. B gives *ceteri enim erant quod . . .* V₄, c. 27, has simply *quod*, but V₂, c. 23, has *certi etenim erant quoniam*; and a comparison of this with B proves that W had *certi enim erant*, and that *ceteri* is an error for *certi*. Hence we infer that X had *certi enim erant*. [Probus i. 24 has *quia sciebat quod*, but we cannot infer from this that there was a singular verb in P.] This probably is the true reading; and the corruption in A may be accounted for by supposing

¹ V₃ follows this tradition, c. 26. That the Muirchu bits in the account of Patrick in the "Historia Brittonum" were taken (indirectly perhaps) from a

MS. belonging to the X tradition is indicated by *in terra Pictorum* (p. 159, ed. Mommsen).

that *erat* was read or written for *erāt*, and *certi* then 'corrected' to *certe*. If one had not the guidance of the second tradition, one might have been inclined to correct: *certe enim [sci]erat*.

The third passage to which I call attention occurs in the next column of A f. 2. r^o b:

Ibique sanctus Patricius sciens quae euentura essent ibi episcopalem gradum ab Matho rege sancto episcopo accepit. Etiam Auxilius Iserminusque et caeteri inferioris gradus eodem die quo sanctus Patricius ordinatus est.

I have punctuated the passage as it appears in printed editions. In the first place B gives *quae uentura sunt illi*, and this combined with V₂, c. 26, *quae uentura erant sibi*, V₄, c. 31, *quae uentura essent ei*, shows that W and X had *quae uentura essent sibi*. And *sibi* is probably the true reading; the resumptive *ibi*, unnatural in this sentence, may have been due to the scribe of Φ. In the second place, the construction of the following words puzzled the scribes. B gives: . . . *accepit. Sed etiam . . . caeteri inferiores gradus ordinati sunt eodem die [quo] sanctus Patricius*; and W (V₂, c. 26, V₄, c. 31) had the same reading (but with *inferioris*; hence *inferiores* is a *proprius error* of B). Therefore X had *ordinati sunt*, and probably *sed* before *etiam*. The obvious conjecture *ordinati sunt* also appears in the margin of A. But I doubt whether it is correct. The original reading of A, which of course was also in Φ, can be construed if we punctuate differently. Muirchu may have written as follows:—

Ibique sanctus Patricius, sciens quae euentura essent sibi, episcopalem gradum ab Amathorege sancto episcopo accepit, etiam Auxilius Iserminusque et caeteri inferioris gradus, eodem die quo sanctus Patricius ordinatus est.

Inferioris gradus is accusative plural, governed by *acceperunt* (understood from *accepit*). It was taken for a genitive, and hence the difficulty.

§ 25. I have unavoidably omitted the consideration of one document which may further illustrate some points in the Muirchu tradition. I refer to Colgan's *Vita Tertia*. But this composition would require a paper to itself, and as I have collected some new material for its text, I find it convenient to omit it from the present investigation, hoping to deal with it separately on a future occasion.

J. B. BURY.

THE FORMS AND SCANSION OF THE GENITIVE AND DATIVE CASES OF *IS*, *HIC*, AND *QVI* IN PLAUTUS.

AMONG the many Plautine questions which await a solution is the question of the form, pronunciation, and scansion of the genitive and dative cases of the pronouns *is*, *hic*, *qui* in the Plautine age. In modern editions of the text of Plautus the forms in question are usually printed *eius*, *huius*, *quoniam*, *ei*, *huic*, *quoniam*; and it will be convenient to use these forms for the present, though it will be shown that four of them cannot have been known to the poet. All the forms vary in their metrical value. The genitive forms are sometimes trimoric, sometimes dimoric. Both values of *quoniam* are illustrated in *Rud.* 967:

égo illum nóui *quoniam* núnc est : | tú illum *quoniam* antehác fuít.

The dative forms vary even more conspicuously. It is generally admitted that *ei*² and *huic* may have the value of four morae, as in

ís summánum sé uocári | díxit : *ēi* réddidí.—*Curc.* 544.

nam nóñ condúcit *huic* sýcophántiae.—*Bacch.* 764.

¹ Statistics in A. W. Ahlberg: *De correptione plautina*, Lundae, 1901, p. 82, sqq.

² Prof. W. M. Lindsay (*Lat. Lang.*, chap. vii., 6, 19, p. 440) questions the certainty of the scansion *ēi* in Plautus.

He would get rid of the numerous instances in our text by simple emendations, or by admitting a form of prosodical hiatus which is not generally allowed. He admits the scansion for Terence and Lucretius.

As to tetramoric *quoi*, there is less agreement, but it certainly seems to occur, *e.g.*,

domíst: non métuo, néc *quoiñquam* súpplicó.

—*Bacch.* 225: cf. *Mil.* 351.

All three dative forms may be dimoric, *e.g.*,

íta uero *huic* ítem Menaëchmo | nómen ést in Síciliá.

—*Men.* 930.

Before a following vowel *ei* and *quoi* may have the value of two morae, or of one mora. They are dimoric in

necáuit ?—aúrumque *ei* adémit hóspití.—*Most.* 481.

ego sum ílle Amphítruo, *quói* est séruos Sósiá.—*Am.* 861.

They are monomoric in

própera, quíd stas ? *ei* áccerse ágnos.—*Pseud.* 330.

probrúm, propínqua pártitúdo *quói* áppetit.—*Aul.* 75.

In examples like the two last quoted, it is possible to suppose total elision of *ei* and *quoi*, but the supposition involves the *reductio ad absurdum* of their prosodical vagaries.

The verses of Plautus must be scanned, and therefore it has been necessary to adopt a working hypothesis as a solution of the prosodical problem here presented. The hypothesis which has been most generally adopted is that all of these forms, with the possible exception of *quoi*, had both a monosyllabic and a dissyllabic pronunciation in early Latin. That theory renders possible the scansion of by far the greater number of lines in Plautus, in which one or other of these forms occurs; but its soundness is far from certain. Strictly speaking, there is no evidence of the existence of monosyllabic forms, or monosyllabic pronunciations, of *eius*, *huius*, and *quius*. They are not

traceable in the inscriptions, or in the MSS. of Plautus, are not mentioned by the grammarians, and do not certainly occur in the classical poets. A verse like *Am.* 266,

ét enim uéro quóniam fórmam | cépi *huius* ín me<d> ét statúm,

is no proof of monosyllabic *huius*: it proves dimoric *huius*, but nothing more. Prof. Lindsay, a distinguished defender of this theory, refers to two hexameter lines as furnishing examples of monosyllabic *cuius*. (*Captiui*, 1900, Introd. § 15.) With the addition of a third from Cicero, they are as follows:

principium *cuius* hinc nobis exordia sumet.—Lucr. i. 149.

nec *cuius* ob raptum pulsi liquere penates.—Verg. *Catal.* xi. 35.

atque *eius* ipse manet religatus corpore toto.

—Cic. *Arat.*, frag. xiv.

But these lines bring no support to the theory. They rather weaken it; for in each case the supposed monosyllable is followed by a word beginning with a vowel, and can be scanned as a pyrrhic.¹

Prof. Lindsay's defence of these theoretical forms would be more convincing if he definitely stated what the dissyllabic forms must have been in the time of Plautus, to what phonetic laws was due the coexistence side by side with them of

¹ A more probable, but still not certain, instance of monosyllabic *cuius* occurs in Lucil. xxx. 48:

cúius uoltu ác facie ludo ac sermonibus nostris.

This would become conclusive if it could first be proved that the early dactylic poets did not occasionally admit resolution of the arsis. But such resolutions are fairly common in early hexameters, especially in Ennius, and in the first foot. *Mēlānūrum*, *āuūum*, *cāpītībūs* are well-known openings of

hexameter lines in Ennius: cf. *fācīlīā* in C. I. L. i. 542; and

prōgēnīē mi genui facta patris petiei.

C. I. L. i. 38,

the scansion *prōgenie(m)* being supported by *prōtinam* (contrast classical *prōtinus*) in Plaut., *Pers.* 680; *Bacch.* 374; *Curc.* 363. (Such classical scansions as *prōgenies* and *prōtinus* can be accounted for by metrical necessity, and were, apparently, foreign to spoken Latin.) Cf. L. Müller, *Res Metr.*², p. 146 sq.

monosyllabic forms, and what those supposed monosyllabic forms actually were. But on these points we learn little that is definite. We are told (*Captivi*, 1900, Introd. § 15, p. 28) that “The actual forms are now generally believed to have been *hvis*, *illīs*, etc.,” with a reference to Luchs. Now the only form of the genitive of *hic* certainly found in the republican inscriptions is *hoius* (*ce*); and the pronunciation of *hoius*, as may be seen from Prof. Lindsay’s *Lat. Lang.*, ch. ii., § 48, p. 47 : cf. ch. vii., § 19, p. 439, must have been *hoi-jus*, parent of the imperial form *hū-jus*. If then **hvis* was a “shortened form” of *hoius* (i.e. **hoi-jus*) it is surely in need of explanation. We have here, apparently, amongst other changes, the expulsion or syncope of *u* before final *s* and after a consonant; and we are bound, it would seem, to find general examples of the same phenomenon, or to explain their absence. Until, therefore, we are presented with more definite statements which may be brought to the test of recognised philological principles, we must consider this theory as at least not proven.

But not only is it not proved : there are circumstances which make it seem very unlikely. For instance, we often find the dimoric forms of *eius*, *huius*, etc., preceded by a long vowel or diphthong in elision, or, more strictly, in συναλοιφή. We find, for example,

propterea *huic* urbei nomen Epidamno inditumst.—*Men.* 263.

et aliarum itidem quae *eius* erant mulierculae.—*Rud.* 52.

et enim uero quoniam formam | cepi *huius* in med et statum.

—*Am.* 266.

It is difficult to imagine what would be the sound of *quae eius* as a single syllable, but harder still to understand how *-ā huic* or *-ī huius* could have formed one syllable; since, if *huic* and *huius* (under the form **hvis*) were monosyllables in these places, it would seem that their second

letter, *u*, must have been as truly a consonant as the *u* of *uicus*. How can a vowel be elided in a consonant?

An alternative theory¹—perhaps it is permissible to say the alternative theory—is that each of these six forms, *eius*, *ei*, *huius*, *huic*, *quonius*, *quon*, was a dissyllable having common quantity in its first or root syllable. Experiment will show that such a theory shares with the theory just criticised the practical convenience of facilitating the scansion of these forms in Plautus. It has it even in a higher degree, for it does not encounter difficulties, as does the former theory, in the case in which *ei* and *quon* are followed by an initial vowel. But no amount of mere practical convenience will make a theory true, or gain for it permanent acceptance. It must submit to a severer test. The theory, then, that these six forms may have had their initial syllables both long and short must explain why so curious a phenomenon in the Latin language was confined, apparently, to so small a group of words, and why its effects cease to be observed when we approach the classical age. It must seek to determine the spelling and pronunciation of these forms in the Plautine age, to determine and formulate the phonetic laws that governed their history, and to exhibit that history in its continuity. That ideal the writer feels constrained to accept, though he can scarcely hope to do more than contribute something to its realisation.

The genitive cases of *is* and *hic* are invariably *eius* and *quonius* on the republican inscriptions. Of the genitive of *hic*, *hoius-ce* (or *hoius-que*) is the only form certainly found. In C. I. L. i. 603, l. 5, of 58 B.C., the form *HVMVS* occurs; but as *hoiusque* is found in the previous line in a precisely

¹ I do not discuss here the theory that older, monosyllabic, loc. - gen. - dat. forms survived in the time of Plautus. They may have survived in certain com-

bination, e.g., *quomodi*; but could hardly have been in general use. The question of the scansion of *illius*, *sim.*, is also distinct.

similar context, HVMVS may be merely the result of an engraver's misreading of his copy. That seems to be the solitary trace of the imperial form *huius* in republican times, and it occurs in an inscription of 58 B.C.¹

The Plautine forms of the datives of *is*, *hic*, *quoi* are also, I believe, determinable with certainty, though not with quite the same ease. We have to choose amongst the following forms recorded on the republican inscriptions:—*eiei*, *iei*, *ei*; *hoice*, *huic*; *quoici*, *quoi*. In the first place, the Plautine forms must have ended in *ei*, and not in *ī*. In the latter half of the second century B.C. *ei* is used in the inscriptions to represent two classes of original sounds—1, an original *i*-diphthong; 2, an original *ī*. In the third century B.C., and the earlier half of the second century, that is not so. At that time *ei* represents an original *i*-diphthong, but not original *ī*. Thus, in the S. C. *de Bacch.* of 186 B.C., written two years before the death of Plautus, we find *deico* (cf. Gk. *δεικνυμι*, Goth. *ga-teihan*) and *inceido* (from O. L. *incaido*) but *audita* and *Lafinī* (gen. s.): contrast *audeire* in *Lex Repet.*, of 123–122 B.C. (C. I. L. i. 198).² The conclusion naturally drawn from these facts is, that in the period of the S. C. *de Bacch.* *ei* and *ī* indicated different sounds, and were therefore not subject to confusion, but that in the later period *ei* and *ī* had the same sound, and were therefore confused in writing. Confirmation of this inference of the dissimilarity of the sounds *ī* and *ei* in early Latin is to be found in a detail of Plautine prosody, whose significance has been overlooked. The word which was in later Latin a dissyllable, *grātīs*, is in Plautus always a trisyllable, *grātīs*. Why is that? If Plautus was as fond of so-called *synizesis* as some scholars

¹ *Huius* occurs in C. I. L. i. 1409, l. 7; but that inscription belongs to the Augustan age: see Mommsen, *ad loc.*

² Cf. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.*, ch. iv., § 34, and *Capt.* 1900, p. 107 f.; Brugmann, *Grundriss*, 1², § 207, S. 184, and § 93, 1, S. 102.

suppose him to have been, why do we not find it here, where it seems so simple? The answer is, that the word was *gratieis* (for **gratiass*) in the time of Plautus, not *gratiūs* (cf. Merc. 479, where MSS. preserve *lucis ingratiūs*), and, the vowel-sound of the last syllable being qualitatively different from that of the penultimate, no contraction took place. It is further confirmed by the fact that the genitive case of nouns like *filius* was *filī* in Plautus and in republican Latin generally, while the nominative and dative plural were *filī* and *filīs* respectively. The explanation of that fact must be this, that the ending of the gen. sing. of the second declension was *-ī* in the time of Plautus (e.g. *Barbatī*, C. I. L. i. 32; *Latini*, *urbanī*, *ib.* 196), while the endings of the nom. and dat.-abl. pl. were *-ei* and *-eis* respectively (e.g. *oinuorsei urei*, *ib.* 196; *facteis*, *ib.* 33). To suppose that early Latin **filī* (gen. sing.) became *filī*, while early Latin **filī* (nom. plur.) and **filīs* (dat.-abl. plur.) remained uncontracted, is to introduce confusion into the phonology of early Latin. Incidentally the non-occurrence of contracted forms of such words as the Plautine *gratieis*, *filiei*, and *filieis* tells strongly against the theory of the contraction of such words as *quoiei*, *eiei*.

Now, the ending of the pronominal dative was in imperial times *-ī* (*sibī*, *eī*), but in the earlier part of the second century B.C. it was *-ei*, with a pronunciation, as we have seen, different from that of *ī*; e.g. *sibei* in S. C. *de Bacch.*, *quoiei* in C. I. L. i. 34, of uncertain date, but apparently later than the S. C. *de Bacch.*: cf. Osc. *lifet*, Umb. *tefe*. It follows therefore that those datives which in imperial Latin were written *ei*, *huic*, *cui*, could not have been so spelt by Plautus, but must have had *-ei* in their last syllable. That this early difference of the sounds represented by *ei* and *ī* respectively was reflected in the spelling of Plautus there is some evidence. In *Truc.* 262 ff.

Astaphium says that *ira* becomes *era* by taking away one letter, which shows that the spelling of *ira* was then *eira*: in *Rud.* 1305 *mendicus* is said to have one letter more than *medicus*, which proves that Plautus did not write **mendicus*.¹ We must therefore eliminate the forms *ei*, *hoice*, *huice*, *quoi*, as being impossible in the time of Plautus, and must select the forms *eiei* and *quoiei*. The form *iei* is found in one inscription only, occurring twice, and is evidently a mere variety of spelling for *eiei*: cf. *meis* for *meis* in i. 38. The origin and pronunciation of the later forms *ei* and *quoi* will be discussed below; suffice it to say for the present, that, as soon as the O. Lat. diphthong *ei* acquired, in unaccented syllables, the pronunciation *i*, it became possible for *eiei* and *quoiei* to be written **ei* and **quoi*, and for their spelling, though not necessarily their pronunciation, to be simplified, after the Roman fashion, into *ei* and *quoi*. But so long as the sounds represented by *-ei* and *-i*, respectively, remained distinct, that is, until after the death of Plautus, such forms as *ei* and *quoi* were clearly impossible. We have still to determine the Plautine form of the dative of *hic*. The dative of *hic* is found for the first time on the Latin side of the famous Tabula Bantina of 133-118 B.C. (C. I. L. i. 197, l. 26). It has there the form *hoice*, which cannot, if the preceding argument is sound, be the Plautine form. On the analogy of *quoiei*: *quoi* we are quite justified in assuming an earlier form, **hoiei-ce*, a form which is, in fact, required to account for the later *huic*.

We have therefore the following six forms as representing the spelling of the Plautine age:—*eius*, *hoius-ce*, *quouis*, *eiei*, **hoiei-ce*, *quoiei*. They have, of course, generally disappeared from our MSS. of Plautus, but they have left occasional traces. For example, in *Pseud.* 271 the

¹ Quoted by Prof. Lindsay, *Lat. Lang.*, ch. iv., § 34, and *Capt.* 1900, p. 108.

Ambrosian palimpsest has *HOLVS* where the Palatines have *huius*: both readings must have started from *hoius*. There are also, I believe, clear traces of the spelling *quoiei* in the corruptions of *Pseud.* 681 (for *quoiei scimus*) and *Am.* 520 (for *quoiei ego*): cf. *Aul.* 420 (*quo ego* for *quoiei*). It will scarcely be disputed that the pronunciation of these forms was *eijs*, *hoijs*, *quoijs*, *eije*, *hoije*, *quoije*. Such a pronunciation is postulated by the later forms, affirmed by the grammarians for *eius*, *maius*, sim., and indicated in the inscriptions. The classical *hū-jus*, for example, postulates an earlier *hoi-jus*, and in the inscriptions we find such forms as *eijsdem* (C. I. L. 2. 1964, col. 1, l. 15), with which compare *maiorem* in the same inscription, col. 3, l. 10, and *contunx*, *ibid.* col. 7, l. 8, &c. Priscian (l. 4. 18, p. 545; [l. 13. 27]) says: *antiqui solebant geminare i litteram et maius, peius, eius scribere, quod non aliter pronuntiari posset quam si cum superiore syllaba prior i, cum sequente altera proferretur, ut pei-ius, ei-ius, mai-ius.*¹ It is scarcely necessary here to inquire into the origin of this consonantal *z*, which immediately preceded the case-suffixes *-us* and *-ei*. It was probably a glide or *Uebergangslaut* (cf. Brugmann, *Grundriss*¹, i., § 278). In that case we may, perhaps, explain the morphology of these forms by supposing the old genitive suffix *-us* and the dative suffix *-ei*, representing respectively the original Indo-Germ. suffixes *-os* and *-ai*, to have been added to the old locatives **ei* (monosyllabic, a diphthong, for **ei-i* ?), **hoi*, and **quoi*, which locatives may have once done duty for both the genitive and the dative cases, just as the Old Indian *mē* (= Grk. *μοι*, Lat. *mī*) was both genitive and dative. Thus, there would have been three monosyllabic locatives—**ei* (*ei + i*), **hoi* (*ho + i*), **quoi*

¹ Fuller details and instances in *Lat. Lang.*, ch. ii., § 49, p. 47; ch. vii., *Nome-Wagener*², ii, S. 376: cf. Lindsay, § 19.

(*quo* + *i*), and these locatives would have done duty as both genitive and dative cases. But there would have been some inconvenience in this: the genitive and dative cases would not have been clearly distinguished. The analogy of the other declensions exerting its influence, the old genitive suffix *-us* and the old dative suffix *-ei* may have been attached to these old locatives, with the result that the genitive and dative cases were from that time distinct. This is, of course, a mere suggestion, and is made chiefly for the purpose of calling attention to the exact correspondence, as regards external form, of these three pairs of words which, it is here claimed, were the only forms known to Plautus. Each word seems to consist of a stem, a locative suffix, and a genitive or a dative suffix respectively superadded. Thus, the Plautine *eiei* would represent a ground-form **ei-i-ai*, which, with the loss of the original intervocalic *i*, the change of *-ai* to *-ei*, and the production of a glide, would become *ei-j-ei*. But the probability or improbability of this suggestion cannot affect the present discussion, which is concerned, not with the origin of these forms, but with their spelling, pronunciation, and prosody in the time of Plautus.¹

¹ Brugmann's explanation of the morphology of these "vielbehandelten italischen Formen" (*Grundriss*, II., § 419), in which he takes the classical dative *ei* to be the original locative of the stem *ei-*: *ei-o-*, without subsequent addition thereto, fails to account for the early form *eiei*, and for the scansion *ēi* in Plautus, Terence, and Lucretius. The Lucretian *ēi* looks back to an earlier *eiei* (i.e. *ei-jei*), and the first *i* of *eiei* cannot, of course, represent the *i* of the original stem *ei-*: *ei-o-*, since original *i* when intervocalic,

disappears in Latin: e.g. *ēum* from **ei-o-m*. To Lindsay's suggestion (*Lat. Lang.*, ch. vii., § 19, p. 438 f.), that the *ē* of *ēi* may have been the result of the contraction, when intervocalic *i* had fallen out of the primitive loc. **ei-e-i*, of the two *e*'s thus brought together, there are two fatal objections — 1. the quantity of the *ē* in *ei* would then be in need of an explanation, and 2. the nom. and dat. pl. ought, for the same reason, to have become **ēi*, **ēis*, respectively.

It remains to say a word or two about the pronunciation of the apparent diphthongs in these assumed Plautine forms. We must distinguish here between the diphthongs of the accented syllables and those of the unaccented syllables. In the former there is no reason to suppose that *ei* and *oi* had yet lost their diphthongal pronunciation. When they were followed by a vowel, as in *quoius, eius*, sim., it is certain that they were true diphthongs. The determination of the exact sound of *ei* in unaccented syllables is not necessary for the purposes of the present discussion. It had probably, as Brugmann affirms, the sound of a long close *e*; but it will suffice to observe that it was still, as we have seen, distinct from *i*. The importance of this fact, as has already been pointed out, lies in this, that it proves the impossibility of such forms as *ei*, *huic*, *quoi* in the time of Plautus, when, as is certain, the ending of the dat. sing. of pronouns was *-ei* (*sibei, quoei*, etc., in inscriptions); and this *-ei*, being distinct in sound from *-i*, could not be represented by *-i*.

I assume then that the only forms possible in the time of Plautus were *eius, hoius, quoius, eiei, hoieice, quoei*, and that in each case a *j* (i.e. *i̯*, with the sound of English consonantal *y*) was heard between the diphthong of the first syllable and the following vowel. These assumptions are supported by the later forms, which are derivable from the Plautine forms postulated by the following changes.

It will be convenient to take first the forms *hoius(ce)*, **hoieice, quous, quoei*. The first change in their pronunciation was that the dative ending *-ei* acquired the pronunciation *-i* (Brugmann, *Grundr.*¹, I. § 247 (1); Lindsay, *Capt.* 1900, p. 107 f.). The datives then became, as pronounced, **hoijic, *quoijī*—as written, *hoice, quoi*. Later, the Old Latin diphthong *oi* became *ū*. The forms then became, as pronounced, *hūjus(ce), *hūjic, cūjus, *cūjī*; but these new dative

forms fall immediately under another phonetic law, the law, namely, by which Latin *j*, originating during the separate existence of the language, disappears before *i*. This law, which does not seem to be noticed by Brugmann,¹ needs a few words of explanation, as it is obscured by such apparent forms as *ābicio*, *cōnicio*, etc. in the Augustan poets. In those forms *j* seems to remain before *i* (*abjicio*), but that is merely a false appearance. Here, as generally elsewhere, modern editors use the post-Quintilian spelling, which has been made the standard. But Vergil wrote *abiēcio*, *coniēcio*, etc.: see Munro on Lucr. ii. 951, who remarks: “The classical writers knew the forms *eiēcit* or *eicit*, never *eiicit*.” The explanation seems to be this. When *o* in the terminations *-os*, *-om*, became *u*, it is well known that the change did not take place after a preceding *u*: e.g. *equos*, *seruos*, but *mulus*, *erus*. This, like all other interferences with phonetic laws, was due to analogy. A form *equus* must have become *ecus*: the analogy of the oblique cases (*equi*, &c.) preserved *equos*. Later, phonetic law triumphed, and *equos* became *equus*, which immediately became *ecus*. Similarly, when O. Lat. *ě* changed to *ĩ* in certain positions (e.g. **effēcio* became *efficio*), then, by phonetic law, *abiēcio* (i. e. *abjēcio*) should have become *abjicio*, which must have become at once *ābicio*. But the analogy of *iacio* arrested the action of phonetic law, and *abiēcio*, &c., were retained. In only one compound of *iacio* was the analogy with the simple verb not felt, namely, *amicio*; and here phonetic law took its course, and we have *āmicio* from the first. But, as in the case of *equos*, sim., so also in the case of the compounds of *iacio*, phonetic law finally prevailed; and Aulus Gellius asks “how the first syllable of *obiciebat*, *conicere*, &c., can be long” (Mayor on Juv., xv. 17). Even in Vergil the *j* sometimes

¹ Cf. *Grundriss*², i. S. 278 ff.

disappears when immediately preceded by *e*; e. g. in Ecl. iii. 96:

a flumine *reice* capellas.

Cf. id. *Ciris*, 118; Lucr. iv. 1272; iii. 877; i. 34; Hor. *Ser.* i. 6. 39. Examples of the later loss of *j* in other positions are Ovid, *Pont.* ii. 3. 37; Martial, *Ep.* x. 82. 1; Lucan, vii. 574; *et al.* This law, therefore, obscured by the traditional orthography, seems certain. How does it affect our forms? The genitive forms *hujus*, *cujus*, will be unaffected, but **hūjīc*, **cūjī* will become *hūīc*, *cūī*, respectively, which must become *hūīc*, *cūī* (antevocalic long vowel shortened). Finally, the law of *Breves Breviantes* will act, and we shall have *hūīc*, *cūī*.¹ In the classical poets *huic* and *cui* were scanned as monosyllables by the poetical licence called *synizesis*. But there is no evidence that *huic* and *cui* were ever monosyllables in the spoken language. The evidence rather proves the contrary; for in those forms of literature in which we should naturally expect to find the popular pronunciation, *cui* and *huic* are dissyllables—*cūī*, *hūīc*. The short quantity in the final syllables prevailed, just as it did in *tībī*, *hērī*, *ūbī*, &c. I append a few examples:

cantabat patriis in montibus et *cūī* non tunc.

Juv. vii. 211 : cf. Id. iii. 49.

séd norúnt *cūī* séruiánt leónes.

Mart i. 104. 22 : cf. Id. viii. 52. 3.

fábulae fingúnt, *cūī* Lúna sómnos.—Auson, *Ephem.* 15.

falsus *hūīc* pinnas et cornua sumeret aethrae.

Stat., *Silu.*, i. 2. 135 : cf. Id. i. 1. 107.

¹ The law that Lat. *j* disappears before *i* could not affect such forms as **hoijīc*, **quojī* above, because there the *j* was held by the *oi* diphthong as a glide.

obsequio condigna dei coniux *hūic* alma.

Paulinus Nolanus, vi. 29.

Other examples will be found in Neue-Wagener³, ii. pp. 454, 415. That these forms, *cūi*, *hūic* (more rarely *cūī*, *hūīc*) represented the popular pronunciation in Priscian's day is proved by a passage from that grammarian quoted by Neue-Wag., *loc. cit.* (p. 415): “Quaeritur in hoc modo declinationis, cum omnis dativus una syllaba minor sit genetivo, *illius*, *illi*; *istius*, *isti*; *ipsius*, *ipsi*; *unius*, *uni*; *solius*, *soli*; *utrius*, *utri*; *alterius*, *alteri*; an *huius*, *huic*; *cuius*, *cui*; *eius*, *ei* monosyllaba sint accipienda in dativo, quod regula exigit et plerique poetarum metris comprobant, ut . . .” (examples from Vergil follow).

Several things in this passage are significant:—1. The only forms about which he admits any question (*quaeritur . . . an . . . sint accipienda*) are *huic*, *cui*, *ei*: he writes down a long list of datives (*illi*, . . . *alteri*) as if they were beyond question. 2. He does not appeal to contemporary usage in order to settle the point, but argues from analogy, saying in favour of the monosyllabic forms of *huic*, *cui*, *ei* “regula exigit” and “plerique poetarum metris comprobant.” His “regula,” of course, was, that, as most pronominal datives were less by a syllable than the genitive, all should be so. 3. He puts *huic* and *cui* on the same footing as *ei*. How could he have used the words “quaeritur an” if *huic*, *cui*, *ei* actually were monosyllables? Again, if monosyllabic *cui* was really the popular pronunciation, and *cūi* was a poetical licence (*per diaeresin*), how strange it is that Augustan Vergil should have used in the highest flights of poetry the popular form, while the disreputable Martial, in occasional verse, should have used, as a poetical licence, an unfamiliar form foreign to the spoken language! The

truth is that the relation of classical Latin to spoken Latin is the same, in a less degree, perhaps, as that of Sanskrit to Old Indian. The usage of the post-classical writers, even of the late ones, is often a safer guide to the usage of Plautus than that of classical writers who were nearer him in time.

It remains to consider very briefly the forms which were pronounced in the Plautine age, *eijus*, *eijeī*. Here the diphthong of the first syllable became *ē*: cf. classical *Pompējus* (in Greek, until after the first century A.D., always Πομπήιος, never Πομπείος), older *Pompeijus*. The dative ending *-ei* became *-ī*, as before, and we consequently have the forms *ējus* and **ējī*, the latter becoming successively *ēī*, by the law postulated above, *ēī*, and *ēī* (by the law of Breves Breviantes). Space fails for the discussion of several minute and less important points of phonology, including the chronology of the various changes. For example, it seems probable that the change of O. Lat. *oi* to classical *ū* took place later after *qu* than in other positions, just as in the case of the change of O. Lat. *o* to *u*. With the pronominal forms here discussed may be compared, as regards scansion, the classical forms *ājō*, *āīs*, *ājunt*, &c., from original *aijō*, **aijīs*, &c. *Cūjus* and *cūī* are one to another as *ājunt* to *āīs*.

It seems therefore that the conclusions to which we were led by a critical examination of the Inscriptions, regarding the Plautine spelling and pronunciation of the forms under discussion, are supported and confirmed by the fact that the postulated Plautine forms are capable of serving as the basis of an explanation of the various later forms—if, indeed, they are not the ground-forms which necessarily underlie them. And now that the Plautine forms of these words, and their probable pronunciation, have been considered, it becomes safe to do what before that inquiry it would not have been safe to do, namely, to

seek an explanation of their apparently anomalous scansion in Plautus. My hypothesis is, that each of these words was a dissyllable in Plautus' time, never a monosyllable, and that each had variable quantity in its first syllable. Now, in Augustan verse it is clear that a word like *huius* had not variable quantity. No explanation, therefore, can be satisfactory which does not explain why so unusual a phenomenon should appear in the Plautine age, but not in the Augustan. At the same time, that very fact may be helpful. By asking what changes had taken place in these words during the two centuries which had elapsed between the Plautine and Augustan ages, we may find a clue to the change in their prosody. Now, taking *huius* again as an example, the only recognised sound-change which had taken place between the Plautine and the Augustan ages was this, that the *oi* of the Plautine *hoi-jus* had become the *ū* of the Augustan *hū-jus*, just as *oinos* and *moiros* had become *ūnus* and *mūrus*. A similar change had taken place in each of the other five forms, that is to say, an *i*-diphthong, either *oi* or *ei*, had lost its diphthongal character. The variable prosody of these six forms ceased when the diphthongal pronunciation of their first syllables ceased; we are justified therefore in inquiring whether the phonetic conditions and the prosody of these words were related as cause and effect.

We find similar phonetic conditions in Greek, in words like *οἶος*, *τοιούτος*, *ποιητής*, *πλείων*, &c., and it is a familiar fact that these words had variable quantity in the *i*-diphthong. *οἶος*, *ποιητής*, &c., could be scanned with their first syllable either long or short (hence from *ποιητής* the Lat. *phœta*), and beside *πλείων* and its inflexions we find *πλέων*. In Thuc. viii. 8 six MSS. have τὰς ἡμέρας τῶν νεῶν, where one has ἡμισείας: cf. MSS. of Plato, *Meno*, 83 C. In Attic we usually have πόα and στοά, but we have ποία in

Eur. *Cycl.* 333, and *στοιὰ* in Aristoph. *Ecol.* 684, 688.
One or two examples of varying quantity in verse will suffice—

τοῖος ἐὼν οἷός ἐσσι, τά τε φρονέων ἄ τ' ἐγώ περ.

Hom. *Od.* 7. 312.

κόσμον δὲ τῷ βίῳ τὸ τοιοῦτον γέρας.

Alexis, 263. 7, Kock.

ἔξὸν τοῖουτονὶ δὲ ἀγάλματ' ἀγοράσαι.

Anaxand. 28. 2, K.

Wherever in Greek the diphthongs *ει* and *οι* were followed by a vowel, the phonetic conditions were exactly the same as those which were present in Latin words like *eius*, *quouis*, sim. The consonantal *i*—its origin, whether in a glide, or an etymologically significant element, does not affect its phonetic character: cf. Brugmann, *Grundr.*², i., § 278, S. 258—which was heard, though not generally written, between an *i*-diphthong and a following vowel in Latin, was also heard in Greek under the same conditions. Thus the Greek *ποῖος* was pronounced *poi-i-os*, just as the Latin *quouis* was pronounced *quoi-i-us* (*quoi-j-us*). That statement perhaps requires a few words of proof. The existence of the consonantal *i* between an *i*-diphthong and a following vowel in Latin is, as we have seen, demonstrable: it is equally demonstrable in Greek. It is indicated by a comparison of Greek with cognate languages in which the glides are written—such languages as Old Indian, Gothic, and Lithuanian; but it is most clearly proved by the fact that the glides were expressed in some of the Greek local alphabets, e.g. Cyprian and Pamphylian. The Cyprian dialect, as is well known, was written in a cuneiform syllabary; and we find in Cypriote inscriptions such spellings as *a-no-si-ja* for *ἀνοσία*,¹ and *pa-pi-ja-s(e)*

¹ On Bronze of Idalion, C. I. Gr. 758a.

for Παφίας.¹ Now the Cyprian dialect was peculiar, not in possessing the *i* and *u* glides, but in expressing them. It was an affair of alphabet. This is shown by the fact that, in the inscriptions of the very closely related Arcadian dialect, the parent of the Cyprian, the glides are not expressed, the reason being, undoubtedly, that the Arcadian inscriptions are written in a form of the common Greek alphabet.

It is certain, then, that the phonetic conditions in a Latin word like the Plautine *quoius* and a Greek word like ποῖος were in every particular identical. For the Greek word it is a recognised fact that its first syllable may be scanned long or short: for the Latin word no such fact has been recognised. Why? The reason is, that our traditional rules of Latin prosody, like our Latin spelling and our Latin grammar generally, are based mainly upon the examination of the literary language of the Empire; and in the literary language of the Empire the *i*-diphthongs had ceased, as such, to exist. All three had become simple sounds in all positions. The ancient grammarians, therefore, could scarcely have left any record of the prosodical effects of such a manner of pronouncing in Latin. We must decide the question without their help, using the extant early Latin texts, and the methods of comparative philology. In *Od.* 7. 312, quoted above, Homer makes ποῖος trimoric, but οἶος dimoric. In other places he makes οἶος trimoric. His pronunciation, therefore, and the pronunciation of the later Greeks, in words of this class, must have varied. It is easy to see how it could vary. When ποῖος was trimoric it was sounded ποῖος; when it was dimoric it must have been sounded πόος. The Plautine *quoius* was sometimes trimoric, sometimes dimoric: why should not the variation have been due to the same cause? Trimoric *quoius* was

¹ See Blass, *Aussprache d. Griech.*, § 278, Giles, *Man of Comp. Phil.*, §§ 14, 20. Brugmann, *Grundr.*, i., *Append. B*, p. 532 ff.

certainly pronounced *quoijus*. Dimoric *quoius* may have been pronounced *quöjus*. If we place side by side two verses such as these—

τοῖος ἐὼν οἶός ἐστι, τὰ τε φρονέων ἄ τ' ἐγώ περ

Hom. η. 312.

égo illum nóui *quöius* núnc est | tú illum *quöius* antehác fuit.

Plaut. Rud. 967—

we seem to have merely two instances of the same phenomenon. That Plautus was familiar with the short pronunciation of antevocalic *i*-diphthongs in Greek appears from such a line as—

quis istic ést?—Charímus.—εὐγε | ἰάμ χάριν τούτῳ ποῖω.

Pseud. 712.

It is not to be thought of for a moment, of course, that Plautus was deliberately imitating this Greek practice as a "poetical licence." The practice could have found no place in the verse of Plautus unless it had been based on the actual pronunciation. That the Greek practice reflected the popular pronunciation is shown by its occurrence in comedy. It is even more strictly regulated in comedy than in tragedy, for while *πλέον* is constantly found in Aristophanes and the other comic writers, *πλέων* never occurs. The natural inference is that *πλέων* was not heard in common speech, but was an analogical form used by the tragedians *metri gratia*. From this fact Wackernagel has sought to connect the Greek variation with the phenomena of accentuation (in Kuhn's *Zeitschrift f. verg. Sprachf.* xxix. 12. 4). The question raised is hardly relevant to the present discussion. We must recognise that the variation was not "sporadic"—that it was governed by a principle in the spoken language, whether in Greek or in Latin. To determine what that principle was demands a separate inquiry. In one respect the Latin treatment of antevocalic *i*-diphthongs seems to

differ from the Greek treatment. We do not find in Latin the complete disappearance of the second element in the diphthong which appears in *στοά*, *πλέον*, *sim*. The reason is that, in Latin, intervocalic *i̇* (*j̇*) arising during the separate existence of the language did not disappear, except before *i*. Thus *Pompējus* did not become **Pompeus*, but the vocative became *Pompei* (dissyllabic—for **Pompei-j-i̇* (?), voc. from ground-form **Pompai-i̇-ios* (?) cf. Brugmann, *Grundr.*² i., § 247 (2)). In Greek, however, the intervocalic *i̇* of similar origin did disappear in certain cases, though it did not always disappear from the spelling, as in *ποῖος*, *τοιούτος*, *sim.*, where *oi* is followed by *o*.

But it is in the text of Plautus, after all, that we must look for proof that variable quantity did actually exist in antevocalic *i*-diphthongs in Old Latin. The proof seems to lie in lines like these :

quoi illám dedísset éxquisísse opórtuít.

Cist. 574.

quoi optígerat póstquam cáptust Phílopolemús tuós.

Capt. 157.

The first foot of the first of these lines must be either a spondee or an anapaest. If it is a spondee, then *quoi* is a monosyllable, and is totally elided. Let us suppose it to be elided. We are at once met with overwhelming difficulties. Take such a verse as *Men.* 493 :

cur aúsu's fácere, *quoi* ego áeque herés erám ?

Here *quoi* is not only not elided, but it remains long in hiatus. There is only one possible explanation of this power possessed by *quoi* of standing in hiatus without shortening : it was a dissyllable. It follows that it could not be elided in *Cist.* 574 ; for, even if we admit that a dissyllable could have been squeezed into a

monosyllable in Plautine Latin, we can hardly admit that this compressed monosyllable could then disappear in elision. Moreover, the verse just quoted (*Men.* 493) not only proves *quoi* to have been a dissyllable: it also proves it to have been (at least in that verse) a spondaic word before the elision of its second syllable. Its second syllable, being the termination of the dative case, must have been long, and the first syllable is palpably long in the verse. Putting aside, therefore, all question of the spelling and pronunciation of that spondaic word in the time of Plautus, and of the possibility of its contraction, it certainly seems impossible that, granting its contraction, it could ever have been elided.¹

We must, therefore, suppose the foot *quoi illdm* (quoted above) to be an anapaest. In that case *quoi* acts as a *breviis brevians*—*quoi illdm*. It is just possible, perhaps, to declare it to be a monosyllable shortened in prosodic hiatus; but prosodic hiatus in the *thesis* of an iambic or trochaic verse is the least defensible of all forms of so-called illegitimate hiatus, and cannot be admitted. To admit it would be to introduce complete disorder into Plautus' metrical practice; it would be necessary to give up the attempt to find any law or principle governing the admission of hiatus into his verse, and to suppose it something anarchical.² Moreover, if we suppose *quoi* to be here shortened in prosodic hiatus we should still have to explain why, in verses like *Men.* 493, *sim.*, it is not shortened. Here again we should be reduced to adopting the old and discredited theory that there were unusual licenses in Plautine verse.

¹ *Quoi* is admittedly never elided in Terence. see Maurenbrecher, *Hiatus u. Verschleifung*, s. 170.

² This form of prosodic hiatus is not admitted by Klotz, though he is by no means orthodox on the subject, inas-

much as he does not confine its use in Plautus to the comparatively narrow limits within which it occurs in Terence. See *Altromische Metrik*, S. 137 f., S. 245.

Rejecting, therefore, as inadmissible the possibility that *quoi* is here a monosyllable shortened in prosodic hiatus, we have but one alternative: we must suppose it to be a dissyllable with its second syllable elided and its first syllable naturally short, and acting as a *brevis brevis*. It is the metrical equivalent of Plautine *mihei* or *tibei*. But if this verse proves that the first syllable of the dissyllabic *quoi* was short, it is equally certain that other verses prove it to have been long. Such a verse is the one quoted above, *Men.* 493:—

Cur ausu's fácere, *quoi* ego áeque herés erám?

Putting the two verses together, therefore, we have a proof that the first syllable of *quoi* was common.

Restoring the form which, as I have tried to show, Plautus used, but using the spelling *quoijei* for the pronunciation which made the first syllable long, the spelling *quojei* for the pronunciation which made it short, the verses quoted above will be scanned thus:—

quöjei illám dedísset éxquisísse opórtuit.
 cur ausu's fácere, *quójei* ego áeque herés erám?
quöjei öptígerat póstquam cáptust Phílopolemús tuós.

Double scansion of *ei*, that is *eiei*, can be proved in exactly the same way by comparing one with another such verses as *Stich.* 653, *Pers.* 256, *Pseud.* 330, *Most.* 481. With the restored Plautine form, but with the double spelling *eije*, *ejei*, to indicate the variation in pronunciation, they may be scanned in order:—

salútem ut núntiáret átque *ějei* üt dícerét.
 danúnt argénti mútuí | ut *éije* egénti opem ádferám.
 própera : quíd stas ? *ějei* áccerse ágnos : | áúdin quíd ait Iúppiter ?
 necáuit ?—aúrumque *éije* adémit hóspití.

If double pronunciation of *quoiei* and *eiei* be admitted,

it must be admitted also for the other four forms. The genitive forms often have their second syllable shortened by the law of *Breves Breviantes* when it is long by position, just as the dative forms often have their second syllable shortened by the same law, though it was long by nature. I add a few miscellaneous examples by way of illustration, using a double spelling in each case, corresponding to the double pronunciation :—

höjūs quæ locútast quaerere aÍbas fÍliám.

Cist. 607.

quándo imágost *hoíjus* Ín me | cértumst hóminem elúderé.

Am. 265.

ét enim uéro quóniam fórmam | cépi *höjūs* Ín med ét statúm.

Ib. 266.

égo illum nóui *quóijus* núnc est | tú illum quóǵjūs antehác fuit.

Rud. 967.

et áliarum Ítidem quæ *ějus* eránt muliérculaé.

Ib. 52.

nam nón condúcit *hóijeic* sýcophántiaé.

Bacch. 764.

Ís Summánum sé uocári | díxit : *éjei* réddidí.

Curc. 544.

Íta uero *hójeice* ítem Menaéchmo | nómen ést in Síciliá.

Men. 930.

domíst : non métuo néc *quojeíquam* súpplícó.

Bacch. 225.

This line has been emended by the insertion of *ego* by Bothe; but the trisyllabic scansion of *quoiquam* is confirmed by *Mil.* 351—

néc *quojeíquam* quam Ílli in nóstra | méliust fámulo fámiliá.

In *Poen.* 479 the MSS. have

quoi rei?—ne ad fúndas uiscus adhaerésceret.

The line is unmetrical, and if an attempt to cure it be made by putting *ne* before *adhaeresceret* (in prosodic hiatus), there is still the objection that *rei* (dat.) is in hiatus, instead of in synaloepha. This hiatus Leo (*Plaut., Forsch.*, S. 324) would excuse by change of speakers. But even then the line seems faulty on the score of its rhythm; for *res* seems to have been generally enclitic, especially after an interrogative (not relative) pronoun: cf. the classical *quáre*, and English *sómething*, *nóthing*, and

eheú quom *illí rei* ego étiam núnc sum páruolús.

Pseud. 783.

quoiei númquam *undm rem* mé licet, &c.

As. 421.

lóquere pórro aliám *malám rem*.

Merc. 615.

This rhythm is preserved, and the verse becomes metrical, if we scan

quojeí rei?—ad fúndas uíscus né adhaeréscerét.

I add

námque núllum péius mácerát homónem
quámde máre saeuóm uirés *quojeí* sunt mágnæ.

Liv. Andron, 22 B.

quæque agúnt uigilántes ágitantque | éa si *quójei* in somno
áccidúnt. Accius, *Praet.* 30 R.¹

The double scansion here postulated is supported by the occurrence of *pěius* in *Trin.* 265:

nam qui in amorém praecípitaúť | *pějús* périt quam sí saxó
saliát.

¹ This verse is quoted by Lindsay, *Capt.*, 1900, p. 19, apparently as an example of the total elision of *cui* (sic), with the remark that “some would make *ěě sě cū* a proceleusmatic.

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It is true that sometimes the restoration of the postulated Plautine form results in what may be thought anything but an improvement to the run of the verse, e.g.,

quíd male fácio, aut *quǒjeĩ* mǎlē díco ? | *quǒjeĩ* pol quómq̃ue
occásióst.

Pers. 210.

To most ears, probably, this will sound less satisfactory than *quóí male díco*; yet the rhythm is exactly the same as in *Stich.* 517—

ín hunc diém. sed *sǎtĩn* ěgǒ tecum | :

cf. *Am.* 718, *Merc.* 965, &c.

Still more uncouth, perhaps, will seem the rhythm of such verses as

sátin ut quém tu habeás fidélem | tíbi aũt *quǒjeĩ* crédas nésciás ?

Bacch. 491—

yet it is almost exactly the same as that of

Amphitruó, speráui ego ístam | *tíbi* pǎřitúram fíliam.

But the real question is not whether these strange forms are harsh in our ears and uncouth to our eyes, but whether they are actually the forms used by Plautus. The present attempt at reconstruction may be incomplete or mistaken; but this at least is certain, that any forms postulated for the time of Plautus must submit to rigorous tests.

We call Latin a dead language; the epithet may be still more truly applied to the Latin of the days of Plautus. Many of its features, many of its forms, have been effaced and overlaid by the later more dignified and imperial speech. It is, in some respects, almost like those forgotten

cities that are buried beneath the ruins of cities themselves dead, and on which the explorer lights with surprise. But those effaced and forgotten features are not lost beyond recovery ; and if this paper has uncovered to the light, or helped to uncover, one small corner of the ancient pattern, it has accomplished its purpose.

CHARLES EXON.

REVIEWS.

The Choephoræ of Aeschylus, with Critical Notes, Commentary, Translation, and a Recension of the Scholia. By T. G. TUCKER, LITT.D., formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Professor of Classical Philology in the University of Melbourne. Cambridge, 1901.

THE present edition maintains the commanding position among scholars which his edition of the *Supplices* of Aeschylus won for Professor Tucker. But we doubt if there is a single correction in it which has as good a chance of winning its way into the accepted text of Aeschylus as λινοσινεῖ for λίνοισιν ἤ, *Suppl.* 102; τορόν τι for παρόντι. *Ib.* 219, and μάθοιμ' ἂν εἴ τις τάσδε μ' ἐξαιρήσεται for the very feeble ἄγοιμ' ἂν . . . μὴ 'ξαιρήσεται, *Ib.* 892. It would seem as if, in the edition now before us, he had hampered himself too much by the attempt to dig out the text from the *scholia*. This is no doubt a commendable method, and the late Professor Davies was, we think, the first, in his edition published forty years ago (Bell and Daldy, 1862), to make a strenuous effort in this direction. The present editor has thoroughly ransacked the scholiasts, and no one understands better than he "the tricks and the manners" of that strange confraternity, whom we are so much disposed to vilipend when they can be quoted against our conjectures, and to glorify when they support them. But they appear sometimes to have led Dr. Tucker from the right path in this edition, and to have prevented him from applying untrammelled his own fine powers of perception, analysis, and exposition. The translation, which faces the text, as in the *Sophocles* of Sir R. Jebb, to whom the edition is dedicated, is a miracle of taste, ingenuity, and command of poetic diction. But this very skill carries with it a danger. A very dexterous use of the English language sometimes avails to disguise eccentricities in the reading suggested, which a less skilful version would cruelly disclose. We sometimes sigh for the days when good old Paley told us that it did not make much difference whether we translated καρδίας κλυδώνιον χολῆς (*Cho.* 182), "heart-surge of bile" or "bile-surge of heart." Now, when ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ δάοις ἐπισκότῳ σέβῳ is translated "against a man who even to the foe was shrouded round

with awe," we forget to ask ourselves, whether Professor Tucker himself, in one of his admirable versions from the English poets, would translate 'majestic' by ἐπίσκοτος σέβας? We trow he would not.

So in 414-416 the strange expression,

ὅταν δ' αὖτ' ἐπ' ἀλκαῖς ἀράρη
θάρσε', ἀπέστασεν ἄχος
πρὸς τὸ φανίσαι καλῶς,

loses much of its uncouthness when it is rendered "but when anon the stars of courage shine in steady confidence, they clear away grief till all grows fair and bright." Had Paley ventured on so daring a reading, he would have translated, "when on strengths are firmly fixed courages they remove grief with a view to proper torchlighting." Then we should have seen that, whatever the chorus said in this passage, it was certainly not what the text presents. This note is somewhat characteristic of the editor's method. Each palæographic change, and each rare usage, is by itself quite defensible; but the coincidence of them all in one passage is very improbable. Be it observed, moreover, that ἀλκαί, in Pind. *N.* vii. 12, means 'instances of daring'; that the word in Eur. *Iph. T.* 1283 is not θάρσε', but θάρση, and that φανίσαι would properly be 'to light a torch,' not 'to give light,' though it might bear the latter meaning.

But "every good and perfect gift" must, on the whole, be commendable and useful; and we see often, in the interpretation, the good influence of that refined taste on the dangerous side of which we have been commenting. For instance, on 274 the editor rightly protests against the intolerable lowering of the key involved in the old interpretation of the words ἀποχρημάτοιςι ζημίαις ταυρομένον. It is true that Orestes and Electra feel deeply their beggared condition, but the oracle could not, with dignity, urge Orestes to vengeance on such material and personal grounds. The words do not mean 'indignant for his ruinous losses,' but 'stern in the infliction of penalties which had nought to do with money,' that is, the penalty of death for death. This is better than Dr. Verrall's 'scowling on their (offers of) compensation which would beggar them,' as more consistent with the use of both the participle and the adjective. However, the credit of making the first protest against the vulgar interpretation is due to Dr. Verrall, who well observes, "if Orestes had killed his mother *because she had robbed him*, he would surely have been a villain by the consent of all ages," and would not, as Cicero says, have been "acquitted by the vote not only of a goddess, but of the goddess of wisdom." Professor Tucker is undoubtedly right in reading (again following Dr. Verrall) Dindorf's πεκκέντα for the πευκέντα of M in 385. He

rightly characterises *πευκήεις ὀλολυγμός* as “an almost inconceivable expression”; *πυκήεις* he translates ‘with loud zest,’ ‘strong, full, hearty’: the schol. would seem to have taken it to mean ‘festal’ in the gloss *πανηγυρικόν*. The reading *ῥογα* (imper.) *μαθεῖν* (452) is very attractive, and so is *πραθείσαν* for *προσθείσαν* in 480, and his defence of *πεδάμαροι* (588) of M against Stanley’s *πεδάοροι*, which is a pure tautology of *πεδαίχμιοι*, carries complete conviction to us; the adj. describes ‘lightning’; we should, however, prefer the form *πεδάμεροι*. The missing – – υ before *ἄταισι* in 596 is ingeniously supplied by a rare word which might well have fallen out. Professor Tucker reads *ἄταις ἄάταισι*, supplying an adj. ascribed to Aeschylus by Hesychius (*ἄήτους· μεγάλας*); but we do not believe in *ἄπέρωπος*, ‘reckless,’ for *ἄπέρωτος* in the same passage. Perhaps his most ingenious conjecture is on 808–811—

*ξυλλάβοι δ’ ἂν ἐνδίκως
παῖς ὁ Μαίας, ἐπεὶ φορώτατος
πρᾶξιν οὐρίαν θελων·
πολλὰ δ’ ἀλφάνει κρυφ’.*¹

Here *πρᾶξιν οὐρίαν* depends on *φορώτατος*, and the rendering is: ‘‘Twere likewise due that Maia’s son should lend his aid: for he can best waft a deed on a fair course, when so he will; and great are his secret gains.’ While making gains for Orestes, the god of gain and stealth will earn much for himself in the shape of offerings.

Two at least of his emendations, we think, he has quite failed to establish. He gives us no defence of the intolerable use of *βαλών* intrans. = ‘going’ (472), except the quite inapplicable *βάλλε ἐς κόρακας*, which did not suggest such a usage even to the Greek comic poets; and on 955 he can plead no better support for *ἐν χρόνους θεῖσ’* (*ἐνθείσα χρόνους*), in the sense of ‘after long tarrying,’ than the Demosthenic *ἐμποιεῖν χρόνους*. This is not sufficient. *Nectere moras* is good Latin, but would that justify *ligare* (or *colli-gare*) *moras* as a conjecture in Virgil or Ovid?

The editor often accepts (and always with graceful and well-deserved acknowledgments) brilliant suggestions of Dr. Verrall. We are therefore the more surprised that he characterises as strained that scholar’s explanation of *εὐναί* as ‘anchorage,’ and as carrying on the metaphor in 317.

Some of the readings are very difficult to construe, and would be almost impossible without the prose version and the explanatory notes. Even with them we do not see how (830)

*Περσέως τ’ ἐν φρεσσὶν
θεῖνε καρδίαν σχεθών*

¹ 809, *ἐπιφορώτατος*, M. 811, *πολλὰ δ’ ἄλλα φανεῖ χρητίζων κρυπτά*, M. He regards *χρ.* as a gloss.

can mean 'get thee within thy breast the heart of Perseus.' Again, in 154 ff.,

πρὸς ἔρυμα τόδε κακῶν, κεδνῶν τ'
ἀποτροπον ἄγος ἀπεύχετον,
κεχυμένων χοᾶν,

the confusion of construction in general, and genitives in particular, is worthy of Babel. The first gen. (κακῶν) is the objective gen. after ἔρυμα, the second (κεδνῶν) is the objective gen. after ἀπότροπον (which governs ἄγος ἀπεύχ.), and the third (χοᾶν) is the definitive gen. depending on the distant ἔρυμα, 'a shield against evil in the form of (consisting of) libations.' Finally, κακῶν is neuter, and κεδνῶν is masculine. What grammar and rhythm have indissolubly joined the editor has put asunder. In 440 ff.,

μόρον κτίσαι μωμένα
ἄφερτον αἰῶνι σῶ
κλύειν πατρώους δύας ἀτίμους,

the rendering is, 'with aim to make his murder lie heavy on thy life, till thou couldst not bear to hear the story of thy father's hurt and shame.' We think we see how the version may be reconciled with the text, but we leave it to our readers to devise their own answer to the riddle. We cannot say that we have any solution to offer of a similar problem presented by 792 ff.,

ἐν οἱ δρόμῳ προστιθεῖς
μέτρον, τό τις ἂν σφζόμενον ῥυθμὸν
θεῖτ' ἰδεῖν δι' ἄπεδον,
ἀνομένων βαμάτων ὄρεγμα,

'setting before him such measure to be run as one might show a steady pace unbroken o'er the level, stride after stride winning to the goal.'

Such passages, however, might gain for Aeschylus admirers among the members of the Browning societies, if any still survive. And we willingly admit that the worst ground for refusing to accept a reading would be the extreme difficulty of explaining it, provided it could be explained at all. But all principles, methods, and rules of procedure have their limits, even *anagrammatismus*, which we do not think justifies ἀκρῶσαι (a coined verb), inferred from ἀκαίρως. If the reader turns to p. LXXXVIII, he will see how completely different are the other instances of anagrammatism alleged in the *Choephoroi*. If he carefully studies the whole work, with the Introduction and Appendices, he will greatly enlarge his knowledge of Greek, and will exercise and refine his perceptive faculties. The only misprint which we have noticed is 995 for 955 in the reference to ἀνη in Index I.

The Theory of Conditional Sentences in Greek and Latin, for the use of Students. BY RICHARD HORTON-SMITH, M.A., one of Her Majesty's Counsel, formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge, and sometime Classical Lecturer of King's College, London. [London: Macmillan and Co.; and New York, 1894.]

"THIS book," says the author in his Preface, "is the fruit of nearly half a century's study of the subject of which it treats on the part of the writer; and if he thought that, notwithstanding that the *nonus annus* of the poet has long since come and gone, yet further delay would add substantial value to his work, he would not scruple to impose it upon himself." Nearly fifty years of one life devoted to the composition of a book on "conditional sentences in Greek and Latin"! It is indeed, in its way, a monument of learning and industry.

The author has not, however, confined himself to the subject of the above title. This, the main or central topic, radiates to infinity under his treatment of it, and brings him from time to time into contact with almost every point that can engage the attention of a grammarian or philologist. He does not even confine himself within the bounds of grammar or of classical literature. He dedicates several pages of his notes (pp. 504-7) to such a matter as 'the embellishment of female beauty'—its treatment in literature—with illustrations drawn from Alexis, Ovid, Lucretius, Euripides, Servius (*ad Virg.*), Juvenal, and modern English and Italian writers; and he concludes the discussion with these words:—"Within the last ten or fifteen years we have seen the rage for golden locks come up again, but it cannot be said that the wearers of them are to be reckoned among the *élite* of the community." This, indeed, is in his notes (which, with their sub-notes, form two-thirds of the whole), but may be fairly taken as a sample of his excursive style. We also find a passage treating of the way in which classical poetry has dealt with 'the bitter-sweets of love,' and a 'sub-note' to it on the expression, 'chewing the food of sweet and bitter fancy,' with the alternative 'chewing the *cud*,' &c. In one place our author has a hit at Mr. Gladstone, who 'ostentatiously disclaims being an Englishman'; in another, a detailed criticism of the Revised Version of the N. T.; in a third, a discussion of the question whether or not the traditional English mode of pronouncing Latin should be 'reformed.' All these things seem, at the moment when they occur, equally natural and germane to the business in hand, though, on reflection, they appear strange in a work on 'conditional sentences.' Our author's enthusiasm is as inexhaustible as his resources for purposes of illustration. Into the service of the latter he presses nearly every European

language, ancient and modern, and nearly every form of publication: judgments delivered in the law courts, letters to the daily papers, &c., &c.

We have constantly before our eyes, as we read, not only the names of the classical authors, and of the great modern critics and editors of their texts, but those also of Camoens, Cervantes, Rabelais, Schiller, Machiavelli (from all of whom he quotes in the original) as well as those of Shakespeare, Spenser, Greene, Beaumont and Fletcher, Lord Chesterfield, and a host of others far too numerous to mention. Mr. Horton-Smith, seeing his own points, as he does, in the broad clear light of a thousand literary analogies, endeavours to set them before his readers in the same broad clear light. The result of this kindly effort, however, is too often to dazzle without illuminating.

Yet one cannot feel otherwise than favourably towards himself and his book. In manner and method it is what we have described. In arrangement, *i.e.* in the divisions, sub-divisions, paragraphing, and those other devices by which cross-references are facilitated, it is almost as unsatisfactory as a book could be. The irritation thus caused, far from being removed, is rather intensified by the ultimate discovery that the references given are always, when properly understood, correct enough. However, in spite of everything of this sort, one who has the requisite leisure and will take pains to read the whole book through, can hardly help being impressed not only with admiration for the learning it evinces, but with positive good-will towards its writer. It is the work of one who has been a progressive student of classics during a life-time. It breathes the wholesome spirit of *litterarum humaniores*. Given, on the author's part, the needful strength of faculty, and the desirable amount of critical power, no such work could be without value and interest. These conditions are fulfilled in Mr. Horton-Smith. His accuracy in detail is (so far as we can judge) as striking as his 'memoria' and width of culture. He is an 'up-to-date' classical scholar in a large and liberal sense: no mere departmentalist. Yet his work labours under serious blemishes. He appears at times (paradoxical as the statement is) to know too much about his subject. Even obvious remarks are overloaded with page upon page of illustrative matter. Readers of sufficient leisure and taste would, perhaps, wish no part of this omitted; but 'students,' for whom Mr. Horton-Smith professes to write, may well be pardoned if they apply the quotation—*νήπιοι οὐδὲ ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἡμῶν παντός*. We suspect, however, that he would care much less for their opinion of his book than for that of mature scholars whose student days are long past.

The utmost caution must be exercised by the reader if he is to avoid forming a totally false under-estimate, *ab initio*, of our author's scholarship. Mr. Horton-Smith commences with the enunciation of certain principles, some of which inevitably cause surprise.

After stating that *ἄν* cannot be used with any part of the imperative mood, he goes on to state that "it can be used with any *other* parts of a verb; and among these with the tenses of the indicative mood which [as all tenses of this mood do, p. 3] denote actual facts. To add *ἄν* to these tenses is to refer the facts denoted by the tenses themselves to the conditions, the prior fulfilment of which—in the case of the tenses of past-time—was, and, in the cases of the tenses of present and future time is, necessary for their existence as facts: to relegate the facts denoted by the tenses to the domain of things not actually facts, but conditional facts only; to thrust back the facts to the category of *contingencies*, and set them forward on their way to possibilities" [pp. 9-10]. Thus, besides *γίγνεται* = 'it happens,' and *γενήσεται* = 'it will happen,' we can (he says) have *γίγνεται ἄν* = 'it happens upon the actual conditions of things' = 'it happens in very truth; really; truly'; and *γενήσεται ἄν* = 'it will happen upon the actual existing conditions of things' = 'it will, &c. [as before].' "So also," he goes on, "with reference to the tenses of past-time, a reference to conditions made by the addition of *ἄν* to them, is a reference to actual past conditions. Therefore, while *ἐγένετο* = 'it happened,' we get, by the addition of *ἄν*, *ἐγένετο ἄν* = 'it happened upon the actual past conditions of things' = 'it happened in very truth; really; truly.' In other words, facts conditioned upon the actual existing state of things, are themselves absolute existing facts, of the present or future time as the case may be; and facts conditioned upon the actual past state of things are themselves absolute facts of the past time, and to speak of them as nevertheless conditional is an affectation of precision. Accordingly, as the language developed in its culture, the use of *ἄν* with the present and future tenses of the indicative mood, and—to a less extent—with the past tenses of the same mood, gradually fell into corresponding disuse." He proceeds to translate all this "into the language of example," and, in the tables following, connects *ἄν* with nearly every tense of the indicative. He gives us not only *ἔσθ' ἔκει ἄν*, *ἔσθ' ἔκειτο ἄν*, but also *ἔσθ' ἔκειτο ἄν*, *σθ' ἔκειτο ἄν*, *ἔσθ' ἔκειτο ἄν*. Next he applies the same principles to the subjunctive mood, the tenses of which denote "possible facts." "To add *ἄν*," he says, "to these tenses is to require for the actual existence as facts of the possible facts denoted by the tenses themselves nothing more than the prior fulfilment of certain conditions: to bring forward the facts denoted by the tenses from the domain of mere possibilities to that of things, which are—not indeed as yet actually facts, but which will become—facts, if certain conditions be fulfilled: to advance possibilities to the category of *contingencies*, and set them forward on their way to actual facts." Thus *γίγνηται* = 'it may happen'; *γίγνηται ἄν* = 'it may happen upon the actual conditions of things' = 'it really, truly, will happen, or (occasionally) happens.' "In other words, facts at present possible only, yet conditioned upon the actual existing state of

things, are in effect themselves absolute existing facts—usually of the future, though occasionally of the present time; and to speak of them as nevertheless conditional is an affectation of precision. Accordingly, as the language developed in its culture, &c. [as before].” The feeling of surprise excited by such a theory (so far as one can understand it) is not lessened when we advance with our author from categorical to hypothetical constructions. He formulates (p. 16) an account of the relation of εἰ to ἄν, and the origin and meaning of ἐάν (ἤν, ἄν), and, as before, at once translates his principles ‘into the language of example.’ The tables which succeed exhibit εἰ and ἐάν prefixed to parts of the Greek verb. In them Mr. Horton-Smith gives us ἐάν εἰσῆλκει, ἐάν ἴσση, ἐάν ἴσται; nay ἐάν εἰσῆλκει ἄν, ἐάν ἴσση ἄν, ἐάν ἴσται ἄν—and other such monstrosities, not to be picked up even in the slums of Greek literature. Yet throughout all this he is but playing with a theory of ἄν and must not be supposed to believe, any more than his critics do, in such constructions as the above. Truly, the man who had the courage of his convictions and thought with Mr. Horton-Smith might be trusted to produce an extraordinary piece of Greek composition. But our author is really labouring under no such weakness as a hasty reader might from all this imagine. He is as sound on matters of classical Greek construction as an excellent scholar need wish to be. This one can amply ascertain from the remainder of his book in which he shows consummate grammatical tact and accuracy. But here, driven by a fanciful theory, he tries to place himself at a prehistoric (or unhistoric) stage in the development of the Greek language. The results are not such as to encourage anyone to adopt his theory of ἄν and its usage. How a scholar of his taste could have for a moment yielded to the temptation to write and print as Greek these expressions of which we have given specimens will probably remain one of the mysteries of the *ars grammatica*.

When we turn to his explanations of the functions of ἄν in connexion with the tenses of the indicative and subjunctive, we find it as difficult to understand and express these in ordinary English as Mr. Horton-Smith found it to translate his *a priori* principles into examples from ordinary Greek. What, for instance, does he mean by “fact”? In the passage last quoted he speaks of facts as “actual,” “conditional,” “possible,” “existing,” &c.; also of “possible facts which are in effect *absolute existing facts, usually of the future*, though occasionally of the *present time*.” (The italics are ours.) Such phraseology seems, perhaps, clear and intelligible, but is really most difficult. To speak of “possible facts” as “in effect absolute existing facts” inasmuch as “they are conditioned upon the absolute existing state of things” is to employ the language of certain metaphysicians who hold that “all the possible is actual,” not, indeed, for us, weak men whose intuition moves within the “form” of time, but for a

Being capable of viewing all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. Accordingly it would almost seem (at first sight and for one brief moment) as if Mr. Horton-Smith had, in his zeal for the elucidation of conditional sentences, dipped into the philosophy of Spinoza, only that Spinoza would never have admitted the distinction of "absolutely existing facts" into those of "present" and "future" time. In good sooth we do not know what Mr. Horton-Smith means by these explanations—or some of them. We leave the matter "dahingestellt."

Thus, in our opinion, the substructure of his work is of very precarious and uncertain validity, but the superstructure is in many respects admirable. Happily it is possible to be a good working grammarian while knowing little or nothing of the *origines* of grammar. For Grammar refuses to reveal its subtle secrets to Logic. The psychical operations which have clothed themselves in the old forms of grammatical construction are too various, too minute, too erratic, and belong too much to the region of the sub-conscious, to be capable of reduction to the regularity of categories. To a grammarian who turns his logical or psychological microscope upon these forms they are wont to appear as unlike themselves as other familiar things do when seen under a microscope. He fails to recognise them, mistakes them for what they are not, and incurs the risk of ultimately straying with his readers into a sort of grammatical wonder-land. He sometimes misses real distinctions, and imagines distinctions where none exist. Thus Mr. Horton-Smith, when seeking to discriminate between ἔστησεν ἄν and στήσευεν ἄν, has nothing better to say than that the former = Engl. "he would have placed," the latter = Eng. "he would have-placed." He concludes that the distinction is one of *nuance* merely. This is true of the English, but not of the Greek, expressions.

But enough of criticism. The work he presents us with has striking merits side by side with striking faults. The best and most scholarly readers will derive most profit from it. They, too, will regard it with most indulgence; but we dread to think how it would fare if submitted to the judgment of critics whose highest function is to pronounce upon the utility of class-books.

Platons Res Publica, recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit
IOANNIS BURNET, in universitate Andreana Litterarum Graecarum Professor, Collegii Mertonensis olim Socius. Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

WE are glad to welcome Mr. Burnet's edition of Plato's *magnum opus*. There are already several good English editions of the text—especially that of Mr. Adam, noticed by us a few years ago; yet the

present has merits of its own which entitle it to distinct recognition, apart from its *raison d'être* as portion of the Oxford Plato. The footnotes of Mr. Burnet's are much fuller than those of Mr. Adam's book, rendering the former more convenient for the use of critical students. Besides this, Mr. Burnet has brought into prominent importance certain mss. of which his latest English predecessor thought less highly. We refer particularly to the estimation in which he holds F, Cod. Vindobonensis 55. In his Preface, after asserting the mutual independence of A, D, M, he states that these three codices have all come from one and the same source, while almost all others are derived from them. Not quite all, however. Vindobonensis F (rashly supposed by some to be derived from Florentinus A) remains to be considered. This codex is full of errors which cannot be explained except on the assumption that it was copied by an ignorant scribe from some ancient ms. written in majuscules. Mr. Burnet gives instances of readings by which he intends to show that it cannot have come from A, D, M, but must represent a more ancient archetype. Further, he observes a curious coincidence between its characteristic readings and those which correspond in Iamblichus, Galenus, Stobaeus, Eusebius, and other ancient writers. Thus for him it is the long-sought witness to a recension older than any hitherto recognized—"deformatum quidem, sicut Glaucum illum marinum, sed sincerum, nec aliunde ut fit interpolatum." He dwells upon the importance which F, therefore, should henceforth assume in Platonic criticism, asserting that it will enable us to dispense with the aid of Venetus E, and Monacensis q; mss. of which Mr. Adam thought much, but which Mr. Burnet calls "novicii et interpolati": useless, except in the cases in which their writers, being men of some erudition, were fortunate enough to hit upon true readings by conjecture. If Mr. Burnet's view be sound, the consensus of Vindobonensis F and Venetus D (Bekker's II) is at times more valuable than that of Parisinus A and Caesenas M, especially when the former consensus is reinforced by the concurrent testimony of Stobaeus or Eusebius. Mr. Burnet's novel position will no doubt be subjected to a fire of criticism by Platonic specialists, but it heightens the fundamental interest of his work.

He is certainly, as an editor, not addicted to "der wüste Dilettantismus der Conjecturenjagd." He adopts into his text the most obviously sound emendations, recording in his notes their author's names: e.g. ἐμποιήσας (ci. Schneider) for ἐμποιήσαι 333 E; δακτύλιον ὄν<τα> (ci. Bywater) 359 E; ἐλοῦσι (ci. van Leeuwen) for θέλουσι 468 A; δι' ὃ ἡ (ci. Adam) for δι' οὗ (or δι' οὗ ἡ) 502 B; δευτέραν δὲ ἰδεῖ (ci. Adam) for δευτέραν δεῖ δὲ 580 D. There are many other conjectural emendations not adopted by him which yet seem worthy of adoption. Much deference is, however, due to his sober judgment in such matters, and even when he does not accept such readings, he carefully records them in his notes. Among the few and not

very important instances in which he has introduced changes of his own there is one which demands a brief attention here. In 444 B 5 the majority of mss. (including Parisinus A, read *τοιούτου ἀντος φύσει οἷον πρέπει αὐτῷ δουλεῖν, τοῦ δ' αὖ δουλεῖν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι*. Vindobonensis E, however, has *τῷ δ' αὖ μὴ δουλεῖν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι*, of which Madvig approves, though it is condemned "as much too feeble" by Campbell and Jowett. Mr. Adam, with these and other editors, reads *δουλεῖν τῷ τοῦ ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι*, omitting the conjunction and the second *δουλεῖν*. Critically this is, of course, unsatisfactory. Mr. Burnet changes the *αὖ* to *οὐ*, and reads *τῷ δ' οὐ δουλεῖν ἀρχικοῦ γένους ὄντι*; The sense of this is that "the one is of such a nature that it is meet for it to serve, while the other is of such a nature that it is meet for it to rule, being of regal stock." But the grammatical instinct of the copyist of Vindobonensis E who read *μὴ* was sounder. *οὐ-δουλεῖν* (which, we assume, indicates the way in which Mr. Burnet would construe) is not = *ἀρχεῖν*; while, if we render *οὐ δουλεύειν* as = 'not to be a slave,' Platonic grammar imperiously calls for *μὴ*, not *οὐ*, with the infinitive. This strange variation of mss. is well worth study, though it is far from easy to understand.

One does not know what to do when the mss. are consentient in such a case as the following. In 558 D 559 C *ἀναγκαῖος* is six times joined with the feminine nouns (sing. or pl.) *ἡδονή* or *ἐπιθυμία*. Three times it appears as of two terminations, and three times as of three terminations. In 558 D 5 we read *αἱ δὲ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖαι κέκληνται*: in 558 D 9 *τὰς ἀναγκαῖους ἐπιθυμίας*: in 559 A 5 *ταύτας εἰ μὴ ἀναγκαῖους φαῖμεν εἶναι*: in 559 B 1 *ἡ τοῦ φαγεῖν [ἐπιθυμία] . . ἀναγκαῖος ἂν εἴη*: in 559 B 3 *ἡ τοῦ σίτου . . ἀναγκαῖα*: and in 559 C 1 *ἡ πέρα τούτων . . οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα ἂν καλοῖτο*. That Plato should have thus capriciously passed from form to form in closely successive sentences is to us scarcely credible. Yet mss. do not (so far as we know) vary here. The divinity that *mis*shapes our ends has probably been at work upon them. But to discuss the matter—*non est huius oīii*.

The Politics of Aristotle. Edited by W. L. NEWMAN, M.A. Vols. iii. and iv., Books iii. to v. and vi. to viii. (Clarendon Press, 1902).

THESE volumes complete the elaborate edition, the first portion of which (vols. i. and ii.) was published in 1887, and reviewed at length by Dr. Tyrrell in *Hermathena*, 1888. Each of the present volumes contains text, notes critical and explanatory, and a prefatory essay on the contents of the books. Vol. iii. has an introduction (supplementary) on the mss. and Latin version of the *Politics*,

and also appendices; while vol. iv. gives indices for the whole work. The Clarendon Press has done its part in making the edition handsome and readable; but the average student will be somewhat deterred by its bulk, and still more by the arrangement which places the critical notes together at the end instead of at the foot of the text.

The editor's textual views have not changed since 1887. Vol. iii. gives us a careful study of (1) the characteristics of the two families (π^1 and π^2) into which the mss. fall, and the errors to which they are liable; (2) the methods of translation adopted in the *Vetus Versio* of Wilham of Moerbeke. He still prefers π^2 , alleging the number and nature of the omissions in π^1 as his main reason. In practice Mr. Newman keeps us as close to his mss. as possible. The order of the books differs from that of Bekker in counting the treatise on Revolutions as Book vii. Emendations and transpositions are seldom accepted, and the defence of the mss. is often conducted with great ingenuity, even against most plausible suggestions, e.g. 1336 b διὸ δὲ τοῖς νέοις πάντα ποιεῖν ξένα τὰ φαῦλα, μάλιστα δ' ὅσα ἔχει ἡ μοχθηρίαν ἢ δυσμείνειαν. Susemihl conjectures *δυσγένειαν*, but our editor remarks that *δυσμείνειαν* is appropriate to the malice of the iambi which are to be shunned, as *μοχθηρίαν* to their depravity, and explains the rendering of the *Vet. Vers.*, *infectionem aut inhaesionem* as incorrect alternative readings of *infensionem*, the true equivalent for *δυσμείνειαν*; while *malitiam* (· *μοχθηρίαν*) has been thus omitted. Again, 1331 a πρέπει . . . ἀγορᾶς εἶναι κατασκευὴν οἶαν καὶ περὶ Θετταλίαν ὀνομάζουσι ἣν ἐλευθέραν καλοῦσιν. Lambinus' νομίζουσιν is generally accepted, but Mr. Newman supplying ἀγορὰν with οἶαν explains "the word ἀγορά was connected in the minds of Greeks with ἀγοράζω, and to use the words as the Thessalians did of a place where nothing was bought or sold would seem strange to them."

Less fortunate is his explanation of 1331 a τόπος ὅστις ἐπιφάνειαν ἔχει πρὸς τὴν τῆς ἀρετῆς θέσιν ἰκανῶς, 'for the enthronement of virtue' can hardly be right, and either Dr. Jackson's *ιερατείας* or Schneider's *θέαν* would improve matters, though Mr. Newman mentions no suggestion. His conservatism makes him reject obvious transpositions like those in 1338 b (where δὲ . . . πρότερον δ' οὐκ εἶχον makes no sense unless transferred to follow πρὸς ἀσκοῦντα ἀσκεῖν in l. 29). 1340 b (where καὶ τις εἴκει . . . ἁρμονίαν should plainly follow ἐλευθεριωτέρας in l. 8), and 1341 a πρὸς μὲν τὰς χρήσεις ἤδη πρὸς δὲ τὰς μαθησεις ὕστερον (where χρήσεις and μαθησεις unless interchanged give a sense exactly opposite to that required by the context). It is only fair to add that Mr. Newman is obviously doubtful about his own arguments in these cases. Sometimes, indeed, as in 1288 a πρῶτον . . . ἀρχάς and 1342 b εἰσὶ δὲ δύο σκοποὶ . . . τό πρέπον (passages bracketed by Susemihl as interpolations,

the one irrelevant, the other contradictory to the context) words are printed in the text without any sign of suspicion; and yet we find on turning to the commentary that the editor admits the truth of the case against them. It is in such instances that the absence of critical footnotes is peculiarly misleading.

The editor is not fond of emendations; nevertheless, in 1328 b *ἐν τούτοις ἂν εἴη ἀναγκαῖον ὑπάρχειν* his neat conjecture <ᾧ> ἀναγκαῖον makes everything clear. Susemihl read διό with MS. P¹ but marked a lacuna. In 1331 b his suggestion τὸ προεστὸς for τὸ πλῆθος avoids the necessity of substituting ὁπλίτας for εἰς before ἀρχοντας. In 1277 a ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινέταιί γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἀρχειν καὶ ἀρχεσθαι καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἢ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι κ.τ.λ. his insertion of δοκεῖ after δοκίμου is clumsy compared with Dr. Jackson's δοκεῖ που, and the word used repeatedly throughout the preceding discussion for the ideal citizen is always ἀγαθός or σπουδαῖος, never δόκιμος.

In spite, therefore, of Mr. Newman's industry, his text is hardly satisfactory to the reader. His own view of the MSS. does not justify extreme caution; and it is apparent to the most careless student that if Aristotle ever arranged our treatise with his own hand, his work has been so much disturbed in transmission that judicious alteration is the truest fidelity. In other ways the editor deserves much gratitude. The Essays on the subject-matter are extremely valuable for the clearness with which they present Aristotle's views on each head, unincumbered by the confusion and repetition of the text actually handed down to us, where criticism, theory, anecdote, and parenthetical remarks, or interpolated notes, bewilder the mind. Mr. Newman has often done little more than bring together his author's scattered remarks, only now and then pointing out inconsistencies and difficulties. The Essays on Oligarchy and Education are perhaps the best.

But the exceptional wealth and width of Mr. Newman's learning display themselves to most advantage in the Commentary. Illustrations and parallels unusually apt and interesting are drawn quite in Aristotle's manner from all times, places and authors. He is on congenial ground in the last three books, where he brings now Venice, now America, and again the Transvaal to support Aristotle's dicta. His notes throughout are conspicuously full and helpful. We may draw attention to those on ostracism, 1284 a, *asymmetæ* 1285 a, φόρβειαν and ὀβελίσκους 1324 b, melodies 1342 a, as specimens. The diligence of the editor is proved by the success with which he tracks down the sources of Aristotle's remarks. Appendix D gives a list of reminiscences of other authors occurring in the text apart from direct quotation. Appendix B is an exhaustive note on the use of hyperbaton in the Politics for emphasis. Such constructions (cf. the occasional use of chiasmus) are noteworthy as telling against the extreme theory that we have Aristotle's works only in the form of notes written up

by his scholars. On the other hand, much space is wasted in speculating on what Aristotle might have said, and in raising trifling difficulties. In fact, there is so much unnecessary matter in these large volumes that, though valuable as storehouses of information, they will probably be supplanted in general use by a more convenient edition, in which attention will be confined to what is really necessary to a proper understanding and appreciation of Aristotle's work.

M. Tulli Ciceronis Rhetorica recognovit brevique adnotatione critica instruxit A. S. WILKINS, Linguae Latinae apud Mancunienses Professor, E. Coll. Div. Joh. Camb. Tomus i. *Libros de Oratore tres continens.* Oxonii e typographeo Clarendoniano.

It was natural that the delegates of the Clarendon Press should turn to Professor Wilkins for a critical edition of the *De Oratore* in the new Oxford series of Classical texts. By his annotated edition of this book, of which the last volume appeared in 1892, he had established a position for himself among the foremost of Ciceronian and, indeed, Latin scholars. The notes in that edition are a perfect mine of information, and no real difficulty is ever shirked. The text of the present is an almost exact reproduction of the text in the earlier edition, as indeed we are told in the Preface, although we are also told that both text and authorities have been submitted to a careful re-examination. I have been able to discover only one or two unimportant passages in which the new text differs from the old. If the editor errs on the side of conservatism in textual criticism, he gives his readers ample material for emendation in a judicious 'apparatus criticus,' which includes the emendations of scholars like Sorof, Piderit, and Reid. One could wish that the suggestions of Reid had been in some instances incorporated in the text.

What is now wanted is a really good English translation of the three books. There is an excellent translation of Bk. I. by Mr. E. N. P. Moor, published by Methuen & Co. I am acquainted with no other in English, except Bohn's, which, besides being faulty in style, is at times absolutely wrong in interpretation. All Cicero's treatises on rhetoric, though at times tedious and incoherent, have this at least to be said in their favour, that Cicero discusses his subject with the originality of a master. We have, in fact, as Mr. Wilkins says, "the greatest of Roman Orators in the very prime of his powers giving us the ripe results of his own experience in the art by which the 'novus homo' of Arpinum had risen to the highest post in the Roman State." Cardinal Newman says of the *De Oratore* in particular, "It is the most finished, perhaps, of Cicero's

compositions. An air of grandeur and magnificence reigns throughout. The characters of the aged senators are finely conceived, and the whole company is invested with an almost religious majesty." One cannot but wonder that so little attention is given to this rich field of Ciceronian literature in the curricula of the three great sister universities of the United Kingdom. Even if there be no science of oratory, a treatise on the subject by one who was the foremost orator of his day, at a time when the art was cultivated in schools and not evolved by the experience of the individual, ought to prove interesting, if not useful, to those whose profession it will be to address public assemblies.

The passage in Bk. II., where Caesar discusses Roman wit and humour in so far as they have a bearing on the orator's art, is, perhaps, the most readable of the entire treatise. It is true he fails to give anything approaching a scientific theory of wit, and quotes examples rather than classifies under general heads; but who since his time has done more? Why cannot some of our own countrymen write a scientific treatise on this subject "which is all our own"? Might we not reasonably hope to have "The Anatomy of Wit" from an Irishman, as we have "The Anatomy of Melancholy" from an Englishman?

One could wish that the Clarendon Press had used thicker type in printing the present edition. In this respect the book contrasts unfavourably with the Teubner text. I have not discovered any printer's errors throughout the volume. *Ill*, a misprint of the annotated edition in Bk. I., §215, has been corrected to *ille*.

In his preface to the annotated edition Mr. Wilkins explains the fact that Cicero distinctly asserts in a letter to Lentulus (Fam. i. 9, 23) that the *De Oratore* was written *more Aristotelio*, whilst he denies in a letter to Atticus (xiii. 19, 4) that it possesses the *morem Aristotelion*, by saying that in the former case Cicero is thinking more of the form, in the latter of the substance of the dialogue. The explanation given is plausible. May not, however, the passage in the letter to Lentulus mean (a) that as Aristotle wrote a treatise on Rhetoric so did Cicero (for adj. cf. *Carneadeo more*, Cic. Univ. I.); or (b)—though Wilkins denies that it is necessary—with the *enim* referring to *more Aristotelio* in true Aristotelian style, i.e. with an originality which disregarded the hackneyed rules of the schools as the *enim* explains. *Quemadmodum quidem volui* will mean in either case 'after a fashion of my own.'

Subjoined are a few remarks on both the editions of Mr. Wilkins:—

Bk I, §87. "Ne primoribus quidem labris attingere," = 'not to have even a smattering of,' is better than Wilkins' "with the tip of the tongue."

§91. Wilkins follows L, an inferior ms., in reading *scire* for *scisse* of H and E, the only two superior mss. which we have of this

passage. But *scisse* is probably the correct reading. This usage of the perf. inf. is, perhaps, an extension of the use of *volo* with perf. inf. (Roby 1371, a.), for which cf. Hor. Epist. i. 17. 5, "*aspice si quid et nos, quod cures proprium fecisse, loquamur.*" A better change would be that of *curassent* into *curarent*. This was possibly adapted to the tense of *didicissent* by a scribe who forgot that the pluperfect of *disco* is here equivalent to the imperfect of a verb of 'knowing.' In fact *scisse curarent* ('be anxious to come to the knowledge of') would exactly correspond in tense to *didicissent*.

§117. "*vastum hominem atque foedum*" = 'a horrid hulking fellow.'

§127. "*Tantum modo similem esse hominis.*" This use of *hominis* in the sense of 'the average man' strongly supports the reading *virtute hominum* in iii. 78, which thus furnishes the parallel desired by Wilkins. Perhaps this use of *homo*, moreover, supports the reading *humane* in Hor. Epist. ii. 2, 70 in the sense of 'moderately.'

§131. "*In specie posita.*" Dr. Reid suggests *in conspectu* on the ground that *specie* can hardly mean 'personal appearance,' but the meaning of *specie* here is rather 'showy appearance,' 'outward show,' and there is no necessity for emendation.

§132. "*unus paterfamilias*" = 'the man in the street.'

§157. "*Visus hominum*" Madvig and Wilkins: "*Usus omnium*" Codd. *Usus hominum*, read by Lg. 2, 36, is most likely the true reading. *Usus hominum subeundus* has, owing to the context, exactly the same meaning as *visus hominum subeundus* (i.e. 'We must accustom ourselves to meeting the gaze of the people'), in opposition to 'cloistered practice' (*exercitatio umbratilis*). This sense of *usus* is generally found in the case of inanimate objects (cf. Cic. Rep. iii. 3), but might very easily be transferred to persons, especially in view of the secondary meaning of the word 'familiarity,' 'intercourse.'

§202. "*Auctor tamen esse deus putatur*" Wilkins: "*tamen esse deus putatur*" Codd. Perhaps the original reading was *artem tamen invenisse deus putatur*. The *art-* of *artem* was dropped owing to the preceding *-aret* of *daret*; then *tamen* (tā) may have affected the *in-* of *invenisse*. Another possible reading would be *arti tamen inesse deus putatur*. Madvig suggests *invenisse* alone.

Bk. II. §22. "*Umbilicos*" is explained as 'sea-snails' or 'small pebbles.' The Greek word σπράβιλος used by Aristophanes (Pax 864) in the sense of 'snail' probably gets this meaning from the resemblance between the shape of a snail's shell and a top. May we not infer that *umbilicus* gets the same meaning from the resemblance between the *umbilicus* proper and a snail's shell?

§60. "*Tactu.*" II E: "*Cantu.*" Codd. recc. Perhaps *contactu* (*clactu*) is the reading from which both come.

§84. "*Non difficiliter arte conjuncta*" bracketed by Wilkins and Friedrich as an interpolation. Perhaps the reading was *nondum*

facili illius arte coniuncta. In this case *illius* will refer to *gladiatori et militi*, or perhaps to the general idea of 'fighting man' in both.

§104. "Sive ex persona ut laudis" bracketed by Wilkins and Friedrich as spurious, omitted by the three best mss. The reading may have been *sive ex persona ut Claudii*, the *s* being added to *Claudi* from the following *sive*. For this use of *persona* with gen. cf. II. 134 *Optimii persona*.

§142. "A iure cognoscendo" bracketed by Wilkins, retained by Friedrich. The words, in my opinion, ought to be retained, and make perfectly good sense. The preposition *a* is the more easily used with *debilitati* owing to its use in the sense of 'with respect to,' cf. *laborare ab re frumentaria*, Caes. B.G. VII. 10. If any change be necessary I should suggest *debilitati—ac iure—cognoscendo*.

§193. "Spondalli illa," read by the best, and "spondalia illa," by the inferior mss., are both probably corrupt. The first is indeed manifestly so. The emendation may be *spondenti alia illi* (sc. Teucro), who made himself responsible for the safe return of Ajax. The difficulty of course is the use of the imperfect participle. May we not, however, take it to mean 'Who was guarantor of far other issues?'

§253. "Quid Spaedius nuculan (iv litterarum spatio relicto) conficere inquit" so H: Wilkins and Friedrich give "Quid Decius? Nuculam an confixum vis facere," inquit."

I believe the word to be contrasted with *nucula* is *cornus* in some form.

1. Perhaps *Quid Decius? Nuculam an Cornum vis conficere? inquit.*
The jingle of *corn-*, *confic-* would inevitably suggest the proper name Cornificius.
2. Or better, perhaps, thus, *Quid Decius? Nuculam an Cornutum vis facere? inquit.*

Though *Cornutus*, of course, means 'horned,' as an adjective it would inevitably suggest *Cornus* in opposition to *Nucula*. 'Do you want to make him a Mr. Nut or a Mr. [C]hornel.'

§310. "Permove" ita A,C,H: "pertinere" Sorof. Reid suggests *valere*, which gives a far more natural turn to the sentence, but it is not very obvious how the corruption arose. *Pervenire* is much nearer the mss.; and as it has the force of *valere* it is more likely to be the true reading.

§328. "Constituitur" is marked spurious by Wilkins, who rejects *consistitur*, the correction of Lambinus, on the ground that we cannot have an impersonal verb co-ordinated with *percurritur*. Surely there is no objection to our taking *percurritur* impersonally also (cf. Hor. Sat. I. 1, 3 *concurritur*). Most probably the copyist considering it personal, altered *consistitur* to *constituitur* so as to have a personal verb co-ordinated with it.

Bk. III. §65. "Sed utrumque est in his," MSS. This is changed arbitrarily, I think, by Wilkins, after Sorof, into *sed nimirum est in his*, alleging that it is "perhaps as good as anything." But either Ellendt's *utrumque est, est in his* or Reid's *vitium quoque* come much nearer the MSS. I think of the two, Reid's is preferable. As to the objection that there are two *vitia*, not one, and consequently that Cicero could not have used the singular, it may be observed that Cicero, when he began the sentence, meant to use *vel . . . vel*, which gives an option between two things, and does not give prominence to the idea of combination as *et . . . et* would.

Friedrich retains the reading *utrumque* which Wilkins says can only refer to what precedes. The analogy of ἀμφοτέρων and ἀμφοτέρα would lead one to think that it might possibly refer to what follows.

§78. "De virtute hominum" seems to me to be right. In spite of Wilkins' objection I think that Sorof's plea for *hominum*, on the ground that orators, being men of the world, knew more about human nature than the Stoics, is admissible. The *virtus hominum* is the excellence of the 'plain honest man,' the *virtus sapientium* of the Stoics was an ideal excellence which had an existence, if at all outside the imagination of its votaries, only in a select few. This use of *homo* in the sense of 'an ordinary man' is supported by Bk. I. §127, *Tantum modo similem esse hominis*. If any change were necessary I think *minuma* or *minumum* would be preferable to *omni* which Wilkins suggests.

The Oldest Civilization of Greece: Studies of the Mycenæan Age.
By H. R. HALL, M.A., Assistant in the Department of
Egyptian and Assyrian Antiquities, British Museum. David
Nutt, 1901.

THIS book is a useful supplement to Schuchhardt's Epitome of Schliemann's works. It brings the discussion of the Mycenæan question abreast of recent evidence, and, as regards material to the date of publication, leaves nothing to be desired. It is too early to say what the discoveries in Crete may bring forth. The illustrations are admirably selected, and in this respect, as furnishing a comprehensive view of the evidence, the author is deserving of high praise. We are glad to see that time-worn cuts are sparingly used, and that illustrations not readily accessible to the general reader have been freely drawn upon, thus giving the work a welcome air of freshness. The Egyptian evidence for the dating of the Mycenæan period is particularly well done. And we have now for

the first time a summary in convenient form of the whole evidence bearing on the question of date. As to the general argument of the book, Mr. Hall discusses the Mycenæan question from the orthodox standpoint. We are inclined to say that it represents the English mind. A profession is made throughout of extreme caution. He insists again and again on the doubtful and provisional character of the "Mycenæan Hypothesis." This air of scientific caution is not, however, maintained when Mr. Hall enters the field himself. Thus on the question of the date of iron he adopts, wholesale, Piehl's views, without indicating to the reader that the subject is in controversy, and that Piehl's conclusions are by no means generally accepted. Mr. Hall is rather contemptuous of Professor Ridgeway's theories. This part of the book seems to bear evidence of being hastily written. He does not seem to grasp Ridgeway's arguments, and is decidedly superficial in the attempts to brush them aside. Thus Mr. Hall writes: "The genealogical arguments which Professor Ridgeway adduces in support of his position cannot be said to prove very much. They must be to a great extent of little value; many Greek genealogies are obviously mere ætiological inventions." Here the argument from the genealogies is quite misunderstood. The point is not that the genealogies are true, but that they are evidence of race distinctions traditionally accepted or recognised at the time they were drawn up. Thus no Achaian is traced to a Pelasgian ancestor. But we have not space to enter on controversial matters. We should like to add a word of praise for the publisher. It is a pleasure to handle a book so admirably produced.

The Scientific Writings of the late GEORGE FRANCIS FITZ GERALD, Sc.D., F.R.S., HON. F.R.S.E., *Fellow of Trinity College, and Erasmus Smith's Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy in the University of Dublin.* Collected and edited with a Historical Introduction. By JOSEPH LARMOR, SEC. R.S., Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis, & Co., Ltd., Grafton-street; London: Longmans, Green, & Co., Paternoster Row. 1902.)

ALL Trinity College men owe Dr. Larmor a great debt for his labour of love in this collection of Fitz Gerald's scientific papers, as well as for the admirable and thoughtful preface, in which he endeavours—and no one is better qualified to do so—to point out, so far as can be done at present, the character and value of Fitz Gerald's lifework in science. Our late professor's forceful and eager, yet withal most lovable, personality, was indeed familiar

to us, but this volume will perhaps give us a clearer idea than we had before of the commanding position he had come to hold in the scientific world.

It would not be in place here to enter into any detailed discussion of the contents of these papers, yet there are some salient features which will naturally strike even those who cannot claim special knowledge of the subjects discussed. The first two papers, dealing, as they do, rather with new treatment of old than properly original matter, would give but little idea of what was to follow. With the third, however, dealing with what is known as Kerr's effect, there begins a series of truly original work, showing ever more and more insight and mastery. Fitz Gerald now threw himself with ardour into what we may call the scientific front—the field of new results and discoveries rather than that of coordination and clear exposition of what is already known. For such a position he was, indeed, well fitted. Gifted with strong physical instincts, in perfect touch with experimental methods, and keenly alive to the significance and bearing of their results, he was also thoroughly trained in the mathematical analysis, which may be said to be the other arm on which science leans. Maxwell has pointed out that great advances in physics have ever been connected with the power not merely to indicate the qualitative character of an effect, but to estimate its quantitative value. Now this is a marked characteristic of Fitz Gerald's work. He always sees clearly the nature of the physical problem that lies before him, and the requisites for submitting it to complete mathematical treatment; and if he does not always supply such treatment, it is rather from his perception that the analysis he gives is sufficient for the physical purpose he has in view. In this respect, indeed, Fitz Gerald differs from the school of physicists, of whom, perhaps, Lagrange is the most illustrious example, with whom the guiding inspiration is not so much physical as mathematical—physics being rather regarded as a means of extending the range and illustrating the methods of mathematical analysis. For Fitz Gerald, on the other hand, mathematics was ever a handmaid—a most useful, nay, an indispensable one no doubt—yet a handmaid still.

No less marked, indeed, than his power of using the instrument of mathematical analysis is the converse one of seizing, apart from mathematical technique, and firmly holding what Herschel has so happily termed "the central thread of common sense, on which the pearls of analytical research are invariably strung." In this connexion we may note the predilection which Fitz Gerald, in common with his English and Scottish confrères, exhibits for the use of concrete models to illustrate physical hypotheses. In page 168 of these papers will be found a carefully reasoned defence of this method of procedure, which appears to

be not so much in vogue with Continental physicists. Poincaré, in fact, finds this tendency of the English school of physics rather ludicrous, and Helmholtz, though recognising its legitimacy, confesses that he himself could work best by directly following the principles assumed without the aid of material analogies. In common with physicists in general, FitzGerald shared in the great forward impulse determined by Maxwell's epoch-making work on Electricity and Magnetism, and his far-reaching theory of the identity of Light with electromagnetic waves, confirmed as this subsequently was by the brilliant experiments of Hertz. The interest, indeed, excited by this discovery can only be paralleled by that which was aroused by the first promulgation of Fresnel's theory of the Wave Surface in crystals, to which we directly owe the principal scientific work of our own M'Cullagh, and hence the work of Jellett and Haughton in the same field.

A long converging series of discoveries, of which we may perhaps take Joule's great demonstration of the equivalence of Heat and Work as the central point, have now, it may be said, brought into definite outline that ideal of the *magna mater scientiarum* anticipated by Bacon. We have been led to conceive of all material phenomena as ultimately dependent on motion and the laws of changes of motion, whilst at the same time we are obliged to admit the existence of a medium, to which we have agreed to give the name of Ether, in which these motions take place, and by which they are essentially conditioned. There may seem here a return to the ancient Greek philosophy of the atoms and the void. There is, however, this vast difference between the early speculation of the Atomists and the modern theory of the Ether, that while they, as was natural in the infancy of science, supposed the problem of the universe solved by their assumption, the corresponding modern theory, which would resolve all physical phenomena into motions in the ether, finds in this very hypothesis the starting-point of new complications. To resolve everything into modes of motion in an all-pervading ether is, indeed, easily said, but to imagine an organisation of this medium which shall at once explain the phenomena of ordinary matter, those of Chemistry, Electricity, Light, and Magnetism, is a task which may well tax the highest powers of the intellect. Here, too, FitzGerald came well to the front. The subject of the Ether, as his papers show, was one constantly before his thoughts, and if it cannot be said that he solved the problem, he was undoubtedly one of the foremost in the little band of scientific inquirers who have ventured to grapple with it, and whose names will be held in honour when this mystery stands revealed to a later age.

Passing from the technical scientific matter in this volume, readers will welcome the exceedingly interesting monographs in

which Fitz Gerald reviews the work of the great leaders of scientific research here and abroad—Lord Kelvin, Helmholtz, Hertz. We feel here the peculiar charm only found when the work of a master is reviewed by a master—complete understanding and sympathy, untainted by any trace of jealousy, combined with a genial estimate of the personalities and pregnant suggestions on the subject-matter.

These papers throw light also on other aspects of Fitz Gerald's mind than the purely scientific. He interested himself deeply in the problem of Education, and that not only on its scientific, but also on its literary side. At the same time, what he felt most strongly seems to have been the imperative necessity of imparting some share of scientific training to the mass of his countrymen. Loving science himself with a genuine love, for its own sake, not for any apples of Atalanta, he was yet too keenly alive to its practical benefits, and too true a patriot, not to view with deep anxiety the prospect of Ireland hopelessly beaten in the competition of life from lack of any true conception of scientific method and accuracy. These views are expounded with the characteristic vigour and vehemence of their author in his lecture to the Irish Industrial League.

Other passages there are which remind us that in the earlier part of his course Fitz Gerald had been an earnest student of Philosophy. We certainly do not require that a great scientist shall also have formed for himself a connected system of philosophy; yet I think it may be said that we are disappointed when we find philosophic speculation wholly alien and distasteful to him. Certainly it was not so with Fitz Gerald, though the passages where his views on this subject are expressed are, from the nature of the case, rare. In his paper on Ostwald's Energetics there occurs a much-needed protest against that conception of Science, which has recently invaded us from Germany, as only a cataloguing of phenomena on the best principles. But more than this, he had that true mark of a philosopher—the longing to ascend from the laws of phenomena to their ultimate source. The ultimate point reached by Science may, no doubt, be Motion, but behind Motion lies Thought, of which it may, indeed, be but the objective aspect, “not, that contradiction in terms, unconscious thought, but living thought, so that all nature is the language of One in whom we live and move and have our being.” Again, in the Helmholtz memorial lecture, the position of the consistent Positivist is spoken of as “consistent but inhuman. In human life we require sympathy and affection; in the highest life we require the highest ideal of the universe to work in.”

A mixed impression arises from the perusal of this volume—one of sadness, inasmuch as there is forcibly brought before us the loss we have sustained in Ireland, and, above all, in our

University—yet withal one of hope ; for these papers are admirably adapted, as perhaps no formal treatise would have been, alike from their trenchant vigour, their frank presentation of the first thoughts of the author, and the spirit of well-grounded confidence in ascertained scientific principles which animates them, to stimulate those amongst us who share any portion of Fitz Gerald's ardour, to follow in his steps and endeavour to carry on his work.

HERMATHENA:


A SERIES OF PAPERS ON

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BY

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HERMATHENA.

NOTES ON CICERO AD ATTICUM XVI.

Ep. 1. § 1 : itane ? NONIS IULIIS ? di hercule istis ! stomachari totum diem licet. Quicquamne turpius quam Bruto IULIIS ? redeo ad meum igitur ἔτ' ἐῷμεν ; nihil uidi.

THIS passage is in disorder. Cicero had not been constantly asking how long Antonius was to be endured. In letters written at or near this time the possibility of resistance is never contemplated. The Greek phrase ἔτ' ἐῷμεν is in itself strange, though it might conceivably come from some drama. I strongly suspect that ἴωμεν stood in the original. Thus *redeo* becomes appropriate ; for the question of leaving Italy had often been touched upon in the preceding letters, as in 15, 20, all through (compare especially *ex hac nassa exire constitui*) ; also 15, 23, and 25. The word ἰτέον occurs with exactly the same kind of reference in 14, 22, 2, and the Dublin editors have excellently introduced it by emendation into a corrupt passage in 10, 6, 1. Further compare 14, 12, 2 *exire auco* and 14, 10, 1 γῆν πρὸ γῆς *cogito*. [The equivalent of ἰτέον in a mutilated passage in 7, 22, 2 is *cedendum* ; with which cf. 9, 1, 3 ; 15, 6, 2.] If, however, ἴωμεν be read, ἔτ' is not tolerable ; and I would change it to ἴτε, supposing ἴτ' ἴωμεν

to be a quotation from comedy. Homer is similarly used in 9, 8, 2 Μέτρον, πῶς τ' ἄρ' ἴω. Further *nihil uidi* is unintelligible at the point where it is introduced by the MSS. It is obviously out of place, and should come after *Bruto Iuliis* (as Boot saw). The ancient writers frequently supply the answer to their own rhetorical questions, though to a modern reader such questions seem to lose part of their force thereby. Objection has been taken to *igitur*, which occurs as the fourth word from the beginning of the sentence, but without reason; many parallels exist. And in this loose style other adverbs tend to get displaced; cf. e.g. 9, 9, 2 *uenio ad alteram nunc epistulam*.

Ibid. § 2: quid autem Plancus tam cursim . . . diem et noctem?

In the corrupt passage, 10, 10, 3 *carti* (sic) *hinc* . . . *euolabo*, we should probably substitute *cursim* for *carti*; the *u* was mistaken for the open form of the letter *a*, the presence of which in the MSS. of these epistles has led to many changes.

Ibid. § 4: de Sexto pro certo habebatur ad arma.

The context proves that *ad arma* gives exactly the wrong meaning. Tyrrell and Purser acutely read *ad larem*, guided by ep. 4, § 2 *ad ipsum autem Scribonem scripsit* (sc. Sextus) *nihil esse nisi ad suum larem liceret*; we might also compare Phil. 2, 75 *Cn. Pompei liberi repetebant . . . larem suum familiarem*. But while *ad larem* is suitable in ep. 4 § 2, it is hardly in place here. Even in 4 § 2 the right to return is said to be denied to Sextus, and to depend on a general disarmament, or a composition. Either *ab armis* should be read, comparing 15, 22 *ab armisque nullus discederet* (of Sextus); or we may suppose that *ab*, which preceded *ad*, is a remnant of *abiecturum*, a word which would be likely to be mutilated, owing to its community of letters with *habebatur*; more likely than *abicere*

or *abiecisse*, which have been proposed. That some part of *abicere* stood in the original appears highly probable on a comparison with 10, 8, 4 *nisi forte arma Pompeium abiecurum putas*; 15, 29, 1 *Sextum scutum abicere nolebam*; 14, 13, 2 *si Sextus in armis permanebit*.

Ibid.: quid ergo? Kal. Ian. in Pansa spes?

The need for inserting *ad* before *Kal.* is not clear. The ellipse is of *erit*, and the substitution of hope for its fulfilment is not without parallel.

Ibid.: λῆρος πολὺς in uino et somno istorum.

So 14, 21, 4, λῆρος πολὺς: *nemo est istorum qui otium non timeat*. By the aid of these two passages we may restore another which refers to the same persons, viz. 9, 18, 2 *reliqua, o di! qui comitatus, quae, ut tu soles dicere, νέκυνια, in qua erat ero sceleri*. (So Med. pr. m.) *o rem perditam, o copias desperatas!* For *ero sceleri* write λῆρος πολὺς.

Ibid. § 5: Ciceronis rationes explicentur; Ouius enim recens. is multa quae uellem, in eis ne hoc quidem malum in mandatis si habunde HS. LXXII satis esse, affatim prorsus sed Xenonem perexiguae et γλίσχωρως praebere id est minutatim.

So Med. The text is obviously marred by glosses. The last three words have been almost universally condemned as a comment on γλίσχωρως. The words *habunde* and *satis* should be similarly treated; they are explanations of *affatim*. It is most improbable that Cicero wrote *satis esse, affatim prorsus*. Nor are the words *perexiguae et* above suspicion. *Si* has been developed from the *s* of *mandatis*. The expression *in mandatis* has the appearance of genuineness, but it must have originally stood between *uellem* and *in eis*. The efforts of scholars to save *abunde* have had no success. In the new "Thesaurus" our passage is quoted as affording an example of *abunde*

"coniunctum cum esse"; which is enigmatic without discussion of the MSS. readings. O. E. Schmidt, in "Rheinisches Museum" for 1898, supposes *si abunde* to be an elliptic expression for *si abunde uelimus dare*; but his reference to 15, 15, 4 does not help out the interpretation. Manutius read *sat abunde*, which is often quoted as though it rested on something else than conjecture (so by Stöcklein in "Archiv für Lateinische Lexikographie," v., p. 415). In no other passage of Cicero's own letters is *abunde* given by our MSS.; for Fam. 10, 23, 6 (quoted in dictionaries, and even in the new "Thesaurus" as Cicero's) is by Plancus. Elsewhere, Cicero has it only in Cato m. 48 *abunde potitur*, where it may conceivably be an archaism, placed in the mouth of old Cato; and De Divin. 2, 3 *abunde erit satis factum*. It is questionable whether Cicero wrote *sat* for *satis* except (1) in the phrase *sat bonus*, which was so fixed that *satis boni* in 2, 19, 4, and 7, 7, 5 should be regarded as doubtful; (2) in the expression *sat est*. Outside these limits we have only *sat multa* in editions of 6, 8, 1, where Med. has *at*, and *sat* may not be the right correction, and Fam. 7, 16, 1 *rabiosulas sat fatuas*, where Tyrrell and Purser are right in assuming a quotation from comedy; and Att. 13, 22, 3 *sat faciendum*, which should be corrected.

Ep. 2, § 1: *Erotem remisi citius quam constitueram, ut esset qui Hortensio et quia e quibus quidem ait se Idibus constituisse. Hortensius uero impudenter.*

In ep. 6, § 3 we have a reference to the same business, in close correspondence with this. It is difficult to understand how, on a comparison of the two passages, any doubt can be entertained that the old correction, *coheredibus* for *quia e* is a true one. Parallel to the words in § 2 *reliqua satis apta sunt ad solucndum*, we have in ep. 6, § 3, *bella reliqua reliqui*, whence it may be suspected that Cicero wrote *ampla*, not *apta*. The two words have of

course been frequently confused in MSS., and *salis apta* is not a natural phrase here. The comparison with 13, 46 raises a very strong presumption that the many editors who have substituted *Hordeonius* for *Hortensius* in this passage were right.

Ibid. § 4: idcirco trahebam ut quam diutissime integrum esset.

The expression *integrum est* (where the subject of *est* is not expressed) is of course common; and occasionally we find *integra sunt*, like *laetiora sunt* in § 2 of this letter, and *exploratoria uidebuntur* in ep. 4, § 4. Such phrases as *res*, *causa integra est*, or *in integro est*, *omnia sunt integra*, are familiar. But in Att. 7, 26, 2 the MSS. give us something which is, I believe, unique in Cicero's writings, *quod me amicissime admones ut me integrum quoad possim seruem, gratum est*. For the formula *se integrum seruare*, meaning "to keep oneself uncommitted," I can find no parallel of earlier date than Tac. hist. 4, 52 *Titum multo apud patrem sermone orasse ferunt, ne criminantium nuntiis temere accenderetur integrumque se et placabilem filio praestaret*. It seems clear that in Att. 7, 26, 2 *me* before *integrum* is derived from *mi* or *mihi*, which has been assimilated to the preceding *me*. Compare Fam. 1, 9, 10 *ut integrum mihi de causa Campana reseruarem*; ib. 8, 6, 5 *de Dolabella integrum tibi reserues suadeo*.

Ibid. v. Id. in Pompeianum cogitabam, inde Aeculanum: nosti reliqua.

This passage, like 6, 1, 16 *scis reliqua*, casts doubt on the interpretation given by the Dublin editors of 10, 6, 2 *de Quinto filio fit a me quidem sedulo; sed nosti reliqua*. They take *nostis reliqua* to be an indication that the words *fit a me sedulo* are a quotation. Of course *nostis reliqua* is often employed when the writer thinks it unnecessary to continue a quotation; but there is nothing in *fit a me*

quidem sedulo to suggest Terence or anything in verse ; and *reliqua* for " the rest of the story " frequently occurs in the letters. In 9, 18, 2 it stands almost adverbially, outside the syntax of the sentence : " as for the rest of the tale," but that is not the case in Qu. fr. 1, 3, 10, the syntax of which is misunderstood by Wölfflin, " Archiv " 2, p. 95.

Ibid. § 5. de Tutia ita putaram. de enictio non credo nec tamen curo plus quam tu.

The words *de Tutia ita* have often been largely emended, but the coincidence with 15, 29, 2 *ait hic sibi Iuliam ferre* cannot well be accidental ; *hic* there is young Quintus, and *Tutia, Iulia* must be derived from the name of a lady who was proposing (he said) to marry him. As to *enictio* (so Med., but *euictio*, ed. Rom.) some name such as *Aebutio* or *Ventidio* (O. E. Schmidt) has usually been substituted for it ; but no name yet proposed seems to be plausible. The corresponding passage suggests *de discidio*. A very simple correction would be *de condicione*, which with the common change of *c* to *e* and ordinary contractions would easily pass to *enictio*. Either correction would bring the words that follow *putaram* into harmony with those that precede.

Ibid. § 6 : ' de Gloria ' misi tibi. custodies igitur ut soles, sed notentur eglogarii (so Med.) quos Saluius bonos auditores nactus in conuiuio dumtaxat legat.

The two improbabilities (1) that Cicero should have formed from *ἐκλογή* the adjective *eclogarius*, which does not occur again in extant literature earlier than Ausonius ; (2) that he should have omitted *loci*, for which omission we have no sufficient parallel, are enough to convict the reading of falsity. For it *ἐκλογαί*, *quas* may with reason be substituted. The corruption began with the attraction of *quas* into the gender of *bonos*. I take *notentur ἐκλογαί*

here to be answered by *ἀνθ' ἑαυτῆς ipsa posuisti* in ep. 11, § 1. That these words refer to the 'De Gloria' and not to the Second Philippic, is, I think, certain. While the 'De Gloria' was complete, the draft of that speech (to which there is undoubted allusion in what follows in ep. 11) was still incomplete; cf. the futures *perstringam* (11, § 1) and *deruam* (11, § 2). The idea that *eclogarii homines* were to be 'pricked' (*notentur*) or 'summoned' (*uocentur*), is open to as serious objections as the view discussed above.

Ep. 3, § 1: idem *σύνταγμα* misi ad te retractius et quidem *ἀρχέτυπον* ipsum crebris locis inculcatum et reffectum. hunc tu tralatum in macrocollum lege arcano conuiuis tuis. . . .

In the one other passage where Cicero uses *ἀρχέτυπον*, viz. 12, 5, 4, it means "account-book," and the word is neuter. We must here either suppose it to be masculine, or assume an ellipse of *librum*. But it is more likely that *hunc* is an error for *hoc*. Whether *arcano* can be genuine seems open to much question. In ordinary Latin literature, after the time of Plautus, this adverb stands only here and in Caes. B. C. 1, 19. And in prose writings before Livy the adjective *arcanus* is found only in Fin. 2, 28 *quicum ioca seria, ut dicitur, quicum arcana, quicum occulta omnia*. Apparently two alternative readings *quicum arcana* and *quicum occulta* have been there incorporated in the text. And it is difficult, on a careful study of the context in Caes. B. C. 1, 19, to avoid the suspicion that *arcano* there is a late insertion. As to the present passage, Att. 16, 3, 1, in what sense is a book read out *secretly* which is imparted to a table full of guests? It is absurd to suppose that they were to be pledged to secrecy. When Atticus had the speech *Pro Ligario* recited in a similar way, Cicero wrote to him: *Ligarianam praeclare uendidisti* (13, 12, 2). The very object of the dinner-party would be that the guests might spread the fame of the

work. It has been suggested that *arcano* may mean "en petit comité;" but the word is particularly ill-suited to indicate merely a careful selection of the guests. Several of the older editors proposed to read *in Arcano*; but there is no reason to suppose that Atticus was at this time residing at the country house of Quintus Cicero, which bore this name. Rather *arcano* is to be supposed an interpolation here as in the passage of Caesar. The excuse for it may perhaps be found in the injunction which Cicero often lays upon Atticus, not to circulate copies of the works entrusted to him for publication, until he receives a special instruction. So ep. 2, § 6, *custodies igitur ut soles*; 15, 27, 2 Ἡρακλείδειον *quod lateat in thesauris tuis*; 13, 21, §§ 4, 5; *ib.* 22, § 3.

It is true that Charisius professed to have found the adverb *arcano* in a passage of Cicero which he does not quote. It has often been supposed that he referred to Att. 16, 3, 4. But Charisius may easily have fallen into error, through misunderstanding of one of the places where there is mention of the country-house belonging to Quintus Cicero, named *Arcanum*. That this name meant 'The Snuggery,' or had anything to do with *arcanus*, is improbable. A connexion with *arx* is suggested in Pauly-Wissowa s. v. Analogy would rather favour a derivation from some local place-name, such as Arca. This name *Arcanum* has ere now given rise to a fancy that *Laterium*, the title of another house owned by Quintus, is akin to *latère*. An affinity with *later* is more likely; cf. *Laterius*, *Laterensis*, *Lateranus*.

Ibid. § 5: quae (sc. reliqua) quamquam explicata sunt, tamen, quod et Dolabellae nomen in eis est et attributione mihi nomina ignota, conturbor.

The ablative *attributione* can scarcely be defended. If a preposition has dropped out, it must be *ex* (Boot) rather

than *in* (Tyrrell and Purser). But *attributa* is more probably right; this is a simpler correction than most of those that have been proposed. The participle is sometimes applied even to persons whose obligation to pay is transferred from one creditor to another; as in 13, 22, 4; C. I. L. 1, 206¹; and Liv. 1, 43, 9 *uiduae attributae* is somewhat similar.

Ibid. § 6: *ecquid amas Deiotarum et non amas Hieram? qui, ut Blesamius uenit ad me, cum ei praescriptum esset ne quid sine Sexti nostri sententia ageret, neque ad illum neque ad quemquam nostrum rettulit.*

Blesamius and Hieras are two agents of Deiotarus, who figure in the speech addressed to Caesar by Cicero. The clause *ut . . . me* is unsatisfactory, the temporal *ut* not being suitable. I suggest that Cicero wrote *qui non, ut Blesamius, uenit ad me* 'who, unlike B., did not pay me a visit'; *cum* begins a new sentence.

Ep. 4. § 2: *scripsit nihil esse nisi ad larem suum liceret.*

The context gives the first definite intelligence about the movements of Sextus Pompeius contained in Cicero's correspondence since May of the year 45 (Att. 12, 44, 3), though two months earlier Cicero deemed it reasonable to expect that Pompeius would come to Italy with a strong army. The seven legions of which Pompeius now boasted the possession must have been somewhat unsubstantial, like the thirteen which his brother had commanded against Caesar (Bell. Hisp. cc. 7, 30). But it is remarkable that in little more than a year after the battle of Munda, Sextus should have been able to appear before Nova Karthago with a legion. That the city was not captured is clear from the stress laid on the storming of a small town (Barea); and the expedition was in the nature of a guerilla raid. It may be doubted whether *nihil esse* can be correct,

in the sense of *nihil tanti esse*; perhaps Cicero wrote *se*, 'that he would accept no terms.' It is clear from the context that terms had been offered to him which did not include a return *ad larem*. I may note that to suppose the words *siue quo alio nomine sunt*, which follow *consules* in § 1, to be a quotation from the letter of Sextus (CFWM) is surely a mistake; Cicero often uses expressions of the kind, as in 14, 5, 2; *ib.* 9, 2; *Fam.* 10, 6, 3 *consulares dicti*.

Ep. 4, § 4: iter illud Brundisium.

C. F. W. Müller accepts without cause the old change to *Brundisinum*, although in *Phil.* 5, 22 *quod autem eius iter Brundisium*? he has made no change, nor in *Phil.* 2, 48 *iter Alexandream*, nor in other passages which accord with this.

Ep. 5, § 1: tuas iam litteras Brutus expectabat cui quidem non nouum attuleram de Tereo Acci; ille Brutum putabat.

It is strange that Müller should regard the text as sound. Rather than strike out *non* (as many editors have done), I would suppose it a corruption of *nomen*, as it sometimes is elsewhere in MSS. Just below, some editors have discovered ambiguity in the words *quod minime me fefellit*, 'exactly what I expected'; but there is none, and the phrasing is usual enough. Cf. *e.g.* *Sull.* 41 *id me multum fefellit*, 'it was very far from what I expected.'

Ibid. § 2: Quintus fuit mecum dies complures et, si ego cuperem, ille uel plures fuisset; sed quantum fuit, incredibile est quam me in omni genere delectarit.

There is no real parallel for *quantum* = *q. temporis*, nor would *dierum*, if it could be supplied from the context, afford soundness to the reading. A contracted form of *temporis* would readily vanish after *quantum*; but I should

prefer to suppose that *quantum* has sprung from *quot*. The most commonly accepted correction is *quam diu*.

Ibid. § 3 : iocari me putas ? moriar si quisquam me tenet praeter te. etenim circumspice, sed ante erubesco. o dies in auspiciis Lepidi descriptos et apte ad consilium reditus nostri.

The words quoted have no connexion with the preceding sentence. In *iocari me putas* we have a reference to a statement which has perished, and at this point there should be marked the beginning of a fragment of a new letter. It is observable that Med. inserts just before this a second copy of Att. 12, 3. In some ancestral codex a reader noted in the margin a reference to that letter, because the language held there about Atticus is very similar. The note was by some successor misunderstood as a direction to insert the whole letter. The process of insertion caused the loss of other matter, perhaps of a whole page. For *ante* many editors read *antequam*; the sense afforded, "but do so before I blush," is absurd. It was for Atticus, who was eulogised, not for his eulogist, to blush. I believe the true reading to be *circumspice te sed ante erubescere* : "you may admire yourself, but had better muster up a blush to begin with." For this use of *circumspicere* cf. Qu. Rosc. 5 *usque eone te diligis et magnifice circumspicis*? And for the abrupt *sed ante* parallels will be found in a note of mine on Acad. 2, § 116; some of these raise a suspicion that *illud* may have fallen out between *sed* and *ante*. It would be possible to take *circumspice* in a Plautine sense, "look round to see that no one is looking on"; but then something like *antequam erubescis* should follow, and *sed* becomes meaningless. This solution is on the whole less satisfactory. It is usual to insert *lepide* after *Lepidi* (with Malaspina); but this makes *descriptos* harder to understand. What is *describere dies lepide* combined with *in auspiciis Lepidi*?

The sense required is "planned out," "arranged," which would be given by *discriptos*, but hardly by *descriptos*.

§ 5: *instar* LXX.

Even here *instar* does not mean "about," as some commentators allege. That sense is later than Cicero; the word here has the signification of "fully," as in 10, 4, 1 *uoluminis instar*, "as big as a volume," and elsewhere.

Ep. 6, § 1: viii. Kal. igitur ad Siccam. ibi tamquam domi meae scilicet; itaque obduxi posterum diem.

The Dublin editors bracket (tacitly) *meae scilicet* without need; and propose *ibi duxi* for *obduxi*. It is true that no exact parallel to *obduxi diem* can be produced, but there are analogies. The idea here is that the original plan is crossed and the extra day thrust in athwart it, so to speak. In Att. 1, 1, 2, writing of the consular elections for 64 B.C., Cicero declares L. Caesar to be certain of success, but says that the other candidates are so weak *ut mihi uideatur non esse aduvarum Curium obducere*, "to thrust Curius across their track," "to lug in Curius." There is a similar use of *obductarier* in Plaut. Merc. 786 (Leo). A remarkable passage (in which the verb is differently applied, but the force of *ob* is somewhat similar) is Tusc. 1, 96, where the death of Theramenes is described: *cum coniectus in carcerem XXX iussu tyrannorum uenenum ut sitiens obduxisset*. He drank off the cup defiantly, "in their faces." Here *obduxi diem* is far easier than *obduretur hoc triduum* in 12, 3, 1, which has not been suspected.

Ibid. § 4: habeo uolumen prohoemiorum.

It is difficult to understand how a proem could be suitable both for the "De Gloria" and for the third book of the second edition of the "Academica." But a reference

to the extant second book of the first edition of the "Academica," the substance of which must have been adopted into the later edition, discloses some matter (in §§ 6, 7) to which there may possibly be allusion here.

Ep. 7, § 1 : eo uenerunt Roma sane recentes.

In this passage the words *Roma sane recentes* have often been treated by editors and grammarians and lexicographers as though they form a clause by themselves, apart from the verb. But without *uenerunt* the ablative would not stand in the Latin of Cicero; cf. Phil. 1, 8 *municipes Regini complures ad me uenerunt, ex eis quidem Roma recentes*. In Verr. act. pr. § 5 we find *cum esset e prouincia recens*, which could not be quoted in support of an isolated phrase *e prouincia recens*, "fresh from the province." In other (mostly later) writers (Varro, Livy, Seneca, Martial, etc.) *recens* is connected directly with *ab*; but of course in l.eg. 1, 39 *hanc (Academiam) ab Arcesila et Carneade recentem*, *ab* does not depend on *recentem*.

Ibid. haec adferebant, edictum Bruti et Cassi, et fore frequentem senatum Kalendis, a Bruto et Cassio litteras missas ad consularis et praetorios, ut adessent rogare.

Surely *rogare* is an interpolation by a glossator who did not know how constantly *litterae* is succeeded by an explanatory clause with *ut* or infinitive.

Ibid. § 3 : tu id non modo non iubebas, uerum etiam approbas.

For *iubebas* (Med. pr. m.) editors have generally substituted either *inhibebas* (with Lambinus) or *prohibebas* (Med 2). Possibly *iactabas* is the right reading; it would form a better contrast to *approbas*. For *iactare* "to flout" cf. Att. 11, 16, 3.

Ibid. § 4: nam si a Phaetro nostro esse (so Med.) expedita excusatio esset.

This sentence is quoted from a letter of Atticus, who had upbraided Cicero for vacillation about leaving Italy. The reading of the Ed. Rom. *esset*, has been commonly accepted. Lambinus supposed *exprobratum* to have dropped out; the Dublin editors think this gives the right sense, but imagine that the word was in the letter of Atticus, and therefore was not needed here. "If your conduct had been condemned by Phaetrus (the Epicurean philosopher), you would have found it easy to defend yourself"; *i.e.* an Epicurean knew no basis for morality but that of expediency. I cannot think this to have been the meaning of Atticus; he would want to know how Cicero could make a defence without deserting his own moral principles; and further the editors in effect make Atticus say: "You would find it easy to beat off an attack from Phaetrus: how will you beat off one from me?" Yet Atticus was an Epicurean. With the reading *esset* a far better interpretation of the passage is possible: "If this conduct proceeded from a Phaetrus, it would be easy for him to make an apology for it." Cf. N.D. 1, 107, a *Democrito omnino haec licentia*. But *esses* (often suggested) gives even a better meaning: "if you belonged to the school of Phaetrus."

Ibid.: ergo id erat meum factum, quod Catoni probare non possim.

Why editors think it needful to write *possem* I do not know. Cicero means "was my action of such a nature that I cannot (now) secure Cato's approval of it?" Plenty of parallels can be found for the present tense, used in such circumstances, dead though Cato was.

Ibid. § 5: unam (uituperationem) quam itinere faciendo me intellegebam suscipere desperationis ac † religionis rei publicae.

The correction of Beroaldus, *relictionis*, has been generally accepted (so that Müller does not even trouble to record the corrupt reading), but there is much reason to doubt whether it is the true one. The word *relictio* has no authority in classical Latin; for in Verr. 2, 1, 35, where editors generally write *relictionem prodicionemque consulis*, the MSS. agree in presenting *reiectionem*. This is perfectly supportable, since *reicere aliquem*, 'to throw over,' 'to cut adrift from,' 'to repudiate,' is a common enough phrase. And indeed in the other passage *reiectionis* (Victorius) would be far preferable to *relictionis*, and we might compare Balb. 29, *siue postliminio siue reiectione huius ciuitatis*. Yet it seems to me more probable that Cicero wrote *relegationis a re publica*; cf. Phil. 10, 6 *uis illum . . . relegatum a re publica uideri*.

Ibid. § 6: reuersionis has speciosas causas habes iustas illas quidem et magnas.

The word *speciosas* has commonly been treated as an interpolation. It is only twice employed elsewhere by Cicero, viz. in Sest. 134, and Brut. 250; in both places meaning 'beautiful' or 'brilliant.' But, looking to the uses of *species*, it may well bear the sense here of 'plausible,' 'good for show.' It is a strange word to have occurred at this point to a *glossator*; nor is it likely, as Lehmann supposed, to be a corruption of *praecipuas*. I should prefer to keep it, and assume *immo* to have been lost before *iustas*, which could hardly be an explanation of *speciosas*, but may well stand in contrast.

Ibid.: in freto medio hanc epistulam legi, ut, quid possem prouidere, in mentem mihi non ueniret, nisi quod praesens me ipse defenderem.

The reading *quod* of Med. is replaced in other MSS. by *ut*. The fault really lies in *defenderem*. If we suppose

this a corruption of *defendere uellem* (an exceedingly common type of error), the text is correct and idiomatic. The combination *nisi quod* frequently connects indicatives, as in 2, 1, 11; 11, 6, 6; Fin. 4, 80; Tusc. 3, 48; Tim. 42. Here the indicatives pass into subjunctives under the controlling force of *ut*.

Ibid. § 7: edictum Antoni legi † ab utro (Med.) et horum contra scriptum praeclare.

The emendation *a Bruto* has been generally adopted. "I owe to Brutus a reading of Antonius' edict." Lambinus added *et Cassio*, and Mueller remarks "ego non dubito quin plura desint." Possibly we should write *et ab utroque horum*.

Ibid. § 8: ita plane uelim. Ei dicas plurimam salutem et suauiissimae Atticae.

Müller is quite justified in removing the stop at *uelim*, and reading *et ei* (with Baiter), while he says of the ordinary lection, 'soloece.' A supposed parallel in 10, 15, 4, viz. *Vettiemo uelim gratias, quod studiosus sit; si quemquam nanctus eris qui perferat, litteras des*, is vitiated by the presence of *uelim*, on which *des* as well as *sit* depends; perhaps *et* has fallen out after *sit*. Cf. also 16, 11 fin. *des uolo*: 2, 10, *ames uolo*. In 12, 29, 2, *cum his communices quanto opere et quare uelim hortos* (not altered by Müller), the word *uelim* appears to be out of place. It may originally have stood before *cum his*, and have been shifted to fill out an ellipse.

Ibid. : cum Pompeianum accederem.

The passages sometimes quoted in support of the MSS. reading, such as 1, 14, 5, *rostra Cato aduolat*, and Fam. 2, 17, 1, *me Rhodum accessurum puto*, are not in point. Names of villas like *Pompeianum*, coincident in form with district-names, always have a preposition attached to them

after verbs of motion in Cicero's writings. The lost preposition here is most unlikely to be *prope* (Müller); and *in* is a good deal more probable than *ad*.

Ep. 8, § 1: *ueteranos quique Casilini et Calatiae*.

So Med.; usually editors have read *qui* and inserted *sunt*; the latter is not needed, as the substantive verb is sometimes in these letters omitted in relative clauses. I would suggest that the right reading is *qui qui <escunt>*; comparing Phil. 5, 44 *Caesar . . . ueteranos cupientis iam requiescere armauit*; and 11, 37 *qui autem* (sc. *ueterani*) *quiescunt*.

Ibid. § 2. *Antonium cum legione Alaudarum ad urbem pergere . . . legionem suis signis ducere*.

It may be questioned whether the commonly accepted emendation *sub signis*, is sound. The phrase *sub signis* occurs first in Livy (though Caesar twice has *sub uexillo* of the *euocati*) and merely means "in due array" as opposed to a loose irregular march; cf. e.g. Liv. 3, 51, 10. Considering what Cicero says elsewhere of Antonius and his *ueterani*, one would have expected a stronger expression; cf. Phil. 2, 108 *agmine quadrato cum gladiis secuntur, scutorum lecticas portari uidemus*; 5, 23 *atque ille furens infesta iam patriae signa a Brundisio inferebat*. The latter passage suggests *infestis signis* here; the *in* would readily disappear after *m* of *legionem*, and if *f*, as often, was mistaken for *s*, the corruption would easily be completed.

Ibid.: *congiarium*.

To Boot's one example of this word in republican Latin (10, 7, 3) should be added Phil. 2, 116; Fam. 8, 1, 4; and a fragm. of Varro.

Ibid. *nunc tuum consilium exquiro*. *Romamne uenio an hic maneo an Arpinum . . . fugiam?* *Romam, ne desideremur, si quid actum uidebitur*. *eo hoc igitur explica*.

So the passage is usually arranged. But surely in the original the sentence *Romam . . . uidebitur* must have

involved a question, not a decision, and probably began with *Romamne*. Further, *actum* is strange: "if you shall think anything has been achieved" is an idea not suitable to the deliberation. Rather *actum* is a corruption of *agendum*. Compare the next letter: *metuo ne quae ἀριστεία me absente*.

Ep. 10, § 1: *Caesarina celeritate*.

The adjective *Caesarina* has been questioned. There are, however, so many irregularities connected with the formation of adjectives from proper names that it is doubtful whether it should be changed. Compare, for example, *Halaesinus* from *Halaesa* and *Petrinum* from *Petra* (both in *Verr.*). A loose analogy with *Censorinus Alexandrinus* and many other words might suggest *Caesarinus*.

Ep. 11, § 1: *de Sicca ita est ut scribis, asta ea aegre me tenui*.

The reading of Med. 1 *asta ea* (*hasta ea* Med. 2) is retained by Müller with a reference to Gurlitt; and this is perhaps better than any of the numerous emendations that have been suggested. (The word *asta* I take as alluding to the sale of confiscated property; and cannot see, either in this word or the context, the obscenity which Gurlitt detects; and I even doubt the correctness of his clever emendation, φαλλῶ for *vallo*: see 'Philologus,' 1898.) But Cicero would never have written *me tenui asta* or *hasta* without *ab*.

Ibid. § 2: *quod uereris ne ἀδόλεσχος mihi tu, quis minus?*

So Cicero in writing to Quintus (2, 8 (10), 1) says *tu metuis ne me interpelles?* Quintus had obviously apologized, like Atticus, for troubling his brother with his letters. The commentators have sometimes missed the drift of the passage.

Ibid. § 4: *haec* ad posteriorem.

These words have been thought corrupt or incomplete, for no other reason, apparently, than that *haec* refers on to what follows. There are plenty of instances of this usage in the correspondence, as elsewhere; cf. above, 3 § 4; 7 § 1; 2, 3, 3; 4, 3, 5; Fam. 1, 1, 1.

Ep. 13a, § 1: cum ante lucem de Sinuessano surrexissem uenissemque diluculo ad pontem Tirenium.

Surely *de Sinuessano* is a marginal note suggested by Ep. 10 fin. and accidentally embodied in the text. If the phrase were not construed with *surrexissem*, it would create no difficulty; cf. Fam. 14, 20; Att. 3, 6. But for a parallel to *de Sinuessano surrexissem* one has to go to Virgil, Aen. 10, 28 *in Teucros surgit ab Arpis Tydides*. I may here notice that the reading *in Sinuessano* at the end of ep. 10 is probably erroneous. An examination of the letters shows that while the great majority of them bear no intimation of date or place of despatch, about seventy have indication of date without indication of place, while the converse is rare, occurring indeed only in Att. 7, 2. Date and place are both mentioned in about fifty cases. In the great majority of instances where the place is mentioned, the letter is said to have been *despatched from*, not *written at* the place. Where a preposition is added, as with the name of a villa, district, camp, or the like, it is commonly *ex*. So *ex castris*, Fam. 12, 11; 11, 9 and 10 and 11 and 26; 10, 24 and 30 and 34a (MSS. *castris*); Att. 11, 3; Brut. 1, 4a and 6 and 13. Also *ex Trebulano* Att. 5, 3; 7, 3; *ex Arpinati*, Att. 15, 26, and 16, 13b; *ex Ponte Argenteo*, Fam. 10, 34a; *ex finibus*, Fam. 10, 23; and *ex Epiro* Att. 7, 1 (referring to a letter received from Atticus). Further, *ab Appi foro*, Att. 2, 10; *a Pontio ex Trebulano* ("the house of P."), Att. 5, 3 and 7, 3; *a Ponte Argenteo*, Fam. 10, 35. In Fam. 12, 13 the codices have *Cypro a Crommyacride*, where editors have often thought it

needful to insert *a* before *Cypro*. Cicero might have written it here, as he writes *ex Cypro decedere* in 6, 2, 9, but he was not bound so to write. [In Fam. 10, 34 *ab confluyente ab Rhodano castra moui* seems to have been questioned without cause. The camp might be at the meeting of the waters, but on the banks of the Rhone, not the Arar, and so have been moved away from both. Müller argues curiously that in order to justify the reading there should be some spot bearing the name *confluens ad Rhodanum*; this argument is not really supported by his quotation from Livy 37, 44, 4 *a Thyatira et Magnesia ab Sifylo*. Livy, like Cicero, several times has *ab* and *ex* with double indication of origin, so 42, 56, 6 and 51, 7.] We come now to the traces of *in*, which are very dubious. In Fam. 12, 12 one MS. (D) gives *in castris*; in Att. 3, 2 the reading *in oris Lucaniae* depends on Bosius. In Att. 7, 2, 3 *in Actio Corcyrae Alexio opipare me muneratus est*, occurring in the body of the letter, does not indicate that Cicero would have used *in Actio* at the end to convey information as to the place of despatch. Compare *Actio* at the end of Fam. 16, 6. In Att. 7, 2, 3 *in Actio* is like *in Caieta* (14, 7, 1), and *Corcyrae* is genitive, not locative. It will now be seen how little support is to be found for the lection *in Sinuessano* in ep. 10. The words were probably tacked on to the end of the letter by a copyist, and were suggested by *in Sinuessanum* in the first line of the letter. It may be noted that *V. Id.*, at the end of § 1, should probably be *VI. Id.* Cicero actually stayed the night of VI. Id. at Aquinum, and he is not likely to have changed his arrangements, or to have left out the night of VI. Id. in his announcement to Atticus here.

The facts just enumerated justify us in supposing that we have ablative of origin and not locatives in the following passages, viz. *Athenis*, Fam. 4, 12; 12, 16; 14, 5; Att. 7, 1; and *Tarichaeis*, Fam. 12, 11 (*ex castris T.*); and *Men-*

turnis, Fam. 14, 14 ; and *Formiis*, Fam. 14, 18 ; and *Leucade*, Fam. 16, 4 (cf. 16, 5 *Leucade proficiscens*) ; and *Cularone*, Fam. 10, 23 (*C. ex finibus*) : and *Vercellis*, Fam. 11, 19, and *finibus (ex castris f.)*, *ib.* 10, 11. The combination *ex castris Regii* given by MSS. in Fam. 11, 9 is not tolerable. The following undoubted ablatives of origin are found : Fam. 14, 2 *Thessalonica* ; Fam. 5, 9, and 10 *Narona* ; *ib.* 7, 19 *Regio* ; *ib.* 7, 20, *Velia* ; *ib.* 10, 31, and 32 *Corduba* ; Att. 4, 18 (16) *Epheso* ; Fam. 11, 10 *Dertona* ; *ib.* 11, 20, and 23 *Eporedia* ; *ib.* 14, 4, and 12 *Brundisio* ; Fam. 16, 2 *Alyzia* ; 16, 6 *Actio* ; *ib.* 16, 7 *Corcyra* ; *ib.* 16, 12 *Capua* ; Q. Fr. 2, 13 *Placentia* ; Brut. 2, 3 *Dyrrachio*. Of locatives the MSS. give us *thuri*, *turri*, *Thurii* in Att. 3, 5 ; *Brundisi*, 3, 7 ; *Dyrrachi*, 3, 22 ; *Pergae*, Fam. 12, 14, and 15 ; while there are seven letters in which *Thessalonicae* occurs, six in Att. III., and one in Q. Fr. 1, 3 (written about the same time). It is not a little curious that the locatives in letters written by Cicero himself all occur in epistles despatched during exile ; while Fam. 12, 14, and 15 are not his. It cannot be said that these locatives are above suspicion. The letters which contain *Thessalonicae* needed no note of origin, and the word may have been attached by copyists. If so, there only remain *Thurii* and *Brundisi* and *Dyrrachi*, for which I should not hesitate to write *Thuriis* and *Brundisio* and *Dyrrachio*.

Ep. 13a (b) § 1 : malo esse in Tusculano aut uspiam in suburbano.

It has sometimes been supposed that *suburbanus* could not apply to a villa situated at so great a distance from Rome as Tusculum, and that therefore *Tusculano* and *suburbano* stand in sharp contrast. But the word is used with freedom, as the examples in the lexica suffice to show. I add a reference to Plin. n. h. 16, 242 *in suburbano Tusculani agri colle*. In this connexion I may note the word

suburbium, which occurs in Phil. 12, 24, and is only quoted again from very late Latin. Very possibly the word is a corruption of *suburbanum*.

Ibid. § 2: *pares acque*.

An unusual phrase, which has been questioned; but cf. Acad. 2, 55 *absolute ita pares*, and Lucret. 5, 880 *non sal par*.

Ep. 13b (c), § 2: tu mihi de eis rebus, quae novantur, omnia certa clara.

The very phrase *certa clara* occurs in the "Ludus de morte Claudii," c. 1, which gives some reason for thinking it a fixed expression. Otherwise one would suppose two alternative readings to have been embodied in the text.

Ep. 14, § 3: sed, ut aliud ex alio, mihi non est dubium quin quod Graeci καθήκον, nos officium; id autem quid dubitas quin etiam in rem publicam praeclare caderet?

With *ut* supply a subjunctive such as *scribam*; the words could hardly mean, "as one thing suggests another" (Dublin ed.). Recent editors incline to accept *quadrel* from C. F. W. Müller (who in his own edition makes the change tacitly). Is the change necessary? Not if Cicero meant (a) "Why do you doubt that the word *would* be suitable (if I were minded to use it)?" or even (b) "Why do you doubt that the word *was* suitable (when I used it)?" Both forms can be readily paralleled. In some passages it is not easy to make out which way the writer intended them to be taken. Thus Att. 3, 20, *1 tibi venire in mentem certo scio quae uita esset nostra* is interpreted by M. Lebreton according to form (a) and by Boot and the Dublin editors (rightly, I think) after form (b). Some illustrations will be found in grammars and in Lebreton's "Études"; I add two. Verr. 2, 4, 86, *omnes id fore putabant ut miser atque innocens uirgis caderetur*;

fefellit hic homines opinio; Att. 9, 2, 1 *mihi uidebare non dubitare quin cederem ita, si et Gnaeus bene comitatus conscendisset, et consules transissent.*

Ep. 15, § 1. nunc uero etiam gaudeo mihi causam oblatam in qua et ipse sentiat et reliqui omnes me ab illo alienatum, idque prae me feram et quidem me (so M¹, *mea* M²) causa facere et rei publicae, ut (*cui* M) illum oderim.

The reference is to Dolabella. Cicero now intends to make his quarrel with him known to all men by suing him for debt. There is also a hint at the still unpublished Second Philippic. Müller is justified in condemning *et quidem*, but his correction *et fidei* is unattractive. Rather the words should be struck out as a duplicate lection developed from *idque*. So below, § 3 *postea* has grown out of the neighbouring *praesentia*. If *mea* be now read the passage runs smoothly: "I shall proclaim that I have both private and public grounds for my hatred of him."

Ibid. § 6. *consenti in hac cura ubi sum ut me expediam.*

Many corrections have been made of this passage; but most of them have left the words *cura ubi sum* untouched, though they can hardly have come from Cicero's hand. Probably *ubicumque* should be read. Cicero had just been questioning whether he should await ruin in the country or go to meet it in Rome. If *ubicumque* be read, the words *hac cura* seem to be sound. The proper correction of *consenti in* is of course a doubtful matter, though the sense required is obvious, and would be given by *confice iam*, from which the change to the MSS. reading would be easy by familiar stages of corruption, the confusion of *s* and *f*, and of *c* and *t*; the passage of *i* to *e*, and the intrusion of *n* after a vowel.

J. S. REID.

ON THE THIRD FOOT OF THE GREEK HEXAMETER.

THE Provost of Oriel, in his invaluable *Homeric Grammar*, lays down the rule that “there must be no diæresis after the third foot of the Homeric hexameter.” This rule stands in the last edition of the *Homeric Grammar*; but the definition of diæresis must be greatly modified if the rule is to hold good, even approximately. Dr. Monro tells us that “by diæresis is meant the coincidence of the division between words with the division into feet.” Thus, if the third foot ends with a word (and whether that word is elided or not, monosyllabic or not, really does not affect the question), there is diæresis after the third foot. The followers of Dr. Monro—*e.g.* Professor Sandford — pronounce such a diæresis rare. But it is not rare. It is very prevalent. One rule may be laid down absolutely concerning diæresis after the third foot. It never coincides with the slightest pause *in the sense*.¹ It occurs only when the third foot is in close connexion with the construction and meaning of the second half of the line. If the diæresis after the third foot coincided with any pause in the sense, then (and then only) the verse would really fall into two halves. But if there is no pause in the sense, there is nothing unrhythmical in a diæresis after the third foot. Accordingly, we find

¹ For this reason Hor. *Epp.* i. 14. 43 should be punctuated *Optat ephippia bos; piger optat arare caballus*. To punctuate after *piger* divides the line

in two, and the rhythm is very disagreeable. But with the stop after *bos* the verse is quite rhythmical.

it is very prevalent. With this view, I have examined Ω , and I find the statistics to be as follows :—

1-100.—There is diæresis after the third foot in 2, 5, 14, 20, 30, 36, 45, 46, 51, 52, 57, 60, 66, 70, 72, 78, 82, 88, 92, 97 = 20.

101-200.—106, 107, 112, 122, 124, 125, 151, 156, 157, 162, 164, 167, 169, 170, 172, 174, 180, 182, 185, 186, 192, 197 = 22.

201-300.—201, 204, 208, 209, 213, 215, 222, 224, 234, 237, 240, 247, 248, 257, 258, 259, 268, 269, 272, 273, 281, 287, 292, 293, 294, 296 = 26.

301-400.—306, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 316, 320, 323, 330, 331, 335, 338, 341, 343, 344, 346, 350, 356, 362, 363, 367, 369, 380, 382, 390, 392, 396 = 29.

401-500.—401, 414, 420, 421, 428, 435, 437, 441, 442, 447, 460, 462, 465, 466, 467, 469, 474, 476, 478, 479, 484, 491, 494, 495 = 24.

501-600.—507, 509, 514, 518, 520, 530, 535, 542, 545, 546, 547, 551, 556, 565, 568, 574, 575, 576, 583, 593, 596, 598, 600 = 23.

601-700.—601, 604, 605, 606, 608, 610, 621, 622, 633, 639, 656, 663, 666, 671, 673, 677, 682, 686, 690, 693 = 20.

701-800.—702, 704, 713, 719, 722, 725, 728, 732, 735, 745, 746, 750, 753, 757, 758, 764, 769, 772, 773, 776, 778, 781, 783, 786, 789, 795, 799 = 27.

Thus, in 804 lines, the diæresis after the third foot occurs 192 times, or nearly once in every four lines. And the prevalence of the rhythm would appear more strikingly if, abandoning the division into hundreds of lines, we turned to the places where it is most frequent. It will be observed, by referring to the above table, how often the diæresis occurs in three consecutive lines, sometimes in four, as in 309-312. Now, no rhythm can be called rare which occurs in four consecutive verses. In 596-606, we have seven instances of it in eleven verses.

I have taken Ω at random; and I have no reason to believe that this particular rhythm is more prevalent in this book than elsewhere. I originally took Ω as a specimen book, merely because I think it the finest book in the *Iliad*, and because some passages in it dwelt in my memory, so that, by means of them, I was able to test the rule before I referred to the book. A cursory examination of a couple of books of the *Odyssey* yields much the same result; and in turning over *Nonnus* and the *Posthomericæ*, I find that there is no sign of an attempt to avoid diæresis after the third foot. I find only fifteen instances in *Virg. Aen.* i. 1-101. The imperative rule being that there must be no pause whatever in the sense, the most prevalent case is where there is a stop just before the last half of the third foot, as in Ω 2, 5,

ἔσκιδναντ' ἰέναι· τοὶ μὲν δόρποιο μέδοντο.

ἧρει πανδαμάτωρ· ἀλλ' ἔστρέφετ' ἔνθα καὶ ἔνθα.

The pause just before the diæresis is sometimes very short, as in

ψεῦδός κεν φαῖμεν, καὶ νοσφιζοίμεθα μᾶλλον.

But sometimes a short stop comes *after the succeeding* foot, as in 201,

ὦ μοι πῇ δὴ τοι φρένες οἷχονθ', ἧς τὸ πάρος περ.

It is, however, quite sufficient to justify the diæresis that there should be no break at all in the sense, as in 215,

ἀλλὰ πρὸ Τρώων καὶ Τρωϊάδων βαθυκόλπων.

The strong cæsure, which is said, on the whole, to be somewhat less common than the weak, is decidedly more prevalent in the cases where diæresis occurs after the third foot. I find that it occurs in 140, out of the 193, cases in Ω . In 134 places, diæresis after the third foot is followed by diæresis after the fourth. In 126, the last part of the third foot immediately preceding the diæresis is a mono-

syllable, sometimes with, and sometimes without, elision. But this does not affect the question concerning diæresis. He who refuses to describe as true diæresis the case where the third foot ends with a monosyllable, or with an elided syllable, is bound to restate the rule, introducing large qualifications. The diæresis after elision, or after a monosyllable, so far as regards the division of the verse metrically, clearly cuts it into two halves. The point is, that this division was not regarded as unrhythmical, provided the meaning (and punctuation as its outward and visible sign) did not coincide with the diæresis. Not once in Ω , or in any of the books which I have examined, is there the slightest pause in the sense at the diæresis after the third foot.

If it be urged that Ω is a book on the genuineness of which doubts have been thrown, we have only to turn to a confessedly genuine book; and we find that in the first half of Π , 1-434, diæresis after third foot occurs 108 times, about once in four lines, as in Ω . But in this book the monosyllable at the diæresis is much rarer. The diæresis at the third foot follows a hypermonosyllable forty-one times in the first half of Π .

If any one so far limits the meaning of diæresis as to refuse to acknowledge a case of true diæresis, unless it follows a hypermonosyllable unelided, even then he can hardly describe diæresis after the third foot as rare. In A , which has 611 verses, there are forty-two cases of such a diæresis; while, if we count monosyllables and elisions, we find diæresis to be even commoner than in the books we have already examined, occurring 151 times in 611. The forty-one cases will be found in the following:—40, 41, 42, 53, 56, 80, 104, 106, 114, 117, 153, 166, 226, 236, 240, 245, 252, 256, 262, 287, 296, 316, 327, 334, 349, 380, 436, 453, 454, 460, 480, 481, 486, 497, 504, 518, 537, 591, 592, 600, 610, 611.

The absence of the cæsure in the third foot is a very much rarer phenomenon. But the rule, "there must be cæsure in the third foot," is somewhat too absolutely expressed. Cæsure is absent from the third foot seven times in Ω, namely, in

449. ὑψηλήν, τὴν Μυρμιδόνες ποίησαν ἄνακτι.
 623. μίστυλλον τ' ἄρ' ἐπισταμένως, πείραν τ' ὀβελοῖσιν.
 624. ὤπτησάν τε περιφραδέως, ἐρύσαντό τε πάντα.
 665. τῇ δεκάτῃ δέ κε θάπτοιμεν, δαινυτό τε λαός.
 718. ὥς ἔφαθ'· οἱ δὲ διέστησαν, καὶ εἶξαν ἀπήνῃ.
 782. ὥς ἔφαθ'· οἱ δ' ὑπ' ἀμάξῃσιν βόας ἡμιόνους τε.
 791. πρῶτον μὲν κατὰ πυρκαϊὴν σβέσαν αἶθοπι οἴνῳ.

It is to be observed, that in all these cases the third foot is preceded and followed by a strong cæsure, and that two of the lines, 623, 624, are among those which recur oftenest in the *Iliad*.

In the first half of Π, there are nine lines without cæsure in third foot, 27, 155, 219, 224, 251, 282, 291, 343, 416; in the second half there are only three, namely, 535, 751, 760. In A, I have observed only six cases, 145, 218, 307, 400, 466, 584. In all the cases of non-cæsural third foot in Ω, Π, and A, the third foot is preceded and followed by a strong cæsure, except in A 400, where the cæsure before the third foot is weak,

Ἦρη τ' ἠδὲ Ποσειδάων καὶ Παλλὰς Ἀθήνη.

It is easy to see how much the rhythm loses by the substitution of a weak for a strong cæsure by comparing this verse with Π 224,

χλαινάων τ' ἀνεμοσκεπέων οὔλων τε ταπήτων.

The fact is, the free course of the Homeric hexameter refuses to be bound by rules, and admits any rhythm which does not offend the ear. And here I must protest against the doctrine of Pope's *Essay on Criticism* that

"The sound must seem an echo to the sense."

I am convinced that the rhythm of even Ψ 116,

πολλὰ δ' ἄναντα κάταντα πάραντά τε δόχμιά τ' ἦλθον,

is the result of chance. Dactyls enormously predominate in the Homeric hexameter. In the ten verses, of which 116 is the last, four have five dactyls; indeed, in the sixty feet of which these ten lines consist, there are only seven spondees, exclusive of the unavoidable spondee in the last foot. The recurring line,

ὁ σφιν εὐφρονέων ἀγορήσατο καὶ μετέειπεν,

ought, on the Popian theory, to indicate a rushing torrent of speech, but it is used of all speakers, and all kinds of speeches; and the leap of Iris from Olympus ought to be described by a flight of dactyls; but it is one of the heaviest lines in Homer,

βῆ δὲ κατ' Οὐλύμποιο καρήνων αἶξασα.

The theory, that the spondees indicate downward motion, is quite groundless. The dactyl might rather denote a descent in the passage from one long to two shorts; but the spondee should convey an even progress over level ground. Besides, we have another very heavy line, K 359, in which there is no downward motion, and which contains an express reference to speed,

γνῶ ρ' ἄνδρας δηϊούς, λαιψηρὰ δὲ γούνατ' ἐνώμα
φευγέμεναι· τοὶ δ' αἶψα διώκειν ὠρμήθησαν.

In the well-known passage, λ 593-60, though the rush of the stone downhill happens to be described in five dactyls, yet the marked pause *in the sense* after the first word of the second line completely destroys the alleged harmony between the sound and sense :—

τότ' ἀποστρέψασκε Κραταῖς
αὖτις· ἔπειτα πέδονδε κυλίνδετο λᾶας ἀναιδής.

Moreover, the verses relating the process of pushing up the stone contain more dactyls than spondees. Pope, in his translation of the *Odyssey*, is careful here to make the sound an echo to the sense, but that is because he was led by the literary proclivities of his age to attribute mannerisms to poetry, however primitive and free from self-consciousness. It is true that such literary tricks and *tours de force* early became popular; and I have no doubt that Virgil imitated the galloping of horses in

“Quadrupedante putrem sonitu quatit ungula campum”;

and that Tennyson was conscious of a certain literary effect when he described

“The flaring atom-streams
Ruining along the illimitable inane”;

and when he wrote

“The sound of many a heavily-galloping hoof”:

but such devices are quite un-Homeric, and utterly alien from the *insouciance* of primitive ballad-poetry.

The poetry of Homer is in the highest degree artistic, but it is never artificial, as Demetrius *De Elocutione* and Dionysius of Halicarnassus would have us believe. But a Greek writer on style sees literary artifice everywhere. Demetrius *De Elocutione* (§ 176) remarks on the roughness of the word βέβρωκε, and says that it is designed to suggest the act which it describes! In the same spirit he tells us that Plato (*Rep.* III. 399*d*) has, “by a long unbroken clause, charmingly imitated the sound of a pipe.” Yet he justly observes ἀπλοῖκοι γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι.

The early *litterati*, critics, scholiasts, and grammarians, were ever ready to attribute to design features in the verse of Homer which were really the result of chance. They are careful to point out that Ψ 644,

ἔργων τοιούτων ἐμὲ δὲ χρὴ γήραϊ (γήρα) λυγρῷ,

may be scanned as an iambic trimeter; and they delight in finding verses like Γ 182,

ὦ μάκαρ Ἀτρεΐδῃ, μοιρηγενές, ὀλβιόδαιμον,

in which each word exceeds the foregoing by a syllable. Such verses they called *rhopalic*, comparing the regular lengthening of each word in the verse to the increasing size of each articulation in a club, *ρόπαλον*, which grows thicker towards the end.

It is not in literary sleight-of-hand, but in his wonderful insight into human nature, that Homer shows what an artist he is, as when Hecuba, Ω 756, tells how Achilles dragged the body of Hector round the monument of his dear comrade Patroclus. The savage old queen adds: "But thou, my son, didst slay Patroclus, and, for all his harrying, he raised him not from the dead." Achilles might wreak his fury on the corse of Hector, but that would not bring back to life Patroclus, who died by her son's hand:

πολλὰ ῥυστάζεισκεν ἐοῦ περὶ σῆμ' ἐτάριοιο
Πατρόκλου, τὸν ἔπεφνες· ἀνέστησεν δέ μιν οὐδ' ὥς.

The touch of nature in the last words of the verse seems to me to be without parallel, except in Shakspeare. But Homer does not weigh epithets, nor "make the sound an echo to the sense."

Nec pluteum caedit nec demorsos sapit ungues.

R. Y. TYRRELL.

NOTES ON W. L. NEWMAN'S EDITION OF ARISTOTLE'S POLITICS, VOL. III.

p. 133 (Pol. 3. 1. 12):—

πολλαχοῦ μὲν οἷν οὐδὲ τούτων τελέως οἱ μέτοικοι μετέχουσιν, ἀλλὰ
νέμειν ἀνάγκη προστάτην.

Liddell and Scott, followed here by Newman, translate νέμειν προστάτην, 'to take,' or 'choose,' a patron, and N. quotes Isocr. de Pace, § 53, καὶ τοὺς μὲν μετοίκους τοιοῦτους εἶναι νομίζομεν οἷους περ ἂν τοὺς προστάτας νέμωσιν, Pollux, 8. 35. This is too much against the usual sense of the word not to raise doubts. If the passage of the Politics stood alone, we should have no difficulty in translating 'assign,' the subject left indefinite. In the other two, the subject must be the μέτοικοι themselves; and we must suppose that the resident aliens chose, and then assigned to their body the particular person whom they thought fittest to represent them. Or is the meaning in all the three passages different from either (1) taking, or (2) assigning, and a mere variation on νομίζειν, 'hold,' or 'acknowledge'?

p. 135 (Pol. 3. 1. 23):—

τῶν δ' ἀρχῶν αἱ μὲν εἰσι διηρημέναι κατὰ χρόνον.

Bernays and Newman translate 'discontinuous,' a sense found in other passages of Aristotle. But in two of these the word is contrasted with συνεχής: it does not seem certain that *without* such contrasting word διηρημέναι would naturally mean this. At any rate, it might here be 'separated,' 'marked off,' nearly 'discriminated,' which is not the same thing as 'determinate' (Welldon).

p. 163 (Pol. 3. 4. 25) :—

ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπαινέϊται γε τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι, καὶ πολίτου δοκίμου ἢ ἀρετὴ εἶναι τὸ δύνασθαι ἄρχειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι καλῶς.

Surely this is right as the MSS. give it, without δοκεῖ before or after δοκίμου. εἶναι depends immediately on ἐπαινέϊται. The virtue of a tried and tested citizen is praised as being the faculty of ruling and submitting to rule properly.

p. 175 (Pol. 3. 5. 11) :—

τῶν δ' ἀναγκαίων must, I think, be masculine, 'of the necessary class,' i.e. the class who perform necessary services. Such a brachylogical change from ἔργα to ἐργαταί is perfectly intelligible, and quite in the style of Aristotle. It is, of course, an obvious remark that those who perform, in a community, the smaller services which are indispensable to life are themselves 'indispensables.'

p. 211 (Pol. 3. 10. 17) :—

πάλιν τε πάντων ληφθέντων.

'And taking (or, looking at) the whole case *in the reverse way*,' i.e. if, instead of the poor dividing the property of the rich, the rich should be more numerous and should divide the property of the poor, the State would be annihilated.

p. 212 (Pol. 3. 11. 1) :—

ὅτι δὲ δεῖ κύριον εἶναι μᾶλλον τὸ πλῆθος ἢ τοὺς ἀρίστους μὲν ὀλιγοὺς δέ, δόξειεν ἂν λύεσθαι καὶ τιν' ἔχειν ἀπορίαν, τάχα δὲ καὶ ἀλήθειαν.

λύεσθαι looks as if it meant in itself 'to be a point for solution,' a debatable point that comes into discussion. This would be a Latin, rather than a Greek, use, e.g. Fronto, p. 86, *Nunquam mihi tam suavis tamque sauiata uisa est*, 'so kissable'; but it does not seem to be impossible.

p. 230 (Pol. 3. 12. 4) :—

ἐτι κατὰ γε τοῦτον τὸν λόγον πᾶν ἀγαθὸν πρὸς πᾶν ἂν εἴη συμβλητόν.
εἰ γὰρ μᾶλλον τὸ τί μέγεθος, καὶ ὅλως ἂν τὸ μέγεθος ἐνάμιλλον εἴη καὶ
πρὸς πλοῦτον καὶ πρὸς ἐλευθερίαν.

Most of the editors seem to ignore the article prefixed to *τί μέγεθος*. If it is genuine, it would seem to be analogous to the use of *τὸ* prefixed to *quoted* words, 'the consideration,' or 'the allegation' of a particular size. *μᾶλλον*, I think, may mean, in a loose sense, 'preponderates,' 'outweighs,' has the advantage in a comparison. But *τὸ τί* may be a corruption of *τουτί*, 'this particular size.'

p. 241 (Pol. 3. 13. 6) :—

ὥστε μὴ συμβλητὴν εἶναι τὴν τῶν ἄλλων ἀρετὴν πάντων μὴδὲ τὴν
δύναμιν αὐτῶν τὴν πολιτικὴν πρὸς τὴν ἐκείνων: *ιδ.* κατ' ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν
πολιτικὴν δύναμιν.

It will seem rash to dissent from such authorities as Bernays, Susemihl, and Newman, who agree to interpret *δύναμιν πολιτικὴν*, 'political *capacity*.' Yet, comparing *π. ισχύς*, which follows only a few lines below and is a mere variation of a word twice repeated already; considering, too, Newman's acknowledgment that *π. δύναμις* elsewhere often means political *influence*, I venture to demur to an interpretation which is certainly not the *prima facie* meaning of the words, and cannot be considered necessary.

p. 250 (Pol. 3. 13. 3) :—

τὸ δὲ πρόβλημα καθόλου περὶ πάσας ἐστὶ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τὰς ὀρθάς.

καὶ = 'and,' *ἰ.ε.* 'including' the right ones, rather than 'even'; and so in the passage cited from de Gen. An. 4. 2, καὶ ἐν πᾶσιν ἐστὶ τροφή τοῦτο καὶ ἐν τοῖς ξηροῖς. So Pol. 4. 17, ταύτην τὴν ἡλικίαν καὶ μέχρι τῶν ἑπτὰ ἐτῶν, is 'this age, and indeed up to seven years of childhood.'

¹ Cf. *τὸ ὀλίγοι*, 'the expression "a few"' (Newman).

p. 352 (Pol. 4. 5. 35):—

ὑστερον ἐπισκεπτέον ἀκριβέστερον, ὅταν ὅλως περὶ κτήσεως καὶ τῆς περὶ οὐσίαν εὐπορίας συμβαίῃ ποιεῖσθαι μνείαν, πῶς δεῖ καὶ τίνα τρόπον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτήν.

αὐτήν does not belong to χρῆσιν ; but the construction is πῶς δεῖ αὐτήν ('it,' *sc.* κτήσιν) ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν. So seemingly Newman, in the first portion of his note, 'how it should stand to the use made of it': but at the end of it he adds, 'αὐτήν is added to τὴν χρῆσιν to contrast the use itself with τὰ πρὸς τὴν χρῆσιν,' which is not, I think, what Aristotle intended.

p. 361 (Pol. 4. 6. 34):—

ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ νῦν ὁρῶμεν πολλαῖς ὑπάρχοντα καὶ χώραις καὶ πόλεσιν ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας εὐφυῶς κείμενα πρὸς τὴν πόλιν, ὥστε μήτε τὸ αὐτὸ νέμειν ἄστυ μήτε πόρρω λίαν, ἀλλὰ κρατεῖσθαι τείχεσι καὶ τοιούτοις ἄλλοις ἐρύμασι.

Newman translates "so as neither to occupy the same city nor to be very far away, but to be held in subjection by walls and other similar defences,' making the subject of νέμειν either ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας or τοὺς ἐνοικοῦντας. This has the merit of simplicity, and the sense of νέμειν seems defensible from such passages as Herod. 4. 188, 7. 158.

Still here, again, I feel a scruple as to νέμειν, and suggest that the subject intended is not ἐπίνεια καὶ λιμένας, but the larger cities to which these are adjacent suburbs, or perhaps a more indefinite subject which Aristotle did not care to realize exactly. Then νέμειν might have its ordinary prose-meaning of assigning, dispensing, extending the use of, "docks and harbours in a commodious situation as regards the main city, so that, without giving them the same municipal centre, they give them a site which is not very distant, capable of being dominated (secured) by walls or other defences."

p. 368 (Pol. 4. 7. 3) :—

διὸ καὶ Ἀρχιλόχος προσηκόντως τοῖς φίλοις ἐγκαλῶν διαλέγεται πρὸς τὸν θυμὸν· “σὺ γὰρ δὴ περὶ φίλων ἀπάγχει.”

περὶ, not παρὰ, is given by nearly all MSS. It is, I believe, right. Passion, says Aristotle, is more readily excited by friends than strangers; this is why Archilochus, when reproaching his friends, addresses his *spirit*, the seat of passion, “for it was thou, my spirit, that wert tormented for thy friends,” i.e. for something they had done or said.

p. 386 (Pol. 4. 10. 8) :—

φασὶ γὰρ οἱ λόγιοι τῶν ἐκεῖ κατοικούντων Ἰταλὸν τινα γενέσθαι βασιλέα τῆς Οἰνωτρίας, ἀφ’ οὗ τό τε ὄνομα μεταβαλόντας Ἰταλοὺς ἀντ’ Οἰνωτρῶν κληθῆναι.

Aristotle does not seem to know the etymology of Italia from *italós uitulus*, which Varro mentions R. R. II. 5. 3. *Nam bos in pecuaria maxima debet esse auctoritate, praesertim in Italia, quae a bubus nomen habere sit existimata. Graecia enim antiqua, ut scribit Timaeus, tauros uocabat italos, a quorum multitudine et pulchritudine et fetu uitulorum Italiam dixerunt. Alii scripserunt, quod ex Sicilia Hercules persecutus sit eo nobilem taurum, qui diceretur italus. Hic socius hominum in rustico opere et Cereris minister, ab hoc antiqui manus ita abstinere uoluerunt, ut capite sanxerint, siquis occidisset.*

p. 395 (Pol. 4. 11. 36) :—

αὐτῆς δὲ (sc. χώρας) πρὸς αὐτὴν εἶναι τὴν θέσιν εὐχεσθαι δεῖ κατατυγχάνειν πρὸς τέτταρα δὴ βλέποντας.

Among the various attempts to explain this passage, I do not find any which makes εἶναι the *orat. obliq.* of εἶη introducing a prayer. δεῖ εὐχεσθαι εἶναι κατατυγχάνειν, ‘men should pray that it may be granted them to succeed keeping four points in view.’ The accusative αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν τὴν

θέσιν *may* be normal after κατατυγχάνειν; but if this should not be capable of proof, there would be no great difficulty in treating it as an *accusativus pendens*: 'As to the position of the city in relation to itself men should pray,' &c.

p. 409 (Pol. 4. 12. 21):—

δῆλον ὡς αὐτὰ προκαλεῖται παρασκευάζειν ἔνια τῶν συσσιτίων ἐν τούτοις τοῖς φυλακτηρίοις.

αὐτὰ is not 'eae res,' as Lambinus translated it, but *ipsa per se*, i.e. either the συσσίτια of themselves, or 'things by themselves' = 'the case by itself' calls for making some of the common meals in the guard stations.

p. 435 (Pol. 4. 14. 23):—

ἐπεὶ δὲ τοῦτ' οὐ ῥάδιον λαβεῖν οὐδὲ ἔστιν ὥσπερ ἐν Ἰνδοῖς φησὶ Σκύλαξ εἶναι τοὺς βασιλέας τοσοῦτον διαφέροντας τῶν ἀρχομένων.

The construction of οὐδ' ἔστιν is in any case quite removed from λαβεῖν (R. Broughton), and has nothing to do with it. The only doubt is whether οὐδ' ἔστιν = "And we have not among ourselves anything to answer to the vast superiority of the kings to their subjects which Scylax says exists in India" (Newman); in closer words, 'and the case is not, as Scylax asserts the kings in India to be so far superior to their subjects'; or whether ἔστιν here = 'it is possible,' '*potest fieri*,' 'and there is no possibility of what Scylax asserts as to the vast superiority of the Indian kings over their subjects.'

p. 448 (Pol. 4. 14. 2):—

ἵνα πρῶτον μὲν αὐτοὶ μὴ δουλεύσωσιν . . . ἔπειτα ὅπως ζητῶσι τὴν ἡγεμονίαν . . . τρίτον δὲ τὸ δεσπόζειν τῶν ἀξίων δουλεύειν.

Newman makes τρίτον depend on ζητῶσι. I think it is an independent clause, added loosely, in Aristotle's way: 'the third [aim] is to exercise absolute rule over those who ought to be slaves.'

p. 460 (Pol. 4. 16. 2) :—

ἢ τε γὰρ αἰδῶς ἦττον ὑπάρχει τοῖς τοιούτοις ὥσπερ ἡλικιώταις.

ὥσπερ if genuine = *just as in* the case of equals in age. But did not Aristotle write ὡς παρ' ἡλικιώταις? So I believe in Aesch. Choeph. 698, νῦν δ' ἡ παρῆν δόμοισι βακχείας καλῆς Ἰατρὸς ἐλπίς has become ἥπερ ἐν (HERMATHENA for 1900, p. 7), a view which has the approval of Mr. Blaydes.

p. 467 (Pol. 4. 16. 34) :—

The second interpretation of καταλελυμένης, 'wrecked,' appears to me impossible.

p. 516 (Pol. 5. 3. 24) :—

διόπερ Ὅμηρος οὕτως ἐποίησεν. Ἄλλ' οἷον μὲν ἔστι καλεῖν ἐπὶ δαῖτα θαλεῖην.

Newman conjectures μόνον, very plausibly. μὲν, however, might also be a corruption of θέμις, which, with ἐστὶ = 'it is right,' is common in Homer.

p. 517 (Pol. 5. 3. 34) :—

νῦν δὲ τοσοῦτον ἡμῖν εἶναι πρὸ ὁδοῦ γέγονεν.

"But now it has happened to us to be so far in advance," *i.e.* of the intended discussion. This is, I think, the natural meaning of the words, cf. Pol. 4. 17, πάντα γὰρ δεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα προοδοποιεῖν πρὸς τὰς ὕστερον διατριβάς.

p. 523 (Pol. 5. 4. 23) :—

καὶ τῶν ἡπειρωτικῶν ἐθνῶν ἕτερα . . . ἃ ληστρικὰ μὲν ἐστίν, ἀνδρίας δ' οὐ μετειλήφασιν.

This is not quite so harsh if we remember that the Greek idiom would naturally supply a *new* subject to μετειλήφασιν, "which, it is true, are piratical, but still they have made no approach to real manhood."

ROBINSON ELLIS.

NOTES ON THE EPISTLES OF HORACE.

I N looking through Dr. Wilkins' excellent little edition of Horace's Epistles, the following points struck me:—

(1). I. 2. 30. 31:—

“Cui pulchrum fuit in medios dormire dies, et
Ad strepitum citharae cessatum ducere curam.”

W. remarks that the Blandinian MSS. read *somnum* for *curam*, and says:—“Acron's note on *ad strepitum* (*quia adhibemus sonitum citharae ac lyrae, ut facilius sopiamur*) is a clear proof that he read *somnum*”; and he continues:—“... We need the mention of some act which is blameworthy. . . . Besides, the transition is then more abrupt to what follows, which is an appeal against undue indulgence in sleep.”

But may not Acron refer to *dormire*, the music soothing trouble, and so assisting slumber? (Cf. 10. 18:—*divellat somnos . . . cura*. C. II. 16. 15, &c.) The truth is that the two verses are closely united, that they form a connected whole, presenting a picture of lazy self-indulgence. And this is the reply to both of the arguments I have just cited.

(2). I. 7. 29:—

Volpecula.

W. quotes a funny argument from Keller, with reference to Bentley's *nitedula*:—“that a weasel would be more likely to eat a mouse than to give it good advice!” How ridiculous! The hole is too small for the mouse to get out;

how in the world could the weasel get at the mouse? And if he did want to eat it, what more judicious advice to that end could he offer than what is given?

(3). I. 10. 9:—

Quae vos ad caelum effertis rumore secundo.

Here (as well as elsewhere, *e.g.*, I. 19. 23) the note is inconsistent with the text, which reads *fertis*; while the note says:—"The authority for this form (*effertis*) is too strong to allow us to reject it," &c.

(4). I. 14. 1:—

mihi me reddentis.

W. translates:—"that makes me my own master again." The meaning is, I think, more general, and includes the idea of physical recuperation. See the similar connexion in 2, 47, 48: 7, init.: 10, 15 sqq.: 16, 12 sqq.: 18, 101 sqq.: &c.

(5). I. 16. 49:—

Renuit negitatque Sabellus.

W. says:—"The meaning then is, 'a man who speaks his mind.' The term is a little out of place here; one does not see why great frankness was needed to dispose of a slave's assumptions." But is not the meaning rather that such a claim was one that needed no philosopher to see through, that a plain countryman (*abnormis sapiens crassaque Minerva*) could do so, who has observed the caution of the rapacious animals mentioned in the next verse? Sabellus is by very many taken to be Horace himself: certainly he is at least his representative and spokesman. And though there is a change from the first person (*aio*, v. 47) to the third here, yet the dialogue seems to revert to the former arrangement without any break or indication of changes among the interlocutors. (See, in this connexion, No. 14 below.)

(6). I. 18. 15 :—

“de lana caprina.”

There is a proverbial Irish expression :—“Going to the goat’s house to look for wool,” to denote a foolish and hopeless quest.

(7). *Ib.* 98 :—

Num te semper inops agitet vexetque cupido.

W. says :—“It seems better to regard *agitet* as a jussive subjunctive . . . ‘whether you are always to be tormented’ . . . There is no need for study and instruction before a man can learn whether he is tormented.”

Is this a correct explanation? Can the subjunctive be a jussive subjunctive? And may there not be need for instruction as regards the *cause* of the trouble? (Note the emphatic position of *cupido*.) In illness a correct diagnosis is a necessary preliminary to correct treatment.

(8). I. 20. 5 :—

Fuge quo descendere gestis.

W. favours interpreting *fuge* as ‘hurry off.’ But Horace has the word in C. I. 9. 13 *f. quaerere*, C. II. 4. 22 *f. suspicari*, S. I. 4. 34 *f. (poetam)*, Ep. I. 10. 32 *f. magna*—always meaning ‘avoid.’ (Cf. I. 18. 69 *Percontatorem fugito*.)¹

(9). II. 1. 42.—Reference is made to the rhymes which occur in the *Æneid* as being mostly accidental. But in an article in the *Classical Review* (Feb., 1896), I think I have succeeded in showing that they are deliberately introduced by the poet in order to produce a special effect.

(10). *Ib.* 159–161 :—

in longum tamen aevum

Manserunt hodieque manent vestigia ruris.²

Serus enim Graecis admovit acumina chartis.

¹ Yet cp. Ritter: “Qui interpretantur ‘uita locum quo tendis’ epistulae rationem non assecuti sunt: nam

Horatius decedenti libro futura praedicit non dissuadet exitum.”—ED.

² Cf. Virg. *Ecl.* 4. 13.

W. says:—" *Serius* refers to *ferus victor*, i.e., the Romans. Ritter thinks that the sense requires that this should refer to some individual writer." And there is appended a note by Mr. J. S. Reid, supporting the latter view. But to me it seems clear that the sense decidedly requires the reference to be general. For we have vv. 159, 160, followed by *Serius enim*, giving the *reason* why the coarseness lasted so long--because the refining influence of Greece was so late in affecting Roman Literature. Hence, it would seem, *Serius enim*, &c., must mean:—"For it was late before the Roman writers," &c., while surely the passage would lose all its force if we take it to apply to a single writer.

(11). *Ib.* 173-176:—

Quantus sit Dossennus edacibus in parasitis,
 Quam non adstricto percurrat pulpita socco.
 Gestit enim nummum in loculos demittere; post hoc
 Securus cadat an recto stet fabula talo.

While considering these words it occurred to me that the best way to discover Horace's meaning (assuming that he is speaking here of Plautus) would be first to inquire:—What is the natural sense of the passage independently of the precise signification of the words *Dossennus* and *edaces parasiti*—that is, taking them for the moment as algebraical signs, so to speak?

Then it is clear that the poet means:—"What a *D.* he is in his representation of *e.p.*"; and then the complete sense must be determined by so interpreting the words as to suit the context, especially the explanatory *gestit enim*, &c.

Horace's line of thought would seem to have been somewhat as follows:—He first refers to Plautus' description of certain common dramatic characters. Then coming to a fourth, it occurs to him as a striking point to be made,

that here the dramatist does not only describe the character in his play, but also illustrates it personally in his own actions. He shows himself, we are told, a characteristic specimen of the proverbial *D.*, even while holding up the *e. p.* to ridicule. Now, that the passage should be connected and the hit forcible, we must take *D.* to be a proverbial specimen of the *e. p.* Then we go on to inquire:—"What explanation of this personage *D.* and of the character *e. p.* will suit the whole context?"

Does it not then become clear, looking to the *gestit enim*, &c., that the character indicated is one whose eagerness for money governs all his actions and crushes all his scruples? reminding us of our poet's famous *Rem facias, rem*, &c. Thus, then, the *e. p.* would be the covetous 'sponge,' and Plautus is spoken of as showing himself, by his unworthy greed, to be no better than a well-known specimen of that genus, *Dossennus*.

(12). II. 2. 21, 22 :—

ne mea saevus

Iurgares ad te quod epistula nulla veniret.

W. says:—"Mea is curiously out of place. . . . Pronouns are often attracted towards the beginning of a sentence." But surely the position of *mea* is not unnatural. Horace means—"Lest you should be angry *with me*, because," &c. And our poet supplies numerous examples of such placing of an important word in a position of emphasis. Indeed, to go no further than this one adjective, *meus*, we have C. I. 20. 10:—

Mea nec Falernae

Temperant vites neque Formiani

Pocula colles.

Cf. II. 6. 6; C. 17. 2-4 :—

Nec Dis amicum est nec mihi te prius

Obire, Maecenas, mearum

Grande decus columeque rerum.

300 *NOTES ON THE EPISTLES OF HORACE.*

(Cf. II. 7. 5 ; III. 4. 69 ; II. 18. 2) ; C. IV. 2. 45 :—

Tum meae, si quid loquar audiendum,
Vocis, &c.

C. IV. 12. 21-23 :—

cum tua

Velox merce veni : non ego te meis
Immunem meditor tingere poculis.

(Cf. Epod. 1. 15) : Epod. 11. 15 ; 15. 17 :—

meo nunc

Superbus incedis malo.

S. I. 3. 70, and 82 : 4. 71 : 10. 92 : Ep. I. 18. 28, 29 :—

Meae—contendere noli—

Stultitiam patiuntur opes.

And lastly, v. 12 of this same Ep. (II. 2) :—

Meo sum pauper in aere.

With regard to this particular error an observation occurs to me. There is a certain pernicious practice acquired in schoolboy days ; but how a scholar of ability could, after he has attained to years of discretion, permit a practice so baneful to survive, is difficult indeed to understand. Great, however, is the power of habit, and too often it prevails.

The practice to which I refer is that of translating as one reads (consciously or unconsciously, wholly or in part) the Latin (*e.g.*) words before the eye into their familiar English representatives. Now, what forces upon me a suspicion of the existence of this failing, even sometimes in the case of scholars of repute, is this: that on several occasions I have been puzzled by happening upon errors or misapprehensions (such as that at present under notice) which upon examination appeared to be inexplicable except upon the hypothesis I have suggested. For the

natural consequence of such methods of reading would be that the Latin sequence of ideas, suited to and clothed in its dress of Latin phrase, would enter the reader's mind confused by its endeavour to adapt itself to an order and arrangement entirely alien. No wonder, then, that a disposition of words which to the Roman reader would seem not less clear than emphatic and pointed, should appear to the Englishman inverted, curious, and topsy-turvy.

But does it not become evident upon reflection that in order to experience the impression which the writer intended to produce, we must put ourselves in the place of the reader whose mind he expected to influence; that we must look upon the picture, so to speak, as painted by its creator, not as distorted by some optical contrivance undreamt of in his day; that we must, in a word, dismiss from our consciousness all recollection of our own idiom, and forget the very existence of such a language as ours?

Test, for example, the two methods by applying them to that marvel of exquisite workmanship in verbal mosaic:—

Namque me silva lupus in Sabina
Dum meam canto Lalagen et ultra
Terminum curis vagor expeditis
Fugit inermem:

and—but what further argument is needed?

What appears to me another very plain example of the same error may be seen in the edition (in most respects very good) of Juvenal by Mr. J. D. Duff: S. III. 54, "*Tanti . . . non sit . . . harena Tagi . . . ut somno careas*, 'do not regard, &c., that you should be willing to lose,' &c. . . . The *ut* clause is elliptical, and in English we must supply the notion of being willing: *ut somno careas* is elliptical for *ut somno carere velis*." Here it is plain that the commentator assumed that the Latin was elliptical, because his English "literal translation" would have been elliptical.

But every commentator should have a motto ever before him: "The Roman did not translate from English into Latin." The thought expressed in the Latin words is clear enough: if the writer had meant *voluit*, he would have said it. Expressed in English, the meaning is something like: "Let not the, &c., be in your esteem (*tibi*) at so high a point (*tanti*) as to be an equivalent for doing without sleep."

(13). *Ib.* 51, 52:—

paupertas impulit audax
Ut versus facerem.

W. says:—"Hirschfelder argues that, as there is no sufficient evidence that the booksellers paid authors for their works, Horace can only mean that *nihil ab eis quos impugnavisset sibi eripi posse videbat*, "and that thus he attacked without fear." But this view is hardly consistent with *impulit*.

And besides, would it not destroy all the force and point of the illustration story? (*vv.* 26 *sqq.*)

(14). *Ib.* 81-86:—

Ingenium sibi quod vacuas desumpsit Athenas
Et studiis annos septem dedit insenuitque
Libris et curis, statua taciturnius exit
Plerumque et risu populum quatit: hic ego rerum
Fluctibus in mediis et tempestatibus urbis
Verba lyrae motura sonum connectere digner?

W. says:—"The connexion of these lines with the context is not very clear, and the thought not logically developed. Hence, some have rejected them as spurious." . . . "Some critics have oddly enough supposed that Horace must himself be the *ingenium*, and thence argued that he must have lived seven years at Athens."

I do not see much difficulty in the lines. I have been accustomed to understand them thus: So-and-so (i.e.

Horace) selected quiet Athens as a place to devote his mind to books, &c. : result—awkward shyness and so on ; but now, under my present circumstances, I cannot go back to the quiet so essential to the poet : so you must not expect Odes from me.

As to the *septem*, is it not simply used as a “round” number ?

W. continues :—“That he is not is shown clearly by the contrast with *ego*, and not less by *hic*, i.e. at Rome.” This last argument I can make neither head nor tail of. Whether *ingenium* is Horace or not, plainly there is intended to be a strong contrast between the situation of *ingenium*, whoever he was, at quiet Athens, and that of Horace in bustling Rome. Neither does the other argument seem to be valid. To begin with, the *ego* conveniently marks the change from third person to first. Secondly, see my remarks above (No. 5) on 1, 16. 49. But finally, and, as it seems to me, conclusively, if the argument as to the contrast with *ego* is a sound one, could one wish for a more forcible opportunity of using it than is offered in 2 Cor. xii. 5, where St. Paul sets in such emphatic contrast his acknowledged and his anonymous personality ?

(15). *Ib.* 114 :—

Et versentur adhuc intra penetralia Vestae.

The meaning of this has been much disputed. In order to arrive at a fair approximation to the real sense, our best plan will be first to glance at the line of thought of the passage (109–119).—If you wish to write a true poem, you must be a severe critic of the vocabulary you employ. You must not hesitate to reject words or phrases that are lacking in force or dignity, “even though they retire unwillingly *Et versentur*,” &c. On the other hand, you will revive and restore to use those that are old and obsolescent if

they possess such striking beauty as would adorn your work; and lastly, you may make use of newly-coined words, provided they *are* suited to the genius and needs of the language."

Here our author refers to three classes of words, *i.e.* (1) every-day words, but colloquial and undignified; (2) old words, but worthy of resuscitation; and (3) new words. We have a similar classification in the A. P., though in different order; (3) v. 52, &c.; (2) (1), vv. 70-71; and there again our author refers to the introduction and popularising of ancient and of new words, and to the loss of words that are familiar.

Now, as to the meaning of the expression *intra penetralia Vestae*, there are two groups of interpretations which we may, I think, set aside at once. First, that which would make it refer it to the poet's house, desk, &c. For is not this inconsistent with the line of thought? The point is the disuse of unsuitable words, and the popularising of those that are suitable. As to the common but unsuitable words you must *verba movere loco*, erase them from your poem. And I think that the error has probably arisen from confusing *loco*, which *does* refer to the poem, with *penetralia Vestae*, which does not. For when we come to the contrast in vv. 115-116, we learn that the poet *Obscurata diu populo . . . proferet in lucem . . . quae . . . nunc situs informis premit*, &c. Here the worthy words which are in dishonour and disuse are to be brought out to honour and use, clearly in opposition to the contrary process with the other words. But if we take *penetralia Vestae* as suggested, the parallel is spoiled. So, too, the corresponding verses in A. P. (70-71) say:—*cadentque Quae nunc sunt in honore vocabula*. Further, this group of interpretations would seem also to be obnoxious to the objection just about to be mentioned with regard to the second group, which would make the *penetralia Vestae* an asylum

to which those in danger (here, of excision from the poem) might have recourse. But, in the first place, this explanation lays itself open to the assault of our former argument, by making the verse refer to the language of the supposed poem, instead of to that of literature in general. And in the second place, to this (and, indeed, to any explanation which would assume a mere recent and temporary habitation) there is opposed the sense of the two words, *versentur adhuc*. Surely these two words suggest an habitual frequenting of the *penetralia Vestae* from of old; suggest, in fact, the reference that I would support, to long popular usage, while they confute any interpretation that would refer them merely to the brief residence of a word in a poem yet a-writing.

But from the passage just quoted (A. P. 70–71) we get a hint suggesting a meaning for the words under discussion — a meaning, indeed, which of themselves they might very naturally suggest. And we should bear in mind a trait of our author, of which in the last number of HERMATHENA I gave several examples—his habit of making a passage in one work reminiscent and illustrative of a passage in another. Note here, *e.g.*, the mention of the same names, *Cethegis*, v. 50; *Catonis*, v. 56; and the mention of *usus* as the dominant factor in the question (v. 72). The suggested meaning then is that of something held in popular respect and veneration; possibly with a hint that this respect is due rather to tradition than to reason. For any further particularising and refining there seems to be no need. W., I observe, quotes Keller as interpreting:—"Phrases hallowed by antiquity, which it seems profanation to touch."

(16). *Ib.* 160–162:

Qui te pascit ager, tuus est, et vilicus Orbi,
Cum segetes occat tibi mox frumenta daturas,
Te dominum sentit.

W. says:—"daturas has been preferred . . . to *daturus* . . . The word seems to go better with the 'corn-fields' than with the bailiff." Besides, it corresponds with the *pascit ager* of v. 160.

(17). *Ib.* 162-165 :

das nummos, accipis uvam,
Pullos, ova, cadum temeti. Nempe modo isto
Paullatim mercaris agrum, fortasse trecentis
Aut etiam supra nummorum milibus emptum.

W. says:—"As Schütz notices, Horace seems to forget that after the full value of the land has been paid in these instalments, the purchaser of the produce would still have to go on paying for all that he wanted." But this involves a misapprehension of Horace's meaning. He does not suggest that you would pay the *trec. mil. n.* or anything like it; but, as he has just pointed out, the field is as good as yours while you are gradually buying it, provided you get what you want from it.

(18). *Ib.* 173 :

Nunc prece, nunc pretio, nunc vi.

Is there here a reminiscence of the legal '*Nec vi, nec clam, nec precario*,' as, e.g., in the Interdict VTI POSSIDETIS?

(19). *Ib.* 190-194 :

Utar et ex modico quantum res poscet acervo
Tollam, nec metuam quid de me iudicet heres,
Quod non plura datis invenerit : et tamen idem
Scire volam, quantum simplex hilarisque nepoti
Discrepet, et quantum discordet parcus avaro.

W. says:—"Utar is best taken absolutely . . . not understanding *genio*, or anticipating *modico acervo*." I should rather incline to take *Utar* and *Tollam* in close connexion, something like—"I shall benefit myself by taking," &c.

On *volam* he remarks—"it will be my wish." But is it not rather—in accordance with the usual signification of *volo*—"it would be my *choice* to understand, 'bear in mind' ? Taking it as 'wish' makes it seem as if he did not know, and would appear to spoil the sense. The *tamen* refers to the previous clause—"I shall not trouble about the *heres* opinion of me, whether he will deem me a careless spend-thrift : but for all that I shall ever choose to have clearly before my own mind the distinction," &c.

(20). *Ib.* 199-200 :

Ego utrum

Nave ferar magna an parva, ferar unus et idem.

W. says:—"It is to be explained by supposing that some expression like *nihil distat* was present to the mind of Horace, for which he afterwards substituted *ferar unus et idem*.' But is there any need for such a supposition ? The construction is very similar to that in Ep. ii. 1. 176:—

Securus cadat an recto stet fabula talo.

There, so-and-so is untroubled as to the reply to the question whether, &c. ; here, I sail unchanged, unaffected (*idem* here like *securus* there) by the reply, &c., whether the ship I am sailing in is big or small. In each passage, too, *sive . . . sive* could have been used with little alteration of meaning. Only, instead of putting it as the effect of certain information on the mind, it would have been given simply as the state of the person affected, under one or other of the two given conditions. "If the play succeeds, he is indifferent ; if not, he is so too."

In the passage quoted from Ovid, Rem. Am. 797 :—

Daunius an Libycis bulbus tibi missus ab oris,
An veniat Megaris, noxius omnis erit.

The question of its origin does not affect the matter ; it is bad in any case—does not the *omnis* perform a function similar to that of the *idem* above, conveying the implication

‘it is all the same in any case,’ and so again avoiding the need for assuming an imaginary suppressed clause. The passage in *Fast.* iii. 5 is of quite another type, and does not seem to present any difficulty.

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Note on *Cic. Off.* III., 30, 110. Here he says (speaking of Regulus):—*Non enim suo iudicio stetit, sed suscepit causam, ut esset iudicium Senatus.* Here Holden’s note (in his ed.) seems to me to destroy the whole force of the argument. He explains:—“For he did not rest upon, was not determined by his own judgment, but undertook the cause, leaving the issue to the Senate.” Now no doubt this would be a very natural meaning for *suo i. st.* if the words are considered apart from the context; but taken thus here, the passage is made to convey a meaning the very opposite to the true one.

For it is just because he did *not* “leave the issue to the Senate” that he is praised. He did not ‘*suo i. st.*’, rest satisfied with the correctness of his conclusion (that the proposal of Carthage ought not to be adopted), and then let the Senate settle the matter as it pleased on *its* ‘*iudicium.*’ Had he done so, Cicero goes on to say, the Senate would have accepted that proposal, and Regulus would have been safe. But what he did was to stand forth as an advocate, *ut esset iud. Sen.*, that *his* conclusion might be that of the Senate also.

That this is Cicero’s meaning is plain, I think, not only because it coincides with, while the other explanation contradicts, the whole trend of the argument, but also from the words below:—*et sentire illa et pati*, i. e., not only hold this as an opinion, but also suffer the consequences involved in acting upon it.

H. T. J.

THE SPIRIT OF MAN. A PROLEGOMENON IN SPIRITUAL METAPHYSIC.

IN examining the metaphysical tendencies of the age, we find ourselves face to face with two opposing forces. The first of these owes its existence, not to that increasing interest in Physics which is itself right and justifiable, but to a tendency towards assigning to Physical Science an exclusive dominion in all spheres of thought. Under this influence, Psychology is being gradually replaced by Physiology, while speculations as to the physical conditions of thought and the physical basis of Nature take the place of Ontology.

The second force is really metaphysical, and produces that search for the Absolute which has been the chief Ontological problem since the days of Kant. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, have all been devoted to this branch of research: it has worked itself out into practical degeneration in the hands of Schopenhauer and the Pessimists. Mr. Bradley, its principal English exponent, by his identification of the Real with Experience, has to all intents brought his followers back from Ontology to an acceptance of metaphysical chaos and indefiniteness. Mr. Bax, the Socialist philosopher, has contributed other elements, whose general effect is to undermine that idea of unity, permanence, and absolute reality which has always been the most important object of Philosophic speculation.

These two opposing systems have the same fault, and the same result. Both are based on imperfect analysis:

both, resting on this destructive basis, in which important parts of man's nature are set aside, have produced false or imperfect syntheses of that nature, and thereby taken away something from the fulness of man's life and the firmness of his grasp on Reality. In both, the imperfect analysis is set so close to the mind as to hide from view Realities that still force themselves in other ways upon us,—Realities, or Pseudo-Realities, from which man cannot part without a breach with his understanding and a violent wrench in his moral and religious nature.

Writing not for Physicists but for Metaphysicians, I do not intend to dwell much on the position taken by Physical Science. But it may be well just to say this. So long as a Sensation remains a Sensation, and not a physical movement, current, or (to take one of the latest theories) *ferment*—so long as the gap between the ultimate material action of the brain and the initiative feeling or thought remains unbridged—so long as a Subject that shows no sign of being ruled by Space has the concept of Space forced on it by the Object, while the Object, in its turn, is endued with an existence in Time by the Subject (as in the concepts of change and of motion)—a Psychologist cannot possibly admit that the world of thought is simply a result of physical action. To take a simple case, he cannot identify the “photographic” action of the eye with the sensation of sight. Physically, he admits that the eye acts as a lens, and projects a picture on the retina: but no physical reasoning will get rid of the fact that sight cannot be simply the perception of this picture, as it is not perceived from without, through the lens that forms it, or from within, through any other lens. But this last is the only method by which a physical picture can be physically reproduced: so the Psychologist is impelled to postulate a non-physical perceptive agent.

As to the other or Metaphysical Theory of man's nature,

we must criticise it on other lines. Is the analysis employed deep enough? Is it self-consistent? Does it really take account of *all* the facts? We may trace the origin of the whole difficulty to Kant's destructive criticism of the "Ideas of the Pure Reason." With ruthless dialectic, he exposes the sophisms by which the belief in the spiritual self, the existence of God, and the object-world are intellectually supported: then, he declares that our moral nature obliges us to accept these Ideas as bases of action. But, considering the moral nature of man as competent to speak of action alone, not of truth, he finally explains that we are obliged to act on the "Ideas of the Pure Reason" as if they were true, but not to believe that they are true, though the moral obligation is as deep as if they were actually true. To this beginning we may trace that separation of man's moral nature from his intellectual which has culminated in much of the current Metaphysic: and to this division made by Kant we must apply ourselves, if we wish to find an accurate analysis from which we may obtain a true synthesis of the nature of man and the basis on which it rests. This is the real origin of all purely experimental Metaphysic; the theories of Mill, Bain, Bradley, and their fellows stand or fall with Kant.

Now, it seems hardly possible to believe that Mental and Moral Science lead to contradictory conclusions. If they do, one or other must be false: if these contradictory principles exist in the same person, the Unity of Personality is destroyed, and with it the unity of the individual. We are, in fact, dealing in each case with *two* beings, one of whom acts on what the other calls falsehood, while the latter's belief is to the former a practical lie. Now, I cannot admit the accuracy of Kant's dialectic—he seems to miss entirely the force of some of the arguments that he attacks. Still, there is a certain amount of truth in what

he says. How can we keep the true part of his argument, and still retain our belief in the Unity of Personality? Only in one way—by finding that unity in some deeper stratum of man's nature, in which the intellect and the moral nature are at one. I am fully persuaded that there is such a unifying element, and that it can be found.

(A.) There are certain contradictory elements in man's mental—or non-bodily—powers. The first has been mentioned. Waiving the question as to how far Kant's objections to the reality of an absolute Subject, an absolute Object, and an absolute God, can be pressed, this much is at least true. These Ideas have not come from the Intellect alone, and men find it possible to exclude them from their intellectual world. But, on Kant's own showing, they must be the ruling powers in the moral world, and, to put it in a famous formula, their falsehood in Reason would "put us to permanent intellectual confusion." Mr. Balfour has done a service to the cause of both Ethics and Metaphysics by pointing out that it is only through belief in the "Ideas" that we can trust our intellect itself. Neither intellect alone nor the moral nature alone can guide us to both truth and conduct; and as we are obliged to receive the conclusions arrived at by both, we have no help but to seek for the personal element—the Ego—in something that, as a deeper source of individuality, can reconcile by outcomprehending both morality and reason.

(B.) Again, the moral and the intellectual Reasons are curiously bound up together. *Quâ* Reason, the former contains certain principles. *Quâ* Moral Sense, or Conscience, it passes judgment on individual acts; and it has been rather too hastily assumed that it does so by referring each act to a moral principle. Teachers of derivate—evolutionary or otherwise—morality frequently take advantage of this illusion in order to upset belief in an ultimate

Moral Law, by means of the contradictions between one code of morality and another. A Greenlander,¹ finding a man knocking his snow-shoes on the ground to clear them, considers it his duty to kill him. The man at the stake and the man who burns him are alike satisfied that they have done their duty. Now the curious point is that such instances impeach, not the moral, but the *intellectual* reason. Whatever we may conceive the moral principle to be, we never directly refer an individual case to it. Between the two is a process of intellectual reasoning; and it would not be hard to show that moral differences find their origin in this process. The Eskimo has *reasoned* out a belief that a man sins against fundamental morality by what is to us an innocent act: if our intellectual process were the same as his, we should act as he does. So, too, in the other cases. Ian Maclaren makes one of his heroines state that "the martyr at the stake and the judge who sent him there may both have been doing what is acceptable to God." In other words, they may both be following the same fundamental morality: their different reasonings in the second stage have thrown their actions into variance. Generally speaking, all men who are equally desirous of morality act alike, except for the intellectual part of their reasoning. Here, again, we cannot help demanding something greater than conscience and more mighty than reasoning, in which both may be reconciled; and we may rightly go one step further, and claim that the moral principles (which rarely come into the full light of consciousness, though they are more permanent than the conscience to which they contribute or the reasoning that lies between it and them) may more probably rest on this deeper principle than on either pure Psychology or practical Ethics.

¹ This case was actually quoted in my hearing, as an argument against a reasonable basis for morality, by a member of the British Association.

(C.) Again, there is perhaps nothing on which those whose Ontology rests on Pure Reason are more agreed than the impossibility of Free Will. We cannot deny that our Minds and our Moral Reason are alike subject to the law of Causation. We have to admit this even when accompanied by the theory that the idea of an Efficient Cause is the merest *Maya*. Yet (*teste* Kant) belief in Free Will is essential to Morality. But we cannot escape the force of the arguments—the intellectual ones. Mr. Bradley declares off-hand that in his Reality—which is Experience—there is no room whatsoever for Free Will. Mill, as everybody knows, assails the doctrine from another side, by assaulting Causation itself, and substituting for it “invariable unconditional antecedence.” Now Mr. Bradley may be right—in his World of Experience. If we are limited to that phenomenal universe of contradictions and varieties, so that we can judge Reality only by its surface, we are living on the skin of Spinoza’s whale, watching nothing but its changes, and may well admit (seeing that we cannot reach the creature’s heart) that there is nothing but surface-change to be found—on the surface. So, too, in the limited Metaphysic of Mill, we may safely admit the absence of any Efficient Causation. Yet men believe they are free; and I have never heard of a Determinist who was satisfied to forgive his enemy, because the enemy’s ill-will was a mere consequent to some antecedent, both of which were outside that enemy’s power to avoid. The affirmation of Free Will rests ultimately on our belief in Causation, derived on certain grounds of reasoning, but existing as a part of the nature of man, from which he cannot finally escape. Does not this, too, send us in search of something in our nature deeper than what we can reach by reasoning? And may we not well conceive Free Will as existing there?

(D.) The late Frederic Myers has made an important

contribution to Psychology. By close observation of the phenomena of sleep, trances, telepathy, that peculiar state in which persons seem to know just beforehand something that is on the point of being said, "psychic" phenomena, &c., he has reached the conclusion that there is a faculty in the mind of man which he calls "subliminal consciousness"; and he is inclined to assign to it a place nearer to the core of our full being than is held by consciousness itself. There are several objections to this conclusion. Myers has found this kind of consciousness existent in abnormal states, and there seems no reason to believe that the "dwellers on the threshold" of our nature are more to be trusted than our normal powers. Further, an analysis of consciousness, however complete, is not an analysis of our being. Again, this species of consciousness (as he considers it) seems akin to those diseased states in which a man talks and acts, while really unconscious; and, as a simple matter of fact, the "subliminal consciousness" may be under the threshold, but, in most lives, it seldom gets through. To seek for truth from such a source is rather like the practice of certain races, who consult idiots to find out the will of God. But that (speaking broadly) there is sometimes a strange intermixture of what seems supernatural (or, at least, unnatural) in life appears at least probable. It never rises to the dignity of evidence, but it has never been fully explained or got rid of. As this is not due to either moral or intellectual reason, may we not seek it, too, in a deeper and more directly personal part of our nature?

(E.) So, too, we may deal with that most curious element, Memory. It may be remembered that Ward met Mill on this very point, in answer to the latter's denial of an *à priori* element in our knowledge, and that Mill neither solved the difficulty then, nor found a solution ever afterwards. The dilemma is this. An act of Memory is "a state of consciousness, accompanied by the belief that

it adequately represents a former state of consciousness." But consciousness can relate only to the present. We are conscious of the *existing* state : by what faculty can we know that this represents a state that has disappeared in the past ? Is there any faculty that is *conscious* of what probably has altogether ceased to exist ? If there be one, we certainly do not know what it is : if there be none, how do we account for our belief that the present state represents a past one ? Here, again, we have a case in which neither consciousness nor intellect can supply an explanation for one of the most constant elements in our experience. Neither can escape from the law of time, or traverse past and future like Mr. Wells's "Time-traveller." *Must* we not seek deeper for the law of Memory, even to a stratum of our being that is not bound so absolutely by the law of Time ?

(F.) There are other facts of human nature pointing in the same direction, at which I can but glance. What is the artistic faculty ? Not a mere simian mimicry : the purer the mimicry, the less the art. Not a mere blending of various impressions, without a creative power. Blending has no artistic element unless the poet's or painter's own nature adds something to it that gives it unity and reality. Indeed, art involves the making of a reality outside experience. Moreover, the greater the artist, the greater is his departure from experience. Is it at all probable that the young author of "Wuthering Heights" had any *experience* of the weird and terrible character whom she gives us as a hero ? Or that any mere admixture of former impressions was alone responsible for the exquisite word-painting in Mr. Barrie's "Little White Bird" ? *Imagination* is itself a gift ; and the history of literature plainly shows that it often absolutely neglects both reason and morality. So, too, with 'Natural Religion.' There is an almost universal belief in a God or gods, except where it has been banished.

Huxley sets over against this the still more universal belief in 'ghosts,' not seeing that here, too, there is only one side of a natural belief in spiritual existence. It is easy to laugh at the Jewish or Christian hold on an invisible world ; but it is not easy to disturb it. And the man who hath no music in himself—the man without any taste for poetry or romance—the man who stands looking at Niagara, with the one idea of developing its water-power—the man whose beliefs are set out with a six-inch rule and reduced to a trust in what he can handle—is generally supposed to embody not human nature at its best, but human nature with something sadly lacking. May we not find here, too, a good reason for seeking the real man, not in reason, but in a deeper stratum of his nature ?

This central, personal, unifying self I call *Spirit*; and in it, and nowhere else, can I find something that gives man an absolute and single personality, and also reconciles the perpetual opposition between the Intellectual and the Moral Reason. Both must trace back to it. As surely as the Brain is only a machine worked by the mind, the mind itself is a machine under control of the spirit. Lying deeper than ordinary experience, it may be considered as the seat of both memory and the inexplicable laws of taste and art. If it be true that Experience has no room for Free Will, and yet that we cannot get rid of the belief that we are free—nay, more, that Reason itself perpetually tends towards this belief, and the moral nature always assumes it as necessary—we may very well regard this element behind Experience as the source of our belief. There is no reason why the spirit should not be free, since it is outside the space and time laws that govern Experience. There is no reason why it should be tied fast to these purely mental laws ; and therefore we may consider it as the source of memory, and what is called 'subliminal consciousness.' In the same way, it seems to be the seat of those moral

principles which belong to humanity as a whole, though individuals reason out from them different results.

I presume that it can hardly be regarded as an objection to this analysis that it is constantly associated with religion, which always finds the root of human thought, life, morals, and 'spirituality' in spirit. And it is also worthy of notice that it agrees with the general trend of human thought, which seeks for all action—mechanical, chemical, vital, intellectual—a cause or origin in that which is subtler, less grossly material, a source less crude than the matter or substance affected by the cause.

There are many questions concerning the nature of spirit and its relations to the rest of our being that I should like to discuss; but it seems better to devote the remaining space at my hand to one point. What seems to be the origin of spirit in man, and how can we connect it with his other powers?

As a matter of fact, the origin of the spirit of man has been the subject of controversy, both in Metaphysics and Theology. We find (1) the doctrine of *Traducianism*, by which it was taught that the spirit of man had the same origin as his body, being sexually procreated. Probably no one now holds this view. There is something repugnant in the idea, specially to those who regard the spirit as outliving the body. Taking the analogy of life, we find that no living material creature is propagated except through some living creature or creatures already existing: life springs from life, though it may be modified by environment. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." So, too, "that which is born of the Spirit is spirit"; and under these phrases we have a metaphysical truth. Physical procreation produces physical organisms; but the spirit is certainly not physical, and there is no ground for treating as an organism that subtle essence, which seems to use all our organised life, material and immaterial.

By reaction from this view grew (2) the doctrine of concomitant creation. The body (argue the supporters of this belief) is indeed generated; but, in each case, God adds to each body at a certain point (generally stated as the time of conception) a separate and individual spirit, created for that purpose and at that time. To this there seem to be two objections. (*a*) If the spirit be the moulder of all vital forces, we should expect it to be in itself anterior, rather than posterior, to the beginning of physical life. (*β*) The analogy of nature is against this view, inasmuch as all life in nature is, in its *process* of formation, evolutionary: if we deny the existence of separate creative acts in nature, we cannot believe that in the spiritual world the process of creation is in direct opposition to the process that holds elsewhere.

We are thus left to face (3) what seems the only other alternative, the pre-existence of the spirit of man. I do not think that the Platonic view, the pre-existence of individual and conscious spirits, as stated by the late Cardinal Newman—

“ And with the morn those angel-faces smile,
Which I have loved long since, and lost a while ”—

shows any probability of truth. Like Creationism, it is inorganic: there is nothing analogous to it in the world, so far as we can see.

But, at the same time, there are many things that lead us somewhat in this direction. Evolution has taught us to refer the common elements in different classes of things to derivation from a common stock. Now nothing seems more certain than that the spiritual nature of man tends to an increasing individuality, while, at the same time, it shows broad lines of kinship through all mankind. We may go yet further, and say that in spirit, no less than in body, there is a strong resemblance between higher animals

and man. If we rightly understand what one may call the spiritual nature (seeing that it is marked in them by results similar to those from which we infer our own deep self) of animals, we may refer it to a common source with our own. In Bishop Butler's defence of the possibility of immortality of animals, he proceeds on two principles—(1) the probability of there being as much need in other parts of the universe as in this of living beings beneath us *grade*; and (2) the fact that "we ourselves" have once possessed an inner nature weaker than that of many animals. Practically, we may treat this as an admission of a common inner nature, and of the power of development or evolution. We may then take a wider view of spirit than we can find by regarding it as simply human, and ask what is probably the common origin of all spirit, whether it takes shape within the narrow limits of the beast, the broader bounds of man's nature, or in any kind of partial or absolute corporeity within the universe.

I would suggest that the most probable solution lies in the direction of pre-existence: but that analogy points to this pre-existent spirit as homogeneous, and, in some sense, indefinite and incoherent at first, but individualised in its development, even as is matter. As with matter, so with spirit: the continuous development of both points in each case to a beginning in Time, or of Time. In the "Unity of Perception," intelligent beings find the Subject and Object—the Ego and Non-ego—momentarily one: but there is an instantaneous breaking up of this unity as the Subjective element in the Sensation becomes mental, while the Objective element passes into our conception of a material world. This grasp of momentary unity may well be referred to the Spirit, which reveals itself in our mental world without becoming an actual part thereof, even as it flashes through our mental powers as Moral Reason, setting up that intellectual process which guides us (not always with certainty).

as we have seen) in our actions. This further justifies us in setting spirit and matter at the opposite poles of man's being, and in giving to mind, memory, &c., an intermediate place between our "gross corporeal substance" and our deepest nature. The precise place of these intermediate elements is a question needing further examination, which I cannot now undertake.

But I must add one other point. If in the spirit we find the element of unity within ourselves, as it gives a common root for the mental Subject and Object, for Pure Reason and Moral Reason, for the remembered Past and the remembering Present, where is the common source of matter and spirit? On earth things are moving up the scale: the appearance of life, perception, thought, conscience, marks definite steps in the passage from the deep blue to the scarlet in the spectrum of existence. Spirit cannot be at its highest potency and in its greatest freedom as we know it here: and it may not be carrying the simile of the spectrum too far to say that as day by day we are now learning how radiations lying beyond the scarlet move the greatest and most mysterious forces of the Universe, so too, beyond the trammels of our present being, there may be powers in our own nature of which we now do not know even the existence. As to the Power that unites spirit, the source of these activities, with matter—the origin of qualities which our bodies, dead or alive, possess in common with the purely material creation,

"Rolled round in earth's diurnal course,
With rocks and stones and trees,"—

an answer is constantly set before us. And I must say that, of all solutions, it seems the most reasonable.

ALEXANDER R. EAGAR.

WENDT'S THEORY OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

THIS examination of the theory which Professor H. Wendt of Jena has recently and attractively set forth in his book *Das Johannesevangelium*, is undertaken not with the object of discrediting his contribution to New Testament criticism, but in order to see whether it meets the facts of the case better than the old view. To state the theory briefly. The Gospel is not a perfect piece like the seamless coat, but is a new edition, by a later hand, of the notes that the Apostle had made of the discourses of Jesus. These notes which Wendt calls *Die Quelle*, were elaborated and set in a historical frame of post-Apostolic and later Synoptic tradition by a member of the Asiatic community, who worked in the first quarter of the second century. The Gospel is therefore the Gospel *according* to John in the sense that it contains the notes of that Apostle, just as the first Evangelist is the Gospel *according* to Matthew, because the Logia of that Evangelist are incorporated therein.

Dr. Wendt tests the Fourth Gospel by the Synoptic tradition as represented in the Gospel of Mark and the Logia of Matthew, and declares that the purification of the Temple, which St. John puts in the forefront of our Lord's mission, took place, as Mark has it, during His last visit to the holy city. "It is not probable," he writes, "that Jesus purged the temple more than once. Only one such demonstrative act performed in righteous indignation would have inner justification." In St. Mark's Gospel it stands in a practical connexion with the development

of the conflict which was to end in disaster; while, as it stands in St. John's Gospel, "it is a solitary deed, unrelated and without consequences." That it had significance in its setting, and that it had influence upon the subsequent attitude of Jesus to the Jews, is evident to the casual reader. The Lord's manner at the wedding in Cana was strange. The mother who had gone to Him in a confiding way is almost repelled by His answer: "Woman, what have I to do with thee? Mine hour is not yet come." That the approach of this 'hour' is not to be merely the signal for the sign, is clear from the use of hour (ὥρα) in this Gospel to denote some momentous occurrence, some epoch in our Lord's history, *e.g.*, "Father, save Me from this hour" (xii. 27), *i.e.*, this period of stress and strain. While meditating a course of action that might open the eyes of the Jews, His train of thought was disturbed for a moment to be resumed after the help suggested had been rendered. No decisive deed followed immediately; but His restlessness may be read in the words, "And they continued there [in Capernaum] not many days." His soul filled with a mighty purpose, now that the consciousness of His mission and His origin has become awake, He follows the crowd of pilgrims to Jerusalem. Each annual visit to the city, since His twelfth year, had but served to increase His indignation against the wrong use to which the precincts of the Temple had been put. And now, specially reminded of His mission, He is prepared to display and assert in public the powers and the claims of which He had already given evidence in the private circle of His disciples. But He is repelled by the hostile attitude of the Jews, so different from the friendliness of the provincials. He is, therefore, thrown back upon Himself. An assumed aloofness conceals His feelings. He is experiencing the first pang of disappointment. And though He did many signs, and many believed on His name, He would not trust

Himself to them, for He was beginning to learn (ἐγίνωσκε) what was in man. Nicodemus, who had noted the signs and heard the words of the young preacher from Galilee, unable to break down that barrier of reserve in public, comes to Him privately, and learns from Him the inwardness of the spiritual change that admits to the kingdom of God. An alteration in His method of self-revelation: a more cautious manner, a calmer demeanour—these are the results of an episode which Prof. Wendt regards as “unrelated and without consequences.”

With regard to the publication and acknowledgment of His Messianic claims, there does not seem to be any real difference between the Johannine and Synoptic narratives. The great confession of Peter was not made for a long time afterwards at Caesarea Philippi (Mark viii. 27; Matthew xvi. 16), and is duly recorded in John vi. 69: “We have believed and are sure that Thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God.” Here, at least, the Fourth Gospel falls into line with the Synoptists. Moreover, the growing reserve in the manner of Jesus which has been noticed in the Fourth Gospel is quite consistent with His rebuking and silencing the possessed in Mark i. 24, and His general shunning of publicity (Mark i. 45). With regard to His own assertion of His claims, the Johannine account does not appear to be greatly at variance with the Synoptic. After the imprisonment of the Baptist, St. Mark tells us that Jesus came into Galilee, preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God (i. 14). In the Johannine account of the Master’s conversation with Nicodemus (John iii.), we find Him preaching of this Kingdom of God, and only proceeding to give a fuller description of its nature and the conditions of admission to it, and of Him who was the centre, in response to the queries of the interviewer. It was only to those who were able to receive it, as Nicodemus and the Samaritan woman,

that Jesus revealed His nature and mission. From the multitudes who would make Him a king He withdrew (John v. 16); and by many of His disciples His claims were rejected (vi. 66).

Wendt proceeds to examine a group of records concerning the Messiahship of Jesus. At the bottom of his exegesis lies, we think, a misapprehension of the relation of the Baptist to his great successor. It is to the Fourth Gospel that we look for the clearing up of the mystery of the Baptist's vacillation which is recorded by the Synoptists. "The explanation that the Baptist had lost faith in the Messiahship of Jesus, after having declared it, because the method of Jesus did not correspond with his ideas of the Messiah, is excluded," writes Wendt (p. 14). There may be, however, another. Much of the history and hopes of the Baptist is revealed in that saying reported in the Fourth Gospel : "He who sent me to baptize in water, the same said unto me, Upon whom thou shalt see the Spirit descending and abiding on Him, He it is who baptizeth in the Holy Spirit." In the heart of that wild figure, whose earnestness was ever at white heat, was treasured up a charge consisting of a message and a promise; and as he did not fail to trumpet forth the one, he did not cease to brood upon the other. This promise was his inspiration. The hope of some day leading to his baptism one who was to confer the spiritual baptism that would purify the heart, supported the reformer in his dark hour. This hope of "the stronger than he" is recorded in the other Gospel sources. But John, who alone of all the evangelists belonged to the inner circle of the Baptist's followers, knew more than the others of the hope that buoyed up his life, and records its fulfilment. One day the herald of the spiritual kingdom in his rapt mood had led a stranger, who perhaps differed in no way from other men, except in the air of peace that rested upon Him, to the waters. And as he raised Him up,

suddenly the rays of the sun fell upon that tranquil face; and in a moment of ecstasy the Baptist witnessed the realization of his dream. That was the supreme hour of his life. It was as if the heavens opened, and the Spirit descended calmly and rested permanently upon the man before him. It was as if a voice was heard proclaiming the coronation and consecration of the King in the words of the Psalmist. And the Baptist, thus apprised of His nature and mission, says: "I saw, and bare record that this is the Son of God" (i. 34). His soul is satisfied; and the day afterwards, seeing the stranger pass, he said, with a reference to his favourite Isaiah: "Behold the Lamb of God, which taketh away the sin of the world"; and his disciples followed the stranger.

In the meantime the Baptist continued his work; and Jesus withdrew again, when it was known that His disciples were more numerous than John's, lest He should wound the feelings of the latter. But the Baptist expressed himself in words of resignation (John iii. 31). Shortly after this, he is cast into prison; and from the soul of the caged prophet the vision he had received fades away. It had helped him to rise above all the Jewish aspirations of his time; but within his dark prison walls the golden hope passes from his grasp. He longs for another revelation, a fresh assurance to fan into flame the dying embers of his faith. This view shows that the vacillation, so far from being "psychologically incomprehensible" (p. 14), is true to human nature. For they who rise to the highest heights of hope are prone to sink to lower depths than those who have never soared at all.

Again, it is noteworthy that in this Gospel, though it is essentially the Gospel of the Holy Spirit—a Gospel strange to the Ephesian followers of the Baptist (Acts xix. 4)—nothing that could in the slightest manner detract from the character and work of the Baptist finds a place. Its

writer paints the Baptist in a softer and more agreeable light, and describes his relations to the Messiah as the constant witness of the True Light, not so much with a view to prove that the Messianic nature of his successor was known to John, as to re-establish the character of the Predecessor (*vide* John xi. 41). There is also a strong similarity between the speeches which the Evangelist puts into the mouth of the Baptist and the Johannine discourses of Jesus. It may have been that the Evangelist reproduced the Baptist's statements, which are of considerable length and evidently summaries (John i. 15-34; iii. 27-36), in the after-light of the revelation of the Word, and recast them in the form in which he reproduced the words of Jesus; or it may have been that the genius of the Baptist exercised a subtle influence upon the mind of the Apostle, and caused him almost unconsciously to adopt his manner of speech, as he recorded the Master's discourses. From the very beginning of the Prologue we see traces of the indelible impression made by the testimony of the Baptist upon the mind of the writer—a testimony which was daily receiving fresh confirmation in the Apostle's life, and which had induced him to make his venture of faith. It was owing to that ever vivid impression that the author twice explains the course of the argument with which he begins his Gospel, by a reference to this testimony. These passages, according to Wendt, interruptions of the original prologue by the later Evangelist (p. 104), are thus, to another view, interludes of human music in the Divine Anthem of the Word, necessary links in that great chain of reasoning that is gradually lowered from the heights of existence and light, which no man can approach unto or describe, to the levels of human being and thought, until the Word Illuminative and the Word Creative stands revealed as an historical figure upon the stage of life. In its broad lines this witness is consistently represented in the four

Gospels; while its more special position in the economy of Christian revelation is given by him who, alone of the Evangelists, could gauge its value and estimate its influence, and whose writings can hardly be said to be actuated by "a polemical interest against the Baptist" (Wendt, p. 226).

Having enumerated certain so-called differences between the Synoptic and the Johannine records, Wendt gives (pp. 30-44) a list of the many coincidences of words and groups of words that are to be found between these authorities, in points of trivial detail as well as in matters of the greatest moment. These coincidences, often quite undesigned, *e.g.* in the reports of the Baptist's words, the alabaster box, the scene with Malchus, the Denial, and the Passion, are to be explained, he says, by the previous acquaintance of the writer with the Synoptic tradition. A knowledge of the other Gospels is, indeed, presupposed by the writer of this Gospel; but this alleged use of the Synoptic records, now of one and now of another, without regard to the relative age and authority of the different sources, stamps the work as of secondary character in the eyes of Wendt. "For an independent witness would present a narrative similar in broad principles with previous records, but in particulars would take an original stand" (p. 44). Now the opposite position might be maintained with equal force. For an independent witness, while bound to adhere to the facts of the case, is at liberty to give his own impressions and interpretations of the principles at stake. And it is remarkable that the historical passages and narrative portions which Wendt attributes to an Asiatic writer of the first quarter of the second century are generally regarded as containing the very points of evidence for the Palestinian authorship of this Gospel; while the history of the Judean ministry stamps the work as independent.

But Wendt, while holding that the Evangelist availed himself of the labours of the Synoptists for the historical setting of his text (p. 46), allows that he found the most important portion of his material, the discourses of Jesus, in another written 'source,' and this of apostolic authority (p. 53). The Gospel is, accordingly, of composite origin. The reasons for this hypothesis are these (p. 50): "In the first place, there are differences between the view-point of the Evangelist and the thought of the speeches reported by him, which could not possibly exist had the speeches been composed by the Evangelist." And in the second place, "the speeches partly belong to a different historical situation from that delineated by the Evangelist, and partly suffer interruption from the introduction of extraneous matter." In fact, the basis of Wendt's theory is the supposed difference of standpoint between the narrative and the rhetorical portions of the Gospel. In the historical parts the 'signs' are said to be extolled, while in the speeches 'signs' are refused, but the appeal is to 'works.' This distinction, however, seems to be forced. For we find in the discourses a strange identification of *σημεῖα* and *ἔργα*, notably in the question of the Jews (vi. 30): "What *σημεῖον* showest Thou, that we may see and believe? What dost Thou work? [*τί ἐργάζῃ;*]" In the discourses, again, Jesus appeals to His signs: "Ye seek Me not because ye saw the *σημεῖα*, but because ye did eat of the loaves" (vi. 26). Here He rebukes the Jews for not having seen the significance of that work as a sign of Himself. But in the narrative portion (xx. 29), omitted by Wendt, He does not appeal to His signs, but says: "Blessed are those who have not seen and have believed." It is true that Jesus appeals to His *ἔργα* as a greater witness than that of John (v. 36), and that the Evangelist concludes the Gospel with a reference to *σημεῖα*, "recorded that men may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of

God" (xx. 31). But is this apparent difference a sufficiently strong basis for the theory that the latter passage was written from a different standpoint and with a different interest from the former? For the 'works' of Jesus cannot be confined to His words, His preaching of the Kingdom, and His revelation of the Father (p. 58); nor can it be said that the "'signs' are the ground of faith in Him" (p. 19). In support of the former view, Wendt quotes iv. 34: "My meat is to do the will of Him that sent Me, and to finish His ἔργον"; and xvii. 4: "I have finished the ἔργον which Thou gavest Me to do." But this latter verse he connects with the words of the 6th verse: "I have manifested Thy name," etc.; whereas it stands in a closer connexion with the immediately preceding words: "I have glorified Thee on earth." Now δόξα and its derivatives are used in this Gospel of objective manifestations. See i. 14: "We beheld His glory, glory (δόξαν) as of the Only Begotten, fresh from the Father's presence"; ii. 11: "this beginning of signs did Jesus, and manifested forth His glory" (δόξαν); and xii. 27, where the words: "Father, glorify Thy Name" (δόξασον), are followed by a voice from heaven. The glory of the Father was not manifested simply by the word of preaching, but also by the word of power, for which see iv. 50: "And the man believed the word which Jesus had spoken."

It was the mission of Jesus to reveal the Father's love both by works and by words. His work cannot be limited to His word: nor may our interest find its centre in His word rather than in His Person. By the prologue of the Gospel, the Divine Personality of Jesus is introduced to us before we find any allusion to His works, which were to the faithful observer sacraments of a divine life among men, revelations of a divine love in action, evidences of a divine power at work, symbols of spiritual processes, and therefore σημεῖα, but which were to the Divine Worker

Himself the natural outcome of His being, that which He wrought, the outer expression of His inner life, and therefore His ἔργα, His works. What were σημεῖα to others were ἔργα to Him. The difference is one of objective and subjective. This identification of ἔργα and σημεῖα may be further established by a consideration of the passages in which ἐργάζομαι occurs. In v. 17-27, regarded by Wendt as part of the original source, Jesus says: "My Father worketh hitherto, and I work (ἐργάζομαι)," etc.

The ἔργα referred to must imply something more than the work of preaching. They have a scale of greatness; they are the source of wonder; and they are connected in the 21st verse with the raising and quickening of the dead. Again, see xiv. 12: "He that believeth on Me, the ἔργα that I do shall he do also; and greater than these shall he do, because I go to My Father." It would narrow the scope of 'works' unnaturally if one limited them here to the work of preaching. And in the narrative portion, ix. 1-4, where we should, according to Wendt, expect to find the word σημεῖα, we have ἔργα: "Neither did this man sin nor his parents, but that the ἔργα of God might be made manifest in him. I must work the ἔργα of Him that sent Me while it is day." Now if the word 'signs' were not used in the discourses, and the word 'works' never appeared in the narratives, Prof. Wendt would have some ground for his contention. But we have seen that this is not the case, and that the miracles of Jesus are regarded as 'signs' because manifestations of a higher nature than the human, and as 'works' because the logical expression of that nature and "in rational sequence" with the Person who wrought them.

Furthermore, if faith in the Messiah is based on the 'signs' of Jesus, and if the primary object of these signs had been the creation of faith in Jesus, that purpose cannot be said to have been successful. The 'sign' in Cana

of Galilee confirmed the faith of those who were already disciples. But the sign at Bethesda and the sign in the wilderness cannot be said to have created faith ; while the blind man of the 9th chapter, whose sight was restored, did not profess faith in Jesus at first : He simply regarded Him as a prophet. Only after a personal interview was faith created (vv. 35-38). Wendt builds upon the fact that the Schlusswort (xx. 30, 31) only mentions the 'signs' of Jesus ; but there is good authority for the reading πιστεύητε, "that ye may go on believing," so that this passage, on which the new theory is built, may support the opposite view, that faith is represented in the narrative portions, not so much as created as confirmed by the 'signs.' With this we may compare the somewhat doubtful conclusion of St. Mark's Gospel. "The Lord *working* with (συνεργοῦντος) them, and confirming (βεβαιοῦντος) the word by the signs that followed" (διὰ τῶν ἐπακολουθούντων σημείων). Accordingly, the whole tenor of the narrative portion falls into line with that of the discourses, which is expressed in xiv. 11: "Believe Me that I am in the Father : or else believe Me for the very works' sake" (διὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτα). That is, if My personality, My life, and My revelation do not win your faith, then infer from the greatness of My works the greatness of My nature. Of the supernatural life described in the Prologue, the signs recorded in the Gospel are but passing episodes, fleeting flashes, the significant phenomena of a unique personality. The standpoint of the Fourth Gospel is distinct from the Synoptists' in nothing more than in this, that whereas in the latter the miracles are put forward as the credentials of His mission and the arguments for faith, in the former the primary motive of faith is the appeal He makes to our own hearts and consciences. The living Christ is thus the principal proof of His religion. As He signified His nature in His works, His works are the signs of His nature,

stamping His utterances with the seal of divinity and truth. And His personality was manifested in and through His words and His works, His words being tokens of His divine wisdom, and His works being proofs of His divine power, so that in a wonderful manner word answers to work, and work corresponds with word, and yet without identification, in the economy of His Incarnate life.

So far we cannot say that Wendt has established his position. His second argument is based on the relation of the narrative portion to the discourses. In the first place, he attempts to show that the author of the narrative failed to understand certain passages in the discourses. But as it would be quite consistent with the subordinate position and work of the Apostle in relation to His Master's utterances to fail in fully grasping their significance, we cannot attach much importance to the alleged instances of misunderstanding. We cannot say, for example, that it would be a higher or more correct interpretation of the words of Jesus, "Destroy this temple (*ναός*), and I will raise it up in three days," to see in it a reference to the Jewish temple and the reform of its religion rather than to the resurrection of His body. This was the twist the false witnesses gave His statement by adding *χειροποίητον* (Mark xiv. 58). But read in the light of the Pauline expression, "Your body is a temple" (*τὸ σῶμα ὑμῶν ναός*, 1 Cor. vi. 19), St. John's comment, "This spake He of the temple of His body" (*τοῦ ναοῦ τοῦ σώματος*), is easily understood.

With regard to xii. 32: "And I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto Myself," Wendt declares it has a deeper significance than that given by the Evangelist—"Thus spake He, signifying by what death He should die." Jesus certainly does refer to an exaltation here—but, in His allusive style, refers to it in terms that are also applicable to the very mode of His death, which was a lifting above the earth. The Jews themselves saw

through these words an allusion to removal from the earth, and they said: "We have heard from the law that the Messiah abideth for ever: and how sayest Thou, The Son of Man must be lifted up? Who is this Son of Man?" In his criticism of the Evangelist's well-known comment upon "rivers of living water" (vii. 38), Wendt presses the saying: "My words are spirit and are life" in order to identify the one gift with the other, and to show that as the gift of life was immediate, so was the gift of the Spirit, and that therefore both were the result of the preaching, not of the glorification, of Jesus (p 64). The Evangelist, however, pointedly co-ordinates these gifts by repeating the verb. Finally, it is to be remarked that these notes with which Wendt quarrels are to be found in the discourses which he admits to be, generally speaking, of apostolic origin, and therefore must have had high authority.

Wendt now proceeds to discover a lack of harmony between the discourses and their historical setting. He begins with c. v., and finds the speech v. 17 ff. has nothing to do with the narrative v. 1-16; for this reason, that in the setting of the discourse there is no allusion to any performances of any work by our Lord on the Sabbath day, inasmuch as the impotent man was cured by a word. This argument is of the nature of hair-splitting. For Jesus' action is referred to in the narrative as a work of beneficent activity (*ποιήσας ὑγιῆ*, v. 11), through which in the eyes of the Jews, who regarded even sympathy with the sick on the Sabbath as a violation of its sanctity, He had not only made another break the Sabbath, but had broken it Himself. Again, Wendt regards the speech recorded in vii. 15-24, as a continuation of the fifth chapter. But the discourses have different subjects. That of c. v. concerns active goodness (*ποιῶ* and *ἐργάζομαι*); while in c. vii. the subject of discussion is moral teaching (*ἐδίδασκε*, v. 15). In

v. 20, Jesus declares: "He will show Him greater works (ἔργα), that ye may marvel (θαυμάζετε)." In vii. 14, Jesus went up to the temple, and began to teach, and the Jews began to wonder (ἐθαύμαζον), saying, "How knoweth this man letters, having never studied?" But the fact that words may cause surprise as well as works does not prove that works are identical with words. The teaching of Jesus in c. vii. is moral doctrine concerning action. The Jews are inconsistent in their actions. They do not keep the law of Moses, for they are thirsting for a man's blood. Here the Master refers to an episode in His life (v. 10) which has drawn down upon Him the deadly opposition of the Jews. The infringement of the Sabbath law is excusable in a case of expediency; but the law concerning murder admits of no exception. As it stands, the discourse seems to belong to its setting. If, with Wendt, we place vii. 15-24 immediately after v. 47, we have an apparent link-word in 'writings,' γράμματα: "If you do not believe his writings, γράμμασιν" (v. 47); "How knoweth this man letters, γράμματα?" (vii. 15) An obvious objection, however, is that v. 47 is clearly a peroration, and that the whole speech becomes a straggling discourse with two endings, very unlike the other discourses admitted by Wendt, if vii. 15-24 be read as its continuation. Moreover, γράμματα in the first passage is definite—the writings of Moses; and in the second is indefinite and general, and means education, viz. διδασχί, or doctrine. Admitting, however, the connexion between the two discourses, it is not unusual for a teacher to repeat himself and his arguments after a lapse of some months if he finds himself confronted with a similar set of circumstances.

We now come to chapter vi. Here it is related that the Jews, after having been miraculously fed by the loaves (1-16), demanded a sign like that of Moses, "What sign showest Thou that we may see, and believe Thee?"

"How," demands Wendt (p. 71), "is such a complete ignoring of the miracle of the loaves conceivable?" But Jesus has already commented upon the fact that the Jews had sought Him, not because they saw the signs, but because they did eat of the loaves, and were filled (vi. 26). As the narrative stands, it agrees with St. Mark (vi. 52), who relates that even "the disciples understood not the matter of the loaves, for their hearts were hardened"; and after his account of the feeding of the 4,000, says: "The Pharisees came forth, asking from Him a sign from heaven" (viii. 11). Wendt discovers a link-word between v. 18 and vi. 41, in οἱ ἰουδαῖοι. But it is not at all probable that the Jews of the 5th chapter and the Jews of the 6th were the same audience, for this reason, that, while the leading inhabitants of Jerusalem might have been generally aware of the Galilean origin and connexions of Jesus (*vide* vii. 27), it is not at all likely that they were personally acquainted with Mary and Joseph, as these people were. This view is supported by St. Mark in whose 6th chapter it is the countrymen of Jesus who ask this question (v. 3).

Another set of link-words ἐργάζουαι (v. 17), ἔργα (v. 20), and ἐργάζεσθε (vi. 27) are hardly able to bear the strain put upon them. For ἐργάζουαι is the middle of self-expression and ἐργάζεσθε of self-acquisition; while, according to Wendt's own interpretation, ἔργα consisted in the labours of preaching (p. 74). Furthermore, the subject-matter of the discourse in c. v. is utterly different from that of c. vi., the former being occupied with the evidence (ἡ μαρτυρία) for Christ, while the latter is concerned with the sustenance (ἡ βρωσις) that is to be found in Christ. Accordingly, if we follow Wendt's suggestion, and read both vi. 27 f., and vii. 15-24 with c. v., we have a grave confusion of subjects, Christian evidence, Christian sustenance, and Christian expediency following each other without connexion and without break. This order is hardly an improvement on that of the Gospel.

Again, we are told (p. 87) that there is an artificial division between certain words in c. vii. and c. viii. The back references of the passage viii. 12-20 to the speeches in vii., if established, may prove that the discourses belong to the same period of time, the feast of tabernacles; but they do not establish any illogical separation. However, it is quite possible that the discussion whether Jesus was a prophet (vii. 52) is the proper introduction to His utterance: "I am the Light (τὸ φῶς) of the world." Compare His reference to the Baptist: "He was the burning and the shining lamp: and ye were willing for a time to rejoice in his light" τῷ φωτὶ (v. 35). After all, why should the Evangelist have cut up the original speech?

Wendt's suggestion (p. 90) that there is another break of the same kind between verses 35-36 a, and verses 44-50 of c. xii., is advanced on the strength of the assumption that the scribe misunderstood 36 β, "He was concealed (ἐκρύβη) from them," which, according to Wendt, means: "He Himself as the person indicated in the figure was hid from them." If so, what of the following word 'departing' (καὶ ἀπελθὼν)? Is it another *Bildwort*?

The greatest alteration, perhaps, suggested by Wendt, is to read chapters xv. and xvi. after xiii. 35. The conclusion of c. xiv. bears the stamp, he says, of a last farewell. "Arise, let us go hence." Some colour is given to the suggestion by the fact that, in c. xvi. 5, Jesus says: "I am going to Him that sent Me, and none of you asketh Me, Whither goest Thou?"; and in c. xiii. 36, Peter asks this very question. But is it possible to leap at a bound from c. xiii. 35 to c. xv.?

We find that the whole conversation of cc. xiv. and xv. follows from the words of Jesus to the eleven, xiii. 31-35; the two leading thoughts of which are His departure and His new commandment. C. xvi. is an answer to questions arising out of His going, its place and purpose, and its

consolation. The little band then leaves the room ; and the Master on the way returns to the other subject of His thoughts, love (*ἀγάπη*). The love of the disciples is then contrasted with the hatred of the world (xv. 18). His followers remain silent with awe ; and to recall their thoughts from their future distress to His present purpose, He says : “ Now I am going to Him that sent Me, and none of you asketh Me, Whither goest Thou ? But because I have said these things unto you, sorrow hath filled your heart ” (xvi. 5) ; and then proceeds to state more fully the reasons of His going, and of the advent of the Comforter ; and declares more plainly than ever : “ I came forth from the Father, and I came into the world. Again, I leave the world, and I go unto the Father ” (xvi. 28). Then the disciples say : “ Now Thou talkest openly, and speakest no proverb. Now we know that Thou knowest all things, and needest not that any should question Thee.” Would it not be startling after this confession that He has answered all that is in their heart to find in xiii. 36—xiv. 31 (which Wendt places after c. xvi.) the disciples asking a number of questions the answers of which are presupposed in the fuller teaching of cc. xv. and xvi. ? Furthermore, the concluding words of the Master : “ In the world ye shall have tribulation : but be of good cheer ; I have overcome the world,” which came in so appropriately where they now stand before the prayer of self-consecration to which they give the keynote, present a climax from which the thought, if it but issued in a series of questions, would suffer an unnatural and inartistic descent.

Accordingly, if the discourse would suffer by such a replacement of its parts, such a replacement leads to a real displacement, unless there are stronger reasons than Wendt has yet adduced. In the remaining portion of this work, Wendt proceeds to analyze the Gospel into its constituent parts according to the principles he has already laid down,

and to describe the characteristics of the "Source," and to state his reasons for holding that it was the work of John the Apostle. It is much that this is admitted by German criticism. But it seems that a less pronounced effort to explain away the supernatural element would lead men to the same conclusion concerning the whole texture of the Gospel, which cannot be divided without being destroyed. For that it is "without seam, woven from the top throughout," has been established by nothing so much as by this attempt to rend it. In conclusion, while we join issue with Dr. Wendt's criticism of the narrative portion of the Gospel, and his theory of the dual authorship which creates greater problems than it solves, we have nothing but gratitude for his study of the discourses of Jesus, for the light he has thrown upon their connexion and meaning, for his defence of their apostolic authorship, and for his vindication of the words "which are spirit and are life."¹

F. R. MONTGOMERY HITCHCOCK.

¹ References in this article are to the German Edition.

THE PROBLEM OF SECOND CORINTHIANS.

THE critical investigation of the Pauline Epistles is likely to be stimulated by the recent introduction to the English-speaking public of the principles and conclusions of the Dutch School of New Testament criticism. These have not hitherto been seriously discussed by English Biblical critics ; but they have now been brought forward by their chief exponent, Professor Von Manen, in some of the principal articles in the *Encyclopædia Biblica*. “The later criticism,” he tells us, “holds that criticism should investigate not only those books which have been doubted for a longer or shorter period ; but also those which hitherto—it may be by everyone—have been held to be beyond all doubt ; whether they be canonical or uncanonical, sacred or profane. Criticism is not at liberty to set out from the genuineness—or the spuriousness—of any writing that is to be used as evidence in historical researches, so long as the necessary light has not been thrown upon it.”

“The so-called external evidences,” he declares, “do not avail here, however valuable may be what they have to tell us often as to the opinion of antiquity concerning these writings. It is internal criticism which must speak the last, the, so far as possible, conclusive word.”

What that word is, is not to him doubtful.

“With respect to the canonical Pauline Epistles, the later criticism here under consideration has learned to recognise that they are none of them by Paul ; neither

fourteen or thirteen, nor nine or ten, nor seven or eight, nor yet even the four so long universally regarded as unassailable. They are all without distinction pseudepigraphai (this of course not implying the least disparagement of their contents). . . . No distinction can any longer be allowed between 'principal Epistles,' and 'minor,' or 'deutero-Pauline,' ones. The distinction is purely arbitrary, with no foundation in the nature of the things here dealt with."

The final appeal, according to Professor Von Manen, is to the phenomena which the Epistles present to us. (And if the evidence of external testimony is ruled out of court, as being unable to do more than to record for us the opinion of the Church of the sub-apostolic age, this conclusion appears to be an inevitable one.) These phenomena, he maintains, clearly indicate that the Pauline Epistles are not letters originally intended for definite persons, despatched to these, and afterwards by publication made the common property of all. On the contrary, they were from the first books; treatises for instruction, and especially for edification, written in the form of letters in a tone of authority, as from the pen of Paul and other men of note who belonged to his *entourage*; while, in reality, the historical background of all these Epistles is a later age, at least the close of the first or beginning of the second century. Paul is, indeed, represented as speaking, and the names of Timothy, Silvanus, and other personages are introduced with the object of making it appear as if those persons were still living; but in point of fact they belonged to an earlier generation. Paul himself and his fellow-apostles are no longer alive. Everywhere there is a retrospective tone. The Epistles, even in the circle of their first readers, give themselves out as voices from the past.

In his opinion, the artificial character of the epistolary form comes to light with special clearness when we direct

our attention to the composition of these writings. "In such a manner," he says, "*real* letters are never written." He maintains that this applies to all the Pauline Epistles; but that it holds in a very special degree of 2 Corinthians. "Many scholars," he says, "belonging in other respects to different schools, have been convinced for more than a century that this Epistle was not written at one gush, or even at intervals; that it consists of an aggregate of fragments which had not originally the same destination. He recalls the fact that Semler, in 1776, followed by others, denied the unity of this Epistle, and he regards this as a preparation for the later criticism which recognises it as a pseudepigraphé, in which are incorporated fragments of earlier writings. He cites 2 Cor. i. 13, and 2 Cor. x. 10, as showing that at the time when this work was composed the Church was in possession of Epistles of Paul, which presented a picture of him different from the current tradition received from those who had associated with him. He also refers to 2 Cor. viii. 18, and 2 Cor. ix. 13, as allusions to fixed and definite customs and usages, belonging to a later age. The choice of 2 Corinthians, as affording a suitable field for the scientific study of the phenomena of a Pauline Epistle, is a very happy choice; for there is no other Epistle which furnishes so rich an abundance of material for such investigation as it does, owing to its professedly occasional nature, and the great number of the references that are made in it to events which are represented as recent, or as being actually in progress at the time of its composition.

Now, in 2 Corinthians, as we have it presented to us in the Greek Testament, there is one most remarkable phenomenon, the existence of which every reader can easily verify for himself. I refer to the extraordinary use which is made in it of the words *καυχᾶσθαι*, *καύχησις*, and *καύχημα*. In this Epistle these words appear twenty-nine

times, excluding two passages in which the manuscript evidence is conflicting; the inclusion of which passages would bring up the number to thirty-one. Now in the remaining twelve Epistles which announce to us Paul as their author (including, of course, 1 Corinthians), these words occur twenty-two times; in the Epistle to the Hebrews *καύχημα* is once found; and the only other New Testament writer who uses any of these words is St. James, in whose Epistle there are three instances. These expressions then appear twenty-nine times in 2 Corinthians; while we can only find twenty-six instances of their use in all the other books of the New Testament.

But when we investigate this matter a little more closely, we make a discovery of a surprising nature. We find that while these expressions occur ten times in the first nine chapters of 2 Corinthians, there is not one of the paragraphs in which any of them is to be found which does not contain a marked compliment to the Corinthians—a compliment which is paid in every instance by the use of one or more of these very words. The reading of some manuscripts would make an eleventh instance (2 Cor. ix. 5); but in that case also the word *καύχησις* would be the vehicle of a compliment. We find further that in these nine chapters the writer (after the explanation of his *καύχησις* in chap. i. 12, which we must consider later on) never speaks of himself as boasting of anything, except of the Corinthians; or of them as boasting of anything, except of him. When, however, we pass beyond the apparent break in the sense at the end of chapter ix., a new and opposite (an apparently contrasted) use of these words begins. We meet them nineteen times in these four chapters; but never once do we find the least approach to the complimentary use of them which characterized the former section. On the contrary, they are here employed again and again to describe the writer's indignant

vindication of his claims against the disloyalty of the Corinthians.

This, again, is a phenomenon of the Epistle which every reader of the Greek Testament can see and verify for himself, and which appears to demand closer examination.

As the proper order of the two sections of this Epistle (chaps. i.-ix. and chaps. x.-xiii.) is one of the questions on which such an examination may possibly throw light, the proper mode of conducting the inquiry is provisionally to adopt each of the arrangements of the text in turn, and try what the result of each arrangement will be in this connexion. At the threshold of our task, however, the question arises, which order shall we provisionally adopt first? If any of the many learned and eminent Biblical critics, who maintain that the present order of these sections is the correct order, had ever attempted to give an explanation of the phenomena now before us in accordance with the present order of these sections, I should, of course, have regarded that explanation, and that order, as having a claim to be considered first. But no one has ever attempted such an explanation. Nor can I find that any leader of the 'later criticism', which regards this Epistle as a pseudepigraphê (or perhaps as an aggregate of pseud-epigraphai), has as yet given us an explanation of these phenomena in the light of his theory. I may, therefore, claim that it is the privilege of an explorer to commence his exploration at whatever point appears to him most promising; and I shall begin by an examination of the section x.-xiii., though the adoption of this order will be only provisional, and will be followed by a consideration of these phenomena, taken in the order in which they appear in our present text.

I shall also set out with the provisional hypothesis that we are dealing with real letters, which were actually addressed to the Church of Corinth.

If we direct our attention now to the section of 2 Corinthians which includes chapters x.–xiii., we shall find that the references made by the writer to himself as boasting are in close and immediate connexion with the word ἄφρων, which is frequently there applied to himself, and with such words as ἀφροσύνη, περισσότερον, and εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα, describing his boasting, so as to indicate that he is repeating taunts that have been levelled at him at Corinth. Ἄφρων is a word which he never once applies to himself outside this section of 2 Corinthians. This is significant, because in 1 Corinthians he often refers to a charge of foolishness, but he never uses the word ἄφρων in connexion with this, or any compound of it. He there invariably employs the words μωρός and μωρία in his references to depreciating criticisms of himself or his teaching. The only passage in 1 Corinthians in which the word ἄφρων occurs is 1 Cor. xv. 36, where it is employed to administer a severe rebuke to a supposed objector, ἄφρων, thou fool !

No general statement of these facts could convey so strong an impression as will be made on an attentive reader by an inspection of some of the passages in which these words appear. In the first passage in which they are to be found in this section (2 Cor. x. 8) we have εἰάν τε γὰρ περισσότερόν τι καυχῆσώμαι . . . οὐκ αἰσχυνθήσομαι ; in 2 Cor. x. 13, ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐκ εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα καυχησόμεθα ; in 2 Cor. x. 15, οὐκ εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα καυχώμενοι ; in the following verse the phrase εἰς περισσείαν, with the word καυχῆσασθαι as the last word of the verse ; then, in the first verse of the next chapter, we have the word ἀφροσύνη, which is nowhere to be found in all the Epistles of the New Testament, except in this section ; and which in the Gospels occurs only once, and that in very bad company (St. Mark vii. 21).

In the eleventh chapter of 2 Corinthians it appears three times. In 2 Cor. xi. 1, we find Ὅφελον ἀνείχεσθέ μου μικρόν τι ἀφροσύνης, and here it immediately follows two verses

containing the words *καυχῆσασθαι*, *καυχώμενος*, and *καυχάσθω*. In 2 Cor. xi. 17, we have *ὡς ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ, ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ ὑποστάσει τῆς καυχήσεως*, and three verses later *ἐν ἀφροσύνῃ λέγω*.

I have already remarked that the adjective *ἄφρων* is never applied to himself by St. Paul, except in this section (2 Cor. x.–xiii.). But here it is thus applied by him again and again in direct connexion with boasting. For instance, in 2 Cor. xi. 16, *Πάλιν λέγω, μὴ τίς με δόξῃ ἄφρονα εἶναι*—*εἰ δὲ μήγε, καὶ ὡς ἄφρονα δέξασθέ με, ἵνα καὶ γὰρ μικρόν τι καυχῆσωμαι*. In 2 Cor. xi. 18, immediately after one of the passages in which the word *ἀφροσύνη* is used, we read *ἐπεὶ πολλοὶ καυχῶνται κατὰ σάρκα, καὶ γὰρ καυχῆσομαι. ἡδέως γὰρ ἀνέχεσθε τῶν ἀφρόνων φρόνιμοι ὄντες*. Again, in 2 Cor. xii. 6, we find *ἐὰν γὰρ θελήσω καυχῆσασθαι οὐκ ἔσομαι ἄφρων*.

In 2 Cor. xii. 11, the writer vehemently protests to the Corinthians that his repeated assertion of his apostolic position has been forced upon him by their want of loyalty. *Γέγονα ἄφρων· ὑμεῖς με ἠναγκάσατε· ἐγὼ γὰρ ὤφειλον ὑφ' ὑμῶν συνίστασθαι. οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑστέρησα τῶν ὑπερλίαν ἀποστολῶν, εἰ καὶ οὐδὲν εἰμι*.

This direct statement, that want of loyalty in the Corinthian Church was the cause of his self-assertion, would, of necessity, cause the frequent repetitions of the words *καυχᾶσθαι* and *καύχησις* which appear in this section to be regarded as a reproach to that Church.

But there is a paragraph in the eleventh chapter which might well be felt by the Corinthians to be the heaviest blow in the whole letter. For in it the founder of their Church tells them, that in all the years he was with them, he never accepted anything from them, and he adds that, in order to keep himself from being in any way a debtor to their hospitality, he accepted contributions which were brought to him from Macedonia, while he was actually

residing at Corinth, and labouring among the Corinthians. "In everything I kept myself from being burdensome unto you, and I will so keep myself. As the truth of Christ is in me, none in the regions of Achaia shall stop me from this *καύχησις*."

Let us for a moment imagine that we ourselves are in the position of the persons who received this letter—that the founder of our Church, the man who was our Apostle, who had converted us from heathenism, and who, in spite of our waywardness, we felt in our hearts was most worthy of our reverence and love, were to write to us, telling us that during the whole time that he laboured in our midst he carefully avoided accepting our hospitality, and that when he was in want he preferred to accept help from friends whom he had known before his first coming to our shores, and that he added, "I have kept myself from burdening English liberality, and I will so keep myself; none within the coasts of the British Isles shall stop me from this boasting." I think that the more we realised the greatness of our obligation to him, the more keenly would we feel that he had, indeed, made us sorry with a letter.

If we examine this paragraph, placing it beside a paragraph which is to be found in 1 Cor. ix., we shall be struck at once by the resemblance of the two, and by the difference between them. In the earlier Epistle the writer had shown that, if others had a right to claim a maintenance from the Corinthian Church, he had yet more; nevertheless, he added (verse 15), "I have used none of these things, and I write not these things that it may be so done in my case: for it were good for me rather to die than that any man should make my boast void, *τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει*." There is plainly a connexion between this statement, *τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει*, and the statement made with reference to the very same matter in 2 Cor. xi. 10, *ἡ καύχησις αὕτη οὐ φραγήσεται εἰς ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς κλίμασι τῆς Ἀχαίας*.

But, while the connexion between the statements is very apparent, there is an important distinction. The declaration in 1 Corinthians is general in its nature. The 'οὐδεὶς' might not exclude any one community more than another; no comparison is made between one Church and another; there is no mention of the Macedonians, and no reference to Corinth, or Achaia, by name. In 2 Corinthians all this is changed; the declaration of the writer about his *καύχησης* immediately follows the statement that "the brethren, when they came from Macedonia, supplied the measure of my want"; and the statement *τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει* has become *ἡ καύχησης αὕτη οὐ φραγήσεται ἐν ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς κλίμασι τῆς Ἀχαίας*.

The previous statement had evidently been challenged, and we may learn something of the nature of the challenge from some of the arguments used by the Apostle in vindication of his honour. It was hinted that, while he asked nothing from his converts at first, after a time, when he had thoroughly secured their devotion, and had caught them with guile, they would be made to contribute to his revenue. This time had already come for the Macedonians; and the turn of the Corinthians would come next. It is evidently to an accusation of this nature that St. Paul is replying in 2 Cor. xii. 16, where, after appealing to their own recollection that he had never burdened them in the past, he rehearses this very accusation: "But be it so, I did not myself burden you: but, being crafty, I caught you with guile." His answer is, that in the years which have elapsed since his first visit, a succession of agents employed by him have continued the work among them; and no contribution towards their maintenance has ever been asked from the Church of Corinth. "Did I take advantage of you by any one of them whom I have sent unto you?" And this disinterested course towards them he is determined to maintain. He says, in 2 Cor. xi. 9 (after the

mention of the contribution from Macedonia), "And in every thing I kept myself from being burdensome unto you, and I will so keep myself."

Yet, though this had been in a manner forced from him by imputations against his honour, which had touched him to the quick, that would not make the blow seem less heavy to the Corinthians; and if we provisionally assume the hypothesis that these four chapters are part of the Epistle which was sent before the reconciliation effected by Titus, we can well imagine that when St. Paul, writing after that reconciliation, told the Corinthians that he had for a time repented of the severity of his letter, this was one of the paragraphs which he would have wished to soften; and that, though they received Titus with fear and trembling, they would, before he left, make known to him how greatly their feelings had been wounded.

On this hypothesis we should certainly expect to find a reference to this *καύχησις* very early in the letter written after the reconciliation.

Now, in the twelfth verse of the first chapter, we have an explanation of a *καύχησις* of the writer, which recalls the identical words with which the statement in 2 Cor. xi. 10, commenced, *ἡ καύχησις αὐτῆς*.

In 2 Cor. i. 12, we have *ἡ καύχησις αὐτῆς*, answering to the *ἡ καύχησις αὐτῆς* of the other passage, and *ἡμῶν*, answering to *εἰς ἐμὲ*; and then follows the only explanation of this *καύχησις* that could be given, viz., that it was a defence of the holiness and sincerity of the Apostle's conduct towards the Corinthians. But, before the paragraph closes, he uses the word *καύχημα*, to pay to his first readers two compliments, which must have been very grateful to their feelings. It would be a pleasant thing to be told by one whom we greatly revered that he was proud of us; but if he had lately accused us of disloyalty, and we had given him cause for doing so, we might then be still

more pleased to hear him say that he knew that we were proud of him; for that would be an emphatic reversal of the charge of disloyalty. In this paragraph St. Paul gives the Corinthians both the one and the other assurance. He says, "You acknowledge that I am your *καύχημα*, as you are mine in the day of the Lord."¹

The next occasion on which he employs one of the expressions which we are considering is 2 Cor. v. 12, and in that passage we also find the word which he used when (2 Cor. xii. 11) he charged the Corinthian Church with disloyalty, saying, "You have compelled me, for I ought to

¹ The opening verse of the paragraph which is discussed above (2 Cor. i. 12) is the first passage cited by Von Manen, as showing that at the time when this Epistle was composed "the Church was in possession of Epistles of Paul which presented a picture of him different from the current tradition received from those who had associated with him." The *Speaker's Commentary*, on the other hand, holds that St. Paul is here repelling a charge of deliberate equivocation with regard to a promised visit. These interpretations evidently depend on the translation of the word *ἀγινώσκετε* in this verse by its later and usual meaning of "read," though the chain of reasoning by which either of them is derived from the sentence "we write none other things than what ye read or even acknowledge" is not self-evident. The Peshito, however, in its translation of this verse, gives to the word *ἀγινώσκετε* its ancient meaning of 'acknowledge,' translating it by *yod 'in*; and the mere fact of the translators of that version rendering the passage thus proves that even in their time the ancient meaning of *ἀγινώσκετε* had not fallen into disuse. Their rendering seems to have in its favour the words *καὶ*, which connect, in this

verse, *ἀγινώσκετε* with *ἐγινώσκετε* for they appear to show that the writer regarded the latter of these words standing to the former in the relation of a stronger to a weaker assertion. But however we may translate *ἀγινώσκετε* the meaning of *ἐγινώσκετε* is clear. We have also to note that the paragraph begins with the words *ἡ γὰρ καύχη* *ἡμῶν αὐτῶν*, and that its closing sentence contains the cognate word *καύχη*, which appears to indicate that the question of the *καύχη* has been in the writer's mind throughout. The statement in the closing sentence gives the substance of all the acknowledgments — of the present acknowledgment made by the Corinthians (*ἐγινώσκετε*), the future (*ἐγινώσκεσθε*), and of the partial acknowledgment which the Apostle attributes to them, even the painful past (*καθὼς καὶ ἐπέγραψα ὑμῶς ἀπὸ μέρου*). The connecting link between the twelfth and fourteenth verses is the assertion in the thirteenth verse, that everything which he has said in vindication of his claims the Corinthians acknowledge. To this thought he gives final expression in the declaration that he is their boast, they are his in the day of the Lord.

have been commended of you," ὥφειλον ὑφ' ὑμῶν συνίστασθαι. This is, of course, a weaker word than καυχᾶσθαι; but the employment of the weaker word only made the censure stronger; for if he had said, "You ought to have boasted of me," that would seem to be expecting a great deal; and, therefore, the reproach of having withheld it might not appear so great. In 2 Cor. v. 12, we again have the weaker word with the negative proposition, where, as before, it adds to its strength (for the exclusion of the weaker excludes also the stronger *a fortiori*); and here we have also the strong expression with the affirmative proposition; where, again, it adds to its strength; for the assertion of the greater, *a fortiori* asserts also the less. But the use of the same terms only makes the absolute reversal of the charges so often found in 2 Cor. x.-xiii. more express. There, the writer was compelled to boast, because he was not commended of them. Here he says, "I do not again commend myself, because I know that I have only to furnish you with the material for καύχησις, and you will use it on my behalf," Οὐ γὰρ πάλιν ἑαυτοὺς συνιστάνομεν ὑμῖν, ἀλλὰ ἀφορμὴν διδόντες ὑμῖν καυχήματος ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. The word πάλιν implies that he has done on a late occasion that very thing which he now assures them he will do no more.

The third paragraph in which one of these expressions appears is 2 Cor. vii. 4, where he says, "Great is my καύχησις on your behalf."

The fourth paragraph is only a little later in the same chapter (verse 14), where he tells them that even when he was sending Titus, he had expressed to him his confidence in their favourable reception of him. The use of these expressions here is very remarkable; for when an envoy was being sent to bring rebels to submission, we should hardly think of describing our anticipation of a favourable result as being a boast on their behalf, unless we wished for some reason to make opportunities for a complimentary

use of that word. In this passage the writer employs both the noun and the verb in this complimentary way. He says : *εἴ τι αὐτῷ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν κεκαύχημαι, οὐ κατρωσχύνην, ἀλλ' ὥς πάντα ἐν ἀληθείᾳ ἐλαλήσαμεν ὑμῖν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ καύχησις ἡμῶν ἐπὶ Τίτου ἀλήθεια ἐγενήθη.*

The next (fifth) paragraph is in 2 Cor. viii. 24, where he speaks of his *καύχησις* on their behalf to members of other Churches, which the context shows to have been the Churches of Macedonia. But the writer is not content with this reference; for two verses later on (ix. 2) he returns to the subject, this time expressly mentioning the Macedonians. Here, too, he brings in the word *καυχῶμαι*, and says to the Corinthians, "I boast of you to the Macedonians that a year ago Achaia was prepared, and your zeal (or 'emulation of you') 'has stirred up very many of them.' Again, in the very next verse, we have the phrase *τὸ καύχημα ἡμῶν τὸ ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν*, and, two verses further on, some manuscripts have the word *καυχήσεως*. But, leaving this disputed reading out of consideration, we have, in a paragraph of only four verses, three of these words, or phrases, all used in the same way to describe St. Paul's praise of the Corinthians to the Macedonians.

When we read these chapters in the order which we are now provisionally adopting, the accumulation here of these expressions, all employed in the same peculiar connexion, acquires a significance which it seems impossible to mistake. For if these chapters were originally part of a letter which was written later than that to which chapters x.-xiii. belonged, the Apostle was here speaking to the Corinthians of that very Church which in his previous letter he had contrasted with the Corinthians in a manner which must have sorely wounded their self-esteem. Nor was this all; for they might very naturally apprehend that the fact of St. Paul's having received help from Macedonia, while he was labouring at Corinth, must have

lowered them greatly in the eyes of the Macedonians. Now they are told that they have been held up as an example to these very Macedonians, and that the zeal of the Corinthian Church has stirred up the Macedonian Churches; and, in telling them this, the writer has employed (but in a sharply contrasted manner) the same expressions which he had used in the paragraph which must have given them so much pain.

The striking correspondence which an examination of these passages reveals may not be deemed an adequate proof that what Von Manen calls the 'background' of 2 Corinthians is a real history, instead of a fiction; (for, of course, it may be alleged that this correspondence may be due to the art of the author of the pseudepigraphê); but it may at least give us some help towards the determination of a question which any investigator who approaches this subject from the standpoint of the 'Later Criticism' is bound to ask himself, if his criticism is to be really scientific. Professor Von Manen tells us that this 'Later Criticism' holds that all the Pauline Epistles, without exception, are pseudepigraphai, which were composed not earlier than the very end of the first century (probably later), and that 2 Corinthians in particular is not a letter, but an aggregation made up of fragments of works which belonged to an earlier period.

A critic who begins his examination of 2 Corinthians with this hypothesis is bound, first of all, to put to himself the question: Was the writer who attempted to personate St. Paul the author of the final form which this aggregation has received, and in which it has come down to us? or was he the author of the fragments which must be assigned to an earlier date? In the latter case the composite origin of this epistle, instead of helping us to the late date for the pseudepigraphê, which is desired by Von Manen, places a serious obstacle in the way. For the

original order, which has been disarranged by the editing which on this hypothesis must have preceded the publication of 2 Corinthians as we have it now, must have preceded that final publication by an interval of several years. Indeed, if the earlier material was not a real letter, but rather a book, or books (as Von Manen contends), time must be allowed for the disappearance of most of the copies, leaving a single copy in such a mutilated and torn condition that it could have been pieced together in the form in which alone it has been preserved for us. A real letter would be far more likely to meet with such an accident. Indeed, it is admitted by most scholars that some of Cicero's letters must have met with this very accident, having been combined in an inverted order, so that a letter which was really written earlier was mistaken for the concluding part of a letter of later date (*e.g.* ad Brut. i. 2).

But the connexion which may be observed between 1 Cor. and 2 Cor. x.-xiii. may throw some further light on the true nature of the 'background' of these Epistles. Critics have long recognized the fact that the partisanship which is disclosed to us in 1 Cor. i. 11, 12, is shown in 2 Cor. x. to have assumed an intensified character, and that the faction of those who said, "I am of Christ," appears to have been especially prominent in assailing St. Paul's position. This is generally considered to be indicated by 2 Cor. x. 7, "If any man trusteth in himself that he is Christ's, let him consider this again with himself, that, even as he is Christ's, so also are we." Now, in speaking of the party divisions at Corinth, St. Paul (or the author who assumed his name) had used in 1 Corinthians the words *καυχάσθω* and *καυχᾶσθαι*, when chiding the Corinthians for the party-spirit they had displayed; for instance, in 1 Cor. iii. 21, *ὥστε μηδεὶς καυχάσθω ἐν ἀνθρώποις*; and in reference to another matter, he had afterwards employed the word *καύχημα* in administering a sharp rebuke, *οὐ καλὸν*

τὸ καύχημα ὑμῶν (1 Cor. v. 6). Those who challenged his authority at Corinth would appear to have been irritated by this; and St. Paul's use of the very same word, in speaking of the independent position on which he prided himself, τὸ καύχημά μου οὐδεὶς κενώσει (1 Cor. ix. 15), would give them a handle for turning his own phrase against himself. The claim which was thus made would be especially likely to offend some of the members of the opposing factions, as the καύχημα referred to an independence of the contributions of the churches to which the original Apostles had made no pretension. We have already seen that this claim would appear to have been challenged, and that it is repeated with great emphasis, but in a somewhat altered form, in 2 Corinthians. It is there confined to the regions of Achaia; and there is another difference in the phraseology, which, though slight, illustrates the propriety with which St. Paul observes the distinction between καύχημα and καύχησις. Καύχημα is *materies gloriandi*, while καύχησις is *gloriatio*, or the act of boasting. Accordingly, in 1 Cor. ix., it is καύχημα that is used; for the Apostle there says that he does not wish to receive the contribution for his support, to which he has shown that he has as strong a claim as the other Apostles, for that it were good for him rather to die than that any man should make his καύχημα, his *materies gloriandi*, void. But the καύχημα, when it has once been uttered in words, has become a καύχησις; and, therefore, when in 2 Corinthians (xi. 10) he reiterates his former utterance, which had been challenged, he now employs the word καύχησις. Ἔστιν ἀλήθεια Χριστοῦ ἐν ἐμοί, ὅτι ἡ καύχησις αὕτη οὐ φραγήσεται εἰς ἐμὲ ἐν τοῖς κλίμασι τῆς Ἀχαίας. Again, in 2 Cor. i. 12, it is καύχησις, not καύχημα, that is employed—the very words ἡ καύχησις αὕτη being here repeated; for αὕτη is here not the predicate of the sentence, but part of the subject. Had the demonstrative pronoun been the predicate, it would have been

τοῦτο, for the meaning would not have been “our boasting is this boasting,” but “our boasting is this thing,” viz. τὸ μαρτύριον, and the neuter noun τὸ μαρτύριον, immediately following, would have attracted the pronoun into the neuter gender.

Two verses later on in the same paragraph, when St. Paul wishes to speak of the *materies gloriandi*, both of the Corinthian Church and of himself, with strict propriety he uses the word καύχημα.

We have already seen that περισσότερον is used in 2 Cor. x.–xiii. in connexion with the word καυχᾶσθαι in such a manner as to suggest that this, or some kindred word, must have been employed by some of St. Paul's opponents at Corinth as a reproach against him. Now, if we refer to 1 Cor. xv. 10, we shall find this very word in a passage in which he asserts that his labours have been greater than those of the other Apostles, ἀλλὰ περισσότερον αὐτῶν πάντων ἐκοπίασα. This to us is the simple statement of a fact, which is abundantly confirmed by all the accounts of the Apostolic age that have come down to us ; but to some of those at Corinth who said, “I am of Cephas,” or “I am of Christ,” it might appear in a different light—as an extravagant attempt to exalt himself above the older Apostles ; and it might furnish a handle to some of his opponents to taunt him with boasting περισσοτέρως. This conjecture derives substantial support, not only from the passages already referred to, in which περισσότερον and εἰς τὰ ἄμετρα are coupled in a significant way with καυχᾶσθαι, but also from a paragraph in 2 Cor. xi., in which the statement which had been briefly made in 1 Corinthians is justified by a copious enumeration of the labours and sufferings of the Apostle of the Gentiles ; for, in the opening of the paragraph in which this is done, the offending phrase is reiterated with greatly-increased emphasis. Just as we find the statement made in 1 Cor. ix. 15, more

vehemently repeated in 2 Cor. xi. 10, so in this connexion we read in 2 Cor. xi. 23, *διάκονοι Χριστοῦ εἰσίν; παραφρονῶν λαλῶ, ὑπὲρ ἐγώ· ἐν κόποις περισσοτέρως, ἐν φυλακαῖς περισσοτέρως, ἐν πληγαῖς ὑπερβαλλόντως.*

Each reader who has accompanied me so far can judge for himself whether a comparison of these passages in these two Epistles (1 Cor. and 2 Cor. x.-xiii.) does not almost force on us the belief that their author must have been maintaining a controversy with men who were actually living at the time, who had received, and had had time to criticise, his first Epistle before he wrote his second, who had cavilled at his words, and uttered taunts which we can gather from his reply.

But we must now look again at the striking phenomenon of the contrasted use of the words *καυχᾶσθαι*, *καύχησις*, and *καύχημα* in the two sections of the canonical 2 Corinthians (chaps. i.-ix. and x.-xiii.), and must consider them in the light of the hypothesis, that these chapters have from the first belonged to one and the same letter, and that the order in which they now appear is the order in which they were written by an amanuensis from the dictation of the Apostle. On this hypothesis we are confronted with the facts that the author of the Epistle, after having, in the most marked way, sought opportunities for using these words in warm praise of the Corinthians, and even as terms of endearment, went on in the very same letter to turn these very expressions into reproaches, which he repeated vehemently, again and again; that after having written, "Great is my *καύχησις* on your behalf;" "You acknowledge that I am your *καύχημα*, as you are mine in the day of the Lord," he added, in the latter part of the same letter: "I never trespassed on your hospitality, and I never will: no one in the regions of Achaia shall stop me from this *καύχησις*." To have done this would have

seemed like scoffing at his own terms of endearment; and would have been utterly at variance with the ardent love which, again and again, appears even among the reproaches of chaps. x.–xiii.

Von Manen may, indeed, say with truth, "In such a manner real letters are never written." But we may add that there is no parallel either in ancient or in modern literature to show that books or pseudepigraphai of any kind have ever been written in such a manner since the world began.

A favourite mode of explaining the marked contrast in tone between the two sections which have been so often referred to, is to suppose that an interval elapsed between the composition of chaps. i.–ix. and of chaps. x.–xiii., and that during that interval unfavourable news arrived from Corinth, completely reversing the favourable account of the situation there which had been given to St. Paul by Titus. When we begin, however, to consider this hypothesis, the question at once arises, Was the insulting use of these expressions against St. Paul, at Corinth (which he so often indignantly quotes in chapters x.–xiii., and which have coloured the most vehement portion of these chapters) part of this later unfavourable news, or was St. Paul cognisant of these taunts before he wrote chaps. i.–ix.? If they were part of the supposed later news, how are we to explain the reiterated use of these very terms in the earlier chapters? Was it a pure coincidence that St. Paul had thus, beforehand, used them, again and again, in warm utterances of esteem and love, in such a manner as he has never even approached in any other Epistle which has ever been attributed to him? We seem to be thrown back upon the supposition that, when the Apostle employed these words to give point to his praise, and to the expression of his esteem and love, his recollection of the taunts of which these words had been the vehicle was fresher and

more recent than when he afterwards used them in indignant reproaches. Each reader must judge for himself what is the measure of the improbability of this supposition.

Nor can we derive much help from recourse to the hypothesis, that the reproaches may have been levelled at one party only, and that the other members of the Church could understand that they had nothing to do with them. On the contrary, one of the most painful of the passages in which the word *καύχησης* was employed contained, as we have seen, an emphatic declaration that none in the regions of Achaia should stop the Apostle from this *καύχησης*, that he had never accepted assistance from any one at Corinth. And in no other part of these four chapters is any such distinction made as the hypothesis assumes.

The proofs which I have adduced are only a fragment of a mass of cumulative proof, the full consideration of which would expand this article to the dimensions of a volume; but it may be well to give a few more instances of the contrasted use of the same words in these sections. We have the word *θαρρῆν* twice used in one verse of the later section (2 Cor. x. 1, 2), in a stern and painful way to express St. Paul's confidence against his opponents in Corinth; and these are the only instances of the use of this word in this section. We have the same word used three times in chaps i.-ix., but never in a painful way; and, the last time that it there appears, the contrast in its use is as great as it is possible to imagine; for it is now confidence in the Corinthians that the word is used to express. "I rejoice that in everything I have confidence in you," *χαίρω ὅτι ἐν παντὶ θαρρῶ ἐν ὑμῖν* (2 Cor. vii. 16).

Similarly the word *πεποίθησις* is used in a severe manner in chap. x. 2, and is twice, and twice only, found in chaps. i.-ix., each time in a contrasted sense. In 2 Cor.

iii. 14, after saying affectionately that the Corinthian Church is his Epistle, written in his heart, the Apostle adds, "Such confidence (*πιστοίθησιν*) have we through Christ toward God."! In the only other passage in which it appears in these chapters it again expresses confidence in the Corinthians (i. 15), for there St. Paul speaks of his confidence that even in the past the Corinthians acknowledged him in part.

Again, the word *ὑπακοή* appears in chap. x. 5, where the writer speaks of the time when the obedience of the Corinthians shall be fulfilled, in a way which shows that he did not consider it as having been fulfilled at the time when he was writing. On the other hand, in section i.-ix., the word is used in a very different way, for in chap. vii. 15, St. Paul speaks of Titus as "remembering the obedience (*ὑπακοήν*) of you all, how with fear and trembling ye received him." And, he adds immediately, "I rejoice, therefore, that in everything I have confidence in you."

When a word had been employed in section x.-xiii., which was so essentially severe that it was incapable of receiving a favourable meaning, while, at the same time, it was necessary that some reference should be made to it in section i.-ix., we find a euphemism substituted for it there. Thus in 2 Cor. xiii. 10, we read, "For this cause I write these things while absent, that I may not when present deal sharply," *Διὰ τοῦτο ταῦτα ἀπῶν γράφω, ἵνα παρῶν μὴ ἀποτόμως χρήσωμαι*. But in 2 Cor. ii. 3, we have sorrow substituted for severity. "And I wrote this same thing, that, when I came, I might not have sorrow," *καὶ ἔγραψα τοῦτο αὐτὸ ἵνα μὴ ἐλθὼν λύπην σχῶ*.

The same euphemism is employed in the first verse of this chapter, *ἔκρινα γὰρ ἑμαυτῷ τοῦτο, τὸ μὴ πάλιν ἐν λύπῃ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἐλθεῖν*, and here it is clearly shown to be a euphemism for severity, for it is immediately followed by the words *εἰ γὰρ ἐγὼ λυπῶ ὑμᾶς*. It is to be specially noted that

these passages immediately follow an explanation which is made in chap. i. 23, of the non-fulfilment of a threat which is actually made in 2 Cor. xiii. 2. In i. 23, the Apostle says, "To spare you I did not come again unto Corinth," *φειδόμενος ὑμῶν οὐκέτι ἦλθον εἰς Κόρινθον*; while in xiii. 2, he says, "If I come again, I will not spare," *ἐὰν ἔλθω εἰς τὸ πάλιν οὐ φείσομαι*. 2 Cor. ii. 1, while it gives the reason for the cancelling of the threat, supplies us at the same time with the *πάλιν* which alone was wanted to complete the identity of the words used in describing the cancelling of the threat with the words used in the actual utterance of it in xiii. 2. In these three pairs of passages, the tenses employed by St. Paul leave us no option which of the corresponding passages is to be placed first. In each of these pairs, the act, or purpose, or feeling, which in chaps. x.-xiii., is present or future, in chaps. i.-ix. is spoken of as belonging to the past.

The words *ἄφρων* and *ἀφροσύνη*, which, as we have seen, are found in chapters x.-xiii., in connexion with the charge of boasting, are quite incapable of being used in praise or compliment; but, I think, we have a euphemism for *ἄφρων* in 2 Cor. v. 13, in the word *ἐξέστημεν*. This word has a far milder signification than *ἄφρων*, being generally employed in the New Testament to express excitement rather than derangement; and often very legitimate and even praiseworthy excitement. But in this passage it would appear to have been substituted for a worse word; for it is opposed to *σωφρονοῦμεν*, and the opposite of *σώφρων* is *ἄφρων*. The past tense of *ἐξέστημεν* here is to be noted, as *σωφρονοῦμεν* is in the present tense. It is like the faint echo of a storm that has passed away. The words *ἄφρων* and *ἀφροσύνη* are never once used in chapters i.-ix.

If the use of contrasted expressions, which is disclosed by an examination of chaps. i.-ix. and x.-xiii., is anything more than a pure accident, which in some extraordinary

way crept into the Epistle, unintended and unnoticed by its author, yet on so vast a scale (as must be admitted if we include in our survey the terms about boasting), the change of tense in some of the pairs shows us plainly which section should be read first. The reversal of the censures of the painful letter which is disclosed to us, when we read the sections in the order thus indicated, could hardly be made more complete, so far as words could reverse them. But there was one practical form of reversal, without which, I think, the repentant Corinthians would scarcely rest satisfied. They now knew from St. Paul's own statement that he had accepted help from Macedonia, and they would hardly feel that they were completely restored to favour if on his forthcoming visit he refused their hospitality. This is a matter on which we could not expect to find information in any of the Epistles to the Corinthians; but if St. Paul wrote the Epistle to the Romans, then we have in it a letter which was written during that third visit to Corinth. Among the salutations in that Epistle (xvi. 23), there is one which, in this connexion, is significant, "Gaius, my host, and of the whole Church, saluteth you."

Commentators appear generally to have passed over this matter as lightly as possible; for, believing the eleventh and twelfth chapters of 2 Corinthians to contain St. Paul's last word on the subject, they looked upon it rather in the light of a difficulty to be explained away, than as containing an interesting piece of information; and they have generally sought to represent the passage as meaning only that Gaius lent a room in his house for the use of the Church; and that they worshipped there. But Meyer has justly objected to this, that Gaius is, in the first place, spoken of as St. Paul's host, and only in the second place as the host of the Church. The natural meaning of the words is that he was the host of the Apostle himself. He was probably also a man of large hospitality; and on this

occasion the demands on his hospitality may have been unusually large. For, after such a reconciliation with their Apostle, the number of daily visitors, eager for an interview, must have very great indeed; and if Gaius rose to the occasion, it would be no exaggeration to describe him as not only St. Paul's host, but host of the whole Church.

In this connexion there is a passage in the Epistle to the Philippians (iv. 15) which is worthy of notice. "And ye yourselves also know, ye Philippians, that in the beginning of the Gospel, when I departed from Macedonia, no Church had fellowship with me in the matter of giving and receiving, but ye only; for even in Thessalonica ye sent once and again unto my need." The Pauline authorship of this Epistle is disputed by some who admit what are called the Major Epistles. Paley has founded an argument for the authenticity of this letter on the agreement of the foregoing passage with the statement about the Macedonians in 2 Corinthians. But there is something here to be explained which he has not noticed. Why is there no mention here of the help which they sent to Corinth? This is a serious difficulty for any critic who would explain the passage as derived from the mention of the Macedonians in 2 Corinthians; for a forger would naturally have taken care to make his paragraph square with what he had learned from that Epistle. Paley, however, instead of calling attention to this, endeavoured to make the statement in Philippians include the gift sent to Corinth, by translating *ὅτι καὶ* by "and that," rendering the passage thus: "You remember that you sent gifts at my departure, . . . and that you had done so before." But Dr. Gwynn, in his Commentary on Philippians in the *Speaker's Commentary*, has justly objected that the position of the conjunctions is against this; and that the inverted order of the incidents is thus unaccounted for.

If the omission of any mention of the contribution sent

to Corinth is a difficulty for the hypothesis that the Epistle to the Philippians is a pseudepigraphé, it also appears to have been regarded as inexplicable by critics who held it to be a real letter; for they have avoided raising the question why was this omission made. The aim of the author of the Epistle evidently was to make much of the liberality of the Philippians, for he is careful to recall the fact that they sent to Thessalonica not once, but twice. Why, then, should he omit any express mention of the gift sent by them to Achaia? If he was afraid of hurting the feelings of the members of any other Church who might chance to see the Epistle to the Philippians, why should the feelings of the Corinthians be regarded as more sensitive than those of the Thessalonians, who, being nearer to Philippi, might be supposed to be more likely to see the letter? To those who hold the integrity of the canonical 2 Corinthians, this may well appear inexplicable; for on that hypothesis, even after the reconciliation effected by Titus, the feelings of the Corinthians were certainly not spared on this very subject. It is only when we accept the light given to us by an examination of the phenomena of the Epistle in the order which is prescribed to us by the author's use of past and present tenses in some of the passages that we have examined, that we come to see how tender and sacred a matter that reconciliation was felt by St. Paul to be. When in this light we examine again the passage in Philippians, we can hardly help observing that the Apostle appears to be anxious that the Philippians should see that he remembers more than he mentions. The mention of the time (Phil. iv. 15) when "I departed from Macedonia" would naturally suggest to the Philippians the time of St. Paul's stay at Corinth, for we learn from Acts xvii. and xviii. 1, that after a short visit to Athens, he went on there at once. The words, too, "for even in Thessalonica," *ὅτι καὶ ἐν Θεσσαλονίκῃ*, seem intended

to show those to whom he was writing that he remembered well that they had done more afterwards. Yet all the time he was careful to make no mention in this connexion of Corinth, or to say anything which could possibly revive the memory of the time when he had made the Corinthians sorry by a letter.

No inquiry into the true mutual relation of the sections of 2 Corinthians, which claims to be scientific, should omit an examination of the text of the document at the close of the former section—in other words, of the point of junction. The majority of the manuscripts which have come down to us give the close of chapter ix. as an ejaculation, *χάρις τῷ Θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγίῳ αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ*—a reading which makes the sentence appear to have reached its conclusion, though that conclusion presents a strange contrast to the sentence which, without the slightest explanation, immediately follows it. But there is another reading, *χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγίῳ αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ*, which, if correct, would show that the sentence must have been broken off in the middle, and which is thus absolutely inconsistent with the present state of the text of the Epistle; yet which has the support of two of the oldest versions, the Syriac and the Ethiopic, and which has also on its side the balance of Patristic authority. St. Chrysostom had probably access to more ancient Greek manuscripts than any that have come down to us, and he quotes the passage as *χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ*, though his intimate knowledge of Greek must have made him fully conscious of the awkwardness of the reading. But a still more important witness is Euthalius, who was one of the principal critical scholars of the following century, and a student of manuscripts, who also refers to the passage as *χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ*, and who never quotes it without the *δὲ*. He could scarcely have done this if he did not feel that he was coerced by the preponderance of manuscript authority to adopt this strange, indeed, impossible, reading in the present

arrangement of the text. How strong would be the tendency to omit the *δε*, is shown by our Authorised Version; for the translators who gave us that version adopted as their authority the Textus Receptus, which retained the *δε*, yet, though they had it before them in their Greek text, they deliberately ignored it in their translation. Indeed, it would be hard to blame anyone, whether scribe or translator, for omitting it as a manifest blunder, which it must be if the present arrangement of our text is the true one; for it would be impossible to make sense out of the reading *χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ ἐπὶ τῇ ἀνεκδιηγῆται αὐτοῦ δωρεᾷ· αὐτὸς δὲ ἐγὼ Παῦλος παρακαλῶ ὑμᾶς*.

However, we may feel thankful for the rigid conservatism of Easterns, like the translators in the second century, who gave us the Syriac, and also of those who gave us the Ethiopic version; both of whom adhered rigidly to the text of their manuscripts, whether it seemed to make sense or not. For when we take into account the internal evidence which we have had to consider, and recognise the possibility that a manuscript may have been torn at this place, the balance is at once shifted, and it is seen that the reading with the *δε* is now the more reasonable. For, in truth, the ejaculation here appears to be merely a makeshift, and does not arise out of what went before, as an ejaculation should; nor is there anything to explain what the gift is; but the *δε* would show that a paragraph was beginning in which the explanation was to be found. We have a paragraph which begins in this way at the sixteenth verse of the eighth chapter: *χάρις δὲ τῷ Θεῷ τῷ διδόντι τὴν αὐτὴν σπουδὴν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ Τίτου*. It would seem as if St. Paul was here beginning a new paragraph in like manner, in which he intended to raise the argument of his Epistle to a higher level before its conclusion, by a reference to the "unspeakable gift" of God. But what the gift was which St. Paul thus charac-

terised—whether it was the Incarnation, or the Atonement, or the gift of the Holy Spirit—can never now be determined with certainty, owing to the loss by the Corinthian Church of the concluding part of the manuscript of the Epistle, which must originally have contained an answer to this question.

J. H. KENNEDY.

BUTLER'S INDEBTEDNESS TO ARISTOTLE : A REPLY.

MR. GOLIGHER'S paper in the last number of **HERMATHENA** deals with an issue certainly not one of the least attractive in the history of Philosophy.

Those of us who have been guided by our University to the study of the great master of Ancient Ethical thought on the one hand, and of the grave divine of the eighteenth century writing "with simplicity and in earnest" on the other, and who have, as they conceive, learned from each weighty, if diverse, lessons, cannot but feel a deep interest in any attempt to trace out the relations between the lines of thought of the ancient and the modern philosopher.

When, however, they find the comparison instituted in the paper lead to the startling result that "the former writer [that is Butler], although he never names the latter, owed to him almost every remark and every doctrine of ethical value," it is but natural that they should retrace carefully the steps which have led to so startling a conclusion, and ascertain whether the rude shock it involves to their feelings of respect and veneration for Butler be indeed necessary.

Speaking as one of such students, I would attempt in the present paper to show that Mr. Goligher's sweeping conclusion is not warranted, and that Butler, after all has been said, remains, if not one of the few great pioneers, yet no mere copier or adapter of Aristotle, but a weighty and original personality in the history of Ethical Philosophy.

Perhaps the first feature which impresses itself on us in Mr. Goligher's paper is the large portion of Butler's work which he omits from review, and which is yet certainly not the least important or original.

The first of these omissions regards the Analogy. Misled by the polemical attitude of the book, which perhaps Butler himself too constantly accentuates, Mr. Goligher ignores Butler's careful study, more especially in the First Part of the Analogy, of the great leading facts in the Nature of Man, and the World—a study which remains of permanent value when the merely controversial interest has passed away.

It may be said that, granting the importance of Butler's work here, it still possesses a religious only, not an ethical, interest. If, however, we hold that in the original moral intuition there is revealed, not merely the Categorical Imperative of Moral Obligation, but a personal Holder of such obligation, it is hard to see how the revelation of His action in Nature can be excluded from the province of Ethics.

Why, for example, we may ask, are we to treat the doctrine of Habits as forming character expounded in B. II. of the *Nicomachean Ethics* as one of cardinal importance in Ethics, but refuse such title to the corresponding doctrine of Butler, on Habits as training and fitting the Individual for a new environment? Nor can it be said that Butler is here anticipated by Aristotle. Beyond the mere general principle of Habit, Butler's line of thought is quite his own, giving little occasion for comparison with Aristotle, and where such does occur, *e.g.* in regard to the famous ἀπορία, *N. E.* II., iv. 4, the relation between the two philosophers is one of antagonism.

Without going into further detail, we may say generally, that the Analogy with the Essays and the Sermons form one whole. *Primâ facie*, indeed, the

Sermons, as a didactic ethical treatise, stand apart from the Analogy as a controversial religious work; on the other hand, there is a real unity between them, inasmuch as both treat of Ethics as manifested in facts, whether of the internal nature of Man, as in the Sermons, or the external system of the World, as in the Analogy.

Again, the Essay on Virtue, though forming a most important part of Butler's system, and one eminently characteristic, is only named.

A leading tenet of Butler, and one which perhaps most of all strikes us when first read as a true flash of philosophic insight, the distinction, namely, between Self-love proper, or the general desire of Happiness, and the natural desires and passions going immediately on their own objects as ends, is not directly alluded to at all. The Sermons (XIII., XIV.) which trace the connexion of Ethics with the Love of God are omitted.

And throughout there is a somewhat irritating display of arbitrariness in Mr. Goligher's selection of this or that passage of the Sermons as specially or solely important, sometimes apparently, if one may speak mischievously, merely because an Aristotelian parallel may be cited.

I pass now to the method by which Mr. Goligher, in the parts of Butler which he does consider, attempts to establish his dependence on Aristotle.

This may, perhaps, be described as the analytic, as distinguished from the synthetic, method. Butler's system, that is, is reduced to certain doctrines capable of concise statement, and it is then attempted to be shown that these, or at least similar statements, are to be found in Aristotle. Now, waiving for the present the question how far this correspondence is actually made out, it is obvious to remark that the synthesis, or development of doctrine, is in this view passed over. "Simple development" is a term of the writer's—a phrase in which the adjective is

certainly not designed to enhance the merit of the substantive.

It must be borne in mind that in the field of Ethics and Metaphysics, in so far as they deal with fundamental facts of Consciousness, originality must be understood in a different sense from that which it bears in the physical sciences. There, a large share of merit will often fall to the discoverer of a new physical fact, even though he failed to see its full significance or to give it due development. In Philosophy, on the other hand, a fact of Consciousness, if it be really fundamental, cannot have escaped the implicit recognition of the ordinary, and the more explicit recognition of the philosophic, observer. Thus, speaking in a manner confessedly exaggerated, in order to bring out the side of the truth which Mr. Goligher, I conceive, has more or less ignored, we might put the matter thus: "To say that an observation respecting fundamental facts of Consciousness is not to be found in Aristotle is not to say that it is original, but that it is untrue."

Thus, to illustrate from the field of Metaphysics, we do not refuse to ascribe to Kant the doctrine of synthetic *a priori* cognitions, because, as Dr. Abbott has pointed out, a very neat and concise description of such cognitions is to be found in Locke.

Or to come nearer home, we rightly attribute to Aristotle the doctrine which finds the Summum Bonum in the development of the most excellent mental activities, yet Aristotle himself admits that the position *εὐδαιμονία = ἀρετή* had been enunciated before him. He does not, on this account, however, depreciate the importance of his own work, but rather finds in the ancient, undeveloped formula a testimony to the truth of his developed theory.

Another danger, necessary to be guarded against, is that of reading Aristotle by a light derived from modern

Ethical conceptions, if not from Butler himself. Such conceptions, in fact, have taken such hold of our own minds that it is hard for us to realize that they were not equally present to Aristotle, and words of his which are little more than compatible with such conceptions are apt to be interpreted as if fully recognizing them.¹

It would, indeed, appear that Mr. Golligher was, in some measure, alive to the dangers above pointed out. How far he has escaped them will, perhaps, appear more clearly when we proceed to examine his account of those parts of Butler's system which he passes in review.

I. *The Doctrine of Human Nature as a System.*

Butler himself in his Preface appears to consider that he was here giving scientific precision and development to the Stoic formula of accordance with Nature. In reality, however, I agree with Mr. Golligher that Aristotle's *'Εργον ἀνθρώπου* affords a closer parallel, though we might add the *initia Naturae* of the Stoic and Epicurean schools.

It is, however, to be remarked that, though we have here, no doubt, pregnant and fruitful germs, they cannot be said to be at all worked out.

In Aristotle the doctrine of the *'Εργον* is not set forth as the fundamental principle of solution of the problem of *Εὐδαιμονία*; rather it is one of those projecting footholds by the aid of which he endeavours to make good his steps in the arduous ascent towards new truth. The principal uses he makes of it are, in fact, twofold: (1) To emphasize the supremacy of Reason; (2) To deduce, *viz* the conception of Art, the Principles of the Mean and the Excellent.

In the Epicurean and Stoical systems, on the other

¹ I cannot but think that Mr. J. A. Stewart, in the context of the passage cited by Mr. Golligher, respecting τὰ

φύσει ἡδέα, has been misled in this way, when he attributes to Aristotle the doctrine of a "permanent personality."

hand, we seem to find some real attempt to base themselves on the actual Nature of Man as a concrete organized being. In the former school, however, this only serves to introduce Pleasure as the true basis of the system; in the latter the consideration of the primary goods soon passes into Nature as identical with Reason.

Butler thus appears to have been the first to attempt consistently to work out the problem of determining the course of conduct suitable to man, from a consideration of his nature as we now know it, in other words, to develop what we may call the psychological view of ethics. In this point of view it will be noted that not alone the ruling principle is to be considered, but also the passions and desires considered in themselves.

This, in fact, forms the subject of the first Sermon, and is the explanation of the "curious coincidence" noted by Mr. Goligher (p. 120). The use, *i.e.* of the term public *affections and passions* in place of Virtues is not confined to *νέμεσις*, but belongs to Butler's position throughout this Sermon, in which the Virtues as such lie as yet in the background. The only remaining point, then, will be Aristotle's recognition of the *πάθος, νέμεσις* as a *Μεσότης*—a term otherwise exclusively confined with him to the Virtues. This point, however, as irrelevant to Butlerian comparison may be passed over.

II. *The Supremacy of Conscience.*

This leading position of Butler's system is thus described by Mr. Goligher: "In other words, the elevation of Ethics from the realm of Empiricism to that of rational knowledge with an *à priori* basis."

I have indeed myself endeavoured, in refutation of the vicious circle—Conscience = Virtue = Conscience—which Mackintosh finds in Butler, to emphasize the fact that

Conscience is not for Butler a magical compass pointing always to the right, but a rational principle, or rather the Moral Reason itself, determining Virtue objectively to the Butlerian triplet—Veracity, Justice, Charity. Yet, if this objective view of Conscience were all that Butler intended, it is hard to see what he could imagine he was adding to the *à priori* doctrine of the fitness of things already expounded by Clarke, and from which Butler distinguishes his own position as *à posteriori*.

In fact, the doctrine of Conscience as the ruling faculty has two sides. On the one hand—that dwelt on by Aristotle—it rules as Reason; on the other, which Butler mainly chooses to consider, it rules as a part of the system of Nature, which rules because its immediate function is judgment. This duplex view of Conscience meets us again in the two different canons given by Butler for the estimation of character. In the note on Sermon III., § 2, where the point of view is subjective, this canon is found in the realisation or non-realisation in fact of the *de jure* supremacy of Conscience. On the other hand, in Sermon XII., § 9, where Conscience appears in its objective character as the principle of Rationality, the canon for the estimation of character is found in the due balance between Self-love and Benevolence.

I have conceded that the Supremacy of Conscience *quâ* Reason is found in Aristotle. This, however, requires some reservation. We naturally now associate with the Supremacy of Conscience the idea, so forcibly dwelt on by Butler, and subsequently by Kant, that of Absolute Obligation—the Categorical Imperative. Here, however, as I have said, we must beware of too hastily attributing to Aristotle conceptions which really belong to modern Ethical thought. It must, I think, be admitted that the absolute $\delta\epsilon\iota$ is rarely represented in Aristotle. That the Moral Judgment rested on Reason he certainly held. But

I cannot find in him any clear statement of an absolute obligation such as we naturally assume, to obey Reason. This would rather seem a post-Aristotelian conception, due, perhaps, in part to the Stoics, but still more to the jural view of Ethics arising from the teaching of the Old and New Testaments. Much less can we find in Aristotle that sense of Good and Ill Desert, anticipating a higher tribunal, which enters into Butler's doctrine of Conscience.

III. *Butler's Doctrine of Resentment.*

The Aristotelian parallel cited here by Mr. Goligher is certainly striking. The Aristotelian doctrine, however, lacks the development found in Butler. Thus the famous distinction between Sudden and Deliberate Anger is not found in him. A further and perhaps more important point is that whereas Aristotle's *ὀργή* is apparently felt only as personal wrong suffered by the injured person, Butler's Resentment connects itself with the general sense of Ill Desert, and may, therefore, be felt when a third person is injured. This sense of Ill Desert, which is so clearly and forcibly dwelt on by Butler in the Essay as a synthetic *à priori* cognition in Ethics, is omitted by Mr. Goligher, along with the other doctrines of those four or five pregnant pages. It certainly can hardly be said to be found in Aristotle. It is to be regretted, indeed, that Butler did not do justice to his own system here by basing on this natural sense of Ill Desert, which he has so clearly expounded, the justification of Penalty.

In place of this, he has recourse to the Utilitarian principle of General Happiness considered as passive enjoyment—a basis, as I conceive, altogether inadequate.

IV.—*Identification of Duty and Interest.*

I know not where Mr. Goligher finds this in Butler. He does not seem to observe that Butler is specially careful even here where he concedes Shaftesbury's requirement, that Interest should prevail over Duty, if in the last resort they conflicted, to distinguish between the two considered subjectively as springs. (That they were objectively coincident, *i.e.*, would lead to the same course of action, he does indeed hold as a necessary consequence of the Moral Government of God.) Butler does not say—he who has sacrificed his lower to his higher and permanent interest, shall find himself recompensed in a future life; but, he who has sacrificed his lower interest, rather than violate duty and the relations of life, shall find this recompense. The parallel in Aristotle is found by Mr. Goligher in the chapter on *Φιλαντία* in Book IX. of the *Nic. Ethics*—a chapter frequently cited by him, and which in its fecundity of Butlerian parallel is only equalled by Lord Burleigh's nod. In point of fact, with the exception of the striking terms in which it speaks of the supremacy of reason, the differences between Aristotle and Butler here are more obvious than the resemblances. To cite a few of these—

(1) The sense of duty, or the jural view of Ethics, differs from the æsthetic view represented by the *τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα* of Aristotle.

(2) The doctrine of the Self reminds us that we are dealing with Ancient, not Modern, Philosophy. Thus, to speak of the Reason, not only as supreme, but as being the man's Self, and still more to speak of the following of Reason as a gratifying of Self, is to speak language nearly unintelligible to moderns, for whom a capacity for

pleasure and pain is quite as essential a note of Self as its Rationality.

(3) The Butlerian Interest essentially refers to a future life, which is rigidly excluded from the scope of the Aristotelian Ethics.

(While on this topic I would remark that I fail to see the Aristotelian parallel which Mr. Goligher finds in Butler's note to Sermon x., § 6. Butler in this note is discussing not two kinds of *φιλαυτία*, but two ways in which Self-regard may influence the conduct.)

In general, we may remark that the whole subject of Self-love in its relation to Benevolence or rivalry with it, which is so carefully elaborated by Butler, finds no counterpart in Aristotle, to whom the duty of love (*φιλία* of Books VIII., IX.), not to a select few, but to all men, would seem to be a non-existent conception. In fact, of Butler's famous triplet, Veracity, Justice, Charity, only the second finds adequate recognition in Aristotle.¹

I come now to consider more particularly some of the parallels adduced in Mr. Goligher's paper, which I have not already touched on in considering the general relations of the two philosophers. His first example is taken from Butler's remarks in the Preface on the special mode of treatment required by Morality. This is paralleled by two quotations from Aristotle, respecting the degree of *ἀκρίβεια* to be required in Ethics. When, however, we look closer, we find that the difficulty of which Aristotle speaks concerns the subject-matter, while Butler is dealing with the words employed. In Lockian language, Butler's point is one of the Third Book; Aristotle's, one of the Second or Fourth.

¹ The character sketch of the *μεγαλόψυχος*, especially if, with Mr. J. A. Stewart, we regard him rather as an ideal than a real personage, illustrates

perhaps most forcibly this fundamental defect in Aristotle's Ethics. But, indeed, the self-regarding character is apparent throughout.

Indeed, it would seem highly probable that Butler had Locke in his mind here. That philosopher is constant in his belief in Definition as a panacea for the difficulties attending the translation of mathematical demonstration to Morality. Butler here shows that the panacea is an impracticable one.

I would note in the next place the references in Butler to the Aristotelian distinction between ἀρετὴ φυσική and ἀρετὴ κυρία. These had already struck me several years ago, and I would concede that here Mr. Goligher has made out a good case. For though the distinction is one which might have occurred to Butler independently, it is hardly probable that a student of Aristotle, such as I believe Butler to have been, should have failed to notice a distinction which he had so clearly drawn, and of which he had made so much use. If so, it would seem far from improbable that Butler employed this distinction in behoof of his own system. Before, however, we are on this ground to represent Butler as a mere reproducer of Aristotle, it would be necessary to show that the systems of the two philosophers were the same, which is far, indeed, from being the case. As to the subjective ethical question of acknowledgment of debt here by Butler, it has been pointed out that such acknowledgments were not as common then as now. Especially would they seem unnecessary in the case of a recognised master, such as Aristotle, whose works all writers on Ethics might naturally be expected to be conversant with. One does not expect a mathematician, in appealing to a well-known mathematical result, to cite book and proposition of Euclid.

I have already admitted that the conception of Human Nature as a system is distinctly found in Aristotle. I cannot see it, however, where Mr. J. A. Stewart finds it in the passage cited by Mr. Goligher, 1099. a. 11. In the first place, things might be naturally pleasant by

reason of their appeal to a simple elementary desire, and so not involve the notion of a system of Human Nature at all. And, then, conceding such reference it is surely implicit only. In fact, Stewart, here, as in remarks of his which I have already noticed in the same context, reads conceptions into Aristotle which are foreign to the context.

I would refer next as raising some important issues to the parallel attempted to be drawn between Aristotle's *σπουδαῖος* and Butler's "plain honest man."

Mr. Goligher does not appear to have sufficiently attended to the epithet "plain" here, which is of itself sufficient to distinguish from the *σπουδαῖος*, who may be termed a moral aristocrat. And Butler's "honest," as his own comments distinctly show, refers not to moral worth in general, but to sincerity—"the plain, honest man can find the rule of right" being equivalent to—"the plain man can find the rule of right if he sincerely desires to do so." But there is a further most important difference. Butler's plain man recognizes a law binding on himself and his fellows alike. Aristotle's *σπουδαῖος* makes a law for himself—for, though his words are susceptible of a good sense, we seem to see with a shudder their natural development in his mind in the proud, exclusive pharisaism of the *μεγαλόψυχος*.

Butler, indeed, here, both in the respect shown by him to the plain man, as distinct from the *χαρίεις*, and in his emphasizing impartiality as essential to the rule of right (compare also here the Sermon on Self-deceit), approaches remarkably to the subsequent position of Kant.

I cannot, indeed, think that this latter Sermon meets with due recognition from Mr. Goligher. Not only, as I have said, do we find in it a remarkable discussion of impartiality, but its avowed subject raises a question of deep ethical interest, and on which Butler evidently felt profoundly. The problem, How can a man deceive

himself?—though akin to that of *πῶς εἰδώς τις ἀκρατεύεται*, —does not seem to have been considered by Aristotle. And it seems rather far-fetched to find Aristotelian indebtedness because Butler makes the peculiar sphere of False Self-love the same as that of the Equitable.

I proceed to notice what I have called elsewhere the common error which Butler ascribes to the good and bad alike, with respect to *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*. Misled, perhaps, by Butler's "is not a middle way obvious?" Mr. Goligher finds here an application of the Aristotelian mean. But this is to misapprehend Butler's main point.

He is here neither moralizing nor (if the 'bull' may be permitted) preaching, but stating a plain fact—a fact which he finds ignored by good and bad alike—the fact, viz. that the enjoyment to be derived from *τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά* soon reaches a maximum, after which, increase of *τὰ ἀγαθά* no longer increases, but may diminish, the enjoyment. The fallacy attacked by Butler is, in fact, the same as I once heard enunciated by a rather fanatical teetotal friend—If ten glasses of wine make you drunk, then one makes you one-tenth drunk. I cannot find this point, the difference in kind, viz. of the effect when the cause passes a certain degree, in either of the two supposed Aristotelic parallels. In the first Aristotle notices a difference of opinion between two classes, *οἱ πολλοί* and *οἱ χαρίεντες*, Butler a unanimity between two classes, the bad and the good; nor is there any reference in Aristotle to the above point. Such a reference is indeed to be found in the second parallel passage; but this not only lacks the precision of Butler, but treats the *ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά*, if we regard the context, rather as contributing to the perfect *ἐνέργεια* of the *εὐδαίμων* than, as with Butler, sources of passive enjoyment.¹

¹ A closer parallel to Butler here might perhaps be found in the Epicurean formula respecting positive pleasure as

compared with pleasure at rest "varia-
tur non augetur."

Of minor parallels I would note that on p. 124, Ser. v., § 3, *N. E.* 1139 *a*, 357f, on the influence of Reason. Here, I confess, the thought in Butler and Aristotle seems to me entirely different. In Aristotle what is stated is that Reason, *quá* Reason, cannot be a motive at all: the remark, in fact, is a metaphysical one. In the passage from Butler, on the other hand, the point is ethical. The Moral Reason, as in Kant, is admitted to be capable of being a spring; but it is contended that this spring is not in practice sufficient without the aid of the affections and passions. Meanwhile, there are not wanting what may be termed Stoical passages in Butler, where he advocates action from the pure spring of Reason alone.

The correspondences noted in the remarks on the difference between misgovernment of the tongue and of perjury, and on the elimination from general ethical discussion of monstrous forms of Vice, stand on a somewhat different footing. Here the resemblance is, no doubt, fairly close. Before, however, we decide that there is actual borrowing here, we should remark that the observations concerned are such as would, in both cases, quite naturally occur from the nature of the case.

I have now considered as carefully as I can the principal parallels contained in Mr. Goligher's paper; and I may fairly claim to have shown that they imply no such indebtedness to Aristotle as would degrade Butler from his high rank as an ethical philosopher.

Butler, in fact, may be regarded from two points of view: (1) as one of the general group of Ethical writers of the seventeenth century, both in England and on the Continent—a group which includes Descartes, Leibnitz, Cudworth, Clarke, Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Hobbes, and others. Considering him in this light, the questions handled by Butler and his contemporaries were, I have contended, hardly contemplated by Aristotle. The mind is

now considered subjectively, not objectively—not from the point of view of the things desired, but from that of the desiring faculties. The notions of absolute duty, of merit and demerit, the obligation of Love to all potentially, to the neighbour actually, the due relation and balance between Self-love and Benevolence—none of which is more than latent in Aristotle—come now to the front, and prevent any real derivation of Butler and his contemporaries, so far as these questions are concerned, from Aristotle.

(2) Butler's peculiar originality we may perhaps centre in his presentation of Ethics as based on Nature, whether Human Nature, as in the Sermons, or that of the External World, as in the Analogy. That Butler was not deficient in the power of speculative thought is indeed evident from his letters to Clarke, and many passages in the Analogy and Sermons. We may therefore conjecture, that not natural habit of mind, but the circumstances of the time, determined him to a development, rather of an *à posteriori* than an *à priori* line of thought. I would say, in conclusion, what I could not in fairness have said before, that if the view I have taken be true, it is one to be welcomed. In place of Aristotle alone, and a modern, not always intelligent, adapter, we have two great masters of Ethical thought, the ancient, indeed, far transcending the modern in metaphysical subtlety and power, yet each bringing to bear on the great facts of Ethics, from his own point of view, deep, penetrating, and earnest observation. And as in Physics the true merit of Aristotle as a physicist was not discerned by those who in mediæval times found all Physics in him; so in Ethics the really great contributions of Aristotle are better seen when we desist from the attempt to find in him what really belongs to modern thought alone.

FREDERICK PURSER.

CERTAIN ASPECTS OF COLONIAL DEMOCRACY (WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO AUSTRALASIA).

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P. LEROY BEAULIEU (fils),	Les Nouvelles Sociétés Anglo Saxonnnes.
LEROY BEAULIEU (père),	. Colonization chez les Peuples Modernes.
L. VOSSION, L'Australie Nouvelle.
MÉTIN, Le Socialisme sans Doctrines.
L. VIGOREUX, L'Évolution Sociale en Australasie.
H. D. LLOYD, Newest England.
PROFESSOR JENKS, History of Australasia.

OF the Imperial Idea we have recently heard much,
of Colonial Democracy but little.

Yet the latter subject ought not to be devoid of interest for Englishmen, since, if the growth of the Colonies has already perceptibly influenced the foreign policy of the Mother Country, the development of a democracy of the outer seas may yet exercise a still more important effect upon the conduct of home and Imperial affairs. The

object of this paper is to present a summary of the changes wrought by the movement in question, to indicate the effects upon the Colonies themselves, but especially to point out the manner in which these developments militate against the closer union of the Empire.

A certain type of politician would have us believe that the cure for all evils of the body politic consists in a further extension of the franchise. This policy, such as it is, has been carried to its logical conclusion in certain of the British Colonies. The results have been both curious and instructive.

If as yet they have not fully realized the gloomy forecasts of Conservatives of the old school, they have certainly in nowise borne out the joyous prophecies of pamphleteering Liberals. The 'workingman,' once placed in power, has proved to be no more altruistic than his predecessors. He has been, if possible, more selfish, because more short-sighted, and has initiated a class-legislation worthy of the most crusty of traditional Tories. His rule of to-day in New Zealand may well be the policy of to-morrow in England.

The ideas of the working classes¹ are much the same all the world over, and the Radicals are already clamouring for many of the measures which have become law in the Colonies.

One of the most profound thinkers and most brilliant writers on this very subject of the British Colonies² has left on record a remark to the effect that between the Mother Country and her children no serious divergence in commercial policy need be feared; while Mr. Buller, in his famous speech during the Session of 1843, declared, "Of the legislation of your own Colonies, of the fiscal policy of

¹ Of course surface differences exist, *e.g.* circumstances have made the Colonial artisan a Protectionist, while his

brother in England is a Free Trader.

² Professor Merivale, "Lectures on Colonization."

the different portions of your own Empire, you can always make sure, and may rely upon being met by no hostile tariffs on their part."

Never, even in the court of Time, has a judgment been more ruthlessly reversed. Not only has England found her own Colonies standing in the Protectionist ranks, but their internal legislation in economic matters has in most respects been diametrically opposed to her own. Within the Empire, the Australasian Colonies have been the foremost exponents of a protective policy; and, in addition to this, it may be said that no country in the world has exceeded them in daring experiments with regard to social legislation.

Only the most salient features of this departure can be touched upon; and these may be dealt with under the heads of Protection and State Socialism.

1. The year 1846 witnessed the triumph of Free Trade in England, and the politicians of the Cobdenite School were in the ascendant. With their views everyone is acquainted. Suffice it to say, that no care was taken, no foresight exercised, in the matter of Colonial trade.

With the privilege of self-government each Colony acquired full control of its own commercial policy, and this fiscal liberty soon became a cloak for commercial license.¹

Since that time the main outlines of the progression from low to high tariffs have been the same in all the Colonies, and the movement is obviously due to the workings of certain broad general causes.² The following, among others, call for notice :—

(a) *The Growth of Immigration.*—A great proportion of the immigrants was drawn, not from the agri-

¹ Canada received self-government in 1840; Australasia during 'the fifties'; the Cape in 1872.

² Professor Bastable, 'The Commerce of Nations.'

cultural classes, but from the ranks of the artisans or townspeople; and these men naturally strove to obtain employment somewhat akin to their accustomed pursuits.

- (b) *The Growth of Capital* came to their aid, inasmuch as various industries were started to develop the resources of the new countries. Both workers and capitalists then joined in the cry for protection—the former, because they wished to make sure of congenial labour; the latter, in order to secure a monopoly of the local market.
- (c) The example of the United States and the growth of certain theories as to national development.
- (d) The increase of public expenditure consequent upon the extension of State functions.

The history of Australia affords the clearest evidence of the workings of these causes. The marvellous growth of the population consequent upon the gold discoveries is too well known to call for any observation. Upon the exhaustion of the placer workings the miners flocked into the towns, which already boasted of a large number of inhabitants. Various rude manufactures had sprung up to supply the wants of the small farming class, which had gradually followed upon the heels of the squatters; these businesses were extended when the gold rush began, and, now that both capital and labour were plentiful, the cry arose for ‘Protection of Native Industries.’

The Colonial suffrage was based upon democratic principles, and the inevitable result followed. The duties, which had been originally imposed for revenue purposes, were slowly increased, and by 1870, Victoria, originally a Free Trade Colony, had imposed ten per cent. upon her imports; and at the end of five years most of the Sister Colonies had followed her example. In 1880 the New Zealand duties, for the most part, stood at fifteen per cent. ;

nor were those of the other Colonies much lower. These rates have been from time to time increased, until in 1900 they were, exclusive of specific duties, somewhat as follows :—

COUNTRY.	VARIATION. Per cent.	MOST USUAL. Per cent.
New Zealand, . . .	5-40	20 & 25
Queensland, . . .	5-25	25 „ 15
South Australia, . . .	10-25	25 „ 10
Victoria, . . .	10-35	25 „ 15
Tasmania, . . .	10-20	20

In 1875, Sir George Baden-Powell could still say of Canada that “she opposed to the ignorant views of Protection the calm considerations of Free Trade;” but only four years later, under the “National Policy,” her duties were raised, more severe methods were introduced in imitation of the United States; and nearly every year has witnessed some extension of the index or some increase of the tariff.¹

The Cape tariff presents no features of special interest, save that it has usually remained below the average Colonial level.

Considerations of space forbid any detailed notice of the arguments² put forward in defence of this policy; but

¹ N. S. Wales, the one Free Trade Colony, joined the Protectionist ranks under the Commonwealth Act. Before 1889 two-thirds of the Assembly were Free Traders; after that date, 66 per cent. Protectionist and 71 per cent. Free Traders. The rural population gradually joined the Protectionist ranks: the rich, because they dreaded a land tax; the others from a desire to retaliate on Victoria. In Victoria these very years witnessed the growth of a Free Trade (inter-Colonial) party, inasmuch as Victorian industries were beginning to feel the effects of the inter-Colonial tariffs.

² See especially “Notes on Political Economy, from a Colonist’s Point of View,” by a New Zealand Colonist. Library, T.C.D., 36 q. 32. Briefly stated, the general arguments are as follows:—

(1) Variety of industries necessary to promote civilization.

(2) No country can become rich by supplying raw materials to other countries.

(3) Internal exchange is more profitable than foreign trade.

(4) A new country cannot enter into free competition with the accumulated capital of older communities.

their general character is everywhere the same. The avowed foundation upon which they stand is that of the protection of *national* as against cosmopolitan or individual welfare. In fact, our Colonists accept the Arnoldian dictum that the *summum bonum* of Political Economy is not that of human welfare; and when at times compelled to confess that their method is not devoid of drawbacks, they claim that the social gains of Protection outweigh its purely economic disadvantages.

2. But, although the growth of Protection bulks largest to the English eye, the progress of Democracy in our Colonies has been accompanied by other phenomena equally worthy of notice.

Of these the most interesting is that system of Class legislation and Governmental interference with industrial life, to which, without any very great exaggeration, the name of State Socialism may be applied.¹

Although in spirit this movement boasts of a near affinity to the Protectionist doctrine, its sphere of influence is not nearly so wide, and for all practical purposes it may be regarded as confined to Australasia. Upon South Africa, with its intensely Conservative² Dutch majority, the movement has obtained no hold; and in Canada, though there are some slight signs of a "Progressive" spirit, yet, on the whole, it cannot be said that the Dominion has increased the functions of the State to any unwise extent.

This tendency towards State Aid may be said to have had its origin in the early history of the Australasian Colonies.

¹ Mr. Reeves, formerly Labour Minister in New Zealand, describes it as an "ill-defined blend of Radicalism, Socialism, and Trades Unionism." His work, "State Experiments in Australia and New Zealand," is by

far the most able defence of the Progressive position.

² With the partial exception of Natal, a colony more exposed to European undesirables than Australasia.

During the old convict *régime* the Governor bore despotic sway, and it was many years before any scheme of self-government could be granted. In its infancy New South Wales was more than once on the verge of starvation ; and during the continuance of those bad times the apportionment of rations for the community became part of the Governor's duty. Long after the Colony had become self-supporting, as far as the necessities of life were concerned, the 'assignment' system continued, and the Government, as was but natural¹ in a new country, undertook the construction of public works. Owing to these and other causes the Australasian colonists soon learned to look to their rulers for assistance in a far greater measure than had ever been the case at home.

The development of the squatter movement, the increase in the number of free settlers, the abolition of the convict system, all tended towards the growth of private initiative, and Australia had, to a great extent, entered upon the steady, if slow, course of agricultural development when the entire situation was changed by the gold rush of the 'fifties.' The statement that the growth of a digger community led to an extension of the State functions seems paradoxical, inasmuch as the miner was even more dependent on his personal exertions than the squatter ; but that such was the case became apparent upon the exhaustion of the diggings. As before noted, the miners swarmed into the towns, and the growth of an urban population, already sufficiently large, was thus greatly increased.

The great majority of the miners were perfervid radicals ; the Colonies had already acquired the right of self-government ; their constitutions were essentially democratic ; and the wealthy colonists were politically ostracized. The first-

¹ The Government could borrow labour supply in the convict class. money on cheap terms, and had a good

fruits of the new régime were apparent in the adoption of a Protective policy, of a new land scheme, and of a reckless system of expenditure.

The first definite, albeit half unconscious, move towards State interference was made between the years 1848-53, when the Government took over the railways of New South Wales, the construction of which had fallen behindhand, owing to lack of workmen. The ease with which the use of British capital was obtained led to a great extension of this policy, and enormous sums have been borrowed by the various Governments for the purpose of developing the resources of Australasia. But little care was taken to see that there was any prospect of these undertakings yielding a return; and the general want of foresight with which matters were conducted, is well illustrated by the history of the railways of Victoria and New Zealand, and that of the waterworks of Geelong and Bendigo.

In addition to this spirited policy of public works, the Colonial Governments have assumed the control of many industries, the management of which might well have been in private hands. By far the greater proportion of the railways are owned by the State. There are State irrigation works; and the Government concerns itself, even to the most minute details, with the export of agricultural produce. This policy is most noticeable in New Zealand, where the State receives most of the rents, owns most of the railways and telegraphs, administers all charitable aid, and is responsible for the working of the State Life Insurance, and the Old Age Pension Scheme.

The tendency towards the theory that the Government should provide work for all those out of employment has been greatly accentuated by the borrowing mania, and the Australasian workingman has come to look upon the State as "a gold mine, from which he can draw permanent dividends."

In 1891 a Labour Bureau¹ was established in New Zealand, and the practice has since been adopted in all the Colonies. These bureaux give help in four ways. They procure labourers for the public departments ; they provide private employers with hands ; they undertake 'relief' works ; and they furnish workmen with free railway passes to districts where work is likely to be found. In many of the Colonies there exists a legal minimum wage of 7s. a day. Besides providing work for the unemployed, all these States are regular employers of labour on a large scale.²

The rapid progress made by the Socialist movement during the last few years is largely due to the fact that Labour has invaded the political arena. This direct representation of Labour³ arose from the failure of the great strikes of 1890, which made the working classes despair of obtaining further 'reform' through the agency of the Unions. As a general rule, the representatives of Labour in each Colony either form an alliance with the 'Progressives,' or hold the balance between them and the more Conservative party. The marked exception is Queensland, where the new Members are professed Socialists. Labour also seems to control the Federal Government.

The industrial legislation of the various Colonies is already so intricate and complex that it is quite impossible to present a survey, however short, of the entire subject. One can but cite a few leading examples.

¹ The New Zealand 'Bureau' became a 'Department' within a few months. In other Colonies Labour Departments and Bureaus are still separate. The work of the former lies mainly in the direction of inspection and collecting statistics. Mr. Reeves observes—"The amount of inspecting and investigating

grows yearly greater."

² In 1900-1901 the New South Wales Government employed some 20,000 men, and between 1898 and 1901 had expended nearly seven and a half millions."—Mr. Reeves, *op. cit.*

³ Walker, "Australasian Democracy."

The measures¹ referred to fall into three main divisions:—

First, those which are intended to regulate relations between masters and men :—*e.g.* Factory, Shop Assistants, Employers' Liability Acts, and, most important of all, the Shops and Factories Act (Victoria, 1896), and the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Act of New Zealand.

Secondly, those which afford special facilities to the poorer classes, but which do not directly affect employers :—*e.g.* Wages' Attachments Act,² Old Age Pensions Act.

Thirdly, Acts relating to immigration :—*e.g.* Anti-Chinese Acts, Asiatic Restriction Bills, 1896.

In Victoria and New Zealand Factory Legislation dates from 1873, but it was not until 1894 that 'Progressive' principles were put into practice. Some of the main provisions are worthy of notice.

- (1.) A 'Factory' is defined as any room where two or more persons, including the employer, are engaged.
- (2.) Work must not be taken home, and accurate record must be kept of all work done.
- (3.) All clothing made for sale must be duly 'ticketed' with maker's name, &c.
- (4.) Hours of work, 48 per week for males; in some Colonies 'overtime' is reduced to a maximum of 10 days in the year.³

¹ It must be carefully borne in mind that public opinion has long ago enforced an eight hours' day. In addition to this, various Acts provide that hours of work in shops must not exceed 48-52 per week, and four half-holidays per month are enforced. The only bad features of these Acts are the minute and vexatious regulations as to the sale of specified goods after certain hours.

² Wages not exceeding £2 per week cannot be attached for debt.

³ The fact that, in spite of high protective tariffs, a certain amount of sweating was found to prevail in certain trades, such as tailoring, cabinet-making, &c., led to these more severe measures. Chinese competition in the furniture trade had ruined the white workers, hence the following provisions in the

In Victoria the year 1896 witnessed the adoption of a fixed minimum wage. Special boards were appointed to fix wages and piece-work rates (and in 1900, hours of work) for all those engaged in certain trades, whether employed in factories or not. These provisions have been extended, and now apply to between thirty and forty trades.

The Industrial Arbitration Act (New Zealand) was the outcome of a conviction that voluntary arbitration had everywhere failed. Its immediate cause was the defeat of the workers in the great strikes which took place between the years 1890 and 1894.¹

In each district local boards of conciliation have been set up, and deliver decisions on any labour dispute at the request of one of the parties concerned. These decisions are merely in the nature of good advice, and an appeal lies to the Court of Arbitration. The award of this Court may be merely advisory, or, if a majority of the Court so decide, may have the force of law. Contracts as to the working conditions agreed upon by masters and men can be filed in the Superior Court.

By the amending Acts of 1900 and 1901 the conciliation boards have been transformed into courts of first instance, and the Act has been extended so as to apply to all manual and clerical employments.

Victorian Act of 1895:—“ *One Chinaman is to be deemed to constitute a factory*, and no person employed in a factory or workroom in the manufacture of any article of furniture is to work on a Sunday, after 2 o'clock on a Saturday, or between 5 o'clock in the evening and 7.30 in the morning on any other day.” In addition to this, furniture must be legibly stamped as made by white or coloured labour.

¹ To an outside observer these strikes appear to have been almost entirely

uncalled for. Most of them appear to have been “sympathetic” in their origin, and due to a deliberate attempt on the part of the working classes to needlessly push their progressive programme. The Queensland strikes, which aimed at the destruction of all free bargaining as between squatter and man, were accompanied by much brutal outrage—attempts at poisoning, train-wrecking, murder, and arson being not infrequent.

The Courts have power to fix wages, and it has been decided—

- (1) That employers must give preference to unionists; and,
- (2) That a union can bring into Court all employers engaged in the same trade within any one district, while the Court's award in any individual case may be binding upon all.

The Old Age Pensions scheme provides that all persons who have attained the age of sixty-five years, and whose annual income is less than £52, shall receive a pension of £18 per annum from the State. The applicant must be of good character, and certain regulations as to term of residence in the Colonies, naturalization, &c., are enforced. The full pension, however, is only paid to those whose annual income is less than £34.

The first serious invasion of Australasia by the Chinese followed hard upon the discovery of gold. The numbers of the yellow men increased with startling rapidity, and no sooner had the Colonies acquired the right of self-government than a policy of exclusion was adopted. This policy was embodied in a series of Acts, beginning with that of Victoria in 1855, and ending with the New Zealand Bill of 1896. The general principles of these measures have always been the same—the restriction of the number of passengers to be carried by each boat; the levy of a poll-tax upon all Chinamen who landed; the imposition of heavy fines upon the master of any vessel who contravened these ordinances.

That these drastic measures have proved thoroughly successful is shown by the case of the New South Wales Act of 1888,¹ and by the fact that in 1891 the Chinese in all the Colonies did not exceed forty-three thousand.

¹ Number of Chinese immigrants in 1887 was 4436.

Number of Chinese immigrants in 1889 was 9.

Only one passenger for every 300 tons burden, and each Chinaman who landed had to pay a tax of £100.

The hatred formerly entertained for the Chinese has now been extended to Orientals of all descriptions—Japanese, Kanakas, and natives of British India. The laws directed against these people are based upon the Natal Act, the chief test being that the intending immigrant must be able to write in some European language.

By far the most stringent of these enactments is the Federal Exclusion Bill of 1900. Amongst other provisions this Act declares that the customs officials may choose *any European language* in which to test the new arrivals, and furthermore that labourers under contract are not to be introduced.

The first attempt to exclude the Kanaka labourers from Queensland was made by Sir Samuel Griffiths in 1885. This law did much harm to the sugar trade, and was allowed to lapse. The Federal Government has recently ordained that after 1904 all employment of Kanakas must cease.

Nowhere has the progress of Socialism been more remarkable than in connexion with the recent developments of the Australasian land question. To sketch the history of this problem within the limits of a few pages is impossible. One can but indicate a few of the main stages through which the question has passed. Each generation has dealt in its own way with the problems which have from time to time confronted it; and the result has been a mass of overlapping legislation, amid which it is a difficult task to discover any signs of general principles.

The great majority of the early settlers were convicts under restraint, and the limits of the Colony were strictly defined by an imaginary 'ring fence,' known as the 'line of settlement.' The feudal dictum that all land belonged to the Crown was revived in the Antipodes, and the Governor was empowered to grant land, free, or subject

to quit-rents, in such amounts as he thought proper. This system continued until 1831, when its final collapse was brought about by the Colonial Reformers, the most prominent of whom was Gibbon Wakefield.

Into the details of the 'Wakefield Scheme,' and the various reservations with which it was adopted in the different Colonies, we cannot enter, but its two main provisions must be noted. These were, first, that Colonial lands should be sold, not given away; and secondly, that part of the revenue so demanded should be devoted to the encouragement of immigration. A minimum price was fixed, with the idea of limiting the amount of land in the market at any one time, and with a view to bringing about 'close settlement' by preventing the dispersion of labourers.

This scheme has been the object of much bitter criticism, yet it rendered good service in its day by introducing large quantities of capital and labour at a time when Australia stood in sore need of them.

The introduction of the new system in 1831 had at first two curious and unforeseen results: it was the direct cause of the squatting movement, and of the land mania of 1842-3.

As to the first the reasons were simple—much of the available land within the line of settlement had been occupied, and the remainder could only be obtained by paying for it. Meanwhile, beyond an arbitrary line, there lay a boundless extent of good pasture. Naturally enough the bolder spirits broke across and established themselves on the great grazing grounds.

Meanwhile the placing of a price upon the soil seemed to have enhanced its value in the eyes of the settlers. They now appeared to have thought that they could become rich by trafficking in land without making any use of it—the result was the crisis of 1842-3. Grazing licenses had been issued to the squatters; but from 700 stations

of large extent the Government revenue was only £60, and in 1841 it had fallen to £20. To remedy this state of affairs, Governor Gipps issued regulations requiring the squatters to purchase 320 acres of their holdings at £1 an acre. In order to check the gambling in land, the minimum price had been raised to 12s., and in 1842 the Crown Land Sales Act fixed it at £1.

The Colonists, squatters and agriculturists alike, contended that this measure had aggravated the distress, and their views are clearly expressed in a report of the Legislative Council of 1844, when it was recommended that the minimum price should be reduced to a merely nominal sum, that all arrears of quit-rent beyond six years should be abolished, and that the Crown Land Sales Act should be repealed. The Colonists claimed that the land belonged to the people of the Colony¹; they pointed out that profitable pursuits could be carried on upon land which was not worth £1 an acre, and they declared that the Gipps policy checked all enterprise. Gipps justly denied the claims of a handful of men to the soil of Australia, and successfully traversed their accusations.

Unfortunately, he had issued his regulations without consulting the new Legislative Council, thus leaving himself open to attack from both squatters and democrats.

The details of the ensuing agitation, which was much complicated by political issues, are foreign to the purpose of this paper. Suffice it to say that, notwithstanding the storm of opposition, Gipps held to his post, and it was not until the time of his successor that the pastoralists practi-

¹ *I. e.*, to the few thousand settlers then in existence. One notices a constant recrudescence of this same selfish policy in Australasian history. And selfish it is, notwithstanding the high motives as to 'foreign paupers,' &c., put forward in the public press.

To take an example: the British Government, when, in 1890, it handed over vast domains in Western Australia to a scanty population, could not retain control of even a circumscribed area of Crown land for the benefit of future generations of Englishmen.

cally gained their end. Gipps' policy was to retain the absolute ownership of the lands for the Crown, with the exception of such portions as formed the homesteads of the squatters. In return he would have granted them the privilege of grazing over the surrounding country until it was required for sale in the ordinary way, when they would have the same right of purchase as anyone else.

The judgment of posterity, even of Colonial posterity, has been given in favour of Gipps, and cannot be better expressed than in the words of Mr. Jenks:—"Never was foresight more completely justified. . . . Had the Colonists been allowed their way, the generation of 1840 to 1850 would have acquired the whole land of the Colony at nominal prices, and the expanded population of the next decade would have found itself under a tyranny of land-owners which would probably have led to a revolution."

The next step in the history of land legislation was the appearance of Earl Grey's Waste Lands Act, confirmed by the notorious Orders in Council of 1847. The general policy underlying the details of this measure was, that any person might tender for land within a specified area, which comprised the greater part of the country, even though it was already held by another man under a license. This Statute caused great mischief, yet it was almost entirely brought about by the selfishness of the Colonists themselves. From the frantic land rush which ensued on the promulgation of this scheme, may be dated the real hostility between agriculturists and pastoralists.

This tendency increased in proportion as the gold 'boom' declined. The diggers now began to cast eyes upon the land, and a new era of speculation dawned. In many cases this led to an enormous extension in the size of holdings, and this, in return, resulted in a *volte-face* on the part of the general body of the Colonists. The unfortunate squatter became the object of universal attack. The cry of "Free

Selection " arose, and in 1861 that principle was embodied in Robertson's Land Acts. These Statutes have been characterized as the cause of " more heart-burning, public immorality, and private chicanery and class antagonism than any measure passed in Australasia."

A new class now came into existence—the "Selectors," for the most part not genuine farmers but "speculators, who made a living by buying land on Government terms, and selling it at an increased price to the pastoral lessees."¹

All the pastoral leases were open to their attack, and consequently a regular war broke out between selector and squatter—a war conducted with but little scruple on either side, and by means of strange devices, known by equally strange names.²

The Commission of 1883 thus reports on the effect of the Act of 1861:—

"That policy offered for sale to one class of occupants the same land which was simultaneously assigned under lease to another class. . . . There was abundant space and to spare to satisfy all reasonable wants, . . . yet two separate forms of tenure were instituted by law, both authorising the occupation of the same ground. The men whose enterprise was telling daily in reclaiming a wilderness could not be expected to receive with favour a law which authorised any stranger to seize upon each spot as soon as it became of any value."

In New Zealand much solid settlement had been effected under the Wakefield scheme; but in 1870 Sir

¹ The selector, by marking his area round the water-supply of a run, could, as it was termed, "pick out its eyes," and so force the squatters to come to terms with him.

Broadly speaking, it may be said that, apart from its moral side, the chief

effect of the 1861 legislation was the conversion of squatters from tenants into landholders, the very opposite to the intentions of the originators of these measures.

² 'Peacocking,' 'dummying,' 'spotting,' 'gridironing.'

Julius Vogel introduced his railway policy.¹ This, largely owing to the conduct of the provincial governments, resulted in a land fever. Land near the railways brought enormous prices, and the usual collapse followed. As in Australia, so in New Zealand, this led to an agitation against the alienation of land, and eventually to the policy of perpetual leases.

The one fact which can be deduced with absolute certainty from the chaos of land legislation, 1861-1890, is that the policy of free selection before survey, while inflicting no little injury on the squatters, had not resulted in any great increase of *bona fide* settlement. The operation of these laws had, save in Queensland, gradually reduced the class of squatters proper to a condition in which they were no longer an object of envy to the mass of the Australasian people. It was at last recognised that much of the land was only fit for pastoral purposes, and accordingly leases for terms of years were granted; but while the areas of the runs were cut down, the rights of pre-emption were restricted; the rents were greatly raised, and small graziers as far as possible favoured.

The schemes at present in operation for the benefit of the ordinary man possessed of some little capital differ in detail according to local requirements. Broadly speaking, it may be said that the lands of each colony are divided into districts (according to their natural qualifications), and that the plan adopted is 'conditional purchase,' or lease of strictly limited areas for agricultural purposes;

¹ Sir Julius Vogel obtained a loan of £10,000,000. This was to be expended in fostering immigration, and in building railways. The immigrants, after assisting to make the line, were to be settled on blocks of land in the immediate vicinity. The scheme, far from proving self-supporting, necessi-

tated frequent borrowing. The provincial Governments sold the land in the neighbourhood of the intended railways, and applied the money to local purposes, and the land fell into the hands of speculators. This policy was persevered in until 1888.

while pastoral lands are, as hinted above, let on lease for terms of years. At the expiration of the term certain portions of the runs may, as a rule, be released. With the exception of New Zealand, the area of 'runs' is not restricted; but the tendency in all Australian legislation is to follow the example of the smaller island.

Hostility has now shifted from the Crown lessees to the great freeholders. The policy underlying all the recent enactments has been to prevent the establishment of large estates, to encompass the subdivision of those already in existence, to confiscate the so-called 'unearned increment,' and to render the land available for small proprietors.

There are three courses by which this may be brought about—undisguised confiscation, special taxation of land and incomes, and purchase by the State.

In five of the Colonies land and income are specially¹ taxed, while in Victoria, New Zealand, and South Australia these taxes are undisguisedly levied with a view to 'bursting up' the great estates.

The distinctively 'progressive' nature of this taxation dates from 1890-91. The Ballance graduated Land and Income Tax is described 'as a policy tax laid on to discourage the holding of large areas . . . It was meant to be a burden which the larger owners should feel.' This system of progressive taxation, and the manner in which these burdens tend to increase, is well illustrated by the case of South Australia. The heavy death duties, progressive, and ranging from 10 per cent. to 20 per cent., also come under this heading.

¹ Extract from a speech of Mr. Reeves, when Minister of Labour: "The graduated tax is a finger of warning, held up to remind them that the Colony does not want these large

estates. I think that whether partially or almost entirely unimproved, they are a social pest, an industrial obstacle, and a bar to progress."

In 1891 the Ballance Ministry¹ adopted the plan of land purchase by Government, and succeeded in obtaining a compulsory Statute in the 'Land for Settlements Act' of 1894, since amended by the measure passed in 1900. Land so acquired is leased to tenants in perpetuity, with a right to resumption by the State. Statutes of the same nature, but with the compulsory clause omitted, have since been passed in all the other Colonies, with the exception of Tasmania.²

Closely connected with this question of land purchase are the measures which have been taken in connexion with the various schemes of Village Settlements.

Hitherto the land systems which have been noticed have endeavoured to assist those who are in possession of some capital—the Village Settlement aims at placing the poorer classes upon the land. Certain areas have been set apart and plots marked out. The money needed by each individual has been advanced by Government, and in many cases the settlers have been further aided by employment on public works. Two different plans have

¹ BALLANCE LAND TAX.

Ground values up to £500 escape, unless the owner possesses more than £1,500. Owner of land, the unimproved value of which is £2,500, pays tax on the whole. Ordinary land tax is 1*d.* in the £1. Estates whose value is over £5,000 are, in addition, subject to the special tax, varying from $\frac{1}{4}$ penny in the £1 on value between £5,000 and £10,000, to 2*d.* in the £1 on values of £210,000 and upwards. Landholders absent from the Colony for more than one year, pay 20 per cent. additional.

SOUTH AUSTRALIA.

Land Tax.

1884— $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* in the £1.

1894— $\frac{1}{4}$ *d.* in the £1 on small estates;

1*d.* on estates over £5,000; 20 per cent. additional on absentees.

Income Tax.

1884—3*d.* in the £1 on incomes from personal exertion.

6*d.* in the £1 on incomes from investment.

1894—4 $\frac{1}{2}$ *d.* in the £1 on incomes under £800 from personal exertion.

6*d.* in the £1 on incomes of £800 from personal exertion.

9*d.* in the £1 on incomes of £800 from investment.

1*s.* in the £1 on incomes from investment.

² Queensland, 1894; New South Wales, 1897; Victoria, 1897.

been adopted. In most of these experiments the scheme has been based on individualist lines ; but attempts have been made to put communistic ideas into practice.

Agricultural banks have also been established in New Zealand, and the movement has spread to Australia, the object of course being to assist in the creation of a class of small proprietors.

In addition to the purely economic measures, there have been in recent years many changes which afford interesting material to the student of political science.

Chief among these are the Federation of the Australian Colonies, the Referendum, the Payment of Members, and Female Suffrage. It is not too much to say that in the future, possibly the near future, all these questions will engage the attention of the British voter.

It is not possible to discuss their merits in an article such as the present ; and in any case a considerable time must elapse before their effect in Australasia becomes really noticeable.

From the point of view of Imperial politics it cannot be said that the new Commonwealth is an entirely satisfactory creation. There is a great danger that it may stimulate that anti-British feeling which, undoubtedly, exists in Australia. The determination to get rid of the very slight control exercised by the Privy Council shows the extreme jealousy with which the Mother Country is regarded.

On the other hand, it is to be hoped that the wider outlook enjoyed by members of the Commonwealth Government will tend to correct the strictly provincial view of things hitherto taken by the average Australasian. There is also some danger that the new Central Government may be led into dangerous ways by the Socialist or Labour Party.

The effect of the Referendum in a country where (I

quote Mr. Reeves) the great majority of the representatives are poor men, and keenly susceptible to the wishes of the poorer classes outside, will scarcely be good. It subjects any Parliamentary measure to the hasty criticism of a most impatient people, and is likely to increase what a French observer has styled '*l'activité effrayante*' of Colonial Legislation.

Female Suffrage was carried through the energetic action of the Temperance party, which hoped by these means to bring about the total prohibition of intoxicating liquors.

The full effects of this extension of the franchise cannot as yet be determined; but from various '*meetings*' it is apparent that the tendency is in favour of the Socialistic programme. The women of the '*lower classes*' are, of course, in the majority, and, if not keen politicians, at least vote in the supposed interest of their husbands. This has thrown additional power into the hands of the working-man, and in the case of the Roman Catholics is probably conducive to the spread of clerical influence in politics. Mr. Seddon claims that the female vote is given to good character rather than to ability or experience. His political opponents do not appear to agree with him. In the opinion of many observers, this measure, combined with the payment of Members, has, on the whole, resulted in the election of an inferior class of representative.

To estimate the effects of Protection on the British Colonies is no easy task, especially as the different circumstances of each Colony must be taken into consideration.

It is not easy to understand the principles on which the Canadian tariff is based. Canada's main source of wealth consists in the production of raw material, and yet raw material is, as a rule, admitted free of duty, while manufactured goods are heavily taxed. Thus the Canadian agriculturists and foresters, who produce 90 per cent. of the

country's exports, are mulcted in the interests of a handful of manufacturers. Canada's chief exports are wooden articles, and it can hardly be argued that her development in this direction is due to Protection, since her French labour and vast timber-supply should place her in a position of natural superiority.

That Protection has failed to keep up wages, and has, to some extent, increased the prices of manufactured goods, is to be inferred from the threatening attitude assumed by the unions at the present moment. There is reason to fear that the remedies adopted will consist of a further extension of the tariffs, and of the adoption of labour legislation akin to that of Australasia. Whatever doubts exist in the case of the Commonwealth,¹ no impartial observer can hesitate to declare that the Dominion would gain by the adoption of Free Trade.

It has been customary to take Victoria and New South Wales as representative communities; and though the great difference between the areas and natural resources, especially coal, of the two Colonies, rendered such a comparison somewhat unfair, yet there can be no doubt that the Protective policy of Victoria failed to effect the advantages claimed for it. Had it not been for her accumulated capital, and what may be called the consequent enlargement of her boundaries, the evils of restriction must have made themselves severely felt. By means of her capital she was enabled to 'annex' the Riverina division of New South Wales, together with a great portion of Queensland. The trade statistics of the Riverina district figured in the Victorian returns, and thus obscured the real position of the little Colony.

Wages, it is true, were high, as compared with a European standard; but then they were at much the same

¹ The great difficulty in Australia is little employment for the greater part that the pastoral industry affords so of the year.

level in the neighbouring Free Trade Colony, where the prices of many articles were much lower. In spite of a high tariff, Victorian manufactures were, as a general rule, confined to objects of ordinary use; the output, according to many accounts, was not of very good quality; and nearly all her luxuries were imported. Her mining industries were handicapped by the high prices of all machinery. Protection did little to keep up wages, and most certainly failed to prevent the growth of 'sweating.'¹

But it is when the population returns are examined that the most striking evidence of the comparative failure of her policy is presented. At first sight, indeed (making allowance for the difference in area), Victoria does not seem to have been in a worse position than New South Wales; but on a closer examination it will be perceived that many of the wage-earners of the best working age have emigrated—a fact which would seem to indicate that Protection does *not* afford steady and remunerative employment.

The fact that all Protective tariffs constantly tend to increase, and that protected 'infant industries' never attain maturity, is especially noticeable in the Colonies.²

The Inter-Colonial Tariffs, undoubtedly, caused much friction between the inhabitants of the different provinces; and that this was the case is clearly shown by the Report of the Royal Commission in 1890. The opinion of the greater number of witnesses was in favour of Inter-Colonial Free Trade; yet it was the task of ten years to allay these petty provincial jealousies, and to admit of the accomplishment of Federation.

In general it may be said that Colonial Protection has not inflicted any very serious evils upon *the Colonies*,

¹ See Report of the Royal Commission, 1890; also a series of elaborate articles in the *Sydney Daily Telegraph* of 1896 (Sept. 25th—

Dec. 26th).

² Sir Charles Dilke, in "Problems of Greater Britain," vol. ii.

chiefly because of the wide extent and abundant resources of these new countries. The worst effects of a restrictive system cannot be experienced in lands inhabited by a comparatively scanty population, and in which the *necessaries* of life can be so easily obtained.¹

It is the Mother Country which has suffered from the tariffs set up by her children, and the prospects of the future seem no brighter.

There can be little doubt but that the increased expenses consequent upon the establishment of a Federal Government in Australia, will be met by a further extension of the tariff; while the new preferential policy instituted by Canada has, to a great extent, proved a failure.²

¹ The following figures illustrate the comparative progress of New South Wales and Victoria :—

In 1866 (before Protection) Victoria *led* by 200,000 in population, £1,000,000 in revenue, £8,000,000 external trade, 150,000 acres of cultivated land ; shipping of two Colonies equal ; Victorian manufactures far ahead.

1887–1888.—Victorian revenue, £1,000,000 less than New South Wales. Victorian external trade, six millions less than New South Wales. Victoria employed 45,773, New South Wales 45,783 in manufactures.

1900–1901.—

	VICTORIA.	NEW SOUTH WALES.
Population,	1,200,914	1,366,408
Revenue,	(<i>actual</i>) £7,460,855	(<i>net</i>) £9,970,677
Trade,	£35,724,333	£55,731,587
Cultivated Land, . . .	3,924,898 acres.	2,888,305 (<i>fallow excluded</i>).
Manufacturing Industries,	3,097 (only 1897 employing “power”).	3,077 employing power*
Number of hands, . . .	64,207	60,779.
Shipping,	375 vessels, tonnage 101,154.	1,062 vessels, tonnage 146,517.

Victoria is (1903) losing population at the rate of 16,000 per annum.

² This preferential tariff came into force in July, 1897, and the preference was raised from 12½ per cent. to 25 per cent., and in July, 1900, to 33 per cent. The Canadians claim that this preferential tariff had increased the trade between the two countries. The Free Traders declare that it has pro-

* Small establishments excluded, *i.e.* less than four hands, and not employing power.

There are, it is to be hoped, but few English-speaking people who would not like to see a closer union between Great Britain and her Colonies; but it may well be doubted whether the scheme recently foreshadowed by Mr. Chamberlain is calculated to achieve that purpose.

At the root of all plans of Imperial Federation lies the idea that Great Britain shall supply the Colonies with the

duced no effect. Mr. Cox cites the following figures in proof of his contention :—

Proportion of imports from—

	UNITED STATES. Per cent.	GREAT BRITAIN. Per cent.
1883-87, . . .	45	41
1888-92, . . .	46	38
1893-97, . . .	49	32
1898,	59	25
1899,	59	25
1900,	59	26
1901,	60	24

Percentage of British goods free under tariff, 28 per cent.; foreign goods, 45 per cent.

Average duty on goods—

	AMERICAN. Per cent.	BRITISH. Per cent.
1897,	14	21
1901,	12	18

This would seem to sum up the case against the tariff, and prove that a preferential tariff has no effect. It must, however, be pointed out that a preferential tariff can only affect dutiable goods. Between 1893 and 1897 British dutiable goods decreased 36 per cent.; while dutiable goods from other countries increased 64 per cent., and from the United States of America 7 per cent.

In 1901 British dutiable goods had increased 56 per cent., United States of America 75 per cent., other countries only 32 per cent.

If we except certain classes of heavy

goods, on which no tariff could have much effect because of the respective distances of Great Britain and the United States, we find that between 1893 and 1897 British goods declined 33 per cent., while those of the latter increased by 22 per cent. In period 1897-1901 *increase* for Britain was 59 per cent., for United States of America 49 per cent. In general, then, it may be said that the Canadian Preferential Tariff has arrested the decline in the importation of *certain classes* of British goods. As to the rise in American imports, it is due to the fact that most of the American goods are of a class with which, tariff or no tariff, Great Britain could not compete, *i.e.*, raw produce, half-manufactured iron, &c., &c., and to the fact that the demand in Canada for such imports has recently increased.

The two disquieting points in connexion with this matter are (1) that the Laurier Government, before granting this preference, raised the duty on British cotton goods, which has largely tended to nullify the good effects of the measure; (2) that the Canadian manufacturers are grumbling against any preference being given without some return. Mr. Cox has shown that so far from granting a *return*, Great Britain is the more generous of the two. Imports into Canada, £8,921,000; duty, £1,634,000. Into United Kingdom from Canada, £21,764,000; duty, £1020.

greater part of their manufactures, and shall utilize these new countries as a field for her raw materials. It is probable that this, the most natural course, would also be the one best adapted to the interests of the Empire. But, however desirable such a scheme may be, no one can afford to neglect the fact that the Colonial working-man is determined to restrict the development of Imperial trade and of his own country in the interests of local manufactures.

In addition to this, the comparative failure of the Canadian experiment illustrates the difficulty of devising a satisfactory scheme of preference when well-organised private interests are opposed to it, and confirms the doctrine that no one can foresee the actual results of the most carefully-prepared tariff.

According to a certain section of our publicists, one of the reforms necessary to the salvation of Great Britain is the nationalization of the English railways. This policy has always prevailed, and under the most encouraging circumstances, in Australasia, while its results are by no means what its advocates would lead us to expect. Of recent years Western Australia alone has made a profit of 4 per cent. ; while the other railways¹ show an average loss of 29.5 per cent. During the prevalence of bad times other evils come to light ; for, at the very moment when the country, owing to a shrinkage of revenue, is likely to suffer heavily from further taxation, more taxes are of necessity imposed, in order to meet the interest on the loans.

In Australasia the existence of State railways has, for reasons before stated, come about almost of necessity ; in England, and as things stand, the case is very different.

¹ The net revenue is deceptive, expenses have been defrayed from inasmuch as many of the ordinary loans. See the *Economist*.

The financial risk in connexion with the purchase from the railway companies would be enormous. These companies are infinitely more powerful than those which controlled the telegraphs; and bad as the Government bargain was in the case of the latter, it would probably be far worse in the matter of the railways.

Professor Bastable¹ has pointed out that if the railway accounts were to be included in the Budget, the expenditure per annum would amount to £270,000,000, and the public debt to £1,880,000,000, while a sinking fund would necessitate increased taxation.

Of course, the question of railway nationalization cannot be decided on financial grounds alone. Thus, in the Colonies, the necessity of opening up new countries, and the interests of the future, may predominate over the mere financial considerations of the present. But there are many grave dangers which cannot be overlooked. The State would have to control large bodies—in England vast numbers—of employés. The political influence of these men would be a danger, and it would be difficult for any Government to refuse their claim to higher wages. The control of all railways by the Federal Government will greatly increase the danger of this in Australia. In addition to this, the public would demand that any increase in the profits should be devoted to lowering the fares.

All these difficulties have been, more or less, experienced in Australasia. The recent and most wanton strike in New South Wales is a case in point. It could scarcely have lasted so long, or inflicted so much damage, had competing private companies been in existence. In the Colony it dislocated all industry, and caused much loss and damage. Who could gauge the effects of such a strike in England, were all the lines of the home country under

¹ "Public Finance," 3rd ed., 1903.

government control? Where, however, the Colonies have really erred in this matter, has been in the construction of 'political' lines out of *loan money, not revenue*, and with little regard to the prospect of remunerative return. Nor is it with regard to their railways alone that the Australasian Colonies furnish us with examples of extravagance.

That irrigation will ultimately prove most beneficial to Australia is a proposition that few will care to controvert; but the manner in which the work has been carried out leaves much to be desired. At Geelong and Bendigo the new panacea seems to have been adopted in great haste. The pressure exercised by the 'local Member' and by deputations of drought-threatened farmers resulted in the handing over of large sums to the local Trusts. These latter "expended the loan money as expeditiously as possible, and without regard to the requirements of the districts or the supervision of the undertakings."

Up to 1896 the expenditure had amounted to £4,695,000, the annual revenue being $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. Now, the money for these undertakings had been borrowed at 4 per cent.; consequently the annual loss to the Revenue would amount to £120,000.

The land speculation of 1887-1892 is another case in point. Great sums had been borrowed from England; this money could not be immediately employed, and so it was deposited in the associated banks. In their desire to make a profit these banks issued this money in loans to their customers, taking land as a security. The direct consequence of this was the land boom of 1893, the disastrous results of which are too well known to call for any special comment.

Again, in the policy pursued with regard to the unemployed, we find the same reckless expenditure. In 1886

£250,000 was spent on relief works in New South Wales. During 1895-6, £201,000 was disbursed for the same purpose; for the expenditure of only £85,000 was there any other justification, and this in a population of one and a-quarter millions. The official declarations show that there were only 1500 genuinely unemployed in Sydney.¹

In twelve years the Sydney Bureau had spent upwards of £70,000 in forwarding labourers to places where they might obtain employment; and in August, 1901, £54,200 was still owing to Government. Out of 16,000 offers of work made to the unemployed of Sydney in 1900, only 8000 were accepted.

Professor Wallace, whose experience of the Colonies is well known, remarks with regard to New Zealand, "In the case of much of the money borrowed the first object of the Government is to find employment for labour, and the improvement of the resources of the country is only a secondary consideration."²

Closely connected with the question of State expenditure is the problem of Old Age Pensions.

It is most certainly to be desired that all who have contributed towards the wealth of the State should be secured from want in their declining years; but the financial diffi-

¹ Walker, "Australian Democracy."

² An extract from an official document, quoted by Mr. Reeves, will give a fair idea of the attitude of the unemployed of New South Wales. This report points out that men could earn from 6s. to 8s. a day, and shows that some engaged in this work, while supporting themselves, had handed over £4 per month to their wives, and at the end of their term of employment had saved £12 in addition. It goes on to say—"Some of the men had

to be returned at Government expense, without doing any work at all. Others go to work late, and knock off early. The rates have been stigmatised as absurdly high, and much greater than any private landholder would think of paying. . . . Great numbers of men refuse the work because it is away from Sydney; and nearly half of those who go abandon the work before completion." Yet the champions of labour accuse the Government of 'sweating'!

culties are great, and our home legislators may well hesitate in face of the results obtained by the Colonial experiments.

The figures for New Zealand show a steady increase in the cost of the scheme :—

YEAR.	AMOUNT PAID IN PENSIONS.
1899,	£ 7,443
1901,	197,292
1902,	207,468 ¹

The Pensions Bill of New South Wales may be characterised as an act of conspicuous recklessness from the financial point of view. The Government estimate during the debates was £300,000; the amount set aside in the budget of 1901 was £357,000; the actual payments in the following financial year amounted to £436,202; while the cost of working was £16,471.

In Victoria, Sir George Turner placed the cost of his six months' experimental scheme at £75,000—the actual cost amounted to £131,000. It was calculated that at this rate the Colony would be mulcted of some £600,000 per annum. Consequently, a new scheme was introduced, the estimated expenditure being £250,000; the actual payments for the year ending June, 1902, amounted to £283,000. In addition to this, it should be observed that the Victorian expenditure on reformatories, asylums, &c., was £316,000,² *exclusive* of local poor rates!

In none of the Colonies has there been any appreciable reduction of the usual charitable aid, while a considerable number of frauds have been perpetrated in connexion with the new departure. The comments of the *Sydney Bulletin* on the restrictions imposed with a view to prevent fraud are characteristic of the 'advanced' party, and, did space permit, are worthy of quotation.

¹ To which must be added cost of administration, £2,593.

² Figures taken from Mr. Reeves' work, "State Experiments."

The figures of the public debt furnish one with food for thought: £195,381,334 for the Commonwealth, and £48,557,751 for New Zealand. Dividing these sums by the population returns, the national indebtedness per head amounts to about £59 in the case of the former, and £63 17s. 8d. in that of the latter. This in countries where the birth-rate is rapidly declining, and where immigration is discouraged, does not promise well for the future.¹

It is undoubtedly true that these Colonial debts are in the nature of 'national capital'; the money so borrowed has not been wasted in armaments, or upon display; but the tendency to unproductive expenditure, apparently for the purpose of giving employment, has been very marked. Many of these loans have exceeded the dictates of ordinary prudence, and the interest is a heavy burden. It must also be borne in mind that some 10 per cent. of the revenue of Australasia is derived from the sale of Crown lands, which, of course, form a continually diminishing asset.

In some cases State interference has been justified by its results. The system of State Life Insurance has proved very successful; while in countries of such magnificent distances, it may be doubted whether private enterprise could have achieved as much as the State in the furtherance of agricultural export.

To the attempt made to control the manufacturing industries the same praise cannot be awarded. The most striking of these schemes is the New Zealand Arbitration Act.

Passing over the obvious danger of submitting the industries of an entire country to the arbitrary decision of three men, it may be said, with Mr. MacGregor, that the

¹ Expenditure in N. S. Wales has risen from £8 to £12 per head, and public debt increased by £17,000,000 in three years.

success of such an Act must depend on the spirit in which it is worked.

And the spirit in which the social faddists and trade unions have approached the Act could not be worse.

They have consistently endeavoured to use it as a screen for their own purposes, and in nearly every case have pushed their demands past the Conciliation Boards, and up to the new Court of Appeal. An appearance before the Court, if successful, will cost the union nothing; and if unsuccessful, will involve none of the dire penalties consequent upon a prolonged strike. As a general rule, says Mr. MacGregor, the great body of the men know nothing about the dispute until they see it in the papers.

Again, the number of these 'disputes' has been alarmingly great, and the constant dragging of employers into Court, in order to snatch some advantage for the unionists, cannot be for the ultimate good of trade. However impartial the judges may be, there must exist an unconscious temptation to decide the matter by the easy process of granting some of the men's demands—it is easier to sympathise with the poor than with the rich.

It cannot be too sufficiently emphasized that the means for enforcing the awards of the Court are entirely insufficient. When the Socialist is in a pleasant mood, he facetiously compares the Capitalist to a wingless bird. This, in a certain sense, is true; and a manufacturer, rather than throw away the money sunk in his business, will bear with much injustice, and will in all probability keep his factories open as long as he can earn a living. An employer's property then is in existence, and can be taxed; but how is the Court to punish a union which may not be even solvent? Even supposing that a large number of small fines can be levied from the 'hands,' can workmen be forced to do real and valuable work? It has been said, with justice, that any union can make men idle; but that

a union which can force them to work has not yet been found.

The boast that no one can starve an Arbitration Court into surrender only means that such a body can prolong a dispute far beyond its natural limits.¹

Two effects of the various decisions already given have been noted.

As to the first, that 'preference shall be given to unionists,' it is impossible to describe the extent to which this hampers the independent worker.

The luminous judicial pronouncement of which this principle formed part, if quoted on the other side, would have been denounced as quibbling hypocrisy.²

The fact that wages may be fixed after inspection of an employer's books, and that a decision given in one case binds all other cases in the same trade, may have strange effects, especially if, as seems to be the case in modern times, profits are in the nature of a rent for special ability.

Mr. Reeves candidly points out that the success of this Act means the extension of State control to the management of all industries. It is claimed for the Act that it has been successful, inasmuch as no great strikes have occurred since its adoption; and many English Radicals clamour that a like measure should be enforced in the home country. The cessation of strikes is undoubtedly

¹ Mr. MacGregor, in his valuable article, "Compulsory Arbitration at Work," *National Review*, Oct., 1899, cites several examples of undoubted tyranny, and clearly shows the manner in which the Amendment Acts have delivered the employer into the hands of his enemies.

² Extract from Mr. Justice Williams' judgment:—"Nor did it [the Act]

contemplate that a decision, giving preference to unionists, should affect any legal right of non-unionist workmen. The non-unionist had no legal right to demand employment. He could sell his labour on what terms he chose, provided he could find an employer able and willing to accept his terms."

a matter for congratulation; but it must be pointed out (1) that hitherto the Act has been most fortunate in its administrators; (2) that it only applies to a very small industrial system; (3) that it has had no experience of foul weather; its decisions have usually been in favour of the workmen, and given on a rising market, when employers could afford an increase of wages. The real test of the Act will come with hard times, and the growls which have greeted certain adverse decisions do not presage well for the future.¹

In the opinion of most observers, the success of the wages boards of Victoria has been very doubtful, and the frequent attempts made to induce the Government to alter the decisions of these tribunals have been productive of much irritation.

It is too soon to judge of the effects of the various regulations, such as the Early Closing Acts, which affect all the minor industries; but it seems likely that in the long run they must tend to sap the self-reliance of the people, while there can be no doubt of the hostility with which capital is regarded. As Mons. Siegfried² remarks, New Zealand is gaining the reputation of being opposed to the

¹ The Report of Mr. Justice Backhouse, who was sent to investigate the working of this Act, is worthy of quotation. He considers that up to the present the Act has worked fairly well, only one industry having been seriously hampered by the decisions. He then goes on to say:—"Since it [the Act] came into operation in New Zealand everything has been in favour of an increase in the emolument, and of an amelioration in the condition of labour. There cannot be the slightest doubt that wages would have risen had there been no Act. Since the Act has been in

force New Zealand has been advancing on an ever-increasing wave of prosperity, which," he continues, "is due to a favourable market for its exports. These exports consist of commodities which have been in no way directly affected by the Act."

See letter from Melbourne, published in the *Economist* for 1901. In the April *Review of Reviews for Australasia* it is pointed out that the scheme of wages boards is (1903) "hopelessly discredited; this legislation has seriously injured the working classes."

² "La Nouvelle Zélande."

influx of foreign capital, while in 1901 Australian capital began to seek employment in England.¹

The dislike in which the wealthy classes are held has found active expression in the land laws.

Australasian statistics certainly show that much of the land is held in the form of large estates ; and this, when the manner in which some of these properties have been acquired is borne in mind, enables one to comprehend the feeling which aims at the regulation of the land system.

The abolition of speculation in land is certainly desirable ; but much of the recent legislation would seem to endanger the development of these industries upon which really depends the prosperity of these great countries. In the first place, the constant alteration of the law has introduced an element of uncertainty into all titles, and an insecure tenure has always proved harmful to the agricultural interest. The real danger, however, of the most recent legislation lies in its tendency to hamper all private enterprise, in what is *assumed* to be the interest of the public weal. Thus, in New Zealand, no one holding more than 2000 acres is allowed to obtain any Crown land ; while individuals and companies alike are confined to the occupation of one run, and the area of that run is strictly limited.² This system will certainly hamper the more enterprising Colonist, while the limitation of the runs is fraught with danger to the most important industry of the country.

As to the retrospective legislation which aims at breaking up the large estates, it should be remembered in the owners' favour that even if many of them, or of their ancestors, acquired the land during the 'speculative period,'

¹ Letter from Melbourne, 1901.

² Mons. P. Leroy-Beaulieu cites the case of a squatter whom he met *en voyage* to South Africa, in search of a

country where he could obtain as much land as was necessary.—“Les Nouvelles Sociétés Anglo-Saxonnes.”

yet they were but exercising their legal rights. The purchase-money, in many cases, was devoted to the development of the country, and a great proportion of Australasian prosperity has been derived from pastoral pursuits, while in this direction at least the present owners are making thoroughly good use of their land.

The land question is of burning importance in these countries, in view of the admitted tendency of the people to crowd into the large towns. This growth of a large urban population is of course a phenomenon of world-wide extent, but is more remarkable in Australasia than in either Europe or America. It is certainly not a healthy sign in a new country; but the following figures are more eloquent than words. (The numerals which follow the names of the chief towns indicate the proportion borne by the population of these cities to that of the entire Colony.)

	Sydney.	Melbourne.	Brisbane.	Adelaide.	Perth.
1871,	. 27'34	28'27	12'51	23'03	29'68
1881,	. 29'93	32'81	14'57	37'11	19'60
1891,	. 33'86	43'05	23'79	41'59	16'97
1900,	. 33'40	41'10	24'00	44'30	20'40

It is worthy of note that London contains but 19 per cent., Paris but 6 per cent., and Berlin but $5\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., respectively, of the population of England, France, and Prussia.

When the population of the smaller towns is taken into account, the magnitude of the evil is clearly perceived. In Victoria, where this movement is most strongly felt, more than five-ninths of the people are town-dwellers, while in New Zealand upwards of one-fourth of the entire population is concentrated in five towns.

It is impossible to enter into a detailed account of the various causes which have contributed to this extraordinary condition of affairs ; but it is hard to believe that the fostering of artificial industries by means of Protection, and the

lavish provision made for the unemployed, together with the high rate of wages, have not contributed to lure the people into the towns.¹ According to the latest accounts in the English press, this immigration is still in progress.

Of the Village Settlement schemes, to which reference has already been made, it may be at once said that those which were based on the co-operative system have proved an absolute failure. The settlers quarrelled with their headmen or trustees, with the authorities, with each other. They attempted, in some instances, to introduce the eight hours' day into agriculture; and the evidence given before the Commission of Inquiry reads like the libretto of a comic opera.

The history of the Murray Settlements may be taken as typical. Thirteen groups were formed, of which eleven were placed on the Murray River. They obtained a grant of some 64,000 acres; all necessities were supplied, including a loan of £50 per head, which loan was subsequently advanced to £100, and the term of payment extended from three to five years. The results were not encouraging. The settlements had been founded in 1893. Two years later only eleven remained. The settlers numbered 1679, of which 381 were men. By 1899 three more villages had failed, while the population of those still in existence had fallen to 775. Only 182 men remained. The year 1900 witnessed the collapse of yet another settlement, and the reduction of the population to 685 souls. The attempt at co-operation was now abandoned, and the lands were divided for private occupation. The loans to the seven

¹ Mr. Reeves quotes the following figures to prove that the socialistic movement has not affected the urban question:—Increase in population of the six Australian capitals for decade 1881–1891, 473,514; 1891–1901, 188,775;

but it should be borne in mind that, while the rate of increase of the Australian population had been 38 in the former period, it was much slower in the latter (6·5 for the years 1891–4).

surviving settlements amounted to £94,549, of which only £13,000 has been repaid.

The details of the similar schemes, put into practice in Queensland and New South Wales, cannot be set forth here; but it may be said that they exhibit in every feature the worst characteristics of Government mismanagement. On the whole, however, those villages which were conducted on individualistic lines have proved fairly successful.

In Victoria, indeed, two-thirds of the land chosen by Government was found to be absolutely useless, and, out of £67,245 advanced, only £6658 has been repaid; but in 1901 some 9183 souls were settled on the land.

In New Zealand, £3340, out of £15,000 lent, had been repaid, and the Government had received some £44,000 in rent. The names of 2011 persons were on the roll; of these, however, only 1000 were 'original settlers,' while one-third were non-resident.

Generally speaking, it may be said that this is an infinitely better way of spending money than on useless relief works.

The system of State loans for agricultural purposes, inaugurated by the New Zealand Government, has been subjected to severe criticism by Mons. Leroy-Beaulieu, who has observed the working of a similar system in France. He points out that the weak point of the French system has always been its connexion with Government, and shows that in Australasia the danger of 'political pressure' is much greater, since there the State is directly concerned. In commenting upon the various attempts made to transform the Australian workingman into a landholder after the French model, he remarks that he has heard much of the 'magic of property,' but little of the extraordinary patience and self-denying thrift of the French peasant, which have made him what he is, and hints that these qualities are distinctly lacking in the average Australasian.

In this opinion he has the support of most observers, including no less an authority than Professor Wallace, who declares that the spirit of dependence is a canker-worm, which gnaws at the vitals of more than one class in the Colonies.¹ It has never been suggested that the Colonist could not obtain a farm at a fair rent from private owners; but it is presumed that such a course would be scouted by your independent Australian.

The following figures would seem to suggest that, in spite of his outcry against the great estates, the average Colonist has no very real desire to quit the towns:—

Year.	Total Population Australasia (in round numbers).	Population engaged in Agriculture, Pasture, Mining.	Percentage.
1881, .	2,742,000	416,139	11
1891, .	3,900,000	451,065	10

The hatred displayed towards the ‘big man’ is shown by the system of direct taxation: “le grand propriétaire,” says Mons. Siegfried, “est l’ennemi.” Not only are these men exposed to heavy indirect taxation by means of Protection, they are also subjected to the heavy progressive imposts noted some few pages back.

One cannot help feeling, indeed, that the heaviest share of taxation should be borne by those for whom the struggle of life is easiest. Yet the danger of this in a fiercely democratic country is very great. The people in power have the handling of other men’s money, and this without any responsibility. In the long run it must tend to diminish the accumulation of capital.² In New Zealand out of 90,000 landed proprietors, only 12,000 pay the land

¹ “The Rural Economy and Agriculture of Australia and New Zealand.”

² A man will doubtless bear a great deal of taxation before he ceases to

work or to save. It is better, surely, to earn £5,000 and pay £500 in taxation than to earn £500 and pay £50.

tax ; while in New South Wales the proportion is 60,000 in a population of 1,200,000.

Nor is the burden likely to be lightened. "I find it everywhere avowed in New Zealand that the present taxes are only a beginning," says Mr. Lloyd;¹ and again he remarks, "One of the most effective features of these taxes is that they can be so easily made heavy by a few words of legislation." To quote once more from this enthusiastic evangelist of Socialism: "Seddon is never at a loss as to revenue for his schemes. He keeps constantly in the cheerful view of his people the availability of higher taxation of the larger estates and larger incomes." Many instances might be adduced of the truculent attitude assumed by Labour at the Antipodes. The determination of the workingman, that everything is to be sacrificed to his more immediate needs, is clear and unmistakable.

At present the Trades Unions *suggest* most of the legislation: if they federate, as seems possible, they will *dictate* it; and what that tyranny will be, let those declare who know their past history in Australia.²

Mons. Siegfried has once again stated the situation in a single sentence when he says, in speaking of the political parties, "Les conservateurs représentent la classe qui possède, les libéraux la classe qui ne possède pas et voudrait posséder."

The following extracts from its programme show the more immediate goal aimed at by the Labour Party in Victoria. It is typical of the general position in Australia. One adult one vote; exclusion of undesirable races; gradual nationalization of the means of production, etc.; eight hours and a minimum wage; all education to be free;

¹ "Newest England," by H. Demarest Lloyd.

² "The Labour Question in Australia," by Mr. Mitchell, gives many

instances. This pamphlet was published in the *Australian Pastoralists' Review* for 1892.

progressive tax on land values, town and country ; a cumulative tax on all incomes over £200 per annum.¹

The cry against militarism, which is so often raised in Australia, does not come well from a Colony whose defences are in such a neglected condition, and whose contribution to Home and Imperial defence, as compared with that of the Mother Country, is represented by the following figures :—

Army and Navy per head of population² :—

	£	s.	d.
United Kingdom, . . .	1	9	2 $\frac{3}{4}$
Australasia, . . .	0	2	8 $\frac{1}{4}$

In spite of the splendid service rendered by their contingents in South Africa, neither Australia nor New Zealand is alive to the necessities of Imperial defence, and but few of the Colonists recognise the advantages which they derive from the British Navy. Many of them grumble at “payment without representation,” and the anti-British feeling is steadily fanned by such papers as the *Sydney Bulletin*.

If the Australasians are somewhat oblivious of the needs of Imperial defence, their attitude is one of absolute hostility as to another question of Imperial interest, that of Emigration.

It may be said at once that their opposition to the Chinese invasion has abundant justification. The Mongolian would speedily swamp the Caucasian. Yet it must also be noted that it is rather on account of their virtues, if thrift and industry be deemed such, that the Chinese are excluded.³ If, however, the indenture system were to be

¹ Victorian labourers are now clamouring for a six hours' working day, and a land tax which shall secure the whole of the unearned increment.—*Australasian Review of Reviews*, 1903.

² The figures for Canada are lower, viz., 2s.

³ Sir Henry Parkes, in his famous ‘Not for the guns of Her Majesty’s Fleet’ speech, honestly acknowledges this.

introduced, their labour might well be employed in the construction of irrigation works, which will otherwise burden the Colonies with a heavy debt.

The attitude of the ruling party towards the Japanese, whether justified or not, is likely to involve the Empire in serious difficulties, while the expulsion of Kanaka labour is an act of sheer short-sighted selfishness on the part of the Australian workers.

Capital to the extent of six millions has been sunk in the sugar plantations, and the industry, hampered as it has been by the endeavours of the legislators to reserve much of the work for the whites, is one of the most flourishing in Australia—is, in fact, the main standby of Queensland. Kanaka labour is cheap and regular, white labour dear and scarce. The work is of the severest description, and is frequently done with the thermometer at 120°.

Dr. Skertchley, the State Geologist for Queensland, declares the statement that white men will labour in the sugar fields to be “a political cry and not a proved fact.” The authorities introduced the thin edge of the wedge by establishing a system of central mills, in which all work was reserved for whites.

The Griffith Law of 1885 forbade the introduction of Kanaka labourers, with the result, admitted even by its enthusiastic supporters, that the industry, hitherto rapidly increasing, made no progress for seven years. In 1892 this Statute was repealed; but by the new Federal Bill no Kanaka is to be employed after the year 1904.

The reports for last year state that the industry is languishing for want of hands, and the Federal Government, bearing in mind the results of the Griffith Law, are attempting to revive the production of sugar by means of bounties and a high tariff. The duty on foreign sugar is to be £6 per ton. Those who believe in the present possibility of Imperial Federation for commercial purposes should note this

fact, and ask themselves whether black-grown sugar from the West Indies, or calico goods from the East Indies, are likely to be admitted to Australia.

The refusal made this year to continue the mail contract, because the Imperial authorities employed Lascar seamen, shows the length to which our Colonial cousins are prepared to go.¹

But the Australasians have also determined to check the influx of white men, and not only of continental Europeans in general, but of Englishmen as well. The original draft of the Bill laid before the Federal Parliament was so severe that the clause relating to 'contract' would have prevented a clergyman from accepting the cure of any particular parish. The 'European language' test may be twisted so as to exclude almost any Englishman. Sir E. Barton's guarantee to the effect that 'such language shall not be arbitrarily chosen' would be waste paper in the face of Australian 'public' opinion.

Sir Charles Dilke, who cannot be accused of dislike for anything appertaining to democracy or the Colonies, remarks that "Colonial Governments are never backward in illegally preventing the landing of persons who are distasteful to the community." The recent case of the 'six hatters' shows that our Colonies will not hesitate to exclude Englishmen on the very flimsiest grounds. This feeling is the more inexcusable when it is recognised that the proportion of population to land is about five to the square mile of *fertile soil*, and that nearly half, and in some provinces more than half, of the people live in towns.

In addition to this, and for the last thirty years, the

¹ I may state that I have no sympathy with the cry that all men are equal. I consider that negroes, and most of the coloured races, are, generally speaking, more fitted to be slaves than free men ;

and so far I am probably in agreement with Australian opinion ; but I cannot see why black labour should not be made use of in climates which are unhealthy for Europeans.

birth-rate in Australia and New Zealand¹ has been steadily declining. The growth of Australasia has hitherto been the fairy-tale of nineteenth-century colonization ; it remains to be seen what effect will be produced by its latest policy. The great strength of North America was not gained in this manner.

Meanwhile every year brings nearer the contest for the supremacy of the Pacific. The struggle will be one between the United States and Australasia ; it is more than doubtful whether the few people of the latter, accustomed to constant aid and restriction, can face their numerous and self-reliant cousins from the Western Continent.

JOHN WARDELL.

¹ In itself, and provided the decline is more marked in the lowest than in the more efficient ranks of society, this is in itself no bad thing. The danger of course is that it is the improvident who will tend to increase, while the more cultured and thoughtful and generally efficient families may die out.

The danger of the 'people of the abyss' filling the gaps caused by the prudence of the more thoughtful, is more pressing in Europe than in Australasia. The decline of the birth-rate in the latter country is only cited to emphasize the 'dog in the manger' policy.

NOTES ON MEDLÆVAL LATIN AUTHORS.

DURING the preparation of a work on the *History of Classical Scholarship from the sixth century B.C. to the end of the Middle Ages*, I have naturally had occasion to study a considerable number of mediæval writers. It occurs to me that, in the case of a few of those writers, some of the points raised in the following notes may possibly be new to scholars; while others, on which I feel less certain, may be further elucidated with the aid of the scholarly readers of HERMATHENA.

JOANNES SCOTUS (Æ. 845 A.D.).

The early study of Greek in Ireland is a topic which has often been treated with different degrees of thoroughness, both at home and abroad. Among the writers on the Continent who have incidentally touched upon it are Friedrich Cramer, Ozanam, Hauréau, Zimmer, and Traube; and, in the home of HERMATHENA, it is a theme which is specially familiar, owing to the writings of a distinguished representative of Trinity College, Dublin. I need hardly add that I refer to the late Professor G. T. Stokes, and in particular to the eleventh lecture in his work on *Ireland and the Celtic Church* (1886), as well as to his interesting contributions to the *Proceedings of the Royal Irish Academy* for February, 1892. His general conclusion seems to be that a knowledge of Greek passed from Gaul to Ireland in the fifth century of our era, during the age of St Patrick. In the two following centuries the love of travel, which the author of the *Life of St Gallus* describes

as having almost become a second nature with the 'Scots,'¹ led to the light of learning which had lingered in the remotest island of the West, being transmitted anew to the lands of the South, where it happily found a home in monasteries of Irish origin, such as Bobbio (613), and St Gallen (614).

While this general conclusion is sufficiently clear, there are many points of detail as to the early teaching of Greek in Ireland and in the Irish monasteries abroad which are still left in obscurity. But we know that the Greek text-book in use at St Gallen at the end of the ninth century was the *Grammar of Dositheus*; and it appears to be not improbable that this Grammar found its way from Gaul to Ireland, and from Ireland to the Irish monastery above the Lake of Constance; but, beyond its mention in connexion with St Gallen, there is no definite evidence on this point.² Early in the same century, the *Book of Armagh* (c. 807) has the Lord's Prayer written in Latin words but in Greek characters; and a few years later, we have the birth of the best Greek scholar of his age, the Irishman commonly known as 'John the Scot.' The only names by which he was familiar to his contemporaries (as has been pointed out by Christlieb and Traube) were *Joannes Scotus*, *Scottus*, or *Scotigena*. In his own translation of 'Dionysius the Areopagite' he calls himself *Joannes Ierugena*. In later MSS *Ierugena* was changed into *Erugena* and *Eriugena*. Later still we find *Erigena*, while the full designation *Joannes Scotus Erigena* does not occur earlier than the sixteenth century. Thus the name

¹ *Vita S. Galli*, ii. 47 (Pertz, *Mon.* ii, p. 30), "Scotorum, quibus consuetudo peregrinandi iam penne in naturam conversa est."

² Dositheus is mentioned by Notker

the Stammerer, who died at St Gallen in 912. He is also represented by a tenth-century MS at St Gallen and by an entry in an ancient catalogue of the MSS at Bobbio.

Erigena, though pleasantly suggestive of Erin, is best discarded by scholars; it may, however, be sometimes convenient to retain it for popular purposes as a means of readily distinguishing between Joannes Scotus and his almost namesake, Joannes Duns Scotus, of four centuries later.

I am not aware of any evidence connecting 'John the Scot' with any definite place in Ireland. But he is clearly regarded as an Irishman by his contemporaries, Eric of Auxerre (d. c. 877), and the papal librarian Anastasius. Eric addresses to Charles the Bald a letter in which (with 'John the Scot' mainly in view) he hyperbolically describes nearly all Ireland, with the band of her philosophers, as disdaining the perils of the sea, and embracing a voluntary exile in answer to the summons of one who was a Solomon in wisdom.¹ Anastasius, who had learnt his Greek at Constantinople, wonders how "this barbarian, living on the confines of the world, who might have been deemed to be as ignorant of Greek as he was remote from civilization, could have proved capable of comprehending such mysteries (as those of 'Dionysius'), and translating them into another tongue."²

There is good reason for believing that the text which he translated was found in Frankland, and not brought from Ireland, and the same is true of his Latin translation of the comments of Maximus on Gregory Nazianzen. Ireland had armed him with the knowledge of Greek; and Frankland gave him the opportunity of turning his knowledge to practical purpose. To his great and in many ways highly original work *De Divisione Naturae*, he gives a Greek title *περὶ φύσεως μερισμοῦ*. I here desire to draw attention to a passage in another important work, where he describes the course of his argument as passing through the four

¹ Migne, cxxiv 1133.

² *Ibid.*, cxxii 93.

stages of “division, definition, demonstration, and analysis,” adding the Greek name of each—(μέθοδος) διαιρετική, ὀριστική, ἀποδεικτική, and ἀναλυτική.¹ It occurred to me to endeavour to ascertain the source from which these terms were derived. The writer was certainly familiar with part at least of Plato’s *Timaeus*; and his Latin quotation of a passage in that dialogue² is entirely independent of the current translation by Chalcidius. But neither in Plato nor Aristotle did I succeed in finding the source of his four μέθοδοι. One of his favourite manuals was the work of Martianus Capella; but the description of Dialectic in that work contains nothing of the kind. Something resembling it may, however, be seen in Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* to the *Categories* of Aristotle; but the resemblance is not sufficiently close to warrant the assumption that John the Scot had that passage in view. After searching in vain elsewhere, I found the four μέθοδοι in the *Prolegomena* to Porphyry’s *Eisagoge* by David the Armenian, as published by J. A. Cramer in his *Anecdota Parisina* (iv 442): εἰσὶ δὲ τέσσαρες αἱ διαλεκτικαὶ μέθοδοι· εἰσὶ γὰρ διαιρετική, ὀριστική, ἀποδεικτική, ἀναλυτική. The text is printed from a Paris MS; and such a MS of David the Armenian may possibly have been in existence in France in the middle of the ninth century; but I would not presume to be certain that John the Scot could only have obtained his four μέθοδοι from David the Armenian. David may have been quoting some earlier writer, for example, Ammonius, son of Hermias;³ and this earlier writer, or some intermediate transcriber of that writer, may have been the source of John the Scot’s quotation. Possibly some of the readers of HERMATHENA

¹ *De Praedestinatione*, i 1; Migne, cxxii 358A.

² Plato, *Timaeus*, 30 D, in *De Divisione Naturae*, i 31.

³ *In Porphyrii Isagogen*, p. 34, 24

ed. Busse (1891), ἡ κατὰ Πλάτωνα διαλεκτικὴ τετραχῶς γίγνεται . . . εἰσὶ δὲ, ὡς εἴρηται, διαιρετικὴ ὀριστικὴ ἀποδεικτικὴ καὶ ἀναλυτικὴ.

may be able to trace it further back than Ammonius; but until I hear of some earlier authority—not for the general sense, but for the actual terms of the enumeration—I must be content to believe that John the Scot is here quoting either from David the Armenian or from David's predecessor Ammonius.

RABANUS MAURUS (d. 856).

Earlier in date than John the Scot is Rabanus Maurus, who is familiar to many as the favourite pupil of Alcuin. He has the reputation of having known Greek; and in his writings we undoubtedly have a few passages which appear to assume some slight acquaintance with that language. But I feel sure that the Greek scholarship of Rabanus Maurus (like that of his master Alcuin) has been much exaggerated by the Abbé Tougard in his very useful but rather rare, and therefore not very commonly known, pamphlet entitled *L'Hellénisme dans les écrivains du Moyen Age du vii au xii siècle* (large 8vo, 1886).¹ He has the great merit of having carefully gone through all the volumes of Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, which contain the authors of the six centuries above mentioned, and of having recorded almost all the traces of any knowledge of Greek, however slight they may be. In the case of Rabanus Maurus it is noticed² that, in discussing the derivation and meaning of *syllaba*, after quoting Priscian, he has recourse to Greek:—*nam syllaba dicta est ἀπὸ τοῦ συλλαμβάνειν τὰ γράμματα*.³ It is only at first sight that this seems to imply some independent knowledge of

¹ Pp. 70, published by V. Lecoffre, 90, Rue Bonaparte, Paris. On p. 27 he says of Rabanus Maurus, *l'homme le plus savant de ce siècle . . . ne pouvait manquer d'être un habile helléniste*.

² By Fr. Cramer, *De Graecis Medii*

Aevi Studiis, i 23. In contrast with the Abbé Tougard, Fr. Cramer is fully conscious of the second-hand character of the Greek learning of Rabanus, but he does not attempt to trace it to its source.

³ Migne, cxi. 617.

Greek. One soon begins to suspect that Rabanus was borrowing from some of Priscian's occasional scraps of Greek; but this is not the fact. He was quoting neither from Priscian, nor from any of the other *Grammatici Latini*, who resort to Greek in tracing the derivation of *syllaba*. In the last resort, one discovers that his little learning on this point is an exact transcript from a passage in one of his favourite authors, *Isidore*.¹ In the notes to Migne's edition there is no attempt to trace the source of the Greek, which clearly cannot be accepted as a proof of the *Hellénisme* of Rabanus.

Elsewhere,² Rabanus mentions the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, as well as the *Aeneid*, as examples of a mixed kind of poetry (*coenon vel micton*). Here, again, one might perhaps be tempted to regard this passage as a credential for our author's *Hellénisme*. But it is easy to suspect that the phrase is not original, and even to find phrases not very unlike it here and there, until at last we light on the ultimate authority in Suetonius, *De Poëtis*,³ and come to the definite conclusion that Rabanus must have had for his authority the quotation from Suetonius in the form in which it was preserved by the Grammarian Diomedes.⁴ Rabanus, by the way, mentions *quidam eloquens* as his authority for a passage nearly identical with Cicero's *Orator* (§ 69). In Migne's edition⁵ *quidam eloquens* has not been identified. Apart from the present identification of the 'eloquent person' whom Rabanus does not vouchsafe to name, the only point of interest in this quotation is the fact that it must have ultimately been derived from a writer who possessed a complete MS of the *Orator*. It will be remembered that the *codices mutili* begin with § 91; and the earliest extant *codex mutilus* belongs to the same

¹ *Etym.* i 16, 1.

² Migne, cxi 420.

³ P. 5, Reifferscheid.

⁴ Lib. iii 482, Keil.

⁵ cvii 408.

century as Rabanus Maurus (cent. ix), while no complete MS of that or any earlier century has survived. I may add that Rabanus could not have borrowed his quotation either from Quintilian or from Julius Victor. Neither of them quotes *this* portion of § 69.

BERNARD SILVESTER (OR SILVESTRIS) OF TOURS
(*fl.* 1145-53).

The name of Bernard was singularly frequent in the twelfth century. Bernard of Chartres, whose fame, as a former head of the School of Chartres, still lives in the pages of John of Salisbury, was identified in the *Histoire Littéraire de la France*,¹ with Bernard Silvester, the author of the *De Mundi Universitate*. Both of these Bernards were further identified by Hauréau, in 1873, and by Mr. R. L. Poole, in his *Illustrations of the History of Medieval Thought* (1884), with Bernard of Moélan, bishop of Quimper in Brittany. But it has since been made clear, by the Abbé Clerval of Chartres,² that there were three distinct persons—(1) Bernard of Chartres, who died between 1126 and 1130; (2) Bernard Silvester of Tours, who flourished between 1145 and 1153; and (3) Bernard of Moélan, who died in 1167. This distinction was, in the main, accepted by Hauréau, and, although another authority on mediæval matters, M. Langlois, still continued to identify (1) and (2), the arguments in favour of the distinction between these three Bernards have since been restated and reinforced by the Abbé Clerval in his excellent work entitled *Les Écoles de Chartres au Moyen Age* (1895). So far as the account of the Schools of Chartres is concerned, it is to be regretted that Dr. Hastings Rashdall's important work on *Mediæval Universities* was published in the same year as the Abbé Clerval's volume,—too soon to allow of any recog-

¹ xii 261.

² *Lettres Chrétiennes*, v 393.

nition of the learned Abbé's researches; and, since that date, there has been no estimate of the value of the latter in the organ where one might have naturally expected to find it—namely the *English Historical Review*. In fact, the only notice of the Abbé's work which I have seen in any book published in England is in Mr. H. W. Woodward's admirable volume on *Vittorino da Feltre* (1897, p. 28). It is all the more necessary to draw attention to a work which no student of mediæval education or mediæval learning can afford to ignore. I may add that the Abbé Clerval, whose personal acquaintance I had the pleasure of making at Chartres in April of the present year, is a former pupil of such eminent scholars as Samuel Berger and the Abbé Duchesne. He was himself the first to identify an important MS in the Public Library at Chartres (giving a complete survey of the Seven Liberal Arts in two vast volumes of 1190 pages in double columns) as the work of a brother of Bernard of Chartres named Theodoric (c. 1141). To the Abbé Clerval's arguments in favour of distinguishing Bernard of Chartres from Bernard Silvester of Tours, I may add the fact that Bernard Silvester dedicates his work *De Mundi Universitate* to Theodoric of Chartres in a preface preceded by the following sentence:—*Terrico, veris scientiarum titulis Doctori famosissimo, Bernardus Silvestris opus suum*. Here, as well as in the preface, which is too long to quote, but may be found in Barach's text, the tone is obviously not that of a brother; in other words, it is clear that the *De Mundi Universitate* is not the work of Theodoric's brother, Bernard of Chartres, but of another Bernard, Bernard Silvester, who is definitely associated with Tours by his pupil Matthew of Vendôme:

"Me docuit dictare decus Turonense magistri
 Silvestris, studii gemma, scholaris honor."

All that I here desire to add with regard to the *De Mundi Universitate* is by way of examination (and possibly of refutation) of the prevalent opinion that the work was composed under the influence of Lucretius.¹ It is written in prose intermingled with verse, after the manner of the *Consolatio* of Boëthius. Of the nine passages in verse, the majority are in elegiacs, and only one in hexameters. The rhythm of the hexameters is obviously that of Lucan, being marked by the frequent recurrence of the characteristic of this poet, which Mr. Heitland has happily described as the ‘hephthemimeral jerk.’ The vocabulary is mainly that of Ovid; and the only apparent trace of Lucretius is a single infinitive in *-ier*, a form which is not confined to Lucretius. More than this, there are many passages in his nine poems on the *Megacosmos* and the *Microcosmos*, which, owing to the subjects of which they treat, would inevitably have led to reminiscences of Lucretius, had the author really known that poet. With a view to obtaining an independent opinion on this point, I entrusted the examination of the whole work to Mr. J. D. Duff, Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, who has seen through the press the posthumous edition of Munro’s *Lucretius*, besides producing separate editions of two books of the *De Rerum Natura*. The examination, which he kindly undertook, has fully confirmed my opinion. While he has noted reminiscences of Ovid and Juvenal, he finds no certain trace of Lucretius in the nine sets of *verse*. In a single passage, however, of the *prose*, he draws my attention to an *apparent* reminiscence of the well-known lines of Lucretius, iii. 19 f. :—

“ Apparet divom numen sedesque quietae,
Quas neque concutiunt venti nec nubila nimbis

¹ Mr. R. L. Poole, *Medieval Thought*, 118, 219 n., describes Lucretius as the model of Bernard’s hexameters.

² In the 66 lines of Bernard’s hexameter poem, as many as 32 are of this particular type.

Aspergunt neque nix acri concreta pruina
 Cana cadens violat semperque innubilus aether
 Integit, et large diffuso lumine rident."

The passage in question is as follows:—*Anastros in caelo regio est . . . indefecto lumine, serenitate perpetua . . . Ea igitur . . . non densatur pluviis, non procellis incutitur, nec nubilo turbatur.* Here *Anastros* comes from Martianus Capella (viii § 814); and I have no doubt that the rest is derived, not from Lucretius, but from Apuleius, an author who was much more read in the Middle Ages than the Epicurean poet. In Apuleius, *De Mundo*, c. 33, I find the following description of Olympus:—*Neque caliginem nubium recipit vel pruinas et nives sustinet; nec pulsatur ventis nec imbribus caeditur.* Apuleius is here translating the Pseudo-Aristotelian treatise *De Mundo* (vi p. 400), where, as in Apuleius, the passage is immediately succeeded by a quotation of Homer's *Odyssey*, vi 42–45, which (as everyone is aware) is the original source of Lucretius, iii 19 f. Thus Bernard Silvester's *apparent* reminiscence of Lucretius is shown to have been suggested, not necessarily by Lucretius, but probably, and indeed almost certainly, by a prose paraphrase of the passage of Homer, from which Lucretius himself derived his inspiration.

GUNTHER (d. after 1210).

Gunther has been definitely identified as the author of a famous epic on Frederic Barbarossa, called the *Ligurinus*, an epic written in the style of Lucan. A far less famous work of Gunther is noticed by Eberhard of Bethune (*fl.* 1212), who confusedly enumerates a number of favourite mediæval poets, sometimes mentioning the name of the poet, and sometimes that of the poem. One of his names is *Solimarius*, which it is easy to mistake for the name of an unknown poet (as indeed Mr. Saintsbury has done in

his admirable *History of Criticism*¹). So far, however, from *Solimarius* being the name of an unknown poet, it is really the name of a poem on the city of *Solima* or *Solyma*, an epic of the Crusades, the existence of which was perfectly well known to Warton,² and 240 lines of which were published by Wattenbach in 1881.³ It was written, as I have already implied, by the author of the *Ligurinus*; but (as compared with that poem) it is now almost completely unknown.

GAUTIER DE CHATILLON (or DE L'ISLE).

Gualterus ab insulis (d. 1201).

The author of a Life of Archbishop Oswald names, as the three typical epic poets, Homer, Walter of Châtillon, and Lucan; and, in 1330, Walter's epic was regarded as a Classic in Flanders, though, at the present day, it has hardly survived, except in the single proverbial line:—

*Incidis in Scyllam cupiens vitare Charybdim.*⁴

There is no doubt that he is one of the popular mediæval poets noticed in Henri d'Andely's *Bataille des Sept Arts* (286–8):—

Iij en tua en .i. randon
Et geta ducis Macidum
Et la Bible versefiée, &c.

The 'versified Bible' is the great poetic paraphrase in 15,050 lines by Petrus de Riga (d. 1209). The allusion in the previous line is to the *Alexandreis* of Walter de

¹ i 410. On the next page Mr. Saintsbury not unnaturally finds some difficulty in identifying *Paraclitus* and *Sidonius*. This difficulty is solved when we discover that these are the titles of the two poems of Warnerius of Basel, as is clear from Hugo of Trimberg's *Registrum Multorum Auctorum* (1280), ed. Hümer, 1888, l. 540 (Warnerius), *Qui duos egregie libros compilavit, | Unumque Sidonium ex his pretitula-*

vit, | Alterum Paraclitum, quod a multis scitur. We fear that both are now forgotten. The *Sidonius* (or *Synodicus*) is, however, published in the *Romanische Forschungen*, iii 315–330.

² *History of English Poetry, Dissertations*, II, p. clxx (ed. 1824).

³ *Archives de l'Orient Latin*, i 555, quoted in Bursian's *Gesch. der cl. Philologie in Deutschland*, i 73.

⁴ *Alexandreis*, lib. v., l. 301.

Châtillon ; but this allusion has been obscured by the fact that neither of the two MSS which contain the poem (7218 and 1830 *fonds Saint Germain*) gives the correct text, the former having *geta ducis Macidum*, and the latter *geta envers Marcidon*. The editor, Jubinal, prints the former without any explanation or correction in either of the two editions of the poem which he published (with the works of Rutebeuf) in 1839 and in 1875. The right reading is clearly *Gesta ducis Macedum*, which are the first words of the *Alexandreis*, the opening words being here (as in classical examples) used to designate the whole work.

ALAIN DE L'ISLE, *Alanus ab insulis* (d. 1203).

In one of the prose works of Alanus,¹ *nihil citius arescit lacrima* is quoted as from Lucretius ! It is easy to point out (though Migne's edition neglects to do so) that it really comes either from *ad Herennium*, § 50, or from Cicero, *De Inventione*, i § 109.

In reading the *Anti-Claudianus*, the celebrated poem by the same writer, I find a passage which seems to me not entirely unworthy of comparison with part of Milton's sublime invocation of 'celestial light' near the beginning of the third book of *Paradise Lost*. I quote only four lines, but the whole passage is worth reading :—

“ Tu mihi praeradia divina luce, meamque
 Plenius irrorans divino nectare mentem
 Complue, terge notas animi, tenebrasque recidens
 Discute, meque tuae lucis splendore serena.”²

The *Anti-Claudianus* and other poems of the same author were well known to Chaucer ; it would be strange if they were entirely unknown to so learned a poet as Milton ; but I should be glad to hear of any

¹ *De Arte Praedicatoria*, c. 1 ; (Migne, ccx 114).

² T. Wright's *Satirical Poets* (*Rolls Series*), ii p. 356.

stronger proof of such knowledge than the parallel passage just quoted, which, though not uninteresting as a poetic coincidence, is in itself hardly conclusive. Alanus has some fine passages in the poem above mentioned; and he had a great reputation in his day. In a poem written within fifty years after his death, he is even regarded by Joannes de Garlandia as *Virgilio major et Homero certior*!¹

JOANNES DE GARLANDIA (fl. 1218–1252).

There are many points of interest connected with this mediæval poet and grammarian, which I reserve for the volume mentioned at the beginning of this article. I here confine myself to one point alone. In a MS in the Library of Gonville and Caius College, Cambridge (385 = 605), Joannes de Garlandia supplies us with an instructive list of the authors which a student ought to read in Latin literature, grammar, dialectic, &c., all of which I have transcribed elsewhere.² The list under the last of these heads includes certain versions of Aristotle's *Organon*. In this list the *Categories*, *De Interpretatione*, *Sophistici Elenchi*, and the *Analytica Priora* are followed by the mysterious *Apodoxium*. The position in the series shows that the *Analytica Posteriora* can alone be meant. The only difficulty is to account for this particular designation. In view, however, of the traditional names by which the *Analytica Posteriora* was known, we may be certain that *Apodoxium* is simply a corruption of *Apodeixeon* (ἀποδείξεων). In the *Analytica Posteriora* (ii 3), we have a passage beginning αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν ἀποδείξεων; and the work is called περὶ ἀποδείξεως by Galen, and ἀποδεικτική by Alexander of Aphrodisias.

J. E. SANDYS.

¹ *De Triumphis Ecclesiae*, p. 74, ed. T. Wright.

² *History of Classical Scholarship*, p. 528.

NOTES ON THE ODES OF HORACE.

III. 4. 9-12.

Me fabulosae Volture in Apulo
Nutricis extra limen Apuliae
Ludo fatigatumque somno
Fronde nova puerum palumbes
Texere.

HORACE had already indulged in a flight of fancy similar to this. In *Odes* i. 22 he relates how a wolf fled from him in a miraculous manner, although he was unarmed; and whilst describing, in this Ode, the wonderful behaviour of the wood-pigeons, he recollects, consciously or unconsciously, the language in which he told the former miracle. In i. 22 he wandered *ultra terminum*, as here he goes *extra limen Apuliae*; there Africa is *leonum arida nutrix*, here Apulia is termed his own *nutrix*. Also in both places he finds occasion to use the word *fabulosus*, applying it in i. 22 to the Hydaspes, whilst in iii. 4 it is taken by the editors, wrongly as I think, with *palumbes*.

It is quite plain that lines 9 and 10 are inconsistent, and their present form due to a mistake. Most editors attack the word *Apuliae*, though attempts have been made upon *Volture in Apulo*, the best of which, Keller's *Volture in avio*, is far from convincing. It seems to me that *nutricis extra limen Apuliae* is sound. Horace had in his mind i. 22. 15-16—

Nec Iubae tellus generat, leonum
Arida nutrix.

The shortening of the first syllable of *Apulia* has so many parallels in Latin poetry that it need offend no one. The editors give the Horatian examples, and the case of *Arabs* and *Arabius* in Propertius is similar. He can write

Nec si qua Arabio lucet bombyce puella (ii. 3. 15)

and

Cinnamon et multi pastor odoris Arabs (iii. 13. 8).

The mistake seems to me to lie in the preceding line. In *Apulo* or *Appulo* there may be concealed the verb *appuli*; and I would suggest—

Me fabulosae in Volturem *ut appuli*,

“as I betook myself to Voltur outside the threshold of my native Apulia.” With *Volturem* written as *Volturē* and *appuli*, surely, confounded with the *Apuliae* of the next line, *Volture in Appulo* would be the certain result.

The verb *appello* is more commonly used as a nautical expression; but the dictionaries give plenty of examples from classical writers in which it is used in its original sense. Thus Lucr. vi. 751—

Quo nunquam pennis appellunt corpora raucae
Cornices;

and Ov. *Met.* xi. 717—

Postquam paulo appulit unda
Et quamvis aberat, corpus tamen esse liquebat;

also Virg. *Aen.* iii. 715—

Hinc me digressum vestris deus appulit oris.

Compounds of *pello* are very frequent; and if Lucretius can use *se depellere*, as in ii. 219 (Munro's reading),

Corpora cum deorsum rectum per inane feruntur
Ponderibus propriis, se incerto tempore ferme
Incertisque locis spatio depellere paulum,

Horace can say *me in Volturem ut appuli*.

At the same time, if any objection is maintained against this use of *appuli*, *attuli* is quite as good in sense, and would also have been readily corrupted into *appulo*. For *Me fabulosae in Volturem ut attuli* compare Virg. *Aen.* viii. 477 *Fatis huc te poscentibus adfers*. Further, I cannot see why *fabulosae* is taken with *palumbes*. In the other place where Horace uses the word, which former use he is now recollecting, it is an epithet of *Hydaspes*. So here I should take it with *nutricis Apuliae*. It is doubtless made to agree with *palumbes* because of the correspondence *me fabulosae-puerum palumbes*; but I do not see how the eye or ear can pass over *Apuliae* and wait for *palumbes* at the end of the stanza. Not one Roman in a hundred reading Horace would have taken *fabulosae-palumbes* together. Acron and Porphyryon are poor authorities in a textual matter, but they could read Latin. Hence the schol.: "Fabulosam nutricem appellant quod hae fere alumnis suis narrare fabulas solent. Extra limen fabulosae Apuliae meae nutricis. Provinciae nomen posuit pro nutricis." *Fabulosae nutricis Apuliae* is thus exactly parallel to *Iubae tellus, leonum arida nutrix*. The pronoun *me* is governed both by *appuli* and *texere*.

III. 24. 1-4.

Intactis opulentior
 Thesauris Arabum et divitis Indiae
 Caementis licet occupes
 Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare Apulicum.

It is agreed that *Apulicum* is wrong, not because of its quantity, but because it has little MS. authority, and does not explain the variant readings. *Publicum* is the best supported reading, then *ponticum*—neither of them making sense. Lachmann's conjecture *terrenum* enables us to keep *publicum*, but is itself unlikely.

I would suggest *Tyrrhenum omne tuis et mare publices*, "although with your rubble you fill up and throw open (for building) the Tyrrhenian sea." *Occupo* and *publico* are both used by Livy in reference to building. Liv. iii. 31 *De Aventino publicando lata lex est*, i.e., about opening the Aventine for building purposes. These two words were doubtless very familiar to Romans in this sense; and Horace transfers their application from land to sea. The figure is grandiose, and suits the context. This impossibly rich man fills up the Tyrrhenian sea with rubble, and lets it out to the public to build upon. He may be doing it for his own gain, or as a public benefactor. Suetonius uses *publico* of libraries, *bibliothecas Graecas et Latinas publicare*. *Mare publices* would become *mare publicum*, and *Ponticum* and *Apulicum* are attempts at making the line mean something.

III. II. 17-20.

Cerberus, quamvis furiale centum
Muniant angues caput eius atque
Spiritus taeter saniesque manet
Ore trilingui.

The use of *quamvis* by Horace is peculiar. The conjunction occurs frequently in his writings, sometimes with indicative and sometimes with subjunctive. But there are several cases where the indicative form is necessary from metrical reasons, as in i. 28. 13 :

Nervos atque cutem morti concesserat atrae :

and a solitary case where the subjunctive is necessary, iv. 6. 6 :

Filius quamvis Thetidis marinae
Dardanas turres quateret tremenda
Cuspide pugnax.

Livy never uses *quamvis* with the subjunctive. It would seem reasonable, therefore, in the numerous instances such as the *muniant* and *manet* of this stanza, to write the indicative form, here *muniant* and *manat*.

Bentley's emendation, all emendations, of this stanza,—*exeatque, aestus atque, illi et usque*—are too far from the MSS. reading. If, however, the right mood with *quamvis*, where either mood is metrically possible, is the indicative, an easy emendation is suggested. I would read:

Cerberus, quamvis furiale centum
Muniant angues caput, *eicitque*
Spiritus taetrum, saniesque manat
Ore trilingui.

The change of subject from *angues* back to *Cerberus*, followed by *sanies*, cannot cause the least difficulty. We get rid of the somewhat awkward zeugma with *manet*. *Eicere* is used frequently in such expressions as *eicere sanguinem* or *vocem*, or *linguam*. Only two letters are changed from *eius atque* to *eicitque*. The error may have arisen because *muniant* and *manat* were altered to the subjunctive mood. In contractions, *spiritum taetrum* would be effectively the same as *spiritus taeter*.

III. 14. 21-24.

Dic et argutae properet Neaerae
Murreum nodo cohibere crinem;
Si per invisum mora ianitorem
Fiet, abito.

I do not think the editors have brought out the full force of this stanza. Horace represents the wonted fires as bursting forth fitfully from their ashes. He commands a revel, but is too indolent to insist on it. Each of his orders is nullified by a kind of *σκῶμμα παρὰ προσδοκίαν*. So he

shouts, 'Bid also clear-voiced Neaera hasten——'; then he sinks back in idleness, and adds, 'to bind her perfumed hair in a knot.' He rouses himself to another command, 'If delay is made by the accursed door-keeper——'; the reader expects at the least 'murder him,' and is surprised into laughter by the bathos of 'go away.' He is now too old for wine and women, and (see the allusion to Plancus) for war. Perhaps his order that the slave should look for a jar dated by the Marsic war is part of the jest.

ERNEST ENSOR.

NOTES ON LACTANTIUS.¹

IN all the thirty-six volumes of Fleury's *Histoire Ecclésiastique* the name of Lactantius is but once mentioned, and he is then referred to as the writer of the *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, a tract the authenticity of which has been vigorously disputed. The most diligent reader of Fleury might be ignorant that the extant apologetic works of Lactantius, his *De Opificio Dei*, his *Divinae Institutiones*, his *De Ira Dei*, and his *Epitome*—to say nothing of certain lost treatises mentioned by Jerome—had ever been written. And Fleury does not stand altogether alone. The historians have little to tell us about Lactantius. He is chiefly known to them as the supposed author of the *Mortes*, and this work is for the most part regarded simply as a source of information about the Diocletian Persecution.

But Lactantius had an important part to play in the history of the Christian Church, and a study of his writings is essential for anyone who desires to form an adequate conception of the state of religious thought in the early years of the fourth century. For at that period there was a movement of the aristocratic and literary classes towards the Church. And if there was much in Christianity to attract them, there was much also to repel. The Church possessed no writings which could appeal to them. The apologists of the third century were Africans by birth,

¹ *Lactance, Etude sur le mouvement philosophique et religieux sous le règne de Constantin*, par René Pichon. Paris, 1901.

and had nothing in them of the traditional Roman spirit; they wrote for the masses, not for the aristocracy, the philosophers, or the men of letters; with few exceptions, they used barbarous Latin, they were wanting in philosophic method, their style was as far removed as possible from that of Cicero. And if this was true of the Apologies, it was not less true of the Holy Scriptures. There was nothing in Christian literature which might commend the new Faith to men of culture in an age of classical revival. There was need, therefore, for a new apologetic suited to the age. Lactantius was the man who supplied the need. A native of Africa, he was summoned thence in the early part of the reign of Diocletian—probably by Diocletian himself—to Nicomedia, where for some years he was a teacher of rhetoric. Subsequently he was entrusted by Constantine with the education of his son Crispus. Thus he was in close contact with the most exalted members of Roman society. Moreover, as his writings prove, he was a man of much learning, thoroughly steeped in classical literature, a diligent student of Greek and Roman philosophy, and himself a philosopher of no small ability, though of little originality; he wrote pure Ciceronian Latin, and, in spite of his African origin and his Christian belief, he was a Roman to the core. He was stirred up to write a defence of Christianity by the appearance in the year 303 of two violent attacks upon the Faith, and the result was the seven books of the *Institutiones*. This work inaugurated a new era in Christian Apologetics. It must have had much influence in bringing into the Church men of rank and learning, and in establishing the faith of waverers within the Society; and it probably prepared the way for the conversion of the Emperor Constantine. For the historian it is a mine of information as regards the philosophical and religious problems which thinkers of that age had to face, and the arguments for and against the

Christian Faith which for cultured men had greatest weight.

We have attempted in a few sentences to indicate the importance to the student of history of the writings of Lactantius. For an admirable discussion of the subject we must refer to the elaborate monograph of M. René Pichon on Lactantius. To give an analysis of M. Pichon's book in the space at our command is impossible. We can do no more than make a few remarks on some of the questions with which he deals.

Not the least important of these is that which is discussed in the Introduction—the authenticity of certain long passages which have been very generally regarded as interpolations. They are five in number, two dedications to the Emperor Constantine, the first near the beginning of the first book, the second towards the end of the seventh book of the *Institutiones*; and three passages of a Manichaean and Arian tendency which are found in some MSS in *De Opificio* 19, *Inst.* ii. 8, vii. 5. M. Pichon has little difficulty in showing that there is nothing in either the matter or style of these passages which forbids us to ascribe them to the pen of Lactantius. The question, therefore, must be decided by an appeal to external evidence. It is admitted that only a few manuscripts contain the doubtful passages, and that those which have them are not those which on the whole give the best text. They give a good text, nevertheless, and therefore their testimony cannot be altogether disregarded. And this further fact is to be noted: the manuscript witnesses for all five passages are identical. They stand, therefore, or fall together. If they are interpolations, the probability is high that they were all inserted by the same hand and at the same time; if they are genuine, they were all cancelled by the same editor. Now it seems impossible to suggest a single motive which could lead both to the fabrication of two dedications to Constantine, and

to the attempt to make Lactantius speak more emphatically the language of dualistic heresy. On the other hand, as the fourth century advanced the cause of orthodoxy became bound up with dislike, to use no stronger word, of the memory of Constantine. An admirer of Lactantius, whose orthodoxy would lead him to cut out the more heretical portions of his apologetic treatises, would be very likely also to cut out his eulogies of the Emperor who was supposed to have favoured the Arians. The likelihood, it may be added, is increased by the fact that in the first dedication there is an allusion to the sons of Constantine who should succeed him in his rule; 'Pro quo facto dabit tibi Deus felicitatem . . . ut . . . tuis liberis . . . tutelam Romani nominis tradas.' Was not Constantius even more an enemy of the Catholic Faith than his father? The conclusion is that the passages in question are genuine, and that they were omitted by a fourth-century editor of the works of Lactantius. M. Pichon even goes so far as to conjecture that this editor was no other than Lucifer of Cagliari. The truth of this theory can hardly be regarded as proved. But the suggestion was worth making; for the hypothesis is certainly one that covers all the facts. Lucifer had much admiration for Lactantius; he was a man of the strictest orthodoxy, very fearful of heresy, and especially of Arianism, violent in his dislike both of Constantine and of his son Constantius. In him, therefore, we have a concrete example of one who might have treated the passages under discussion in the very way in which M. Pichon supposes that they were dealt with, and for the very reason which he assigns. And the fact that M. Pichon has succeeded in laying his finger on such a person renders his general argument much more convincing.

So excellent is the reasoning with which M. Pichon seeks to prove the genuineness of the disputed passages,

that one may be permitted to express regret that he has added to it some arguments of less value. It was scarcely worth while, for example, to urge that Brandt has somewhat under-rated the value of the manuscripts R and S; for the examples which M. Pichon gives of readings in which R is superior to B G are not very numerous, and many of them are doubtful. Moreover, the conclusion which he reaches, that while B G are excellent, R S are still good, is already granted by his opponent. And, again, there is not much significance in the fact that in two places in *Inst.* v. R stands alone, while Lucifer and all the remaining manuscripts are in agreement. It scarcely follows, as M. Pichon would have us believe, that the majority of manuscripts follow a recension due to Lucifer, and that R alone gives the older text. We take one of the instances which he alleges. In *Inst.* v. 18. 2 R has *diuturna*, Lucifer and the rest *diutina*. But it seems far more likely that R has substituted a more usual for a rarer word, than that Lucifer deliberately did the opposite, and that all the manuscripts of his recension were proof against the obvious temptation to alter the text.

Accepting, then, the two dedications as genuine, we have valuable help towards fixing the date of the *Institutiones*. But the indications are unfortunately not quite consistent. For in the first dedication there is a sentence in which reference is made to certain evil men, 'qui adhuc aduersus iustos in aliis terrarum partibus saeuiunt.' On the other hand, the second dedication declares that it is one of the duties of Constantine, 'ipsos denique malos a republica submouere, quos summa potestate deiectos in manus tuas Deus tradidit.' The first dedication was therefore written while persecution was proceeding outside the dominions of Constantine, the second at a later time, probably after the Edict of Milan. How can this inconsistency be got over? The hypothesis

adopted by M. Pichon appears to be the only possible one—that the several books of the *Institutiones* were written and published successively between 306 and 313. According to him, indeed, the first book appeared *very soon* after Constantine's first edict in favour of the Christians (A.D. 306). But there is nothing in the dedication itself to warrant such a statement. And if Lactantius wrote at such an early stage in the persecution, it is very difficult to account for the absence of allusions to it elsewhere in the first four books of the *Institutiones*. While accepting M. Pichon's theory of the successive publication of the several books, we are therefore inclined to think that the first of them did not appear until the last stages of the tyranny were reached and signs of the end were already manifest.¹

The significance of the absence of allusions to the persecution in the first four books can scarcely be appreciated by one who has not remarked the frequency with which they occur in Book V. Whole chapters are devoted to descriptions of its horrors, and in the majority of cases it is described in the present tense, as though it were actually at the moment being carried on with the greatest severity. The writer's mind is full of it. He does not merely refer to it incidentally, as he does occasionally in Books VI. and VII. It is scarcely more closely connected with the subject of the book—which is entitled *De Iustitia*—than with that of Book VI.; yet he seems here unable to avoid it. It leads him continually into long digressions which it is difficult to connect with his main argument. We cannot doubt that, if the fifth book had come down to us as a separate treatise, these allusions would have been

¹ The use of the word *nuper* in *Inst.* ii. 10. 15 is consistent with the supposition that some years had elapsed since the publication of the *De Opificio*. Lac-

tantius was already an old man, and the *De Opificio* was a comparatively recent work.

taken as an indication that the persecution was at its height.

All this, of course, gives reason for dating this book several years before the Edict of Milan; it is, in fact, as M. Pichon tells us, the strongest argument against the authenticity of the second dedication. Accordingly he endeavours to minimize its force.

In the first place, he remarks that the past tense is used with reference to the persecution, as well as the present; and he urges that the present is commonly employed to describe the general character of the persecution, the past in narratives of events. This may be conceded, but as an argument it has little weight. An event must be past before it can be related; and one who wrote at some distance from the scene (as Lactantius probably did: see v. 11. 15) could not have direct knowledge of what was passing at the time of writing. But it is granted that in itself the use of the present tense cannot be pressed. There is, for example, a reference to the persecution in *Inst.* vi. 17. 6, 7, in which no one would think of building anything on the use of the present tense;¹ and the same may be said of vii. 22. 12. And it is worthy of note that in the summary of Book V. in the *Epitome* (chaps. 47-54), which was written long afterwards (chap. i. § 1), the present tenses are preserved. But the frequency of the allusions, quite apart from the question of tenses, especially when their rarity in other parts of the work is remembered, leaves an impression of the nearness of the facts which cannot easily be got rid of. And the force of some individual sentences is at least seriously diminished if we suppose that the troubles were nearly over. Such, for instance, is the impassioned appeal in v. 12. 4, 'Quid laceratis? quid adfligitis?' Or, again, the

¹ One can hardly, however, agree with M. Pichon, that it is there distinctly referred to as past.

statement a little further on (§ 8): 'Ecce in eo est errore ciuitas uel potius orbis ipse totus, ut bonos et iustos uiros tamquam malos et impios persequatur, excruciet, damnet, occidat.'

And even in the comparatively few places where the past is used, it seems important to observe that the allusions are satisfied by events which may be assigned, so far as we can date them at all, to the year or two immediately following the First Edict of Diocletian. Thus, for instance (v. 11. 10):

'Aliqui ad occidendum praecipites exstiterunt, sicut unus in Phrygia, qui uniuersum populum cum ipso pariter conuenticulo concremauit.'

This incident is referred to also by Eusebius (*H. E.* viii. 11. 1), and has been placed by Mason (*The Persecution of Diocletian*, 1876, p. 129), and, with less confidence, by Gibbon (chap. xvi.) in the earliest period of the persecution.

Lower down (v. 11. 12) we find the following:

'Itaque dici non potest huiusmodi *iudices* quanta et quam graua tormentorum genera excogitauerint, ut ad effectum propositi sui peruenirent.'

The resemblance between this passage and *Mort.* 15. 4, 5, which seems to deal with the time immediately subsequent to the departure of Galerius from Nicomedia in the 'middle of winter' (*i.e.*, apparently March), 303, is striking:

'*Iudices* per omnia templa dispersi uniuersos ad sacrificia cgebant. Pleni carceres erant, tormentorum genera inaudita excogitabantur, et ne cui temere ius diceretur, arae in secretariis ac pro tribunali positae, ut litigatores prius sacrificarent atque ita causas suas dicerent, sic ergo ad *iudices* tanquam ad deos adiretur.'

Another passage in the same context is more definite (v. 11. 15):

‘Vidi ego in Bithynia praesidem gaudio mirabiliter elatum . . . quod unus, qui per biennium magna uirtute restiterat, postremo cedere uisus esset.’

This sentence, of course, cannot have been written till two years after the date of the First Edict, *i.e.*, till 305. But the tone of the passage suggests that the lapse mentioned took place not long after that time. As late as, say, 307, it cannot have been very uncommon for one who had persevered for two years, or even longer, to yield under torture.¹

And even references in the present tense, though somewhat vague, seem to point to the same period. Let us take, for example, the following (v. 11. 11):

‘Illud uero pessimum genus est cui clementiae species falsa blanditur, ille gravior, ille saevior est carnifex qui neminem statuit occidere.’

Is there not here a plain reference to a time when an attempt was made to stay the progress of Christianity without the actual taking of life? Two such periods are mentioned in the *Mortes*. The first lasted for some time

¹ The official mentioned by Lactantius seems to have been Hierocles, who was probably *praeses* of Bithynia in 303 (*Inst.* v. 2. 12, *Mort.* 16. 4). But the confessor Donatus, who was imprisoned early in 305 (*Mort.* 35. 2), was subjected to torture before Hierocles *and his successor*, Priscillian (*Mort.* 16. 4). Hence it may be inferred that Hierocles ceased to be *praeses Bithyniae* about the time of the abdication of Diocletian (May, 305). Now, shortly after (*μικρὸν τοῦ χρόνου ὕστερον*) 2 April, 306, the martyr

Aedesius was drowned, in consequence of his insulting conduct before the Prefect of Egypt, whose name is recorded by the Greek Menea to have been Hierocles (Eus., *Mar. Pal.* 4. 15; 5. 2 *sq.*, with the note of Valesius). It appears highly probable, therefore, that Hierocles left Nicomedia on his promotion to the prefecture of Egypt in 305, which would fix the date of the boast referred to in the passage quoted in the text.

after Diocletian's first persecuting edict. The Augustus, we are told (*Mortes*, 11. 8),

‘Traductus est itaque a proposito et quoniam nec amicis nec Caesari nec Apollini poterat reluctari, hanc moderationem tenere conatus est *ut eam rem sine sanguine transigi iuberet* cum Caesar uiuos cremari uellet qui sacrificio repugnassent.’

The second attempt to persecute without slaughter was made in the territories of Maximin, apparently in 305-6. In the year 311, we learn from *Mortes*, 36. 6, 7,

‘Facere parabat quae *iam dudum* in Orientis partibus fecerat. Nam cum clementiam specie tenus profiteretur, *occidi seruos dei ueluit*, debilitari iussit. Itaque confessoribus effodiebantur oculi, amputabantur manus, pedes detruncabantur, nares uel auriculae desecabantur.’

In the following sentences (*Inst.* v. 11. 6) we seem to have a reference to the execution of the eunuchs of the palace, which took place not long after the second fire at Nicomedia (*Mort.* 15. 2 ; Eus., *H. E.* viii. 6), *i. e.*, about March, 303 :

‘Nemo huius tantae beluae immanitatem potest pro merito describere, quae uno loco recubans tamen per totum orbem ferreis dentibus saeuit et non tantum artus hominum dissipat, sed et ossa ipsa comminuit et in cineres furit, ne quis extet sepulturae locus : quasi uero id adfectent qui Deum confitentur, ut ad eorum sepulchra ueniatur, ac non ut ipsi ad Deum veniant. Quaenam illa feritas, quae rabies, quae insania est lucem uiuis, terram mortuis denegasse?’

Put beside this Eusebius' account of the indignities inflicted on the bodies of the imperial servants :

τοὺς δέ γε βασιλικούς μετὰ θάνατον παῖδας, γῇ μετὰ τῆς προσηκούσης κηδείας παραδοθέντας, αὐθις ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς ἀνορύξαντες, ἐναπορρίψαι θαλάσση καὶ αὐτοὺς ᾤοντο δεῖν οἱ νενομισμένοι δεσπότες, ὥς ἂν μὴ ἐν

μνήμασιν ἀποκειμένους προσκυνοῖέν τινες, θεοὺς αὐτοὺς, ὥς γε φόντο, λογιζόμενοι.¹

And lastly, at *Inst.* v. 11. 17, we read :

‘Illi autem pertinaci stultitia iubent curam tortis diligenter adhiberi, ut ad alios cruciatus membra renouentur et reparetur nouus sanguis ad poenam.’

Have we not in this sentence an allusion to the brutal severity of Galerius after the abdication of Diocletian (1 May, 305), described at *Mortes*, 21. 9?—

‘Incensae faces et extinctae admouebantur singulis membris, ita ut locus nullus in corpore relinqueretur intactus. Et inter haec suffundebatur facies aqua frigida et os umore abluabatur, ne are-scentibus siccitate faucibus cito spiritus redderetur.’

But M. Pichon contends that in some places it is implied that already there was a lull in the persecution. He cites, for instance, v. 13. 10 :

‘Ita fit ut data diuinitus pace et qui fugerunt universi redeant et alius propter miraculum uirtutis nouus populus accedat.’

But do these words imply anything more than that peace had been restored where Lactantius wrote—or, in other words, that the book was penned in Gaul, and not earlier than 306? A similar implication seems to lie in the opening sentence of the same chapter (v. 13. 1) :

‘Cum autem noster numerus semper de deorum cultoribus augeatur, numquam uero *ne in ipsa quidem persecutione* minuatur.’

The indications of later date, which are supposed to be given by such passages as v. 22. 13, 18, 23, are too ambiguous to need discussion.

¹ Compare also *Mortes*, 21. 11: ‘Lecta ossa et in puluerem comminuta iacta- bantur in flumina ac mare.’ This seems to refer to the year 305.

On the whole, then, the allusions, so far as we have examined them, point to an earlier date for Book V. than for the other books of the *Institutiones*, say about 306 or 307. And other considerations confirm, if at the same time they may lead us to modify, this opinion.

Let us observe, first, that Lactantius seems to have taken some pains to make the books of the *Institutiones* of uniform length. Once or twice he mentions the 'mensura libri' in such a way as to imply this (vi. 20. 1; vii. 25. 1). And, in fact, we find that the seven books and the *Epitome* are all of nearly the same length. On the other hand, three tracts not belonging to this series, but each a complete work in itself—the *De Opificio Dei*, the *De Ira Dei*, and the *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, are of nearly equal size, each of them being about two-thirds of the average length of a book of the *Institutiones*. This can hardly be the result of accident. Now when we turn to the Fifth Book of the *Institutiones*, we notice that it is the shortest of the series to which it belongs. We observe, further, that it consists of two parts which have scarcely anything in common. The first part is an introduction (chapters 1-4), longer and more elaborate than any of those prefixed to the other books. It has no special appropriateness to Book V., and might very well have served as a Preface to the entire work. It includes an account of the circumstances which led to the undertaking (v. 2 sq.), a statement of its aim and purpose (v. 1. 1-20; 4. 1, 2), and a criticism of the labours of previous apologists (v. 1. 21-28; 4. 3-8). It is followed (chaps. 5-23) by the discussion to which the Book owes its title, *De Iustitia*. The transition from one to the other is abrupt and awkward: 'Sed euagatus sum longius quam uolebam. Nunc reddenda est de Iustitia proposita disputatio.' The chapters so introduced form a treatise complete in itself, and it is remarkable that its length agrees closely with that of the

shorter tracts already mentioned. It is in bulk midway between the *De Ira* and the *De Mortibus*. Now all the passages which appear to imply an early date for the Book have been taken from this latter part. We are unable, indeed, to affirm, with M. Pichon, that chaps. 1-4 point to the closing years of the persecution, but there is nothing in them inconsistent with so late a date—not even the reference to the ferocious deeds of the enemies of the Faith (v. 1. 5-7). These considerations suggest a hypothesis which it may perhaps be worth while to submit to the judgment of the readers of HERMATHENA. It may have been that about 306, soon after he had left Nicomedia and followed Constantine to Gaul, and while the troubles of the Church in the East were at their worst, Lactantius wrote a little tract entitled 'De Iustitia.' Some years later the *Divinae Institutiones* began to appear, book by book. When he reached the fifth book, instead of writing a fresh treatise, 'De Iustitia,' Lactantius may have utilised his earlier work, revising it no doubt to some extent; and, in order to make it as nearly as possible equal in length to the other books of his *magnum opus*, he may have prefixed to it a Preface for which he had not been able to find room in a more fitting place.

However, leaving this hypothesis to the judgment of others, let us note two features of *Inst.* v. 5-23, not yet mentioned, which make for an early date. Lactantius displays great care and skill in the arrangement of his arguments. This appears not only in the plan of the *Institutiones* as a whole, but in each of the books of which it is composed, in the *De Ira*, the *Epitome*, and even in the *Mortes*. In this matter our author is a true Ciceronian. There are but two exceptions to the rule. The first is his earliest extant work—the *De Opificio Dei*; the second is *Inst.* v. 5-23. The latter is so confused in its arrangement as almost to defy analysis. Lactantius himself was con-

scious of the imperfection of the structure of this book, for in the summary which he gives of it in his *Epitome* the arrangement is completely changed (Pichon, pp. 153, 277). This remarkable absence of orderly arrangement in his fifth book may, indeed, be in part accounted for by the vivid sense of the sufferings of the Christians, under which, as we have seen, Lactantius wrote; but it is reasonable to believe that it was in some measure due to the absence of that literary skill which he acquired with advancing years.

But it was not only in the arrangement of his materials that Lactantius approached more nearly to the classical models in his later works. A proneness to exaggerated statements is noticeable in the *De Opificio*, from which most of his writings are comparatively free. But an exception must again be made of the Fifth Book of the *Institutiones* (Pichon, p. 294).

We have mentioned some resemblances between the *De Opificio* and Book V. It is now time to direct attention to a very remarkable contrast which exists between them. The Fifth Book of the *Institutiones* is the most outspoken—the most notably anti-Pagan—of the writings of Lactantius. The *De Opificio*, on the contrary, is the least definitely Christian of them all. In it he writes as though he felt it imprudent to make a distinct avowal of his sympathy with the adherents of the new Faith; and that, although it was quite certainly addressed to one who was, like himself, a Christian. Christianity is seldom referred to, and then only in obscure hints, such as the following (*De Op.* i. 9):

'Memento et veri parentis tui et in qua ciuitate nomen dederis et cuius ordinis fueris. Intelligis profecto quid loquar.'

Can we explain this difference of tone on the supposition that the *De Opificio* and the original treatise *De Iustitia* were not far apart in date? Most readily, as it seems. We have but to suppose that the *De Opificio* was

written at Nicomedia, if not after the publication of the edict of 303, at least when the open profession of Christianity by a member of the Court was attended with danger; while, on the other hand, the treatise which formed the basis of *Inst.* v. was penned in Gaul under the protection of Constantine, not long after his Edict of Toleration in 306. Thus we are led to the conclusion, which has more than once already been in sight, that the treatise *De Iustitia* was first published in a part of the empire which was exempt from persecution.

But, to quote the words of Lactantius, ‘Euagatus sum longius quam uolebam’: it is time to return to the work which has suggested this article. We open it at a most interesting chapter, that in which M. Pichon treats of the ‘religious sources’ of Lactantius.

There is one source, it may be remarked in passing, of which Lactantius seems certainly to have made use, but which has escaped the notice of M. Pichon, as of Brandt before him. It is the Book of Enoch.¹ The fact that Lactantius had recourse to this book is the more interesting, because it is one of the few traces which remain in his extant writings of his early training in Africa, where from the days of Tertullian onwards Enoch was held in high esteem.

The thesis which M. Pichon maintains—and maintains with success—in this and the following chapters is that, while Lactantius knew and used the Scriptures and the later Ecclesiastical writers, he was much more at home with profane authors. He bases arguments on the Bible; but, as a true classic, he is saturated with the writers of the Augustan period, and, above all, with Cicero. M. Pichon goes on to say that (for the most part at any rate) Lactantius’ knowledge of Scripture was at second hand.

¹ See *Journal of Philology*, vol. xxv., p. 214 *sqq.*

He took his proof-texts, not directly from the Bible, but from St. Cyprian. Here, one may be inclined to think, M. Pichon somewhat underestimates Lactantius' familiarity with the Christian Sacred Books. It is quite true that we should not expect a man of his training and temper to have a very minute knowledge of them. 'And if,' as M. Pichon puts it, 'one of his predecessors had done him the service of collecting beforehand all the passages of Scripture necessary for the historic proof of Christianity, we may be sure he would gladly take from him the materials of which he had need, without having either the time or the taste to gather them for himself.' Such a collection of Scripture passages existed in the *Testimonia* of Cyprian, an author for whom we know that Lactantius had much respect. *A priori*, then, it is very likely that he would have made use of Cyprian's *Testimonia*. But the *a posteriori* evidence of this borrowing does not seem to be quite so strong as M. Pichon represents it to be. He sums it up in a single sentence:—'Most of the passages which he quotes are found either in the *Testimonia* or in the other writings of St. Cyprian, and usually in the same form.'

Let us remark, in the first place, that it would not be very surprising that many, or most, of Lactantius' proof-texts, however he came by them, should be also cited by Cyprian. If a writer makes a collection of texts which aims at being fairly exhaustive, under certain heads, and a later writer quotes a smaller number of texts under the same or similar heads, it is natural to expect that most, if not all, of the latter will be included in the former. If this turns out to be actually the case, we are not entitled to infer that there has been borrowing on the part of the later collector. If, therefore, most of Lactantius' proof-texts were found in the *Testimonia*, we could not at once infer that they had been taken from Cyprian. But M. Pichon does not say even so much as this. Most of them, he

states, are found 'either in the *Testimonia* or in the other writings of St. Cyprian.' And the words which we have printed in italics constitute a very important admission. For Lactantius' ignorance of Scripture can hardly have been so profound that, when he was not quite satisfied with the material supplied by the *Testimonia*, he was obliged to search the works of Cyprian for additional quotations instead of going to the Bible itself. But M. Pichon adds that Lactantius quotes the passages in the same form as Cyprian. This, if it were true, would be significant. But we cannot allow that it would be absolutely convincing. For, of course, Cyprian made his quotations from the current African text of the Bible, and it is quite possible that Lactantius carried an African Bible with him when he went to Nicomedia. But is it true? M. Pichon, doubtless, bases his statement on Hartel's edition of Cyprian in the Vienna Corpus. But Prof. Sanday has proved (*Old Latin Biblical Texts*, ii. p. xliii. *sqq.*) that in the *Testimonia* Hartel has followed an inferior manuscript. It is therefore unwise, until we have a better text of this work in our hands, to make confident assertions about the form of Cyprian's quotations. In some cases, however, it seems pretty clear that Lactantius differs from him very strikingly. Thus, for example, St. John i. 1-3 is cited by both writers (*Inst.* iv. 8. 16; *Test.* ii. 3, 6); and both in Hartel's text of Cyprian and Brandt's text of Lactantius *verbum* appears in this passage as the translation of λόγος. But it is to be noted that the two MSS designated in Hartel's apparatus by the letters B and L, which, according to Prof. Sanday, when they are in agreement yield a text 'which possesses high claims to consideration,' read *sermo*. It seems clear, too, that if Lactantius used Cyprian's *Testimonia*, he did so with more freedom than M. Pichon leads us to suppose. He does not always follow Cyprian as regards the order in which he cites his texts, and sometimes he even brings

together under a single head passages which are cited by the earlier writer under several different heads. One example may be given. In *Inst.* iv. 11. 4-6 Lactantius quotes the three passages which are found in *Test.* i. 2, but in a different order. Next (§§ 7-10), in proof of the statement, 'Illum filium suum primogenitum . . . delabi iussit e caelo, ut religionem sanctam Dei transferret ad gentes,' he quotes three passages: the first of them (*Mal.* i. 10) is found in *Test.* i. :6, under the heading, 'Quod sacrificium uetus euacuaretur et nouum celebraretur'; the others, among many, in *Test.* i. 21, under the heading, 'Quod gentes magis in Christum crediturae essent.' We have perhaps said enough to show that it is scarcely proved that Lactantius borrowed his texts from Cyprian, but that if he did so, he at least displayed independent knowledge of the Scriptures. But we cannot pass on without noticing a curious slip made by M. Pichon with regard to one of Lactantius' quotations. He cites (*Inst.* iv. 15. 3) St. Luke iii. 22, under the form 'Tum uox audita de caelo est: filius meus es tu, ego hodie genui te.' This M. Pichon describes as 'in truth not a quotation, but a confused reminiscence' of the verse in St. Luke and Ps. ii. 7. This, of course, is inaccurate. The words as given by Lactantius were in his day a well-known reading of the evangelic text. They are attested in Greek as early as the time of Justin Martyr, and in Latin, among the contemporaries of Lactantius, by Juvenius. Originally, it may be, the reading was due to the fusion of two distinct passages of Scripture; but there is scarcely room to doubt that Lactantius found it in his copy of St. Luke's Gospel.

There is not space to do more than touch very briefly upon a portion of M. Pichon's work which deserves fuller treatment: his masterly study of the *De Mortibus Persecutorum*. His defence of the authenticity of that

work, though of course all his arguments are not equally convincing, is very powerful. We cannot, we confess, accept his dictum, several times repeated, that the hypothesis that the book was written by a pupil of Lactantius is 'quite gratuitous.' All, however, will now agree that the external evidence for the Lactantian authorship of the *Mortes* is very strong, and M. Pichon's answers to the objections of Brandt and others, from internal considerations, seem to us convincing. The style of the *Mortes*, it is true, differs from that of the *Institutiones*; but the difference, M. Pichon assures us, amounts only to this, that what is normal in the one is exceptional in the other. He produces from the *Mortes* examples of the long and stately periods with which the readers of the *Institutiones* are so familiar. He is perhaps hardly so successful in his search in the *Institutiones* for short and rapid sentences, such as occur everywhere in the *Mortes*. But he at least succeeds in proving that the author of the one work, as of the other, was skilful in adapting his style to his subject. And the subject of the *Mortes* was as different as possible from that of the *Institutiones*. Their normal style would, therefore, certainly differ, supposing they had a common author. All we could reasonably expect would be an occasional resemblance in diction between the two treatises. And this we actually find. But M. Pichon gives prominence to another consideration which is not always kept in view. The *Mortes* not only deals with a different subject from that of the *Institutiones*, it is addressed to a different public. We may quote M. Pichon's words (p. 343):—

'Si les *Institutions* pèchent par excès de parure littéraire, c'est moins l'effet d'une coquetterie d'auteur que d'un désir, très légitime, de conquérir un auditoire instruit et exigeant. La forme oratoire du grand ouvrage de Lactance est commandée impérieusement par les goûts du public

profane qu'il a en vue. Le *De Mortibus Persecutorum* au contraire est dédié à un martyr, adressé à un groupe de chrétiens, tous gens moins soucieux de l'art d'écrire, plus attentifs au récit des événements qui intéressaient de si près leur Église. Cette fois, Lactance n'avait pas besoin de soigner autant la forme de son livre ; il pouvait se contenter d'un style plus uni et plus nu, et, avec un convenance parfaite, il a su, lui le rhéteur, l'imitateur de Cicéron, l'amoureux du beau langage, il a su être simple avec les simples.'

But the most serious objection to the Lactantian authorship of the *Mortes* is founded, not on the literary style of the tract, but on chronology. It is asserted (1) that the writer of the *Mortes* was an eye-witness of the events which he narrates, and in particular of the occurrences at Nicomedia subsequent to the Edict of Toleration of Galerius; and, on the other hand, (2) that the writer of the *Institutiones* had left that city some years before the publication of the Edict. The second of these statements M. Pichon accepts—rightly as it seems, though Prof. Bury takes a different view of the matter.¹ But he remarks that there is no reason why Lactantius may not have returned from Gaul to the East between 311 and 313. We are not sure that it would be easy to reconcile this supposition with the second dedication of the *Institutiones*. But M. Pichon is on safer ground when he vigorously combats the first of the two statements on which the chronological objection is based. That the writer of the *Mortes* was an eye-witness of all that he records he declares—and with reason—to be impossible; that he was at Nicomedia during the later years of the reign of Maximin the text does not compel us to believe. It seems to us that M. Pichon's argument is unanswerable; and it is confirmed by subsequent chapters of his book, in

¹ See his edition of Gibbon, vol. ii., p. 532.

which harmonies between the *Institutiones* and the *Mortes*, which easily escape the hasty reader, are dwelt upon.

There is, in fact, a difficulty in the common assumption that the author of the *Mortes* wrote his tract at Nicomedia, or resided in that city between the years 311 and 313, which does not appear to be generally recognised. He seems not to have had very accurate knowledge of all that passed there after the death of Galerius. Two examples may be given.

Both the writer of the *Mortes* (36. 3) and Eusebius (*H. E.* ix. 2. 2 ; 4. 1) inform us that Maximin procured memorials from the cities of his dominions, praying him to renew the persecution, which had been for a while suspended. And Eusebius tells us that the substance of the petitions was that the Christians should be banished from the cities from which the memorials came. On the details of the persecution of Maximin the author of the *De Martyribus Palaestinae* speaks with authority. And in this case his testimony is strongly corroborated. He gives us two documents which emanated from Maximin himself—the answer to the memorial from Tyre, and the letter to Sabinus—and in both of them (*H. E.* ix. 7. 12 ; 9. 19) the statement is made that the citizens had desired the expulsion of the Christians. Moreover, in the second of these two documents prominence is given to the circumstance that Nicomedia itself was among the cities by which memorials had been presented. It is impossible to imagine that a prominent Christian living in Nicomedia could have been ignorant of these facts, even if we may suppose that he was permitted to remain there after the prayer of the citizens had been granted. But the *Mortes* contradicts Eusebius and Maximin as to the scope of the petitions :

‘ Inprimis indulgentiam Christianis communi titulo datam tollit subornatis legationibus ciuitatum quae peterent ne intra ciuitates

suas Christianis conuenticula extruere liceret, ut suasu coactus et impulsus facere uideretur quod erat sponte facturus.'

And again, further on in the same chapter of the *Mortes*, in a passage which has been already quoted (36. 6), we are told that about the same time Maximin ordered that the lives of the Christians should not be taken. Here also Eusebius is at variance with the *Mortes*, and again his statements are confirmed by independent evidence. He mentions a large number of martyrdoms belonging to this period (*H. E.* ix. 3, 6; cf. viii. 13. 1-7). Among those who suffered, according to him,¹ was the famous scholar Lucian, a presbyter of Antioch, who was put to death at Nicomedia. Now a fragment of the Apology of Lucian, delivered shortly before his death, to the *praeses* of Bithynia, is still extant in the Latin rendering of Rufinus (Routh, *R. S.* iv. 5), and in it he mentions 'ista, quae nunc falso conscribuntur, Acta Pilati.' It was a daring allusion certainly, but one which could not have been made except in the last years of Maximin. For it was then that the *Acta Pilati* were forged, and by his authority circulated everywhere and taught in the schools (*Eus. H. E.* i. 9. 2; ix. 5. 1). How could a Christian living in Nicomedia have been unaware of all the martyrdoms recorded by Eusebius, some of the most remarkable of which took place in Nicomedia itself?

But enough of this. To the student of the Diocletian Persecution the authorship of the *Mortes* is of comparatively small moment. For him the important question is its historical value. And this is very carefully discussed in two chapters in which the *Mortes* is considered as an historic source, and as a political and religious pamphlet. There are, indeed, one or two passages which are open to criticism.

¹ And according to Jerome (*De Vir. Ill.* 77), who had evidently independent knowledge of the facts.

Thus, at p. 363, it should have been observed that Eusebius (according to the received text) is inconsistent as to the month in which the persecution began, giving March in *H. E.* viii. 2. 4, but April in *M. Pal.* Pref. Again, the paraphrase given on p. 365, of Eus., *M. Pal.* 13. 15 (12), does not convey the sense of the passage itself, quoted in a footnote. Is it fair, on the same page, to quote Optatus of Mileum as supporting Lactantius on the religious policy of Constantius? Surely he agrees more closely with Eusebius. But such slight slips as these do not appreciably lessen the value of the discussion.

We have in this Paper, perhaps, unduly enlarged upon those parts of M. Pichon's monograph in which he expresses opinions from which we have felt compelled to dissent. They occupy, after all, only a few pages of the entire work. Of the judgment to be pronounced on the book as a whole there can, we believe, be little doubt. Apart from the edition of the text in the Vienna Corpus, it is the most valuable contribution to the study of Lactantius which has been published for many years.

H. J. LAWLOR.

THE RELATION OF METRICAL ICTUS TO ACCENT AND QUANTITY IN PLAUTINE VERSE.

THE most important problem of Plautine versification is the exact relation of the metrical ictus to the word-accent of prose and to quantity. This problem may be said to divide Plautine scholars into two camps. Those scholars who may perhaps be distinguished as the philological or scientific school, favour, for the most part, the theory that the ictus of Plautine verse was determined chiefly, if not exclusively, by the word- and sentence-accent of prose. In the learned essay on *The Accentual Element in Early Latin Verse*, that forms the appendix to his large edition of the *Captivi* (1900), Prof. Lindsay strives to bring into harmony with the accentual system of prose, a large number of instances of metrical stress which seem to be in conflict with it. In this he is in agreement with Prof. Skutsch. Another school of critics, which may perhaps be called the non-philological or literary school, hold that the natural prose accent had little or no influence in producing the characteristic features of Plautine verse. This view has been expressed by Seyffert, and by the late Richard Klotz.

The most characteristic phenomenon of Plautine verse is the shortening of originally long syllables by the so-called *Law of Breves Breviantes*. That law need not yet be formulated. It will be enough to say that, in that shortening, a stress-accent coöperates with a short syllable in shortening a following long one. This shortening occurs very often in Plautus; and the question arises

whether the stress-accent that is a factor in producing it was the word-accent of prose, or the metrical ictus imposed by the will of the poet. The philological school hold firmly that it was the former, while the non-philological school take the opposite view. Seyffert and Klotz seem to regard this shortening as a purely metrical phenomenon, the latter, for instance, holding that the shortened syllable (*breviata*) and the shortening syllable (*brevians*) must both belong to the same arsis or thesis.

It is clear that questions of Plautine metric cannot be kept distinct from the wider question of the character of Latin verse in general. On that subject, too, there is much divergence of opinion. Scholars are not even agreed as to the proper way of reading Vergil's hexameters, some holding, with Bentley¹ and Hermann, that the words should be pronounced as in prose; others holding, with Luc. Müller,² that the prose accents should be disregarded; and one writer³ at least holding that they should be read without either ictus or word-accent, but with scrupulous regard to quantity!

If, therefore, we are to arrive at the truth of the matter, it will be necessary to examine the expressed or unexpressed postulates that underlie these very divergent views. For example, Skutsch reveals the postulate on which some of his views as to Plautine verse rest in the course of a review of Klotz' *Altrömische Metrik* in *Vollmöller's Jahresb.* 1891,⁴ where he declares that a quantitative poetry is properly suited only to a language with a musical accent, and that the only verse suited to a language which, like Latin, had a stress-accent is accental verse. In examining this postulate, therefore, and other postulates, which presumably underlie other views,

¹ In his *Schediasma de Metr. Terent.*

² *Res Metr.*², pp. 233 sqq.

³ C. E. Bennett : *What was Ictus in*

Latin Prosody? in the Amer. Jour. of Phil., vol. xix. 4 (Baltimore, 1898).

⁴ The passage will be quoted below.

it will be necessary to inquire into the exact meaning of the terms 'quantitative' and 'accentual' as applied to verse, to distinguish precisely the various kinds of word-accent, and to determine their respective relations to different metrical systems. And, above all, if such an inquiry is to begin hopefully, it will be desirable to ask what is the essential element in verse. The whole subject of metre, as to which there is so much disagreement, can only become clear when it is unified—when ancient verse is compared with modern verse, and the element common to both—if there be one—disengaged.

I.

In this, as in other matters, it is best to proceed from the known to the unknown. For us moderns the effect produced by modern verse is known; but the effect produced by ancient verse on its contemporaries is comparatively unknown. We are also substantially, though not perfectly, agreed as to the external means by which the effect of modern verse is produced. It will probably be admitted that a line of English or German will be recognised as verse when it suggests to the ear a beat or pulse recurring at normally regular intervals of time. The intervals need not be exactly equal. It is enough that the effect of equality be produced on the ear. There may be acceleration or retardation of the time, but the acceleration or retardation will be normally uniform, though, as in music, more or less sudden pauses may be occasionally employed for the sake of special effect. Nor need every single beat be actually heard. A beat may be omitted; but a thing may be suggested by its very absence, and the omission of a beat is conditional, in English verse, on such an arrangement of the part of the verse in which it occurs that the voice dwells as long on that part in recitation as if the missing beat were heard. Thus the time occupied

in reciting an English line is not affected by the absence of a beat. The effect of a regularly recurring beat or pulse is given by a regularly recurring stressed syllable, and the stressed syllable requires normally more time for its utterance than the unstressed syllables. To determine exactly how much more time is scarcely necessary; but, roughly speaking, the stressed syllables require twice as much time as the unstressed. The stressed syllable is normally, therefore, one on which the voice can dwell, as in—

Immórtal áge besíde immórtal yóuth.

or,

Steíget aúf, ihr álten Träúme!

Let it be agreed to call such syllables long, and syllables like the first of *never* and German *bitte*, short. The unstressed syllables in an English verse can be either long or short; but whichever they be, the voice will dwell on them a shorter time than on the stressed. The stressed syllable, however, can be short; and in that case, the short syllable is not prolonged, but the required time is filled out by a pause. Usually the short stressed syllable is pronounced with the following syllable; and a pause follows to take the place of the unstressed syllable; as in

She néver tóld her lóve,

where the two syllables of 'never' are pronounced in the time of one long one, and there is a pause equal to the time of a short syllable before 'told.' There are also other breaks in the regularity of the pattern. There is the phenomenon called inversion of the accent, in which the stressed syllable occupies the place of the unstressed, and *vice versa*. Inversion of the accent is usually found only at the beginning of the line. Several of these

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characteristics are illustrated in the lines of Shakespeare :

Duke. And whát's her hístory?
Viola. A blánk, my lórd. She néver tóld her lóve,
 But lét conceálmént, líke a wórm i' the búd,
 Féed on her dámask chéek.

Twelfth Night, ii. 4. 112 ff.

The last line here exhibits inversion of the accent in the first foot, and the stressing of a short syllable ('dámask') in the second. Using the symbol \times for an unstressed syllable (which may be long or short indifferently), and the symbol \wedge for a pause equal to the time required for the utterance of an unstressed syllable, we may represent the scheme of the last line as follows¹ :—

$\angle \times | \times \cup \cup | \wedge \angle$

Inversion of the accent in German verse is shown in Goethe's

Wár es ein Gótt der díese Zeíchen schríeb,
Faust, 434,

and stressed short syllable in

Jetzt érst erkénn' ich wás der Weíse sprícht,
Faust, 442,

where there is a pause before 'was,' '-kenn' ich' being spoken together in the place of one long stressed syllable.²

It is by no means my purpose to attempt a complete account of modern verse, as represented in English and German. The points to which I should like to direct attention are that, omitting details, English and German

¹ I am indebted for some valuable hints on English metre to Prof. E. A. Sonnenschein.

² Stressed short syllables are less common in German verse than in English, because English has preserved

many originally short vowels which in German, since the Middle High German period, have become long: contrast Eng. *I gíve*, Ger. *ich gēbe*, O. H. G. *ih gību*.

verse depends for its effect on the recurrence of long stressed syllables at regular intervals. The pattern is, we have seen, often broken. It may even be admitted that much or most of the charm of English verse depends on this breaking of the pattern. But the pattern is not destroyed; it is divined amid all variations.

Let us turn now to ancient verse, and propose the same question—namely, on what did its effect, as verse, depend? It will be best to take Greek examples, as Greek verse admittedly differs most widely from modern verse. In a Greek iambic trimeter we find six *θέσεις*, that is to say, six stressed syllables, and they occur at equal intervals of time. Further, these six stressed syllables or *θέσεις* are long, except that occasionally two short syllables take the place of one long one. Also twice as much time was occupied in reciting a *θέσις* as in reciting an *ἄρσις*. So far the Greek metre corresponds closely in character with the modern English metre. We have the recurrence of long stressed syllables at regular intervals of time, and we find that the voice dwelt twice as long on a *θέσις* as on an *ἄρσις*—an *ἄρσις* being the unstressed portion of a verse between two consecutive *θέσεις*. But in some other respects the Greek metre differs from the English. For example, the second, fourth, and sixth *ἄρσεις* must, in tragic verse, consist of a single short syllable; again, a *θέσις* can never be omitted, nor can it change places with an *ἄρσις* (inversion of stress); and there are no pauses (*χρόνοι κενοί*, *inania tempora*, Quint. ix. 4. 51).

Which, then, of the characteristics of a Greek iambic trimeter are we to regard as essential? What is that which we could not take away from it without making it cease to have the nature of a verse? I do not say, 'cease to be a verse,' because, perhaps, a pedant might hold that if you put a long syllable in the second *ἄρσις*, it ceases to be a verse. Would it remain essentially a verse if pronounced without

stress in the *thesis*?—or if long syllables were found in the *arsis* of the even feet? In other words, are we to regard as the essential element in Greek verse that which it has in common with modern verse, or that which is peculiar to itself and the verse of some other literatures? Logic almost compels us to the former conclusion. Sophocles and Shakespeare both wrote iambic verse. Surely, then, that which their verse has in common will be its essential element? Many writers seem to hold that the æsthetic effect of ancient verse was due to what is called quantity, that is, a certain arrangement of long and short syllables. If it was, why do we also find *stressed* syllables recurring in Greek verse at regular intervals? Or it may be said that the æsthetic effect of Greek verse was only partly due to the recurrence at regular intervals of stressed syllables, and partly to an orderly arrangement of long and short syllables. If that is the right view, then we must admit that Greek verse was all that modern verse is, and something more; and we must deny to Dante, and Shakespeare, and Goethe the power of producing in modern ears effects equal in fulness to those produced in Athenian ears by Aeschylus and Sophocles. We must admit, too, that we moderns have grown incapable of feeling the full beauty of quantitative verse. At any rate, I must confess, for my own part, that the verse of Sophocles does not seem to me more beautiful, as verse, than that of Shakespeare. Many classical scholars seem to have had almost a superstitious feeling about quantity, as of a mysterious and lost quality of language which no modern ear could appreciate. Thus Munro, during the discussion which arose out of Matthew Arnold's *Lectures on Translating Homer*, not only attributed the whole force of ancient verse to "the instinctive feeling for and knowledge of quantity" of the old Greeks and Romans, but proceeded to deny that quantity "existed even potentially in any modern language," or that any

modern ear could recognise it or feel its effect.¹ Such opinions must be soon dispelled by a knowledge of the laws that govern the life and growth of language. But the question whether quantity was the cause of, or even contributed to, the æsthetic effect of ancient verse can be answered otherwise than by an appeal to subjective feelings if it can be shown that quantity in ancient verse served quite another purpose—that it was a part of the technic of ancient verse, not of its essence.

Ancient and modern verse are usually distinguished as quantitative and accentual respectively. The terms need defining. They do not necessarily predicate the essential element in the two kinds of verse. We have seen that, in Greek verse, we find a regular succession of long stressed syllables (*θείσεις*). If, therefore, stress may be called accent, there is a sense in which ancient verse is as much accentual as modern verse. But the two names do, of course, represent a real difference. In modern verse the metrically stressed syllable is always a syllable that bears the word-accent of prose speech: in ancient verse that is not so. In a Greek verse, the metrical ictus (to use the more technical term) is as often in conflict with the word-accent as not, as, for instance, in

*στέργειν γὰρ αἱ πάθαι με χῶ χρόνος ξυνὸν
μακρὸς διδάσκει.*

SOPH., *O. C.* 7.

And that is really all that is meant by saying that modern verse is accentual as compared with ancient verse. Both kinds of verse have a regularly recurring succession of stressed long syllables; but in reading a modern verse, we are guided where to place those stresses by natural word-accent, while in reading a Greek verse natural word-accent

¹ Cited by J. M. Robertson, in *New Essays towards a Critical Method*, p. 347.

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is utterly disregarded, and we must be guided by something else. That something else was quantity. For instance, the reciter was guided, in the verse of Sophocles quoted above, to the placing of a stress on the last syllable of *στέργειν* by the short syllable *γάρ*; and generally, the first *θείσις* of a Greek iambic line will be the first syllable followed by a short one—excluding the first syllable of the line. In other words, as the word-accent is the clew to the reading of a modern verse, so was a certain arrangement of long and short syllables the clew to the reading of an ancient verse.

The next step in the inquiry is that we should ask why Greek used a quantitative clew to its verse, while English and German use the clew of natural accent. The usual answer is, that it is because the accent of English and German is expiratory, while the accent of old Greek was musical. Such an answer implies the general proposition that the natural poetry of a language with an expiratory accent will be accentual, and the natural poetry of a language with a musical accent will be quantitative. As the accent of Latin was expiratory, it would follow that quantitative Latin poetry must be pronounced artificial. It is necessary, therefore, to examine this point rather closely.

It is well known that word-accents can be distinguished in two different ways—firstly, according to the principle on which their position in the word is determined, and, secondly, according to their nature.

If we regard its position in the word, we may distinguish three kinds of accent—*Free*, *Fixed*, and *Rhythmical*. 1. In languages with Free accent, each word has one chief accent, which may fall in any part of the word, however long the word may be. Different inflexions of the same word may have the accent in different places. 2. When the accent is Fixed, its position is determined on a uniform principle;

and it must be in the same place in every part of an inflexional system. Fixed accent is found in the Germanic languages, where, in uncompounded words, the accent must fall on the first syllable, that is, the root-syllable; and it must remain there throughout all inflexions or lengthenings by suffixes; *e.g.*, English *like*, *likeness*, *likenesses*, *liken*, *likening*; *begin*, *beginning*, *beginner*. 3. When accent is Rhythmical, it is restricted to certain syllables, its position being determined in each case by a law which depends solely on the rhythm of the word—that is, the number and quantity of its syllables. When the word is inflected or increased by the addition of suffixes, the position of the accent is changed as often as is necessary to bring it into harmony with the rhythmical law. This kind of accent is perfectly illustrated in Latin, less perfectly in Greek; *e.g.*, *vidēs*, *vidētis*, *videbātur*, *videbatūrne*; *pōpulus*, *pōpulōrum*. The free and fixed kinds of accent may be classed together as *Significant*, that is, they were intended originally to make the speaker's meaning clearer: they were addressed to the understanding. Thus in English and German, the accent distinguishes the predicative from the formative elements of uncompounded words. But the rhythmical kind of accent is, in a sense, meaningless: it is addressed to the ear, it is placed automatically. It will be seen that this distinction is not without importance for the theory of Latin metric.

According to its nature, two kinds of accent are usually distinguished—*Expiratory* and *Musical*. Expiratory accent is often supposed to consist solely in a stronger emission of the breath, and musical accent solely in a heightened pitch. But, as Brugmann points out,¹ no accent is purely a stress-accent, or purely a pitch-accent. Differences of pitch and stress are always associated. But

¹ *Grundr.*², i. § 52.

where the element of stress preponderates, the accent is called expiratory, for the sake of convenience, and *vice versa*. In reality, every expiratory accent is partly a musical accent, and every musical accent is partly an expiratory accent. Thus the accent of ancient Greek is called musical, while the accent of modern Greek—found in the same position as in the ancient language—is called expiratory. What has happened is that—owing to causes of deep interest and importance philologically—the stress-element in ancient Greek accent has continually waxed, while the pitch-element has as continually waned, until their mutual relations have been reversed.

The character of accent can always be determined with certainty from its effects. The effect of accent in the modification of a language is in direct proportion to the strength of its stress-element. Stress-accent lengthens originally short vowels; *e.g.*, Ital. *mēno*, *fuōco*, from Lat. *mīnus*, *fōcus*; N.H.G. *viel*, *gēbe*, from M.H.G. *vīl*, *gēbe*. Where the element of stress is strongly preponderant, the vowels of the unaccented syllables lose both quantity and quality. Thus, in English, unaccented vowels are normally short, and indeterminate in quality; *e.g.*, the unaccented syllables of *wāter*, *sāllor*, *bēggar*, *flīgure*, have exactly the same sound. When, in English or German, the unaccented vowel is associated with a nasal or liquid, the vowel is syncopated, and the nasal or liquid becomes sonant; as in *gentleman*, pron. *géntlm̩n*; *Reisender*, pron. *reɪsndr̩*.

The accent of English and German, then, is not only expiratory: it is also fixed. Moreover the element of stress preponderates in it as strongly as possible, especially, perhaps, in English, where all unaccented syllables normally suffer ‘Ablaut.’ With such conditions prevailing in the languages, an accentual system of verse is a necessity. As the ictus falls normally on long syllables,

only the accented syllables are available for its reception, all others having lost both quantity and quality. The powerful action of English accent is directly due to its character, but it may also be indirectly connected with its fixed incidence. An accent that abides always on the same syllable through all inflexions and changes will probably produce a more powerful effect than one which changes under inflexion from syllable to syllable—just as a mountain torrent that keeps to one narrow channel will produce more conspicuous changes by its erosive action than a stream that often changes its course. We see, then, that English and German verse are accentual, not precisely because those languages have an expiratory accent, but because the effects of expiratory accent in those languages are what they are.

The accentual verse of other modern Indo-European languages can be accounted for in the same way as that of English and German, which have been taken as their representatives. Thus in Italian normal coincidence of ictus and accent is necessitated by the fact that all accented syllables are long, and all unaccented syllables short.

We have seen why English and German, as the representatives of the modern tongues, have, and must have, accentual verse; let us now briefly consider why Greek, as the representative of the ancient tongues, had, and could not but have had, quantitative verse. The accent of old Greek is shown, by the general absence of those effects which are always observed in languages with an expiratory accent, to have been musical. But, as has been pointed out, that does not mean that the element of stress was quite absent from it. The element of pitch predominated; but the element of stress was present, and was even strong enough to produce certain effects. This is, it is true, denied by Brugmann,¹ but is held to be proved by other philo-

¹ *Grundr.*², i., § 1051.

logists. Perhaps the most certain trace of the effects of accent is the law discovered by Wackernagel,¹ which explains the relation between pairs of words like κόρη·κουρεύς; Old Att. ὄρας·οὐρά. Brugmann² tries to explain away these examples; but he passes over in silence the strongest instance of all, the pair of words ἔρη (for ~~ἔρη~~·οὐρέω (for ~~φορέω~~): cf. O. Ind. várshati, 'it rains.' Hirt holds Wackernagel's law to be proved.³ As regards its incidence, the Greek accent was rhythmical, though within certain narrow limits the original Ind.-Eur. accentuation was retained. But the important point for the argument is that the accented vowels were often short, and the unaccented vowels long. Further, Greek was rich in polysyllables—such common words as βασιλέως, προσστέχοντα, ἱξανιστάναί. The ictus must fall normally on long syllables. But the long syllables are very often unaccented—as in ἱξανιστάναί—and the accented syllables are very often short. Consequently, ictus and accent could not coincide, as a general practice. The accent of a word, therefore, was no guide to the ictus, and another guide, or clew, as I have called it, had to be found. If a reader of verse saw before him a word like προσστέχοντα, how was he to be directed to find the ictus without hesitation or stumbling, seeing that three consecutive syllables were capable of receiving it? And before the invention of writing, how were verses to be held firmly together, to be kept in shape? The only possible clew was *quantity*, which the poets did not invent, but found there to their hand, in a language spoken by shepherds, and soldiers, and artisans. By an arrangement of short and long syllables, which was suggested by the language itself, the reciter could be unerringly guided in the placing of the

¹ Kuhn's Zeitschrift, 29. 127 ff.

² Grundr., § 846, Anm.

³ Handbuch der griechischen Laut- und Formenlehre, § 237.

ictus. The use of a short syllable for marking the *ἄρσις*, or unstressed portion of the foot, would naturally be suggested by the fact that in all verse—in modern verse as well as in ancient—an unstressed syllable is naturally shorter than a stressed. I suggest, then, that the function of quantity was not directly æsthetic, but practical. The æsthetic effect was produced by the regularly recurring stress: ‘metre begins with pulse-beat.’ Such a doctrine enables us to unify ancient and modern verse, and removes a slur which has unjustly rested on the latter since the Renaissance. “Every classical scholar readily admits the superiority of Latin versification over English,” wrote an editor of Juvenal, Dr. Nuttall, in 1836; and the belief that ancient verse is more perfect than modern verse is probably widespread. The doctrine here put forward will perhaps be regarded as a heresy; but, if it is, it is directed against a superstition. Quantity, I believe, is not of æsthetic origin in any language. The Goths, in the days of Wulfila, spoke a quantitative language: are we to hold that they possessed a sense and an instinct that were lacking to the contemporaries of Shakespeare and Goethe? Hungarian is also strictly quantitative at the present day; but we need not, therefore, exalt its verse over that of the rest of modern Europe.

The nature of old Greek verse is sufficiently revealed by the facts and details of Greek metric, provided that those facts and details be interrogated. Often they are treated as needing no explanation—as being ultimate laws, to be used only *à priori*, and not as determined by the needs of the men that made them, and the character of the material they had to work with. For example, the iambic trimeter of Greek tragedy allows an ‘irrational’ iambus in the odd places. Why was that? The language contained many words of the measure of *μείζω* or *προσστείχοντα*. Without that permission, all words having two or more consecutive

long syllables would have been excluded. Pure iambics could still have been written ; but each considerable performance therein would have been a *tour de force*. Why then did they not admit such words to every foot in the line? Because it was simply impossible : there would have been no clew for the reciter—he might just as well have made such a verse trochaic as iambic. But a clew in the alternate feet was sufficient. Again, in an English or German iambic line, we often find, as we have seen, a trochaic ictus in the first foot. Why do we never, or almost never, find it in Greek iambics?¹ To modern verse it gives variety and an added charm. The answer to the question is that, in some respects, word-accent is a better verse-clew than quantity. It is surer; it requires less attention on the part of the reciter. Consequently some things are possible to a modern poet from which an Athenian was debarred. If a Greek iambic line had begun with a trochee, followed by an iambus, the reciter might have mistaken it for a dactylic opening, and have pronounced – ∪ ∪ | – ∟, say, instead of ∟ ∪ | ∪ ∟ | –, thus throwing the line out of gear. It is for precisely the same reason that we never find in Greek iambics those pauses that are so common in English verse (see above, p. 473 f.). Experiment will show that it is impossible to allow them in Greek dialogue metres without injuring the clew to their fluent recitation. This seems to be proved by the fact that such pauses (*tempora inania* of Quintilian) are constantly found in the lyric parts of tragedy. There we have not only pauses, but also inversions of the ictus (ἀνάκλασις) and prolongations—τρίσημοι, τετράσημοι, etc. The reason is that, in the lyric passages, the music furnished the clew, not quantity.

¹ The only instances known to me are in Aesch., *Theb.* 475, where an iamb. trim. begins with Ἰππομέδοντος σχῆμα, 'a concession to the inevitable'—

(Verrall); and Aesch., *Choeph.* 1049 : φαιοχίτωνες. Aesch., *Theb.* 547, is rejected by Dindorf, H. Wolf, Verrall, and others.

It would be interesting to pursue this subject, and to seek the *raison d'être* of other details of Greek metric; but the limits of this paper forbid an exhaustive treatment. Enough has been said, perhaps, to bring support to the doctrine that quantity in Greek verse had as its immediate function, not the producing of an æsthetic effect, but the guiding of the reader or reciter in his declamation—that is to say, a merely practical function. This seems to be shown by the fact that quantity is sacrificed wherever that can be done without the practical inconvenience of damage to the metrical clew—for example, in the alternate feet of the γένος διπλάσιον. Were the odd places of an iambic trimeter less excellent or less perfect than the even places? Or did they break the stately march of the line by requiring a longer time for their utterance? But before leaving this part of the subject I should like to call attention to one point. Reference has already been made to the belief that ancient verse was in some way superior to modern verse—a belief partly due to the fact that the rules of ancient metres can be more definitely stated without reference to the living ear, which is often a convenience. But we have here seen that, in some respects, Greek verse must yield the superiority to modern verse. It had less power to vary the cadence of the lines by occasional inversion of the ictus, and by permitting pauses. In a word—and a bold word—it was more monotonous. A student of the classics cannot but feel a sadness in admitting it; but truth compels. It must be granted that all quantitative verse is necessarily more monotonous than accentual verse. The preceding argument is an attempt to show why it must be so; and I would cite as a supporting witness the late Professor Newman:—

“Very few persons have ever actually heard quantitative verse. I have; by listening to Hungarian poems, read to me by my friend

Mr. Francis Pulszky, a native Magyar. He had not finished a single page before I complained gravely of the monotony. He replied: 'So do *we* complain of it'; and then showed me, by turning the pages, that the poet cut the knot which he could not untie, by frequent changes of his metre."¹

We have now inquired what is the essential element in verse, and found it to be a succession of stressed syllables at regular intervals of time; we have inquired in what exact sense ancient verse can be called quantitative, and modern verse accentual; we have further asked why modern verse is necessarily accentual, and ancient verse quantitative; and we have found that the function of quantity in Greek verse was not æsthetic, but practical. It has been argued that English and German verse are accentual, not so much because they have an expiratory accent, as because the effects of expiratory accent in those languages are what they are; and that Greek verse was quantitative, not so much because Greek had a musical accent, as because it had short accented, and long unaccented vowels. The ground having been thus, as I hope, cleared, we may pass to the subject of Latin versification, and, more particularly, to Plautine versification.

II.

If the character of the Latin language approached more closely that of English or German than it did that of Greek, then, doubtless, it follows that an accentual poetry would have been better suited to it than a quantitative poetry. Some authorities seem to consider that the question is settled when it is said that the accent of English is, and the accent of Latin was, expiratory. That seems to be the view of Prof. Skutsch, for instance. In the

¹ Cited by J. M. Robinson, *New Essays towards a Critical Method*. London, 1897.

course of a review of Klotz' *Altrömische Metrik*, in *Vollmöller's Jahresbericht*, 1891, he criticises adversely Klotz' quantitative theory of the Saturnian metre, and observes :—

“Die einfache Erwägung, dass keine Sprache, vorsichtig sei hinzugefügt, keine indogermanische Sprache, mit expiratorischem Accent von Haus aus eine andere als accentuierende oder silbenzählende Poesie kennt und, aus naheliegenden Gründen kennen kann, sowie dass die quantitierende Poesie ausschliesslich Eigentümlichkeit der Sprachen mit musikalischem Accent ist, wirft jede quantitierende Saturniertheorie über den Haufen.”

So eminent a Latinist, and so sound a philologist, as Prof. Skutsch speaks on such a subject with the greatest authority ; but I confess that the ‘ obvious reasons ’ (*nahe-
liegende Gründe*) here spoken of, which render it impossible for any language with an expiratory accent to have from the first any other than an accentual or syllable-counting poetry, are to me not quite clear. I recognise that all modern European languages of the Indo-European stock have a more or less expiratory accent, and that they also have accentual systems of verse. But it seems that if, starting with this statement as our major premiss, we proceed to deduce that any natural system of Latin versification would also have been accentual, there is a flaw in our syllogism. We must first establish the general proposition that *all* languages with a stress-accent have naturally an accentual poetry ; and obviously we can only do that if we show why it is *necessary* for the verse of such a language to be accentual. And again, if there are different *degrees* of stress-accent, that fact also may vitiate our reasoning ; because accentual verse may only begin to be necessary with a certain degree of stress-accent.

Though English accent and Latin accent are both called expiratory, there are two important differences :

(1) Latin accent was less strongly expiratory than in English; and (2) Latin accent was rhythmical, while English accent is fixed. The English accent has, generally speaking, deprived all unaccented vowels of length and determinate quality. The Latin accent, at least in Republican and early Imperial times, had not had that effect.

Long vowels are found in unaccented syllables, and retain their proper quality; *e.g.* *ōrātōrēs*. Nor had the Latin accent, in Republican and early Imperial times, the effect of lengthening originally short accented vowels, as we see them lengthened in German, Italian, and modern Greek. The Latin accent, therefore, though undoubtedly expiratory, could not have been so strongly expiratory as the accent of modern English or German. Further, it does not seem quite safe to speak of 'the Latin accent,' as if the language had remained unchanged during the whole of its literary history. The Latin of Plautus and the Latin of Juvenal are widely different, not only in other respects, but also in the character of their accent. Even in the time of Horace, the Latin accent was probably not what it was in the time of Juvenal, since, in the time of the latter, further progress had been made towards the destruction of quantity in unaccented syllables. For instance, Horace does not shorten an originally long final *o*, when a long syllable precedes; but before Juvenal's day final *o* had become everywhere short. In the time of Plautus, as is well known, most originally long terminations remained long, except under the Law of *Breves Breviantes*, so that we find such pronunciations as *ōrātōr clāmāt*. It would seem, therefore, that the stress-element in the Latin accent gained strength continuously from the time of Plautus to later Imperial times, when it probably became as strong as it is in modern Italian. Latin accent is only roughly classed when it is called expiratory.

It is natural that an Englishman or a German should feel that, if the natural prose stress-accent is taken off a word, and a new accent imposed on it, the word must become unintelligible or absurd. Perhaps that feeling may be one of the 'obvious reasons' mentioned by Skutsch, why the only natural poetry of a language with stress-accent must be an accentual poetry. In English it is simply impossible to change the accentuation of a word of native origin, or thoroughly naturalised, because, generally speaking, the unaccented syllables contain only the short indeterminate vowel, which could not receive the accent without being made determinate; whereupon the sonant of the originally accented syllable would, in turn, become indeterminate. But in Latin there could, at least, have been no such impossibility, because the unaccented syllables contained vowels capable of being accented. But, apart from questions of impossibility, it is worth while considering whether the feeling against the displacement of a stress-accent would be likely to be as strong among a people speaking a language with a rhythmical accent as it must be among a people whose language has a fixed accent. As has been said, the fixed accent of the Germanic language is *significant*, that is, it has a meaning for the understanding. In uncompounded words of native origin it distinguishes the predicative from the formative elements; and in compounds it has a purely logical function. But the rhythmical accent of Latin is meaningless for the understanding, and is addressed only to the ear. Accent-shifting would therefore be less likely to affect the intelligibility of a word in Latin than in English. Take the series of words, *vides, vidétis, videbátis, videbatísne*. The accent moves step by step from the root-syllable to the fourth. Consequently it was almost impossible to place the accent on any syllable of a Latin word on which it might not rest naturally in some other inflexion or some

other collocation. Suppose the word *videbātis* to have been unnaturally accented on the first—*videbātis*: such an accentuation would have at least been familiar in *vides*. Suppose it to have been unnaturally accented on the second—*vidēbātis*: that accentuation was at least familiar in *vidēbas*. And if it had been accented on the last—*videbātis*—even that pronunciation was familiar when an enclitic followed.

I do not suppose this reasoning to prove anything as to the actual facts of Plautine versification. They must be proved by *à posteriori* methods, by means of an examination of Plautine verse. Its object has been to show that there is no *à priori* objection to an ‘unnatural’ accentuation of a Latin word in verse—or, at least, a less strong objection than there would be in English or German—and to suggest that conclusions as to the sort of verse naturally suited to Latin, drawn from a hasty comparison of the Latin and modern Germanic accents, are in danger of error from the overlooking of important differences. I now, therefore, proceed to interrogate the actual facts of Plautine versification with a view to winning from them, by *à posteriori* methods, an answer to the specific questions which I had proposed for solution. The preceding inquiry into the essential element in verse, the meaning of ‘quantitative’ and ‘accentual’ as applied to verse, the true function of quantity in Greek verse, and the character of the word-accent in the languages involved in the discussion—all that inquiry has been designed to facilitate as objective an interpretation as possible of the facts, an interpretation independent of any particular school of Plautine critics.

III.

The chief question may be thus stated: Is Plautine verse purely accentual, or purely quantitative? Or does it partake of both characters? And if it partakes of both

characters, to what is that fact due, and what cause or causes determined the employment of the one or the other principle in any given case? And the precise meaning of the question, 'Is Plautine verse purely accentual,' is this: Did the actor of a Plautine play place the stress of his voice always on the syllable which would have borne it in prose, or did he sometimes place it on syllables which would not have borne it in prose, and neglect or suppress, when metrically necessary, the prose accent? So concrete a statement of the question is necessary because some writers do not seem quite decided as to the precise nature of *ictus*. I, of course, assume it to have been a stress, and the point will, I hope, be definitely proved. A conclusive answer to part of the question proposed may be found in the working of the law of *Breves Breviantes*. That law may be thus stated: A syllable long by nature or position, and preceded by a short syllable, was itself shortened if the word-accent fell immediately before or immediately after it—that is, on the preceding short syllable, or on the next following syllable. The sequence of syllables need not be in the same word, but must be as closely connected in utterance as if they were. Or in symbols, $\cup -$ and $\cup - \cup$ became $\cup \cup$ and $\cup \cup \cup$ respectively. It need hardly be said that we have here no mere metrical phenomenon, but a linguistic phenomenon, the causes of which lie in the physiology of speech. The point can be proved, if it were not tolerably obvious. The law would have operated if Latin had had no poetry at all. But when we find this law operating in verse, the question is slightly complicated; because, if metrical ictus was itself a stress-accent, and if it could fall on syllables unaccented in prose, and could suspend and abolish for the time the natural prose accent, the question arises whether the ictus could not have usurped the functions of

the prose accent, and have acted as a factor in shortening by the law of *Breves Breviantes*.

I take for the present a single example of the working of this law in the verse of Plautus:

dédisse dóno hodié, qua te ílli || dónatum ésse díxerás.

Am. 761.

It is not disputed that the ictus fell as I have marked the line. It is not disputed that the first foot is a tribrach, and that it becomes so by the operation of the law of *Breves Breviantes*. But how? It follows from the statement of the law that the middle syllable of *dedisse* could not be shortened if the word-accent remained upon it: therefore the word-accent has been superseded and temporarily abolished. It also follows from the statement of the law that a stress equivalent to a Latin word-accent must have fallen immediately before or immediately after the shortened syllable, the *breviata*. The only trace of such a stress here is the ictus on the first syllable of *dedisse*. It follows, therefore, indisputably that in this place the metrical ictus was a temporary stress-accent at least as strong as a Latin word-accent, that it fell on a syllable unaccented in prose, that it superseded and abolished the prose-accent, and that it shortened the middle syllable of *dedisse*. There is only one escape—the *ultima ratio* of declaring the line corrupt.¹ If it stood alone, it might safely be rejected; but the verses in which the same phenomenon occurs are too numerous to be rejected,

¹ Lindsay has, it is true, suggested —though with hesitation—that the shortening in *dédisse* here may possibly be due to ‘the accentuation of the word-group *dedisse-dóno*’ (*Capt.* 1900, *Intr.*, p. 36). But the suggestion is surprising; because even though it were granted that *dedisse-dóno* formed

a word-group, and that *dedisse* was a proclitic in that group, without even so much as a secondary accent, even then the shortening would not fall under any statement of the law of *Breves Breviantes*—the law to whose operation he of course attributes it.

even if their rejection were not forbidden by a certain remarkable circumstance. The instances do not occur indiscriminately in the text, but under special conditions. They have been collected by Ahlberg (*De Correptione Iambica Plautina*. Lundae. 1901). Ahlberg began his inquiry as an adherent of the view that it is the word-accent, and not the metrical ictus, which operates in the shortening of long syllables in Plautus under the law of *B. B.* He is consequently an unwilling witness, as it were. He gets rid of instances opposed to that view, whenever it is possible to do so, by supposing enclisis, accent-shifting caused by elision, so-called synizesis, and so forth. But after all deductions, there remained an irreducible minimum of instances of shortening under the word-accent, which could not be got rid of without violence to sound critical and scientific method. All of them were found to occur in the first foot of an iambic or trochaic line or hemistich, or in anapæsts. In anapæsts they occur in all parts of the verse. Now, in view of the numerous other metrical peculiarities which are found to occur under the same conditions, the fact that all of these instances of shortening occur in the first foot of an iambic or trochaic colon, or in anapæsts, is strong evidence that they have been correctly handed down.

I have already examined a typical instance occurring in the first foot of a trochaic septenarius. I will take one other instance from an anapæstic octonarius:—

distráxissént disqué tulissént || *satèllitēs* tui mé miserúm foedé.

Trin. 833.

Here we have two syllables shortened, and both would have been accented in prose, if the view of Lindsay and Skutsch, that pronominal adjectives were enclitic, is correct. Lindsay seeks to explain the shortening of the

syllable *-ell-* by supposing that in this word the older Latin accentuation on the first syllable survived. But even if that were admitted, the shortening of *-tes* has still to be accounted for—an accented syllable (in prose), if *tui* was an enclitic. But whether *-tes* was accented or not, no other cause can be assigned for its shortening here than the metrical ictus. The ictus admittedly fell as it is marked above; and if it was a stress-accent and overpowered the prose-accent, it must, from the statement of the law of *B. B.* given above, have caused the shortening of both the syllables in question. Yet it is held that it could not have had anything to do with either! Other examples of shortening under the prose accent are *Bacch.* 1106, *Aul.* 723, *Trin.* 821, *Mil.* 1278, *Poen.* 907, 922, 871, *Capt.* 90, 321, 431; *et al.*

The shortening of the middle syllable of *dedisse* in *Am.* 761 would not have the effect of making the word unintelligible, because a similar pronunciation would be familiar in *dēdissēmus* and *dēdissētis*.

Even those scholars who deny to ictus the power to annul the prose accent, and cause shortening by the law of *B. B.* in Plautus, can hardly, I think, refuse to accept the following statement of facts:—

1. No long syllable is shortened in Plautus unless it is immediately preceded or followed by the metrical ictus.
2. No originally long syllable is shortened under the metrical ictus (Seyffert, in *Berliner Phil. Woch.*, 1891, p. 77).
3. Some long syllables are shortened under the prose accent (Ahlberg, *op. cit.*).

If only the first two of these statements be admitted, the facts are very significant. If the third be also admitted, the conclusion to which the facts point is clear. Lindsay, quoting the second of these statements, suggests¹ that

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 38.

there is an adverse instance in Liv. And. *Trag.* 38. R, which he would scan

quem *egŏ* nēfrendem álui lácteam ímmulgéns opém.

But the line can be scanned

quem *egŏ* nēfrēndem álŭi lácteam, &c.,

the shortening in this part of the line of the accented syllable in *nefrendem* being justified, according to Ahlberg's rules (*op. cit.*), by the elision.

It is clear, therefore, that, unless we reject as corrupt a large number of passages in Plautus, the metrical ictus was, at any rate sometimes, a stress-accent which was at least as strong as a word-accent in prose, and that, at any rate sometimes, it overpowered the prose accent, and caused the shortening of an accented syllable. Can it be seriously contended that the metrical ictus was sometimes one thing, sometimes another? But we must of course ask why the ictus seems to have had this power only in the first foot of iambic and trochaic cola, and in anapæsts. It may be thought that this was a 'special licence,' used sparingly by Plautus because he felt it to be a straining of the language. Why, then, did he use it at all? Under metrical stress? Let us not think so lightly of the facile powers of that genial artist. Besides, it can be shown that no metrical stress existed. And why did he elect to use it in any foot of an anapæstic line, but in the first foot only of iambic and trochaic cola?

The anapæstic is the only metre in Plautus which has no 'irrational' feet. In anapæsts each foot contains rigidly four *moræ*, no more and no less, and the metrical ictus recurs punctually at intervals of four *moræ*. Thus an anap. octon. contains thirty-two *moræ*, and the ictus always falls on the 3rd, 7th, 11th, . . . and so on, *moræ*. This is not the case with any other metre used by Plautus

(the rare dactylic may be disregarded). In the trochaic septenarius, for example, the number of moræ ranged from twenty-three to twenty-nine, and the ictus might fall on syllables that did not show any regular numerical order. Consequently, in anapæsts quantity was a perfect clew to the metre—that is, to the placing of the ictus or metrical stress. The actor, as it were, cut up his line into perfectly equal lengths as he went along, and dropped his stresses at equal intervals, without paying the slightest regard to the accent of prose.¹ Hence lines like *Trin.* 239, which seem to excite the surprise of Professor Lindsay (*Capt.* Introd. p. 77):

blandíloquentúlus, harpágō, mendáx, &c.

We can now see a possible reason why in anapæsts Plautus allowed the ictus to shorten accented syllables under the law of *B. B.* in any part of the line. It was almost impossible in anapæsts for the reciter to go astray—to lose the verse-clew—in any part of the line. That this was the actual reason will appear, I hope, in the succeeding argument.

In iambic and trochaic verse Plautus allows this special shortening only in the first foot. Why? It could not have been because he felt it to be a straining of the language, or that words so ‘mispronounced’ became unintelligible or ridiculous. A mispronunciation is not more tolerable in the first foot than elsewhere in the line; nor is it more tolerable in anapæsts than in other metres. It is impos-

¹ This is perhaps too strong a statement. Plautus adopted for his anapæsts the dipody-law of the Greeks, which forbade a dactyl in the second place of the dipody unless it was preceded by a dactyl in the first place; but he adopted it with a slight modification. He allowed a dactyl in the second place

of the dipody even when other feet than the dactyl preceded in the first place, provided that the word-accent rested on the first short syllable of the dactyl in question, that is, on the first syllable of the resolved arsis. For instances see Klotz, *Allr. Metr.*, pp. 281 ff.

sible to separate this particular privilege of the first foot from others. It is well known that a number of Plautine metrical rules are relaxed for the first foot. It is significant, too, that they are relaxed also for anapæsts, wherever possible. The reason, therefore, why any particular licence is found in the first foot of iambic or trochaic verse (and in anapæsts) will probably explain why all the rest are found there. It has already been remarked that Plautine iambic and trochaic verse differs from anapæstic verse in admitting 'irrational' feet freely. The number of syllables found in such lines was not constant, and the ictus fell on syllables that did not show any regular numerical order. The consequence was that it was harder to recite such verses without hesitation—harder to steer the voice without stumbling to the end of the line. That this difficulty was felt by Plautus is proved by the existence of those metrical rules already referred to. Let me illustrate this statement. A dactyl might take the place of a trochee in any of the first six feet of a trochaic septenarius. When, therefore, a reciter met a dactylic sequence beginning a trochaic foot, it was possible for him to hesitate for a moment, uncertain whether he should give the whole sequence to that foot, or whether he should give to it only the first two syllables of the sequence (a trochee) and begin a new foot with the third. How is the difficulty met in Plautine versification? A number of rules have been disengaged from the text of Plautus. They are mostly prohibitions, and sometimes they overlap. Four or five bear on the particular case I am considering.

1. A dactylic word or word-ending may not occupy the place of a trochee except in the first foot: this forbids, *e.g.*, *péctora* | *múlcenť*.

2. A dactylic word or word-ending may not occupy the place of an iambus, except in the first foot: this forbids *pectóra* | *mulcént*.

3. The first two syllables of an anapæst may not be the ending of a polysyllable: it forbids *sed pec | tora mûl | cent*, or *séd pec | tóra mul | cént*. This rule does not apply to anapæsts.

4. A dactylic word may not receive the ictus on its middle syllable, except in the first foot of dialogue metres, and in anapæsts; it forbids *pectóra*.

Now if these four prohibitions be combined, they give a single positive rule, namely, that in dialogue metres a dactylic word or word-ending must be accented on its first and third syllables—*péctordá*. Obviously such a rule facilitates scansion. But when we combine with it the rule forbidding trochaic cæsure of a dactyl (*e.g.*, *confi | ge sagitt | tis*), it is practically impossible for a reciter to stumble by speaking a dactyl for a trochee. I regard these rules, therefore, as conventional—as serving a practical, not an æsthetic, purpose. Professor Lindsay¹ sees in the rule forbidding the accentuation of a dactylic word on its middle syllable “regard for the natural accentuation of words.” Why, then, had Plautus less regard for the natural accentual of words in anapæsts and in the first foot of dialogue metres? But if these rules served a practical purpose, we can see why they should have been relaxed for anapæsts and the first foot of iambic and trochaic cola. In anapæsts, as we have seen, it was impossible for a reciter to miss the verse-clew: it was equally impossible to go astray in the first foot of the dialogue metres. This explanation is supported by another detail of Plautine versification. The accentuation *pectóra* is allowed in the first foot, but an accentuation *genéra* is never allowed. Is it a mere coincidence that in this particular case an accentuation *genéra* would lead to uncertainty even in the first foot? If *pectora* begins an iambic line, the ictus must fall on the middle

¹ *Capt. App*, p. 360.

syllable; but if *genera* had been allowed to begin an iambic line, the ictus might have fallen either on the second or third syllable.¹ When, then, we find Plautus shortening an accented syllable by the law of *Breves Breviantes* only in anapæsts and in the first foot of the dialogue metres, we are justified in suspecting that his reason for doing so was identical with his reason for confining many other relaxions of his metrical rules to the same parts of his verse. Let us test this point. In *Am.* 761 he begins a trochaic line with *dédisse dóno*; and it is impossible to miss the clew. But suppose he had written *séd tibi dedisse dono* in the middle of a line: the reciter must have hesitated between *séd tibi dedisse* and *séd tibí dedisse*, unless he had known that the pronunciation *dédisse* was conventionally forbidden in that part of the verse. It appears, therefore, that Plautus only abstains from shortening long accented syllables by the power of the metrical ictus under the law of *Breves Breviantes* when he is forced to do so by the danger of confusing the metrical clew. In other parts of his verse he admits such shortening. But the existence of such shortening at all proves that metrical ictus was in Plautine verse a stress-accent at least as strong as the word-accent of prose, that it could fall on syllables unaccented in prose, and that it could temporarily prevail over and annul the prose accent.

Let us consider now a verse like the following:—

laudó, malúm quom amíci túom ducís malum.

Capt. 151.

If the preceding argument is sound, the actor must have stressed the second syllable of *laudo*, and have pronounced

¹ The accentuation *genéra* was forbidden also in anapæsts. There the prohibition was rendered necessary by the Plautine modification of the Greek dipody-law for anapæsts, already referred to in note ¹ on page 496.

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its first syllable without stress, and so on through the line. What clew had he to that 'unnatural' accentuation? Nothing but quantity. He stressed the second syllable of *laudo* because of the short syllable following it, just as in

μείζω κολαστήν τῶν πρὶν ἡμαρτημένων,
Soph., O. C. 439,

the actor's voice was guided to the stressing of the second syllable of μείζω by the short first syllable of κολαστήν. As there are thousands of such verses in Plautus, it follows that his verse was not accentual in the sense in which modern verse is accentual. That fact indeed is sufficiently indicated by the very existence of those technical metrical rules which have been already referred to. If they have been here rightly interpreted as serving a merely practical purpose, they clearly prove that the poet felt it to be a matter of the first importance to provide his actors with a sure conventional guide or clew to the verse in all those metres where there was any possibility of going astray. But he need have had no anxiety on this head if the 'natural accentuation of the words' had been a sufficient clew to the pronunciation. That the Plautine actor did not follow the 'natural accentuation' is further indicated by instances of different stressing, in different metres, of the same phrases; *e.g.*

quōi hōmini dī sunt prōpitiī.

Curc. 531.

quōi hominī di sūnt propītii.

Ib. 557.

But it is notorious that the metrical ictus coincides with the word-accent to a conspicuous degree in Plautus. It was observed by Bentley, and has been reaffirmed by Ritschl, Skutsch, Lindsay, and other scholars. The fact is indisputable. But in view of the evidence already considered,

it would be rash to conclude from it that Plautus felt that conflict of ictus and accent involved any straining of the language, or produced an unpleasing result. If he had felt that, he might have written more verses like

quia nūc remíssus ést edéndi exércitús.

Capt. 153.

We must consider first whether there was any other cause. A certain amount of correspondence between ictus and accent is accounted for, as we have seen, by certain technical rules, adopted or invented by Plautus for the guidance of his actors. But there is another cause. The Latin language is rich in words of the measure of *spectātōrēs*, *orātōrēs*, *effundēbant*, *conclāmābant*. Such words could find no place in iambic or trochaic verse strictly composed after the Greek model. It was necessary, therefore, for the Roman comic poets either to abstain altogether from the use of such words in dialogue metres, or to modify the Greek model. They chose the latter alternative. But they might have chosen the other. Iambic and trochaic verse can be written in Latin after the strictest Greek models. Catullus and Horace wrote poems in pure iambi, and the *Pervigilium Veneris* is written in trochaics which conform to the requirements of the Greek metre. But if Plautus had retained the Greek model, as we find it in the New Comedy, he would have been hampered, and his verse would have lost freedom and some of its comic force. Having modified the Greek model, therefore, by admitting a spondee into every foot but the last of iambic cola, and the seventh of trochaic sept., he produced verses like these:—

sed spectatores, vos nunc ne miremini.

Bacch. 1072.

stulte ecastor fecit: sed tu enumquam cum quiquam viro.

Cist. 86.

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It is obvious that here quantity does not give the clew to the placing of the metrical ictus. As, therefore, the admission to comic verse of words like *spectatores* involved the frequent failure of the quantitative verse-clew, it was necessary to find another clew; and the only other possible clew was word-accent. Now, in the Greek model, the reciter of iambics or trochaics looked for his verse-clew in the alternate feet, which might be called the guiding-feet. Plautus continues to give the clew in the same feet. Hence the Roman Dipody-law, which decrees that when the thesis in the even feet of iambics, or the odd feet of trochaics, consists of a long syllable, it must not bear the word-accent. The law is conveniently stated in a negative form; but its real force was positive. If the long thesis in the guiding-feet was not accented, a neighbouring arsis always was accented; and the plain meaning of the law is simply this: When the quantitative clew in the guiding-foot fails, there must be an accentual clew. The quantitative and accentual clews are used side by side; and the accentual clew is used from sheer necessity. It may be safely said that where the quantity gives a sufficient clew to the ictus, Plautus shows not the slightest objection to the conflict of ictus and word-accent.

Professor Lindsay, in the essay on *The Accentual Element in Early Latin Verse* already referred to, sees evidence that the Latin language was from its character suited to accentual rather than to quantitative verse in the modifications of Greek metres introduced by the Augustan poets. There cannot be any reasonable doubt that the changes made by Horace, Vergil, and Ovid in the Sapphic, Hexameter, and Pentameter, respectively, were due to a deliberate attempt to "reconcile the stress-accents of the words with the ictus or metrical beat of the line." But does that prove anything for the Latin of the Plautine

age? It is usually supposed that the earlier Roman imitations of Greek verse were the freer—that they approached more nearly to the national Italian type of verse, which is assumed to have been accentual. If that is so, why do we find republican writers of elegiacs like Catullus conforming more completely to the Greek model than Ovid? The Augustan poets were highly cultured: their instinct must have been to copy the Greeks as closely as possible. Yet they go out of their way, apparently, to do what earlier poets had not done—to make changes in the Greek models. They must, it would seem, have felt some pressure, and they must have felt it more strongly than the republican poets. It has already been suggested that the character of the Latin accent must have changed considerably between the Plautine and Augustan ages. By the third century p. Ch. n., as we see from the poems of Commodianus, quantity was practically destroyed in spoken Latin. That is to say, short quantity in accented, and long quantity in unaccented syllables, were no longer found in spoken Latin. That change implies a strictly concomitant change in the character of the Latin accent. It must have become more strongly expiratory. It is a physiological impossibility that the strongly expiratory accent which we must assume for the third century, could have coexisted with the long quantity still found unimpaired in final syllables in the time of Plautus. This change, like all changes in language, must have been silent and unperceived, but continuous; and, therefore, we seem to be justified in drawing the conclusion that the Latin accent in the Augustan age was more strongly expiratory than it had been in the early republican age, and to that fact were due the changes made in certain Greek metres by the Augustan poets. I do not here discuss the remains of Saturnian verse in their bearing on my subject. It seems

that in the present state of our knowledge no certain conclusions are to be obtained from them.

As regards the general question of the relations of ictus and accent in ancient verse, I have already hinted that, to an Englishman or a German, it almost necessarily seems an unnatural thing that words should have had in poetry an accentuation different from that of prose. But the language of prose and the language of poetry serve different purposes. The one speaks chiefly to the understanding : the other, to the soul. It is not unnatural, therefore, that the poet, when he takes the speech of the market-place and turns it to diviner uses, should seek in all ways to put off from it its meaner associations. Hence, undoubtedly, the use of what is called poetic diction. Hence, too, the poet discards as much as possible the petty emphasis of prose, and sings in solemn pulses, or the happy beat of joy. Perhaps, then, to an ancient poet it may have been a boon to be able to strip a word at once of its work-a-day air by chanting it to another and a stranger cadence.

CHARLES EXON.

REVIEWS.

Demetrius on Style. Edited after the Paris MS., with introduction, translation, facsimiles, &c., by W. RHYS ROBERTS, LITT.D. Cambridge University Press. 1902.

THIS edition, which is produced with the finish characteristic of the Cambridge Press, is of wide scope and excellent design. It includes an Essay on Greek Prose style, a full summary of the treatise itself, and a careful treatment of the difficult questions concerning its date and authorship. The Bibliography, too, is very complete; and facsimiles are given of pages of the Paris MS., which is wonderfully clear and legible, and which has been carefully collated throughout. The fact that this is the first English text and the first English translation of a very valuable and interesting work gives it an added importance, and opens up what will be a new field for many scholars.

The Greek will present considerable difficulties to those whose reading has been confined to the strictly classical writers. The translation, which is exceedingly vigorous, elegant, and ingenious, has one other signal merit: it never "hedges": the translator never hides a doubt about the meaning under ambiguous language; he leaves no uncertainty about the meaning which he attaches to the text; and in the few places where we may venture to take a different view, we feel that there is always something to be said for the version which we reject. The editor of Longinus on *The Sublime* and the three *Literary Letters* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus is much better versed in postclassical Greek than we can claim to be; and when we differ from his renderings, it is with diffidence and a feeling that we may very possibly be wrong.

We propose first to refer to certain places where it seems possible to take a slightly different view of the meaning, and then to point out some of the many merits of the work. In referring to

passages, we give the page and line, except in a few places where we refer to the paragraph.

Must διακρίνει (p. 66, l. 8) necessarily mean 'differentiate,' and not merely 'divide into parts'? It is hard to see from what the 'members' (κῶλα) differentiate Prose. Not, it would seem, from Poetry.

70. 18: τοῦ πρέποντος seems to mean 'picturesqueness' rather than 'propriety.' Cp. § 276, where the editor rightly renders πρεπόντως λέγειν 'to use picturesque words.'

74. 4: καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνων συνεμφαίνεται τῇ ἀρχῇ τοῦ δρόμου τὸ τέλος is translated 'for at the beginning of their race the end of the course is manifest.' The context would seem to demand 'in the case of runners the beginning and the end of the course find their expression in one word,' περίοδος, *a coming round to the starting-point*, in which sense περίοδος is used in Plut. Sol. 4.

The very parallel passage quoted from Longinus, in illustration of 76. 15, would seem to show that τὸ ἀπίθανον must mean 'its artificiality,' or 'inability to convince' (see § 221), or 'want of naturalness,' or, that it should be corrected to τὸ ἀπαθές, or τὴν ἀπάθειαν, both of which expressions occur in the treatise. It is hard to see how τὸ ἀπίθανον could mean 'the idle trick.' For the thought cp. § 28.

100. 22. Demetrius points out the effectiveness of the repetition of the name *Nireus* in B. 671-4. 'Repetition, recurrence,' is certainly the meaning of ἐπαναφορά, but διάλυσις is hardly 'disjunction.' It means the avoidance of conjunctions in 'Nireus brought three ships, Nireus the son of Aglæa, Nireus the goodliest man.' This appears from the next section, § 63, where he points out how 'the opposite figure is sometimes effective, and illustrates by 'the host consisted of both Greeks and Carians and Lycians and Pamphylians and Phrygians,' adding, 'the repeated use of the same conjunction gives the impression of a countless host.' As a modern example of the effectiveness of repeating a name, the editor aptly compares Tennyson's 'Elaine the fair, Elaine the lovable, Elaine the lily maid of Astolat.' Had Tennyson the Homeric passage in his mind? It is hardly likely that he had read Demetrius.

104. 1. It is difficult to render ἡχώδη in a way suitable to the context. Can it be 'resonant' or 'sonant,' referring as it does to a collision of the same vowels, as in λᾶαν ἄνω ὤθεσκε or ἀάατος? It is hardly 'noisy,' as the editor renders it, nor yet 'jarring.' Cp. 150. 27, where ἡχώδές τι means 'a sort of resonance' produced by double letters.

114. 29 foll. § 93—

ὄνομα δ' ἀντὶ λόγου τίθεται, οἷον ὡς ὁ Ξενοφῶν φησιν ὅτι οὐκ ἦν λαβεῖν ὄνον ἄγριον, εἰ μὴ οἱ ἵππεῖς διαστάντες θηρῶεν διαδεχόμενοι· ὀνόματι, οἷον ὅτι οἱ μὲν ὀπισθεν ἐδίωκον, οἱ δ' ἀπῆντων ὑπελαύνοντες πρόσω, ὥστε τὸν ὄνον ἐν μέσῳ ἀπολαμβάνεσθαι· φυλάττεσθαι μέντοι διπλᾷ τιθέναι τὰ διπλᾷ ὀνόματα· τοῦτο γὰρ ἔξεισι λόγου περὶ τὸ εἶδος.

An example of a word used instead of a phrase is Xenophon's sentence: 'it was not possible to capture a wild ass unless the horsemen posted themselves at intervals and gave chase in relays.' The single word (διαδεχόμενοι) is equivalent to saying that those in the rear were pursuing, while the others rode forward to meet them, so that the wild ass was intercepted. The compounding of words already compounded should, however, be avoided. Such double composition oversteps the limits of prose-writing.

Such is the Editor's translation of this paragraph. But it seems to us to lack all consecutiveness unless the passage from Xen. illustrates the use of a *doubly-compounded verb which conveys in itself a very pregnant meaning*. It seems to us that we must read here (and of course also in Xen. *Anab.* 1. 5. 2) διυποδεχόμενοι in the sense of 'hunting in concert,' an expression which Demetrius then goes on to explain. Further, for ὀνόματι, which Dr. Roberts in the notes shows to be without construction, we would restore ὄνομα δέ, and thus translate:—

"An example of a word used instead of a sentence is the passage in Xen., where he says, 'it was not possible to capture the wild ass unless the mounted hunters separated and hunted according to a concerted plan.' Now the word (διυποδεχόμενοι) conveys the meaning that one party hunted the animal, while the other came to meet them from an opposite direction, and thus intercepted the ass between them. *The compounding of words already compounded* should, however, be avoided. Such double-composition outstrips the limits of prose."

The conventional rendering of διαδεχόμενοι, 'in relays,' is unmeaning. The operation described is not a pursuing in relays, but a dividing of the hunters into two bodies acting in concert. The verb ὑποδέχεσθαι is a *vox propria* in Xen. for 'stalking,' 'heading off'; and the additional prep. διά conveys the division into two bodies. Demetrius himself affects doubly-compounded verbs, of which there are a good number in this treatise, e.g. ἀνθυπαλλάσσω, ἀποκαθίστημι, μετασυντίθημι, προσπεριορίζομαι, συνεξαίρω, ὑποκατασκευάζω. The use of infinitive for imperative in φυλάττεσθαι is a favourite idiom with Demetrius. It might, perhaps, be suggested that the reference is to διά, occurring both in διαστάντες and διαδεχόμενοι. But could any such meaning be expressed by the words διπλᾷ τιθέναι τὰ διπλᾷ ὀνόματα?

116. 16: ὡς μὴ φρυνγίζειν ἢ σκυθίζειν τις δόξει μεταξύ Ἑλληνικοῖς ὀνόμασι. There is no reason to change the datives to genitives, as the editor does in the passage here quoted. But μεταξύ is not a

prep., it is an adverb. The point on which the writer is dwelling is that, in forming new words, a writer should observe the analogy of existing words, and should not bring foreign inflexions into his coined words, 'talk Phrygian or Scythian in Greek.' He would have preferred *appendixes, crises, terminuses* to *appendices, crises, termini*. In Philemon Holland's translation of Plutarch's *Moralia*, we meet *musæa* for *musæums*, *sphinges* for *sphinxes*, *chori* for *choruses*, and even *ideæ* for *ideas*. Such forms Demetrius appears to condemn in this passage. He would certainly have condemned *rhinoceri* (*Sin of Hagar* by Helen Mathers). Or perhaps Demetrius is referring to ill-coined words like *gaselier*, or like *starvation, racial, speechify* (English with Latin termination), or hybrid like *saciology*. The adverb *μεταξύ* is pleonastic. It is better so to regard it than to change *Ἑλληνικοῖς ὀνόμασι* to *Ἑλληνικῶν ὀνομάτων*, or to acquiesce in *μεταξύ* governing a dative. The word is usually an adverb, as it is in that lovely line-and-a-half, which by some subtle charm lives in the memory of every reader of the first book of the *Iliad*—

ἐπειὴ μάλα πολλὰ μεταξύ
οὔρεα τε σκιόεντα θάλασσά τε ἤχῃεσσα.

Perhaps *ξὺν* should be read; possibly the corruption arose from *μετὰ*, superscribed by a copyist who thought that preposition better Attic.

There can hardly be any doubt that the editor is mistaken in separating *φύσει* from *κινδυνώδει* (130. 8), and translating it 'sheer genius.' The meaning clearly is, that the writer praises Sappho for her power of handling with grace 'matter by its very nature so *risqué* and intractable.'

158. 14: 'The avoidance of *asyndeton*' would have been clearer than 'the employment of words bound together.'

'In the *course* of a long-sustained outburst' (160. 17) should rather be 'in the *case* of a long drawn-out passage of any kind,' if *ἐπιφέρεισθαι* can bear that meaning in late Greek; *τὰ ἐπιφερόμενα* means 'the foll.' in Polybius.

We cannot help thinking that *παρὰ τῷ Εὐριπίδει* is an oversight in 160. 7. *Εὐριπίδους* was printed in the *editio princeps* of the *Ἀθηναίων Πολίτεια*; but it was found subsequently that the *parvulus* rightly gave *Εὐριπίδου*. Even if the Paris MS. gives the monstrous form here, we should not hesitate to correct it to *Εὐριπίδῃ*. No critical note on the passage is given.

162. 1 and 4: *πλαγίας λέξεως* and *ἐξ εὐθείας* would seem to be *oratio obliqua* and *oratio recta* rather than 'dependent constructions' and 'a straightforward construction.'

'His narrative of the death of Cyrus,' *τῇ ἀγγελίᾳ τῇ περὶ Κύρου τεθνεώτος* (168. 21), is not absolutely accurate, unless *ἀγγελία* can be shown to mean 'narrative' in late Greek. Why should not the

words mean 'in the announcement of the death of Cyrus,' in the scene where the messenger mentioned in the next line brings the intelligence?

In 172. 2 *βεβαιούσαν* must be wrong. It could not mean 'steady-going,' but that is certainly the sense required. Could it be *βαδίζουσιν* or *βεβαίως ἰούσαν*?

178. 5. For *ἐπὶ τῆς ἐν Σαλαμῖνι ναυμαχίας* we would suggest *ἐπὶ τοῦ*. The point is that a writer of Gadara (or Gades) had spoken slightly of Salamis in describing it as *an* engagement, just as another person quoted here understated the case when he spoke of Phalaris as having inflicted *some* (ἄττα) annoyance on his subjects. The nature of the slight is expressed in the second case, and ought therefore to be expressed in the first. The *τοῦ* being mistaken for the article would be at once changed to *τῆς*. It might seem that *τοῦ* would thus stand in a somewhat unnatural position; but Demetrius puts *τοῦ* where *τῆς* should have been, to show that the slight lay in the use of *τοῦ* instead of *τῆς*. Besides, Demetrius is very prone to transgress the natural order of words. Cp. *αὐτὸς τῆς γραφῆς ὁ ὄγκος* 126. 19, and Professor Roberts' note on 128. 29, where many such hyperbata are enumerated. Cp. especially 164. 18, *ἐχέτω δὲ καὶ ἔδραν ἀσφαλῆ τῶν κώλων τὰ τέλη καὶ βάσιν*.

179. 16. Demetrius adduces the well-known verse Ψ 116, *πολλὰ δ' ἄναντα κάταντα πάραντά τε δόχμιά τ' ἦλθον*, as an example of cacophony intended by Homer to suggest 'broken ground,' *τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν*. We do not accept this view, so characteristic of Demetrius and his age, that the primitive bard used any such self-conscious literary trick. But we refer here to this passage because we think it explains a subsequent comment in which the Editor's rendering does not seem quite satisfactory. In 182. 9 *δεινὸν γὰρ πολλαχοῦ καὶ τὸ δύσφθογον ὥσπερ αἱ ἀνώμαλοι ὁδοί* is translated, 'yes, in many places harshness gives all the effect of vehemence, as though we were jolted on rough roads.' Might we render 'harshness often is striking like wild, broken scenery'?

180. 8. Surely *ὀνόματα* ought to be bracketed as a corruption of *ὄντα*, which is superscribed in P., not as an addition, but as a correction. If the *language* of Theopompus is forcible, the writer may fairly be described as forcible; but the point of the passage is that, though the *situation* described is forcible (*πράγματα ἐξ ἑαυτῶν ἐστι δεινά*), the style of Theopompus is weak.

184. 8: 'excessive antithesis, already condemned in the case of Theopompus, is out of place even in Demosthenes, as in the following passage, *ἐτέλεις, ἐγὼ δὲ ἐτελούμην*.' But the expression *οὐδὲ ἐν τοῖς Δημοσθενικοῖς ἤμοσεν* demands the translation 'is out of place in the Demosthenic passage too,' as is proved by the addition of *ἐνθα*, whereas the editor's version would imply that in some cases Demosthenes might claim indulgence for a fault unpardonable in Theopompus.

192. 18. The translation throughout is marked by so much vigour and dash that we hesitate to point to a lack of those qualities in 'the forcible style demands a certain vehemence and terseness, and resembles combatants dealing blows at close quarters.' We should prefer 'the aim of the forcible style is to be sharp and short like sword-play.' But we could fill pages with examples of ingenuity and of happy turns in the translation.

192. 29. It is hard to see how τὸ ἐξαίρεσθαί πως λαμβανόμενον could mean 'a discreet use of elaborate language.' If thus accented, we would render 'a certain exaggeration of language *in attack*' (λαμβάνόμενον). Qu. λαμβανόμενόν του? But if it can be shown that in the Greek of the Demetrian age λαμβάνεσθαι means 'to pick and choose,' we are prepared to withdraw our rendering, though the verb does bear the meaning suggested by us in ταχὺ γὰρ σοῦ λάβοιτ' ἂν τις, Plat. *Legg.* 637 b, and it suits the galling invective quoted from Dem. *Fals. Leg.* 421, 'you may hold out your hand as a speaker, but as an ambassador you should keep it under your cloak.' But accenting πῶς, and taking it with λαμβανόμενον regarded as a passive, Mr. Roberts' rendering will stand.

When in 194. 3-7 Demetrius cites the fine passage Dem. *De Cor.* 71, by ἐπανάστασις we should be disposed to understand the *crescendo* of the passage to be indicated, and we should certainly render the concluding words, 'it is apparently a denunciation of Aeschines, while it really has for its object Philip. 'So here Aeschines and Philip are respectively denounced' is Professor Roberts' translation; but compare a very similar passage, 142. 7, 'at all events Zeus is no longer burlesqued, but (the ridicule is transferred to) Homer and the Homeric line.'

196. 7: ὧζεν γὰρ ἂν ἡ οἰκουμένη τοῦ νεκροῦ does not mean 'the world would have scented the corse,' but 'the world would have reeked of (stunk with) the corse.' But Professor Roberts is quite right in translating as he does, because Demetrius, in adding ὧζεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἡσθάνετο, shows that he misunderstood the meaning of the verb.

In 196. 20 Demetrius seems to have misapprehended Demades' fine description of Athens as 'the state that once ruled the waves, but is now a lean and slippered beldame sipping her gruel.' Demetrius says that the last words, πτισάνην ῥοφῶσαν? (ῥοφοῦσαν?), 'imply that the city was occupied with feasts and banquets, and was squandering the war-funds.' But πτισάνη is always part of an invalid's regimen, and is added only to heighten the picture of helpless anility.

It is hard to devise an exact rendering for τὸ καλούμενον ἐσχηματισμένον ἐν λόγῳ (196. 28); but it can scarcely be Greek for 'covert allusion.' If we may infer its meaning from the illustrations given of its employment, it might be translated, 'the adroit use of a single word' (qu. ἐνὶ λόγῳ?) in a sentence to convey something different

from, and more than, what the whole sentence expresses. Thus, to take one of the examples given, Demetrius of Phalerum rebuked the pride of Craterus, who was receiving the Greek embassies with arrogance, by one word τοῦτον, 'we once received these men as ambassadors together with *that* Craterus.' Of course this comes very near 'covert allusion,' but is 'covert allusion' to be found in the Greek? In 144. 12 we have in κατηγορίαὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένοι an expression which would have fairly conveyed this meaning.

We have dwelt so long on the fascinating theme of the exact reproduction of the thoughts of this very interesting and suggestive writer, that we have little space to detail other special excellences of this edition. This, however, we regret the less, because the notes so teem with happy references and illustrations from modern literature—from Shakspeare and Milton to Stevenson and Phillips—that we are embarrassed by the amplitude of our material; and even if we had far more room, we should have far too much to fill it. Dr. Roberts has a very keen eye and ear for literary beauty; and the treatise affords ample scope for the employment of his wide and various knowledge of modern literature. We are surprised to find that Demetrius, writing not later than the first century of our era, should have anticipated (150. 8) the remark of Goethe, that 'nothing is more significant of men's character than what they find laughable.' George Eliot, perhaps more justly, made this the test of culture rather than of character. Demetrius makes it an indication of character, τοῦ ἥθους τις ἔμφασις. Yet the context shows that he meant rather culture. Did Goethe borrow the thought from Demetrius? We have often to ask ourselves a similar question about Milton and others. On this subject Demetrius further makes the acute observation, that humour and wit are spoiled by over-elaboration. His example of impressionism drawn from the countryman, 'the noise of whose tramp was heard from afar as he approached,' is excellently paralleled by the spearmen of the huge Earl Doorm,

'Feeding like horses when you hear them feed.'

Admirable, too, are the editor's modern examples of personification of inanimate things on §§ 80–83.

It is curious that Demetrius condemns ἀμφὶ δ' ἐσάλπιγξεν μέγας οὐρανός, on the ground that a great thing, the firmament, is compared to a small thing, a trumpet. Probably for the same reason he would have found 'triviality,' μικροπρέπειαν, in Wordsworth's

'The cataracts blow their trumpets from the steep,'

and Swinburne's

'And heaven rang round her as she came
Like smitten cymbals.'

He praises Plato when (*Protag.* 312 a), referring to Hippocrates, he says, 'He was blushing: for the first glimmer of dawn now came to betray him.' Thus the description is made very vivid (*ἐναργέστατον*), and we are reminded that it was night when Hippocrates visited Socrates. Dr. Roberts adduces a beautiful modern parallel from Tennyson's *Grandmother*:

'And he turn'd, and I saw his eyes all wet in the sweet moonshine.'

The Notes teem with happy illustrations like this.

The *De Elocutione* is a treatise full of interesting and suggestive comment; and all lovers of literature owe their best thanks to Professor Roberts for the edition of it which he has put in their hands.

ROBERT YELVERTON TYRRELL.

Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines.
By H. J. ROBY. 2 vols. Cambridge University Press. 1902.

THIS important work is an indication of the progress made in England during recent years in the study of Roman Law. After a period of entire neglect, the first sign of revived interest was shown by borrowing from French and later on from German commentators on the Civil Law. Then came independent expositions of its general principles and scholarly editions of the institutional writers. But now, for the first time, we have an elaborate English treatise, dealing with one particular period as a distinct whole, and bringing the most modern methods of research to establish and elucidate its characteristic features. In one sense, no doubt, the problem is an old one, for a great mass of literature has since Niebuhr's discovery gathered round the *Institutes* of Gaius, as revealing the law of the Antonine period. But Mr. Roby goes into fuller detail; and, in harmony with the historical spirit, seeks to work back from the later, well-authenticated law to the less-known classical system. His difficulties are indeed somewhat increased by the extension that he has given to his period. Unlike Cuq, with whose second volume¹ his work may naturally be compared, he does not limit himself to the reign of Hadrian as a starting-point. His view goes back to, and includes, the age of Cicero. Some of the most interesting discussions are devoted to points occurring in that writer's works. This kind of

¹ *Les Institutions Juridiques des Romains*, tome second, "Le Droit Classique." Paris. 1902.

treatment seems to involve the assumption that the law of Cicero's day was substantially the same as that known to Gaius. Now this is a rather questionable position. To take a parallel: could we say that Blackstone's treatise, in its original form, adequately represents modern English law? And yet it is but 150 years since the inception of Blackstone's work; while from Cicero's death to the probable date of Gaius (162 A.D.) is over 200 years, and in that time not only had the political constitution been completely changed, but the legal institutions had been seriously affected. Mr. Roby would of course maintain (he has done so already) that "the change in the law between this time [the time of Cicero and Augustus] and that of the Antonines was slow and gradual, bearing on isolated points, not a sudden and sweeping reform";¹ but this is equally true of English Law from Blackstone's time to the present day. A number of small changes may revolutionize a legal system even more thoroughly than a single comprehensive measure; and the legal reforms in the first 150 years of the Christian era were neither few nor slight. The private law of Rome in the days of Cicero was not, and could not be, the same as that of the Antonine period. A deft employment of the historical method might exhibit the system as one in course of growth, approaching its full expansion in the exposition of the classical Jurists; and to some extent this is Mr. Roby's line of treatment. In the main, however, he limits himself to a statement of the system presented by Gaius, the many *lacunæ* being filled up from the abundant material of the *Digest*, with, of course, due caution in respect to the probable interpolations and omissions of Justinian's Commissioners.

In this most careful setting forth of the rules obtaining in private law, there is, it appears, a decided intention to avoid historical interpretation or conjectural explanation. It is the law as it stood that is the subject-matter; and from this standpoint, Mr. Roby is not readily led to depart. The chief deviations occur in the treatment of questions raised by certain passages of Cicero's letters, and by some of his speeches. In such cases the claims of the scholar are placed beside or above those of the student of law—a course which is perhaps permissible in a book that will be consulted as much by the former as by the latter class. It, however, adds much to the difficulties of the reviewer, not unnaturally impressed by the weight of the author's authority in these different branches of work.

Another criticism may be made in respect to the absence of any discussion of the social and economic conditions underlying the legal rules so fully described. The doctrines of the classical jurists were the result of the development that established the Roman

¹ *Academy*, March 5th, 1887, vol. xxxi., page 157.

Empire of the second century, and they supply innumerable indications of the social necessities that they were devised to meet. Some notice, however brief, of these determining conditions would have been welcome, and would, we believe, have added to the interest of the work. But, after all, an author so eminent as Mr. Roby is entitled to assign the limits of his task, and to hold that the accurate statement of a great body of legal rules forms a true unity, which would be impaired by the intrusion of what he may regard as extraneous matter.

The general arrangement of the work is somewhat peculiar. Apart from a short "Introduction," in which the sources of Roman Law are concisely described, there are six books, dealing respectively with (1) Citizenship and Status; (2) Family; (3) Inheritance; (4) Property; (5) Obligations; (6) Procedure. In this order the opening and closing sections are placed in their natural position. Citizenship is so fundamental in Roman Law that it may claim the first place; but the law of Status is very closely connected with the special law of the Family—such at least was the Roman view. It is not easy to conceive of Gaius breaking up his first Book into two divisions.¹ The family law is included in the law of persons. No doubt it is possible to take the special rights and duties of the members of the family as a separate section, which, however, must be involved with the laws of property, and, therefore, best placed after the examination of proprietary rights. Inheritance, the subject of the third book, is closely connected with the family, but is also hardly intelligible without previous acquaintance with the law of property. Gaius was fully sensible of this natural sequence. Hence it would seem that the Fourth Book, dealing with Property, has a claim to precede the law of Inheritance, and possibly the special part of family law. Even Obligations, the treatment of which fills the Fifth Book, might be taken before Inheritance, which includes the difficult rules respecting legacies, in one aspect a kind of obligation.

Classification is, unfortunately, the most difficult matter if inconsistencies are to be avoided and perfect symmetry secured. No grouping will prove altogether satisfactory, and almost any arrangement will have some advantages not possessed by its competitors. Still Mr. Roby's plan requires more justification than he has supplied for it.²

Anything like an examination of the mass of material contained

¹ One curious result of this division is that *capitis deminutio media* and *maxima* are treated in Book I., ch. iv., while *c. d. minima* is placed in Book II., ch. 7.

² "The order of importance in an old Roman's eyes is not, perhaps, that most suitable for a student. With the person

of a Roman citizen were intimately connected Family and Inheritance. . . . These three sections (Books i., ii., iii.) deal primarily with the Roman citizen in his family; the other three (Books iv., v., vi.) principally with his business relations to the world." (Roby, vol. i., page 3.)

in these two volumes is obviously quite impossible here. We can only express hearty thanks to a writer who has undertaken so great a labour, even though it be a labour of love. Constant use will be necessary to test the innumerable references and statements of doctrine. The author invites criticism, which can only bring out the solid merits of his work.

Amongst points which occur to the reader, the first is one respecting the division of freedmen into Roman citizens, Latins, foreigners, or "*dediticii*" (vol. i., p. 18). On the next page we read that the "*dediticii* are foreigners, who," &c. The truth is that in Gaius' time the *dediticii* had vanished, and were replaced by "freedmen in *numero dediticiorum*," a class created by the *Lex Aelia Sentia*. Next the translation of "*domicilium*," by what is now the technical English term "domicile," appears likely to mislead; "residence" would be better, and more in accordance with Mr. Roby's own principles of translation (Preface, p. xiii.). On page 49 "Gaius i. 14" should be "iv. 14."

In dealing with the forms of marriage, Mr. Roby rightly leans against the idea that in "*coemptio*" the husband and wife purchase one another, but appears to countenance it by his translation of the term as "co-purchase."¹

The interposition of a number of chapters (5-11) between the discussion of the old marriage—"Wives in hand," is our author's title—and the general rules regulating the relations of husband and wife, appears inconvenient. The patron's rights might have been assigned a later place, as also the discussion of guardianship. But the account of marriage and dowry is so detailed and valuable that complaint is hardly admissible. The uncertainty of the Roman view as to the true nature of the "*dos*" is well brought out (p. 138), and the complicated rules are stated with admirable brevity.

The law of inheritance has received more attention, and has also given rise to more speculative theories, than the other branches of Roman Law. Mr. Roby's treatment is eminently sane and accurate. He shows the origin of the will "*per aes et libram*," as "due to the emergency of illness, which admitted of no delay" (p. 177). He devotes a separate chapter to the problem of the connexion of the "*sacra*" with the succession to a deceased's property (pp. 387-90). The different theories as to the origin of *bonorum possessio* are stated (p. 237, n.), the author himself favouring the view adopted by Dernburg, Vangerow, and Girard,² which regards it as due to the need of arrangement for the due conduct of a suit for an inheritance among the several claimants. In an important

¹ May not the mutual interrogations spoken of by Ulpian (Boethius, *Topica* 3, 4) have been somewhat like the "*leges mancipii*" adjoined to the

principal transaction?

² The reference to the last-named writer's *Manuel* should be "p. 775," not "p. 357."

appendix dealing with the question of "*cretio*" in Cicero's letters, Mr. Roby appears as the classical scholar, and enters into discussions of the text and interpretation, to an extent hardly required in a legal treatise. The most interesting points from the juristic aspect arise from the following passage:—"Ex Balbo cognovi Cluvii—o Vestorium negligentem—liberam cretionem, testibus praesentibus, sexaginta diebus. Metuebam ne ille arcessendus esset: nunc mittendum est ut meo iussu cernat: idem igitur Pollex" (Cic. ad Att. xiii., 46, 3). Here it seems plain, as Mr. Roby insists, that "*cretio testibus praesentibus*" cannot mean "acceptance through an agent"; and, secondly, the probabilities are in favour of the view that "*Pollex*" is the nominative to "*cernat*." Mr. Roby takes the opposite view on grammatical grounds, but he underestimates the difficulty of holding that one freeman (*extranea persona*) could act for another in such a transaction as taking up an inheritance. The Roman law of Agency was probably the least developed branch of law. Even in Gaius' time the acquisition of possession was the only exception (if it really was one) to the broad rule precluding acquisition through another (Gaius, ii. 95), and there is every reason to believe that the law had developed since the time of Cicero. Nothing short of a perfectly clear statement by Cicero could overcome this presumption.

An exposition of the law of Property as it stood in the Antonine period is a specially difficult task. For Gaius, in his *Institutes*, gives but a small space to this topic, and the *Digest* is less trustworthy, as this is a branch of law which undergoes many changes in a civilized society. The theory of possession is a good illustration. The chapter in which Mr. Roby handles this matter is practically a *résumé* of the doctrine of the *Digest*. Some discussion of the growth of the conception of possession would have been specially welcome, as containing the sober judgment of a master of the legal literature on a topic which has been the playground of metaphysical speculation; but this is denied to us. In compensation we get such instructive notes as those on "*antestatus*" (vol. i., pp. 423-4), and on "the legal qualities of Italian land" (*ib.*).

More than half of the second volume is occupied by the account of "Obligations." The familiar classification of the Institutional writers is rejected as artificially symmetrical,¹ and in its place the division according to the character of the action for enforcement is adopted. But this can hardly be regarded as truly scientific. There are strong grounds for segregating all the formal contracts,

¹ "It is noticeable that Gaius in his *Institutes* gives '*mutuum*' alone as an instance of real contract, and omits altogether the other three which are classed with it in the *Aurea*" (Roby, vol. ii., page 3). The word "*veluti*," however,

shows that Gaius is taking "*mutuum*" as a specimen. Cf. the account of verbal and consensual contracts (Gaius, iii. 92-135). But cf. Mr. Roby's account, vol. ii., p. 285.

and placing them in a distinct group. It is somewhat inelegant to place "*fiducia*" immediately after "*depositum*." On the much-debated question of the nature of the "literal" contract, Mr. Roby's conclusion is that it arose through usage. "The custom of business men procured it legal validity" (page 284). He accepts Gaius' view that it was confined to cases of transfer; but adds that the original transaction may not have existed, but been "presumed" (pp. 285-6), and supplies the modern analogy of "accommodation bills." The examination of the varied applications of the term *nexum* ought to dispose for ever of the conjectural accounts given by Ortolan and Maine.

The final book on "Procedure" is equally thorough. The suggestion that "Gaius, iv., 170," should be altered by the omission of *non*, so as to give the opposite sense, will hardly gain approval. The cases where *non* is inserted are not parallel, as omission is a common fault of a copyist (in the reference to the Vatican Fragments, "154," is a misprint for "151"), and the word is well established in the MS. There seems to be little difficulty in taking the "*vis*" referred to as that necessary for the fiction on which the proceeding is based.

The wealth of material, the suggestive way in which it is grouped, and the sober method of treatment, make this work indispensable for every scientific student of Roman Law.

C. F. BASTABLE.

The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time. By A. H. J. GREENIDGE, M.A.
Oxford. Clarendon Press. 1901.

THE leading design of this book, as Mr. Greenidge tells us, is to furnish students of Cicero's writings with a clue to the chief difficulties they will meet with in the course of their reading. The work admirably fulfils the immediate purpose which the author had in view, and at the same time constitutes a most valuable contribution to the study of Roman Law.

In Book I. Mr. Greenidge deals with Civil Procedure. The subject naturally falls under two heads: (1) the Period of the *Legis Actio*; (2) the Period of the Formulary System. In connection with each period Mr. Greenidge gives a very clear account of the various courts and jurisdictions.

In the section devoted to the *legis actiones*, pp. 49-75, Mr. Greenidge, by a comparison of Gaius, and the references in Cicero, produces an excellent reconstruction of the *Actio Sacramenti*. In treating of the *legis actio per conditionem*, however, the explanation given by Muirhead ought to have been referred to, as it is probably the best that has been offered of a matter that puzzled Gaius,

viz., why this *actio* was needed. Muirhead's theory is that inasmuch as the Poetilian Law had been passed in relief of debtors, it was necessary to extend the remedies of the creditor in another direction. The result was the *Lex Silia* and the *legis actio per condictionem* with a simplified procedure, and the risk of costs to an unsuccessful defendant—the *sponsio et restipulatio tertiæ partis*.

A writer on Roman Procedure in Cicero's time has necessarily to deal with many questions that rest largely on conjecture. Mr. Greenidge will, as a rule, be found a very safe guide, but one or two of his conclusions will probably call for re-statement or correction in future editions. Mr. Greenidge holds that "the contract of *nexum* is quite independent of the *legis actio per manus injectionem*," p. 527. No doubt, it was a common form of contract in early times for a man who had lost everything to impledge himself last of all with a condition that in the event of non-payment the creditor might reduce him to a condition of slavery or semi-slavery without any process of law whatsoever. But such a contract belongs to a period of civilization much less advanced than that which is reflected in the XII Tables. To hold that the creditor could reduce the nexal debtor to a state of quasi-slavery by his own private act, and without the judgment of a court, is to make the Roman contract of *nexum* harsher even than it was, and to render the words of the XII Tables more difficult of explanation. The *judicatus* and the *confessus* are clearly distinguished in the XII Tables, as given by Gellius ("aeris confessi rebusque judicatis triginta dies justi sunt"). Mr. Greenidge adopts the view that the *judicatus* is the defendant whose defence has failed and the *confessus* a defendant who admitted liability in open court. No doubt, in the *legis actio* a distinction was drawn in real actions between the defendant who confessed in court, and one who made default; and in later times, in personal actions, a defendant who confessed liability in open court might save himself the penalty of double damages. If the confession in open court in a personal action had no important consequences at the time of the XII Tables, the *confessus* would be also *judicatus*, and then *aes confessum* must refer to the debt of the nexal debtor. If a distinction was made at that time between a debtor who confessed and one who had been condemned before a *judex*, still the nexal debt would be *aes confessum*. In every system of law fictitious judgments play an important part. It is only necessary to mention Fines and Recoveries, warrants of attorney and *cognovit* in English law, and in Roman law the *cessio in jure*. The contract of *nexum* is analogous to the warrant of attorney, whereby the borrower authorized the creditor to enter judgment without further proceeding in case of default of payment on the pre-appointed day. The *aes confessum* of the XII Tables would thus clearly include a nexal debt. The procedure by *manus injectio* would apply up to the entry of judgment, but the

subsequent delays did not apply to the nexal debtor. Mr. Greenidge in another place (p. 75) appears to admit this view. When speaking of the *confessio in jure*—the undefended *vindicatio in rem*—he suggests that there may also have been fictitious judgments *in personam*. The judgment on a nexal debt furnishes an apt illustration. (See also p. 252.)

Mr. Greenidge is of opinion that *pignoris capio* was originally a part of administrative law, and was a kind of 'execution' given by the State in certain cases (pp. 67, 68). But *pignoris capio* appears originally to have been distress pure and simple; self-help in its most primitive form. The right to distrain must, earlier or later, in every state require regulation and control, and when Gaius wrote, *pignoris capio* had received considerable modifications. Of the examples mentioned, one—the right of the *publicani* to distrain—was founded on some forgotten censorial law. (Mr. Greenidge makes a similar suggestion at a subsequent part of the book, p. 337.) It would be easy to instance similar statutory rights of distress in English law. The other examples of *pignoris capio* were probably founded on early custom, regulated to some extent by the XII Tables, and in the account given by Gaius we see traces of the early character of the remedy. The goods can be seized in the absence of the owner, and the distress may be made on any day—*fastus* or *nefastus*. Mr. Greenidge is doubtless right in thinking that the next step was an action by the owner of the goods against the distrainer for wrongful or excessive distress. The contrary view—that the distrainer had in all cases, after seizure, to bring an *actio* to establish his claim—altogether loses sight of the extra-judicial character of the remedy.

Passing to the Formulary System, there is little to be said in the way of criticism, or even of suggestion. A complete account is given of an *actio* from the commencement to the appeal. The different kinds of action, the legal effects of the different steps in the action, the relation of the parts of the *formula*, and the modes of trial are set forth with ample learning. The student will acquire a knowledge of the Roman system of Pleading in the best way, viz., by a study of carefully-constructed examples. The *praescriptiones* and the *actio praescriptis verbis* require, perhaps, fuller notice.

The second book deals with Criminal Procedure. The various courts and jurisdictions are fully explained, and an interesting account is given of the development of Criminal Law. Where everything is so well done it may seem invidious to select parts for special mention; but particular attention may be directed to the summary of the rules of Criminal Evidence, and the accounts given of the *provocatio* and the domestic jurisdiction. Under this last head Mr. Greenidge collects a great deal of information not readily accessible, and it is certainly remarkable to find the survival of the domestic forum in criminal matters to so great an extent at

so late a period in the history of Roman Law. One may doubt, however, with Mr. Greenidge, whether the 'freedman,' whom Caesar is said to have put to death, was a freedman in the full sense, *i.e.*, manumitted by one of the modes of *manumissio legitima* (p. 372). Another example which Mr. Greenidge mentions (p. 370) may be regarded as the excuse extended to the outraged feelings of a husband in circumstances of exceptional provocation and entirely unconnected with *manus* or any legal theory of the nature of the marriage tie.

Mr. Greenidge confines himself rigidly to the Law of Procedure: he seldom touches upon questions of Substantive Law. At times, however, he permits himself a little expansiveness—an occasional visit to the "law's lumber-room." It is interesting to know that there was in Rome a class of inferior barristers practising in the police courts—"Old Bailey men"—on whom Cicero professed to look down with contempt. The 'mild treason' of Claudia, who, when jostled in the streets, uttered a wish that her brother Pulcher were still alive to lose another naval battle, and thin the ranks of the Roman rabble, carries the mind back to the 'constructive treasons' of our own law. One thinks of the unfortunate citizen of London who said he would make his son 'heir of the Crown' (being the sign of the house in which he lived), and was promptly hanged. It is also consoling to know that the Roman courts were, like our own, at times pestered with lady litigants, and that the ceaseless activity of one Gaia Afrania, a senator's wife, called forth a special rule of procedure—that women should not appear for others. This fact will interest lady aspirants to the legal profession.

Occasionally Mr. Greenidge's terminology sounds somewhat unfamiliar. Nothing is gained by the use of 'actioned' or 'to action,' or by employing 'sentence' for decree or judgment.

Mr. Greenidge selects four of Cicero's speeches for special commentary. A study of the careful analysis given of each of these speeches will prove instructive. No better plan could be adopted to show the working of the Roman procedure as a living system.

There is an index to the passages of Cicero illustrated by the text, and these passages are cited in the foot-notes. The general index—not the least important part of a work of this kind—is very good.

C. MATURIN.

De Sermone Amatorio apud Latinos Elegiarum Scriptores thesim proponebat Facultati litterarum in Universitate Parisiensi RENÉ PICHON scholae normalis olim alumnus. Paris. Hachette & Co. 1902.

M. PICHON'S exhaustive investigation of the amatory vocabulary of Catullus, Tibullus, Propertius, and Ovid falls into two divisions. In the first he deals with the general questions pertaining to his subject—such questions as arise in considering the style of the Roman love-poets, their debt to previous Greek and Latin writers, and their individual peculiarities; while another section estimates the value of such researches for critical and orthographical purposes. The second division of the work consists of an index of words, arranged in alphabetical order, and containing all the words used by the four poets in what can be called an amatory meaning. The two parts occupy 73 and 230 pages respectively, and of these the second is the one which renders the book a valuable addition to the classical student's library. There was little room for novelty in constructing the first part, as will be seen from a brief summary of M. Pichon's more salient conclusions. He finds that there were two amatory styles—one bluntly obscene, employed by Martial, Petronius, and Apuleius, and by the ordinary Roman; while the other, he says, was *re quidem non multo castior, specie tamen decentior*, and was used in elegiac poetry. He then proceeds to draw up a list of the principal similitudes employed by the elegists in describing the passion of love—how, for example, it is a flame and a fire by which men are heated and burned and devoured and wasted and parched and sweated; or a disease, bringing death and destruction, causing men to render up the breath of life, and die and perish and pour forth their blood and come to the funeral pyre; or a warfare, in which are battles, fights, quarrels, struggles, wrestlings, contests, ambuscades, stratagems, veterans, raw recruits, victory, defeat, and slavery. In the second chapter M. Pichon points out some interesting differences between the poets in their uses of words. Thus, Catullus employs *laetari*, *laetitia* of any joy whatever; Propertius confines *laetitia* to the joy which a lover feels when he knows his love returned; while Ovid uses *laetari* simply as a synonym for *ludere*, *iocari*, *ridere*. The language of Catullus is described as being, on the whole, strong—"suos affectus efferre conatur tam vivide quam valide in sese sentit." And so his vocabulary smacks more of the common talk: he uses *savia*, which occurs but once in Propertius, and never in Tibullus or Ovid; nor does he stop before *prurire* or *scortum* or *moechus*; while on the other side he loves diminutives, "quibus inest nescio quid delicati," such as *femella*, *labella*, *languidulus*, *saviolum*, *zonula*, etc. Tibullus was a poet of less burning passion: even *flamma* and *flagrare* are

outside his vocabulary, to say nothing of *furor*, *libido*, *amens*, or *vesanus*. Propertius has many verbal peculiarities. He alone describes a woman's hair as *fulva*, or calls her breasts *mammæ*; he alone uses *ulna* for arm, or *aqua* for tears, or *finis* for the girl "post ceteras dilecta"; in him alone do we find *vincire* meaning 'to embrace.' A girl with Propertius is not alone, as with others, *mea vita*, but *vita* simply—a height to which Ovid, the *δυσεῖρος*, rises only once. The latter, however, is the most careful painter of girlish beauty: "namque solus *formam* certo peculiarique, non generali, sensu accipit; solus *crura* et *ventrem* nominat, *marmoreum* et *fuscum* colorem, *castigatum* corporis habitum, *menda*, *breve* corpus, *exiguum* pedem, *argutos* oculos." He depicts the joys and pleasures of love, as Propertius does its sorrows; his attention is devoted rather to the body, but that of Propertius rather to the spirit, and so with the latter *culpare puellam* is to find fault with a woman's character, while with Ovid it means to set a low value on her beauty; *gaudia* for Propertius are *mentis laetitiae*, for Ovid *corporis voluptates*. But the main point of difference between Ovid and the others is that he degrades the meaning of a great many words. *Gaudia* is one example, *iuvare* is another: "apud Tibullum aut Propertium *iuvare* est placere, apud Ovidium voluptarium sensum titillare." In fact, the utmost resources of his art and labour are spent in clothing with decent words the most indecent ideas.

M. Pichon's third chapter begins by considering the value of these investigations in deciding questions of doubtful authorship, and he asserts that it is little or nothing. Thus, speaking of the third book of Tibullus, which he holds to be certainly spurious, he says: "Tibulli ipsius eum esse putaret quisquis solam inspiceret orationem." He thinks that a little more help is afforded in pronouncing upon individual lines, while at the same time he warns us that the utmost caution is to be observed. We may quote the first of his forty-nine examples:—

Cat. lxiii. 31: *Furibunda simul anhelans vaga vadit animagens.*
Sic MSS. O M G. Ex quo duxerunt Avantius *animo egens*, Statius *animi egens*, Lachmannus autem et Baehrensius *animam agens*. Ac mihi quidem priores coniecturae praeferendae videntur, cum saepissime fanaticus iste impetus furori aut insaniae adsimuletur, haud minus atque amor ipse.

We may also, out of *pietas*, find room for another:—

Ov. *Her.* xv. 316: *utere mandantis simplicitate viri.* Palmerus (*Class. Rev.*, 1891) pro *mandantis* legendum censet *non vafri*, quod et acutiorem sensum efficit quam *mandantis* et cum amatorio sermone plane convenit; nam *vafers* est quasi *callidus*, *astutus* in re amatoria tractanda (Ov. *Her.* xix. 30).

The *index verborum amatoriorum* is an excellent piece of work, and M. Pichon deserves the thanks of all scholars for the labour

which he has spent upon it. As a specimen we reproduce the article *improbus*:—

Improbus saepe ponitur pro molli, voluptario: Cat. lxviii. 126–127 improbius oscula decerpere. Cf. Ov. *Am.* II. v. 23; *Ars Am.* 3. 796; *Trist.* 2. 441.

Improbus dicitur Amor quia hominibus nocet: Prop. I. I. 5–6 donec me docuit castas odisse puellas, *improbus*.

Improbi dicuntur quoque qui erga amantes duri manent et severi: Prop. II. 8. 13–14: ergo tam multos nimium temeraria annos, *improba*. . . ? Cf. Ov. *Her.* 18. 57.

Alias *improbus* idem valet atque infidus: Prop. I. 3. 39: o utinam tales producas, *improbe*, noctes. Cf. Ov. *Am.* III. 11. 41; *Her.* 10. 77; 12. 204; *Ars Am.* 2. 400; *Fast.* 6. 555.

Aliis in locis *improbus* est quasi audax, temerarius: Ov. *Ars Am.* 1. 665: pugnabit primo, fortassis, et “*improbe*” dicet. Cf. Ov. *Her.* 16. 75; 19. 147; 20. 115; *Ars Am.* 1. 676; *Fast.* 2. 331.

Notes and Emendations to Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Euripides in connexion with the Text of the Fifth Edition of Dindorf's Scenici Graeci. By A Graduate of Cambridge. London. David Nutt. MCMIII.

THIS work aims high. The author opens his preface thus: “I do not think there could be any greater service from a literary point of view to the students and admirers, *if such are still to be found*, of the three great tragic poets of Greece, than to direct their attention to the many gross and mischievous interpolations with which our texts are deformed.” The words which we have italicised are not likely, *a priori*, to conciliate a critic, however they may affect others. To distinguish interpolations from the genuine work of a great tragic poet is often no easy task. Zeal and enthusiasm are admirable things; but they do not in themselves qualify one for the office of a critic. He needs objective principles, rules by which he can guide himself, and which his readers can follow and understand. It is not enough to denounce verse after verse, or passage after passage, with the words, ‘I regard this as interpolated,’ or ‘this to me savours of interpolation.’ His reasons for rejecting a verse (and which, perhaps, the reader of his book has been accustomed to admire) must be clear and strong, if he is to win converts to his view. As we read the opening words of the preface above quoted, we are inclined to take up towards our author the attitude indicated in the line: ‘Quid dignum tanto feret hic promissor hiatu?’ As we wade on through the maze of notes in which the author

casts suspicion upon, or expels, individually or in groups, hundreds of lines in the tragic poets, in many cases without assigning a reason except that they do not please himself, our feelings are apt to become too strong to be expressed in language of classical moderation and sobriety. We have, in fact, a perfect right to demand much stronger grounds than he gives us, in most cases, for assenting to his *dicta*. We are not touched with a sense of the service which he professes to do us; nor can we be grateful for his unreasonable kindness. In short, this book contains a host of points on which hostile criticism could fasten. We have not space to deal with a tithe of them, nor is it worth while. We shall contemplate the whole from a single standpoint. By way of compensation for the vast number of lines which he would strike out of our text as spurious, the writer presents us with some hundreds which are largely of his own construction. This would be something to be grateful for, if the lines he gives were excellent. Even modern verses, 'poor shadow' though they are, sometimes give pleasure; and at least they have one merit. The man who can himself compose good verses has an apparent title to declare whether a given verse is good or bad, and therefore worthy or not of a great tragic poet. Of one thing we are sure, namely, that if anyone, with self-complacency, writes and publishes iambs or trochaics which will not scan—which outrage syntax and prosody—he has no right to that authority which our author assumes as a critic of the remains of the Greek tragedians. The single standpoint, therefore, from which we shall examine his book is that of an exercise in the schoolboy art of writing Greek iambic and trochaic verses. In his Preface, p. xxiv, he frankly tells us that "entire ignorance of the laws of choric metres unfits him for dealing with lyric passages."

Aesch. *S. C. T.*, 470. "I will read here" (he says):—

"καὶ τῶδ' ἔπ' ἄνδρα χρῆ πέμπειν φερέγγυον."

Agam. 596. "I would read then, in 596:—

ἔλασκον εὐφημοῦσαι πρὸς θεῶν ἔδραις."

Choeṛh, 250. "I would read thus:—

νῆστις πιέζει λίμος' (*sic*) τῇνδε (*sic*) κάμει σοι."

Eumen. 827. "I would read thus:—

κλῆδας, κεραυνὸς οὗ σφραγίζεται μόνη."

The above attempts illustrate his capacity for iambic verses. His suggestions for trochaics contain the following:—

Aesch. Agam. 1657. "One might suggest:

στείχε καὶ σὺ χοῖ γέροντες οἷδ' ἔπ' οἴκους πρευμαίνῳς."

Agam. 1672. "I would read :—

μὴ προτιμήσης ματαίων τῶνδ' ὑλαγμῶν παντ' ἐγώ."

He does not seem to know that the 'Pause' rule applies rigorously to trochaic tetrameters.

So much for the service he professes to do us as regards Aeschylus. We pass to—

Soph. O. R. 852-3. "These verses" (he says) "should, I think, be read thus :—

οὔτοι ποθ' οὔτος τόν γε Λαῖου φονέα
φάνοι (*sic*) σ' ἂν ὀρθῶς, ὃν γε Λοξίας ἄναξ."

O. C. 1616. "For λύει we should read λύσει, for the *ū* (*sic*) of λύει is certainly short, and I know of no instance of its being lengthened." On page 80, however, on *Hipp.* 809, as if unconscious of having written this, he says: "I should be disposed then to read thus:

ἐκλύεθ' ἄρμους, ὥς γε τὴν δυσδαίμονα."

Trach. 700. "699 is, I believe, interpolated; and I would read in 700:

ἐκβρώμαθ' ὥς βλέψαις ἂν ἐν τομῇ ξύλου."

Phil. 495. "Perhaps we should read:

ἔστελλον ὥς ἂν μ' αὐτὸς ἐκώσοι μολών

κ.τ.λ. . . . The fut. opt. seems the tense required."

We go on to Euripides.

Eurip. Med. 715. "Dindorf well says of θάνοις, *mirè dictum*. I would read:

καί νιν ὀλβίους φάνοις;

φαίνω being here used as ἀποφαίνω is, in the sense of 'render.'"

Hipp. 492. "I would read

τὸν εὐθὺν οὐξείπωσιν (*i.e.* οἱ (*sic*) ἐξείπωσιν) ἀμφὶ σοῦ λόγον."

Hipp. 519. "I would read:

πάντ' ἂν μάτην γὰρ ἴσθι κ.τ.λ.,

φοβηθεῖσα, or rather δεδοικυῖα, being supplied from 518."

Troad. 946. "Rejecting, then, 945 as interpolated, I would read 946 thus:

τί δὲ τόδ' ἐρεῖς γάρ· δὴ φρονοῦσ' ἄμ' ἐσπόμεν."

Orest. 545. "I would read :

ἐφ' οἷσι μέλλω σὴν ὀδυνήσειν φρένα.
λυπήσειν, an explanation of ὀδυνήσειν."

Suppl. 401-2. "We should read these verses in one, thus :

Ἐτεοκλέους θανόντος συγγενοῦ χερὶ . . .

"402 is not a verse one would lightly attribute to Euripides."

How apposite these words would be if used of his own verse !

Hel. 886. "I would read :

τὸ κάλλος τῇσδ' ἑκατι μιμητοῖς γάμοις."

Hel. 1051-1056. "I would read, then, the passage thus:—

MEN. κακὸς μὲν ὄρνις, μὴ θανὼν λόγῳ θανεῖν."

Did the critic ask himself here what the construction of θανῶν is ?

Hel. 1564. "I would read: πρόχειρος ὤφθη, and φάσγανος in 1563." He does not seem to know that the word is φάσγανον.

Bacchae, 682. "Perhaps we should read :

Ἀγαυὴ μήτηρ σή, τρίτη δ' Ἰνὼ τρίτον."

The above specimens are, perhaps, sufficient to enable one to form an estimate of our author's fitness for pronouncing, as he does so often, upon what one of the three great tragedians could or could not have written. We forbear to notice the cases, perhaps twice as numerous, in which he would fain have us believe that they wrote verses containing unrhythmical divisions of a tribrach or dactyl. We have already given a few hints of his position with regard to forms and syntax. We shall add one more. On Eurip. *Troad.* 933, he writes: "The -αι of κρατεῖσθαι is not elided, but coalesces with the ε̄ of ἐκ." The lines are :

καὶ τοσόνδ' οὐμοὶ γάμοι
ὤνησαν Ἑλλάδ', οὐ κρατεῖσθ' ἐκ βαρβάρων, κ.τ.λ.

Thus he actually takes κρατεῖσθ' here for κρατεῖσθαι, as if the οὐ could stand before the infin., expressing consequence after ὤνησαν.

It is unfair to Cambridge that our critic, suppressing his proper name, should have thus inscribed his work with the name of a graduate of that great University.

Aeschylus: Septem contra Thebes, with an Introduction and Notes.
By A. SIDGWICK, M.A. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

THIS is the first edition of this play (as we infer from a list of editions given in the Introduction) which has appeared with an English commentary since Dr. Verrall's smaller edition, published in 1888. It will be found that Mr. Sidgwick is much more conservative in interpretation than was Dr. Verrall. Few of that scholar's brilliant emendations and suggestions have been accepted; occasionally the points he raised have been ignored, and the traditional explanation followed without further remark.

Mr. Sidgwick's commentary, while sometimes lacking in clearness, has been carefully written, especially the latter half. His text is based on that of his edition, with critical notes in the Oxford series. He prefixes an Introduction, containing, amongst other useful matter, a summary of the growth of the myth, and its treatment by previous poets.

We proceed to notice a few passages in detail. In vv. 200–201 the MSS. read :

μέλει γὰρ ἀνδρί, μὴ γυνὴ βουλευέτω,
τᾶξωθεν· ἔνδον δ' οὔσα μὴ βλαβὴν τίθει.

Dr. Verrall objects to τίθει, because 'the injunction ἔνδον δ' οὔσα κ.τ.λ. cannot, by the rules of grammar, mean "Go within, and do not hinder." Nor, indeed, does Eteocles here express any wish that the maidens should return home.' He himself reads τιθῇ. The words are then a cynical remark on woman, "within the house she is likely enough to hinder." Mr. Sidgwick keeps the MSS. reading, offering no defence against Dr. Verrall's objections, but simply translating: "It is a man's part—let not a woman advise—to order what is without; dwell thou within, and harm us not." We would keep, with Mr. Sidgwick, the MSS. reading, but would give the passage a particular, instead of a general, reference. Noticing the contrast in vv. 193, 194, between θύραθεν and ἔνδοθεν (outside and inside the city respectively) we would emphasize the same distinction here, rendering: 'For it is a man's care—let not a woman advise—to see to what is taking place outside the city; but thou, since thou art within the walls, hinder us not.'

In v. 273 f. MSS. give

ἐγὼ δὲ χώρας τοῖς πολισσούχοις θεοῖς . . .
Δίρκης τε πηγαῖς, οὐδ' ἀπ' Ἰσμηνοῦ λέγω,
. ὧδ' εὐχομαι.

Mr. Sidgwick's note here seems confused. Objecting to the suggestion of Abresch, οὐδ' ἀπ' Ἰσμηνὸν λέγω, 'because the sentence would be without a principal verb,' he accepts ὕδατι τ' Ἰσμηνοῦ λέγω (Geel), which he evidently regards as parenthetical, and equivalent to 'the water of Ismenus I mean.' The difficulty about the principal verb does not, however, arise, whatever view be taken of vv. 275-278. But the presence of τε in a parenthesis of this kind is, as Dr. Verrall pointed out, contrary to Greek usage. The dative is, of course, possible: cf. Aesch. *Frag.* 175 (Nauck); Dem. 388, 22; but the passages quoted by Mr. Sidgwick are not quite satisfactory. In the first (v. 658) there is a variant, Πολυνείκη for Πολυνείκει; in Ag. 279, εὐφρόνης is a genitive of time, not to be taken with λέγω.

In vv. 515 foll. the Vulgate reads:

τοιάδε μέντοι προσφίλεια δαιμόνων
πρὸς τῶν κρατούντων δ' ἔσμέν, οἱ δ' ἡσσωμένων
εἰ Ζεὺς γε Τυφῶ καρτερώτερος μάχῃ,
Ὑπερβίῳ τε—πρὸς λόγον τοῦ σήματος
εἰκός γε πράξειν ἄνδρας ὧδ' ἀντιστάτας—
σωτὴρ γένοιτ' ἂν Ζεὺς ἐπ' ἀσπίδος τυχών.

Mr. Sidgwick, objecting that εἰκός always takes pres. or aor. infinitive, reads πρᾶξαι κᾶνδρας, adopting κᾶνδρας from Pauw: by inverting vv. 518, 519, reading δὲ for γε in v. 519, and placing a colon at μάχῃ (following Brunck), he obtains a satisfactory sense. The passage thus emended is an improvement on Paley's text; and the old interpretation, which Mr. Sidgwick retains, is more convincing than Dr. Verrall's strange theory, that Eteocles is indulging in a sneer at his own champion's patron deity. For μέντοι confirmative Mr. Sidgwick well refers to Soph. *O. C.* 997.

In v. 785 Mr. Sidgwick attempts to defend the unsatisfactory κρεισσοτέκνων δ' ἀπ' ὀμμάτων. He does not mention Dr. Verrall's brilliant χρυσοτέκνων πωμάτων.

In v. 858, where MSS. read τὰν ἄστονον μελάγκροκον ναύστολον θεωρίδα, Mr. Sidgwick, rejecting ναύστολον, reads μελάγκροκον ναῦν ἄστολον θεωρίδα, obtaining ἄστολον from Schol. (with Stanley), and ναῦν from his own conjecture.

If Mr. Sidgwick, in this edition, has added but little to our knowledge of the play, he has rarely left a difficult passage without comment. His explanatory notes are concise and to the point; and we are confident that students who are not professed specialists in Æschylus will obtain the information they require more easily from this edition than from many of a more pretentious character.

Aeschylus: Persae. Edited, with Introduction and Notes, by
A. SIDGWICK, M.A. Oxford. Clarendon Press.

THIS play has received but little attention from English editors and commentators. Yet its comparative simplicity has made it a favourite in schools—a fact which Mr. Sidgwick has kept in mind in writing his commentary. In the Introduction, he sketches the plot of the play and its mode of production, and gives useful information respecting the manuscripts, scholia, and chief editions. With regard to Mr. Sidgwick's text, there is little to be said. Deviations from the text of his edition in the *Bibliotheca Oxoniensis* are very rare, and, with one exception, unimportant. He again acknowledges his obligations to Dr. Wecklein.

Verse 815 is a well-known difficulty: here MSS. read:

κρηπὶς ὕπεστιν ἄλλ' ἔτ' ἐκπαιδεύεται,

which is without meaning. Schütz's conjecture ἐκπιδύεται has been generally accepted. In this edition Mr. Sidgwick adopts also Mr. Housman's conjecture for the former part of the line, so that the whole line reads:

οὐδέπω
κρηνὶς ἀπέσβηκ' ἄλλ' ἔτ' ἐκπιδύεται,

which he translates: 'Nor yet is the spring of sorrow dried, but still wells forth.' The only difficulty is, that κρηνὶς does not elsewhere occur in Aeschylus, though it is found in Eur. *Hipp.* 208, in an anapæstic passage. If this objection is felt to be insuperable, Mr. Sidgwick suggests κρήνη κατέσβηκ' . . ., comparing *Ag.* 888, 958; *Sept.* 584.

It is interesting to find that Mr. Sidgwick rejects with contempt Herodotus' story, accepted by Rawlinson and other Orientalists, of the indignities inflicted by Xerxes on the Hellespont. He argues plausibly enough from the silence of Aeschylus; but arguments from silence rarely carry conviction. On this point some observations of Dr. Tylor (*Primitive Culture*, vol. i., p. 295) would suggest an opposite conclusion to that of Mr. Sidgwick. Dr. Tylor explains Xerxes' action by the theory of 'Animism,' in the light of which it appears quite natural. He cites an instructive parallel in a custom of Athenian law—"A court of justice was held at the Pryteneum, to try any inanimate objects, such as an axe, a piece of wood or stone, which had caused the death of anyone without proved human agency, and this wood or stone, if condemned, was in solemn form cast beyond the border." The same spirit, as he points out, reappears in the old English law, recently repealed, by

which, in the words of Bracton, “*Omnia quae movent ad mortem sunt deodanda*” (*i.e.* forfeited and sold for the poor).

On v. 868 we notice that Mr. Sidgwick agrees with Weil in thinking that by ‘Acheloian dwellings of the Strymonian water,’ Aeschylus refers to the Pæonian lake-dwellers of Lake Prasias mentioned by Herodotus.

To conclude, Mr. Sidgwick, in a small compass, gives the chief results of modern scholarship. If occasionally his notes appear somewhat meagre, he never falls into the error of too many editors, who, in their endeavours to be exhaustive, encumber their pages with masses of irrevelant matter, which serve only to confuse, instead of to instruct, the reader.

The Aeneid of Virgil. Literally rendered into English blank verse by T. H. MAY, M.A., Trin. Coll., Cambridge. London. D. Nutt. 1903.

MR. MAY says “the beautiful pictures of the poet need no setting and gilding.” But it is one thing not to attempt to gild refined gold, and quite another to maul and chip and hack the gold until it looks like the basest metal. The reader of the translation, if he does not know Latin, will think the epic of Virgil a very poor piece of work. He who can read the poem in the original will feel sentiments far removed from pleasure or gratitude when he finds sublime passages, such as the familiar burst of rhetoric in the sixth book, presented in such vile attire as this :—

“ Be all thy thought,
Roman, to govern nations as their lord ;
These shall thine acts be : terms of peace to name,
To spare the conquered, and war down the proud.”

Mr. May writes in his Preface :—“ I have thought that a blank verse rendering of the Aeneid might be written which should be as helpful to the student as an ordinary prose crib, and more easily remembered.” We cannot see that anything is gained by hitching an ordinary prose crib into verses of such a rhythm as

“ No goddess hadst thou for thy mother, nor
Was Dardanus the founder of thy race,
But Caucasus grim with his flinty rocks
Thy parent was, and unto thee gave suck
Hyrcanian tigresses ” ;

and

“son and sire
I would have made an end of with the race”;

or of such phraseology as “rolling her eyes each way,” “marriage-bed by which I perished,” “her comely breast,” “Nereus’ mighty pools,” and many like these.

We will lay before our readers a version of another noble and familiar passage from the *Passion of Dido*, that they may compare the poverty of the English with the opulence of the Latin (vv. 622–629).

“Then you, O Tyrians, with your hatreds ply
The stock and all the race that shall arise.
These to my ashes be your funeral gifts.
Love ’twixt the peoples, treaties be there none.
Some vengeance-bearer from my bones arise,
That thou those Trojan settlers may’st pursue
With fire and sword—now—in the days to come—
Or whensoever might shall lend its aid,
Shores against shores, and surges against waves,
Arms against arms, in solemn curse I pray;
And let the men and let their grandsons fight.”

Nor is the second volume at all less inadequate than the first. The couple of lines (viii. 364, 5),

*Aude, hospes, contemnere opes, et te quoque dignum
Finge deo : rebusque veni non asper egenis,*

are, indeed, kingly words of welcome to a poor abode. Fénelon could not repeat them without tears; and Dryden wrote of the passage, “For my part I am lost in the admiration of it. I condemn the world when I think of it, and myself when I translate it.” Mr. May is not so easily discouraged if he is satisfied with

“Have courage, guest,
Wealth to despise, and fashion thee to be
Worthy of godship, and approach not here
Disdainful of our humble circumstance.”

Further quotation is quite unnecessary to show the character of the work. We do not know of any class of readers to whom it could be of any use. The “ordinary prose crib” makes no pretence to be anything but prose, and is certainly not more unworthy of the original than Mr. May’s “blank verse.”

The Harmonics of Aristoxenus, edited, with Translation, Notes, Introduction, and Index of Words, by HENRY S. MACRAN, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Dublin, and Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Dublin. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1902.

THE reviewer of this work is confronted by two tasks, each quite distinct from the other. He has to consider it, on the one hand, as an edition of a Greek writer, and, on the other, as a contribution to our knowledge of Greek musical theory. We propose, first, to give some account of the book regarded in the latter aspect, and then to discuss a number of the emendations and new constructions suggested by the editor.

The introduction is divided into two sections, which deal with the development of Greek music, and with Aristoxenus and his extant works. Mr. Macran begins by pointing out that it is a fallacy to regard music as a universal language. The idea is a pretty one; we have often seen it used with great effect by the writers of novels, but it is none the less fallacious. To us, the music of ancient Greece is like the music of modern Japan—*a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, signifying nothing*. Furthermore, the Japanese regard our music just as we do theirs; and the ancient Greek condemned as a mere discord that very concord which we have made the foundation of our minor scale. The solution of the mystery lies deep down in human nature: Mr. Macran throws an illuminating flash upon it, when he says:—

“The whole meaning of music depends upon the immediate appeal to our emotions through the association of feeling with sensation; and so the strangeness of the foreign music of to-day, and of the dead music of the past, is insuperable, for they are the expressions of emotions which their possessors could not analyse, and we can never experience.”

Hence our interest in the subject can be but theoretical. The Greeks were supreme in every other branch of art; they failed, to modern thinking at least, in music, because, suffering from a defect of their qualities, they pursued the path of artificiality and subtle complication when they should have taken the way of simplicity. All that is left for us to do is to trace their erring steps; and to this task Mr. Macran addresses himself. It is not our purpose to reproduce here his lucid and masterly analysis; we shall content ourselves with mentioning one or two of the problems which he discusses in passing. Every student of Greek music has been puzzled, for instance, by the Greek quarter-tone, and many have been inclined to think that it proves a greater acuteness in the

ancient Greek perception. But this is not *prima facie* probable; and we think the true explanation to be that which Mr. Macran adopts—

“Its disappearance is due, not to the dullness or coarseness of modern ear or voice, but to the fact that the more highly developed unity of our system demands the accurate determination of all sound-relations by direct or indirect resolution into concords; and such a determination of quarter-tones is manifestly impossible.”

Again, what did the Greek theorists mean by their elaborate discussions as to the pitch of the scales? What produced the scales called ‘transilient’?—a question which Aristotle promised to answer; but no answer has come down to us. Mr. Macran conjectures that one cause was the adaptation of an instrument to a scale larger than that for which it was originally intended. Above all, how are we to explain the fact that the Greeks attributed a distinct *ethos* or emotional character to each of the modes? These are some of the many interesting problems which Mr. Macran discusses, and to the last-mentioned—surely the most interesting of all—he has devoted special attention. He sets forth both the old explanation and that which Mr. Monro substituted for it in his *Modes of Ancient Greek Music*, and proceeds to point out the fatal defects of each. His main argument against Mr. Monro’s view is that it involves an absolute determination of the pitch of the keys, whereas such a determination is nowhere mentioned by the authorities, and is *per se* impossible. He himself finds the explanation in the fact that the distinction of mood was a distinction of pitch,

“but not such as exists between our keys, for it arises immediately from the order of intervals. The Mixolydian is a high mode because any melody composed in it, whatever be the absolute pitch of its total compass, must necessarily lie for the most part in the upper region of that compass. . . . Let us assume that high tension of the voice is the natural expression of poignant grief, an easy relaxation of it the natural expression of sentimentalism; let us suppose, too, that to represent these emotions respectively a musician desires to write his songs, neither of which is to exceed the compass of an octave. How, then, shall he bestow the required character on each of these melodies? Evidently not by choosing a low key for one and a high key for the other, in the modern sense of the terms ‘high’ and ‘low’ key: for this would imply that all first treble songs must be tragic, and all bass songs sentimental. He must, instead, leave the general pitch of the songs undetermined, so that either of them may suit any voice; but he must so compose them that the one will lie chiefly in the upper, the other in

the lower region of the undetermined eight-note compass. And this a Greek musician could only effect by choosing, for his pathetic song, a scale in which the tonic lay near its upper extremity, and for his sentimental, one in which its position was the reverse."

We must refer the reader to the book itself for the reasoning by which Mr. Macran arrives at this conclusion and for the arguments by which he supports it, while we turn now to the consideration of his treatment of the Greek text. The references are to Mr. Macran's pages and lines, with Meibom's added in brackets.

97. 17 (4. 3). τούτων δὲ διωρισμένων περὶ διαστήματος καθόλου δίκαιον.

Here H (the lost Strassburg codex) added εἰπεῖν; Mr. Macran acutely conjectures λεκτέον, and points out that at 147. 25 (57. 23) the MSS. have λεκτέον where δεικτέον is required.

100. 8 ff. (7. 1 ff.) ἐξηριθμημένων γὰρ τῶν συστημάτων καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν γενῶν κατὰ πᾶσαν διαφορὰν τὴν εἰρημένην μιγνυμένων πάλιν τῶν γενῶν ταῦτὸ τοῦτο ποιεῖται πραγματευτέον· οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν τὴν μίξιν τί ποτ' ἐστὶ καταμεμαθήκεσαν.

In this difficult passage Mr. Macran is evidently right in saying that ποιεῖται should be ποιητέον, as the context shows that there is no room for an indicative. What, then, is to be done with πραγματευτέον? It cannot be simply excised, because only its presence accounts for the corruption of ποιητέον, and besides, as Mr. Macran remarks, the γάρ-clause is then unreasonable. He cures the disease by putting a stop after ποιητέον, and inserting περὶ οὗ οἱ πλείστοι τῶν ἀρμονικῶν οὐκ ᾔσθοντο ὅτι. After συστημάτων he inserts τῶν.

110. 12 ff. (18. 24 ff.) τὸ μέγιστον μέρος καὶ πλείστην ἔχον ῥοπὴν εἰς τὴν ὀρθῶς γιγνομένην σύστασιν τοῦ μέλους περὶ τὴν σύνθεσιν καὶ πού καὶ τὴν ταύτης ιδιότητα ὑποληπτέον εἶναι.

Here Mr. Macran reads Marquard's τὸ before περί and his own καθόλου for καὶ πού. But καθόλου is hardly the true opposite for ιδιότητα; and it is worth noting that, although it occurs very frequently in the *Harmonics*, it is nowhere corrupted. Perhaps nothing more is required than the insertion of τά (not τό) before περί. The sentence then means that nothing is so important for the right constitution of melody as a knowledge of the various methods of collocating intervals and notes, and, to some extent, of even the special nature of collocation itself.

111. 7 (19. 20) πᾶν γὰρ τὸ λαμβανόμενον μέλος τῶν εἰς τὸ ἡρμωσμένον ἦτοι διάτονόν ἐστιν ἢ χρωματικὸν ἢ ἑναρμόνιον.

This is impossible. Various emendations have been proposed; but they are all antiquated by Mr. Macran's simple and convincing τῶν εἰς ταὐτὸ ἡρμωσμένων, 'any melody that is harmonised on one principle.' As he says in his note, 'Aristoxenus is obliged to add this qualifying phrase to show that his division of the μέλος is not inconsistent with mixture of genus.'

123. 14 (31. 32) οὐδέτερον δὲ τούτων ἀληθές ἐστιν, οὔτε γὰρ εὐκαταφρόνητόν ἐστιν ὥς νῦν ἔχει τὸ μάθημα.

Mr. Macran objects to ὥς νῦν ἔχει that the present condition of the science of Harmonic has nothing to do with the argument. We fancy that this imputes too much logic to Aristoxenus; but we are quite sure that he would not have referred to an improvement in the science without putting in a word for himself; and so we have no doubt that Mr. Macran's very neat emendation is correct: he reads ἐστὶ τινι ὃς νοῦν ἔχει. No mistakes are more common in the MSS. of the *Harmonics* than the omission of single letters and the reading of ω for ο or *vice versa*.

139. 14 ff. (48. 27 ff.) πυκνοῦ μὲν εἶδος τιθεῖσα ὥς ἂν τὰ δύο διαστήματα τοῦ ἐνὸς ἐλάττω τόπον κατέχη, . . . χρώματος δεῖ διέσεως ἃ τὸ χρωματικὸν ἦθος ἐμφαίνεται.

Mr. Macran's correction of this passage is brilliant and certain. For δεῖ διέσεως, he reads δὲ εἶδος ἕως; and for the impossible ὥς in l. 14, he reads the idiomatic ἕως, which must have been read in l. 17 to give rise to the scribe's διέσεως. For ἕως in the sense of 'to cover all cases in which,' he compares 141. 1 (50. 15) πυκνὸν δὲ λεγέσθω μέχρι τούτου ἕως ἂν ἐν τετραχόρδῳ κτλ.

145. 15 (55. 4) ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν διαστήματικῶν μεγεθῶν τὰ μὲν τῶν συμφώνων ἦτοι ὅλως οὐκ ἔχειν δοκεῖ τόπον ἀλλ' ἐν μεγέθει ὥρισται, ἢ παντελῶς ἀκαριαῖόν τινα.

This passage has given rise to the wildest conjectures, including one so desperate as to require that τόπον ἔχειν shall mean 'to take place, to occur'! Mr. Macran is undoubtedly right with his ἐνὶ μεγέθει ὥρισθαι, 'when we consider the magnitudes of intervals, we find that while the concords either have no locus of variation and are definitely determined to one magnitude, or have an inappreciable locus.'

147. 4 ff. (56. 26 ff.) φανερόν δὴ ὅτι πρὸς ἑκατέρῳ τῶν ὀριζόντων τὸ γεγονός σύστημά δύο συνεχεῖς ἔσονται καὶ μὴ ἐν αἱ ὑπεροχαὶ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἴσας εἶναι διὰ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν εἰρημένα.

Meibom, Marquard, and Westphal are all guilty—incredible as it may appear—of the hopelessly unscientific change of ἐν to μία—a change which has not even the merit of importing sense into the passage. Mr. Macran's correction—the last that we shall quote, and perhaps the best of all—is κείμεναι. The sentence then means: "It will be seen that adjacent to each of the extreme notes of the scale thus obtained, there will be two complements in juxtaposition, which must be equal for the reasons already given."

For a few of Mr. Macran's other emendations, we may refer the reader to 97. 2 (3. 16), 101. 2, 3 (7. 26, 27), 113. 18 (22. 2), 120. 2 (28. 18), 123. 13 (31. 31), 126. 20 (35. 24), 134. 5 (43. 19), 138. 14 (48. 4), 144. 18 (54. 8), 152. 18 (62. 8), 159. 15 (69. 5). It will now be evident that the present edition has set the criticism of Aristoxenus on a completely fresh basis, and leaves to previous texts a merely historical interest. The editor's services to the interpretation of his author are of equally fundamental importance, as our brief account of the introduction will have led the reader to expect; but we must content ourselves with mere references to some of the more important passages, where new methods of construing are to be found, viz., 102. 11 (9. 8), 114. 14 (22. 31), 123. 11 (31. 28), 133. 2 (42. 15), 134. 17 (44. 2), 136. 10 (45. 30), 158. 15 (68. 6), 161. 24 (71. 20). The edition is enriched by an excellent translation and a useful index. As regards the printing, we need only say that the book comes from the Clarendon Press. Of misprints we have only noticed two—the reference to p. 140, on p. 289, should be to p. 150, and in the Index s. v. καθόλου 125. 22 should be 123. 22.

